Tag World War I

The Origins Of The U.S. Army’s Concept Of Combat Power

The U.S. Army’s concept of combat power can be traced back to the thinking of British theorist J.F.C. Fuller, who collected his lectures and thoughts into the book, The Foundations of the Science of War (1926).

In a previous post, I critiqued the existing U.S. Army doctrinal method for calculating combat power. The ideas associated with the term “combat power” have been a part of U.S Army doctrine since the 1920s. However, the Army did not specifically define what combat power actually meant until the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 Operations, which introduced the AirLand Battle concept. So where did the Army’s notion of the concept originate? This post will trace the way it has been addressed in the capstone Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations series.

As then-U.S. Army Major David Boslego explained in a 1995 School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) thesis[1], the Army’s original idea of combat power most likely derived from the work of British military theorist J.F.C. Fuller. In the late 1910s and early 1920s, Fuller articulated the first modern definitions of the principles of war, which he developed from his conception of force on the battlefield as something more than just the tangible effects of shock and firepower. Fuller’s principles were adopted in the 1920 edition of the British Army Field Service Regulations (FSR), which was the likely vector of influence on the U.S. Army’s 1923 FSR. While the term “combat power” does not appear in the 1923 FSR, the influence of Fullerian thinking is evident.

The first use of the phrase itself by the Army can be found in the 1939 edition of FM 100-5 Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations, which replaced and updated the 1923 FSR. It appears just twice and was not explicitly defined in the text. As Boslego noted, however, even then the use of the term

highlighted a holistic view of combat power. This power was the sum of all factors which ultimately affected the ability of the soldiers to accomplish the mission. Interestingly, the authors of the 1939 edition did not focus solely on the physical objective of destroying the enemy. Instead, they sought to break the enemy’s power of resistance which connotes moral as well as physical factors.

This basic, implied definition of combat power as a combination of interconnected tangible physical and intangible moral factors could be found in all successive editions of FM 100-5 through 1968. The type and character of the factors comprising combat power evolved along with the Army’s experience of combat through this period, however. In addition to leadership, mobility, and firepower, the 1941 edition of FM 100-5 included “better armaments and equipment,” which reflected the Army’s initial impressions of the early “blitzkrieg” battles of World War II.

From World War II Through Korea

While FM 100-5 (1944) and  FM 100-5 (1949) made no real changes with respect to describing combat power, the 1954 edition introduced significant new ideas in the wake of major combat operations in Korea, albeit still without actually defining the term. As with its predecessors, FM 100-5 (1954) posited combat power as a combination of firepower, maneuver, and leadership. For the first time, it defined the principles of mass, unity of command, maneuver, and surprise in terms of combat power. It linked the principle of the offensive, “only offensive action achieves decisive results,” with the enduring dictum that “offensive action requires the concentration of superior combat power at the decisive point and time.”

Boslego credited the authors of FM 100-5 (1954) with recognizing the non-linear nature of warfare and advising commanders to take a holistic perspective. He observed that they introduced the subtle but important understanding of combat power not as a fixed value, but as something relative and interactive between two forces in battle. Any calculation of combat power would be valid only in relation to the opposing combat force. “Relative combat power is dynamic and can be directly influenced by opposing commanders. It therefore must be analyzed by the commander in its potential relation to all other factors.” One of the fundamental ways a commander could shift the balance of combat power against an enemy was through maneuver: “Maneuver must be used to alter the relative combat power of military forces.”

[As I mentioned in a previous post, Trevor Dupuy considered FM 100-5 (1954)’s list and definitions of the principles of war to be the best version.]

Into the “Pentomic Era”

The 1962 edition of FM 100-5 supplied a general definition of combat power that articulated the way the Army had been thinking about it since 1939.

Combat power is a combination of the physical means available to a commander and the moral strength of his command. It is significant only in relation to the combat power of the opposing forces. In applying the principles of war, the development and application of combat power are essential to decisive results.

It further refined the elements of combat power by redefining the principles of economy of force and security in terms of it as well.

By the early 1960s, however, the Army’s thinking about force on the battlefield was dominated by the prospect of the use of nuclear weapons. As Boslego noted, both FM 100-5 (1962) and FM 100-5 (1968)

dwelt heavily on the importance of dispersing forces to prevent major losses from a single nuclear strike, being highly mobile to mass at decisive points and being flexible in adjusting forces to the current situation. The terms dispersion, flexibility, and mobility were repeated so frequently in speeches, articles, and congressional testimony, that…they became a mantra. As a result, there was a lack of rigor in the Army concerning what they meant in general and how they would be applied on the tactical battlefield in particular.

The only change the 1968 edition made was to expand the elements of combat power to include “firepower, mobility, communications, condition of equipment, and status of supply,” which presaged an increasing focus on the technological aspects of combat and warfare.

The first major modification in the way the Army thought about combat power since before World War II was reflected in FM 100-5 (1976). These changes in turn prompted a significant reevaluation of the concept by then-U.S. Army Major Huba Wass de Czege. I will tackle how this resulted in the way combat power was redefined in the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 in a future post.

