The Advance in the Northeast – part 4 of the First Phase of the War discussion

This is the fourth in a series of extended posts examining the First Phase of this war. The first post is here: The Assault on Kiev – part 1 of the discussion on the First Phase of the War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Second post is here: The Assault on Kherson – part 2 of the First Phase of the War discussion | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The third post is here:  The Attack on Mariupol – part 3 of the First Phase of the War discussion | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The Advance in the Northeast:

The northeast part of Ukraine includes a number of medium sized cities that are scattered about. From west to east, they include Chernigov (pop. 285,234), Konotop (pop. 84,787) and Sumy (pop. 259,660) and Okhtyrka (pop. 47,216). After that we kind of wander into Kharkov territory, which is the second largest city in Ukraine and the largest primarily Russian speaking city in Ukraine. This will be the subject on its own post.

These urban areas are kind of spread out and limited in number, leaving these cities as “islands” among the farmland and villages of this area. There is not any line of continuous urbanization, meaning each city stands alone. Furthermore, they make up a significant part of populations in these regions. For example, the Chernigov Province (oblast) has 1,511 settlements yet Chernigov city alone makes up almost a third (29%) of the population of the province. The second largest town is Nizhyn with only 66,983 people, the third largest town is Pryluky with only 52,553 people and no other towns in the province has more than 20,000 people. 

Sumy province is a little more populated and a little more densely populated, containing the cites of Sumy, and the towns of Konotop, Orktyrka, Romny (pop. 38.305) and Shostka (pop. 73,197) and a whole lot of smaller towns and villages. Still, beyond the few larger towns in the direct path of the invasion, it is not very urban.

It appears that the forces used for this advance were not the best prepared Russian front-line forces. These were reserved for Kiev and other axis. Most of these forces were armed with T-72s (now an over 50 year old tank design) and had a large number of conscripts. In some cases, it does not appear that they were told they were going to war. The units appeared to be poorly prepared. The infamous video of a Ukrainian driving by a out-of-fuel tank column and talking to them is from the Sumy area. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=14gVDF2b1vA.

The Advance on Chernigov: Chernigov (called Chernihiv in Ukrainian) came under threat on the first day of the war. It was close to the Russian border and on the route to Kiev from the northeast. The Russian Army made no serious attempt to take it. Forces in the area were determined to include elements of the 11th Guards Air Assault Brigade and the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade. The fact the Russian soldiers from these units were reported surrendering on the first day of the war is surprising. In the case of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade, it was an entire reconnaissance platoon along with its commander, Konstantin Buynichev. Ukraine provided pictures of them. Either these units were truly poorly motivated or this is a very clever cover story to cover for the U.S. intelligence the Ukrainians were receiving. Suspect the former.

Also the 35th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade was reported operating in the area, and according to one Ukrainian sources it took heavy losses in early March. Intercepted communications reported by the Ukrainians indicated that at least 45 soldiers died and it may have been as many as 132. At least one death has been confirmed by name.

The Russians did attempt to attack Chernigov on the first day of the war, but quickly switched the seizing the surrounding territory instead. The failure to take this city was a pattern we would see throughout this offensive. They either assumed it would fall when they showed up or they had intended to bypass it from the start. It was bypassed and Russia declared that it was surrounded the following day, except it was not. It was designated a “Hero City” on 6 March. On 10 March, the mayor announced that the city had been completely encircled. This was rather slow progress for an invasion that was already 15 days old against a city that was less than 50 miles from the border.

Fighting continued around Chernigov throughout this period, but it was mostly a loose siege operation with occasional artillery shelling. During the course of siege, more than half of the city’s population fled. Also, on 17 March, the American civilian, James Whitney Hill, was killed by a Russian artillery strike as he was standing in a food line.

There was some real fighting in and around Chernigov. According to estimates derived from Ukranian statements 300-350 soldiers were killed defending Chernigov and the surrounding areas. Ukraine claimed on 2 March that 132 Russian soldiers had been killed and 50-100 captured. A Russian Su-34 was shot down over Chernigov and the area was laced with mines, which the Ukrainians now have to clean up. The mayor of the city estimated that 350-400 civilians has been killed. 