Notes

[1] David V. Boslego, “The Relationship of Information to the Relative Combat Power Model in Force XXI Engagements,” School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1995.

Chinese “Pirates” Accused Of Plundering WWII-Era Shipwrecks

A crane barge allegedly pulling up scrap metal from a World War II wreck in the Java Sea. [The Daily Mail]

An investigation by the British newspaper The Daily Mail has alleged that 10 British shipwrecks from World War II lying of the coasts of Malaysia and Indonesia have been illegally salvaged for scrap by “pirates,” including Chinese, Mongolian, and Cambodian-flagged vessels. The shipwrecks have been designated war graves and are protected from looting by the U.N. International Salvaging Convention and British, Indonesian and Malaysian law.

British Defense Minister Gavin Williamson has demanded an immediate investigation into allegations that dozens of barges with cranes have been plundering the wrecks for many years.

One Chinese shipping giant, Fujian Jiada, which owns five of eight barges alleged to be recently actively salvaging, has denied any involvement. The Malaysian Navy impounded the Fujian Jiada-owned Hai Wei Gong 889 in 2014 on charges of illegally salvaging Japanese and Dutch shipwrecks, and detained another Vietnamese-crewed barge in 2015 for doing the same.

Both vessels were also accused of looting the wrecks of the battleship H.M.S. Prince of Wales and battlecruiser H.M.S. Repulse, sunk by Japanese aircraft off the coast of Malaysia in 1941. Marine experts estimate half of the remains of the two ships have disappeared and stolen artifacts have been discovered being offered for auction.

In 2016, the British and Dutch Defense Ministries revealed the discovery that the wrecks of three Dutch Navy, three British Navy, and one U.S. Navy ships sunk off the coast of Indonesia during World War II had disappeared from the seabed.

Sonar image of the Java Sea bed location where the wreck of the HMS Exeter used to be. [BBC]

Metals salvaged from the wrecks can be quite lucrative, each vessel yielding up to ₤1 million, and brass propellers and fixtures selling for ₤2,000 per metric ton. Metals fabricated before post-World War II atmospheric nuclear testing are particularly useful for medical devices. The Daily Mail found that the barges drop the cranes on to the wrecks to break off large pieces. These are then taken to scrapyards in Indonesia to be cut into smaller pieces, which are then shipped to China and sold into the global steel markets.

And earlier TDI post on the this subject can be found here:

The Curious Case of the Missing WWII Shipwrecks

TDI Friday Read: Cool Maps Edition

Today’s edition of TDI Friday Read compiles some previous posts featuring maps we have found to be interesting, useful, or just plain cool. The history of military affairs would be incomprehensible without maps. Without them, it would be impossible to convey the temporal and geographical character of warfare or the situational awareness of the combatants. Of course, maps are susceptible to the same methodological distortions, fallacies, inaccuracies, and errors in interpretation to be found in any historical work. As with any historical resource, they need to be regarded with respectful skepticism.

Still, maps are cool. Check these out.

Arctic Territories

Visualizing European Population Density

Cartography And The Great War

Classics of Infoporn: Minard’s “Napoleon’s March”

New WWII German Maps At The National Archives

As an added bonus, here are two more links of interest. The first describes the famous map based on 1860 U.S. Census data that Abraham Lincoln used to understand the geographical distribution of slavery in the Southern states.

The second shows the potential of maps to provide new insights into history. It is an animated, interactive depiction of the trans-Atlantic slave trade derived from a database covering 315 years and 20,528 slave ship transits. It is simultaneously fascinating and sobering.

Cartography And The Great War

Detail of “Die Schiffsversenkungen Unserer U-Boote.” Carl Flemming (Firm), 1918. [Geography and Map Division, Library of Congress.]

There is no denying it: maps are cool. National Geographic’s All Over The Map blog has another cool story about advances in cartography during the First World War. Greg Miller summarizes some new work by Ryan Moore, a specialist in the Geography and Map Division of the Library of Congress. Moore recently updated a 2014 publication of his, “Maps of the First World War: An Illustrated Essay and List of Select Maps in The Library of Congress.”

Moore’s paper and accompanying blog posts cover aspects of military cartography from mapping enemy trench lines, layouts of minefields, naval blockade zones, interpreting aerial photography, and more. The information is interesting and the maps are fascinating. Take a look.

War Stories-The Podcast for Military History Nerds

Angry Staff Officer says, "Safety is paramount in all things. Terrorists fear safety glasses that are also reflective."
The Angry Staff Officer says, “Safety is paramount in all things. Terrorists fear safety glasses that are also reflective.”

If you like military history and podcasts, then I would like to recommend that you give War Stories a listen. It is a new production from two members of the Military Writers Guild, Adin Dobkin and a serving Army National Guardsman who posts publicly under the nom de guerre, Angry Staff Officer. Seeking to bridge the gap between military history that focuses on engagements or battles, and broad sweeping analysis, Dobkin and ASO tell stories that link specific instances with a broader narrative arc. In doing so, they hope to “engage the human interest angle while also tracing broader trends in warfare, through balancing narrative and dialogue.”

The first season of the podcast is tracing the development of modern tank warfare from its dawn on the battlefields of France in the First World War, through the present day. The result is Basil Liddell Hart meets This American Life. Dobkin and ASO both have engaging personalities and military history nerd-wit in abundance. They bring a youthful perspective leavened by recent military experience and the perceptive eye of today’s well-trained and highly educated military officer corps.

The first four episodes begin with doomed British cavalry charges on the Somme battlefield in 1916, to George Patton’s first combat experiences at the St. Mihiel salient in 1917, to the clash of Russian and German inter-war tanks in the Spanish Civil War, to the baptism of fire of the American tank destroyer corps in Tunisia in 1943.

The results are both informative and quite entertaining. My only (minor) quibble is that it would help to have some maps and photographs to go with the narrative to help pin down places, faces, and tank silhouettes. If you appreciate the fact — as Dobkin and ASO do — that the Soviet T-34 tank owes its existence to the American engineer  J. Walter Christie, this is the podcast for which you have been searching.

The Curious Case of the Missing WWII Shipwrecks

Sonar image of the Java Sea bed location where the wreck of the HMS Exeter used to be.
Sonar image of the Java Sea bed location where the wreck of the HMS Exeter used to be. [BBC]

The Netherlands and British Ministries of Defense recently announced that the wrecks of three Dutch Navy, three British Navy, and one U.S. Navy ships sunk off the coast of Indonesia during World War II have disappeared. Divers intending to photograph the Dutch ships for a 75th year commemoration of the 1942 Battle of the Java Sea discovered the wrecks were missing. After three dimensional sonar imagery revealed only sea bed indentations where the light cruisers HNLMS De Ruyter and HNLMS Java had been discovered in 2002, and partial remains of the destroyer HNLMS Kortenaer, the diving crew surveyed the other battle wrecks in the Java Sea area and discovered them mostly missing as well.

[BBC]
[BBC]

The British government has condemned what it believes is the result of illegal salvaging of the wrecks of the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter and destroyers HMS Encounter and Electra, and has asked the government of Indonesia to investigate and take “appropriate actions.”

Although some experts expressed skepticism that the Dutch ships had been salvaged from under 70 meters of water, 60 miles off the Indonesian coast, other World War II Pacific naval wrecks have been victims of scavenging in the past. According to the Guardian,

Crews posing as fishermen and using long rubber hoses to stay underwater for hours have scavenged the waters around Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, locating the wrecks and stealing parts, including steel, aluminium and brass.

The potential worth of metal-built shipwrecks is estimated at hundreds of thousands of pounds. Some of the propellors, often the first items to be stolen, are made of phosphor bronze scrap metal, valued at over £2,000 per tonne.

The British Ministry of Defense has also been accused of not doing enough to prevent looting of British and German ships sunk in the North Sea during the World War I Battle of Jutland in 1916.

Learning From Defeat in World War I

Men dressed as First World War soldiers mingle with regular commuters aboard an underground tube train in London, to mark 100-years since the start of the Battle of the Somme, early Friday July 1, 2016. London commuters were met by the eerie sight of people dressed as World War I soldiers as they made their way to work Friday, with the soldiers singing wartime songs or remaining silent, revealed later Friday as a Somme tribute, the work of Turner Prize-winning artist Jeremy Deller, National Theatre Director Rufus Norris and thousands of volunteers. (Sarah Perry / PA via AP) The Associated Press
Men dressed as First World War soldiers mingle with regular commuters aboard an underground tube train in London, to mark 100-years since the start of the Battle of the Somme, early Friday July 1, 2016. London commuters were met by the eerie sight of people dressed as World War I soldiers as they made their way to work Friday, with the soldiers singing wartime songs or remaining silent, revealed later Friday as a Somme tribute, the work of Turner Prize-winning artist Jeremy Deller, National Theatre Director Rufus Norris and thousands of volunteers. (Sarah Perry / PA via AP) The Associated Press

Last week marked the 100th anniversary of the first day of the Battle of the Somme during the First World War. The battle, intended to relieve pressure on the French Army defending against a massive German offensive aimed at Verdun, is remembered for its enormous casualty list and strategic futility. Contemporary historians are re-thinking the impact of the Somme battle and of the British Army as a learning organization. Dr. Aimée Fox-Godden of the University of Birmingham has published an interesting examination of how the lessons of the Somme were viewed and applied in other theaters during the war. Her post is the second in a series by the First World War Research Group of the Defense Studies Department, King’s College London.

Another entry in the lessons of World War I department comes in the pages of the current edition of Military Review. Major Robert Chamberlain (USA) examines the role theories of warfare influence the planning, conduct and outcome of battles, looking specifically at the case of the German Army during the Battle of Verdun (pp. 78-87). He then looks at the lessons of Verdun regarding the relationship between a theory of warfare, political objectives, and outcomes and applies them to the current state of U.S. military thinking.