The Ukrainian armor column that attacked Brovary on 10 March was from this force that bypassed Chernigov. It appears to have been a single BTG (Battalion Tactical Group).

Not sure what the overall forces were that were committed to this advance, but based upon the extremely limited results of this advance, it was probably only 3 to 6 BTGs. They did surround Chernigov, sent a column of the 90th Guards Tank Division to Brovary to get shot up, and grabbed a whole lot of area in between, but the fighting was otherwise limited. At least two BTGs were shot up pretty badly. 

On 31 March, the advancing Ukrainian forces opened the highway connecting Kiev and Chernigov and the mayor reported the first quiet night there since the war began. The Russian army withdrew from the area around 4 April, ending the fight.

The Advance on Konotop: Konotop is a weird story, because the Russians advanced on it on 24 February to attack it with a column of up to 300 vehicles (is this one BTG?). Konotop is also less than 50 miles from the Russian border and the Russian forces arrived outside the city on the first day before 1700. The Sumy state administration said that it was surrounded as of 1:30 AM on 25 February. This sort indicates that there was no real defense along the border, but only at the major cities and towns inside the country.

The mayor of Konotop, a representative of the neo-fascist Svoboda Party, claimed that he was prepared with the militia to fight to the last man for control of the town. He then negotiated with Russians and it was agreed that the Russian forces could pass through (not that any of the accounts actually say this) as long as the residents did not attack them. Russia also agreed not to change the city’s government, deploy troops in the city, obstruct transportation or remove the Ukrainian flag. So Instead they bypassed it and even moved through it but did not occupy the town. It was reported for Konotop on 26 February that two soldiers and 3 civilians had been wounded. 

The neo-fascist Svoboda Party (Svoboda means freedom) holds only 1 out of 450 seats (0.2%) in the Ukrainian parliament. It held 37 seats in 2012 election but has been in decline since then. It holds 890 local positions out of 43,122 in regional elections (2.1%), the Mayor of Konotop is one of them. 

The advance past Konotop went westward towards Kiev, although not sure these forces ever got as far as the outskirts of Kiev.

On 3 April, Russian forces had withdrawn from Konotop region (raion).

The Advance on Sumy: Sumy, the other major city in the northeast was also not taken. It came close to being one of the early Russian prizes coming under attack on the first day. The Russian ground forces in the area were commanded the 1st Guards Tank Army, including the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division, 4th Guards Tank Division, 47th Guards Tank Division, and 27th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. A mix of Ukranian Army forces (including 27 Artillery Brigade) and militia formed the defense. The Russians did enter the city, burning down a church there and getting in a fight near the Sumy State University in the evening (battle began at 22:30). During the night, the Russian forces withdrew from the city (at about 1:39 AM).

The Russian pushed into the city two days later, with the Russians advancing half-way into the city, according to a twitter post by Zelensky. They were then pushed back out by the end of the day, putting the whole city was back in Ukrainian hands. It would remain that way. If this account is correct, then it does raise the question as to why a force could manage to penetrate halfway into the city and not manage to deploy troops and supporting forces into the city to hold onto it for a while. It appears that this may have been company-size or a best unsupported battalion-size force thrust into the city that did not have the size or confidence to hold onto their positions. Again, one gets the sense with the back-and-forth in places like Sumy and Kherson, that the initial forward Russian forces were simply not that strong.

The Russians then partly enveloped the city and held in place around three-fourths of it for the next month, fed by a road from the south. Ukrainian casualties are claimed to be at least 81 soldiers killed, but this source is Wikipedia and does not appear to be properly backed by sources. Four soldiers were killed along with 22 civilians on an airstrike on 8 March. At least 25 civilians were killed and maybe over 100 civilians were lost during the month of fighting there. Russian casualties included 104 reported captured as of 11 March. The Ukrainians claimed a hundred Russian tanks destroyed. Most of these claims (96 tanks) come from a strike on Russian armor on 28 February by Bayraktar TB2 drones and GM-31 Grad launchers. As a BTG usually only has around 10 tanks, one wonders what formation or operation was being done that gathered that many tanks together. We doubt these counts of tank losses. 

Sumy was relieved/abandoned on 4 April. On 8 April the governor said that the Russians had left Sumy province.

Two large outlying towns, Okhtyrka just to the south of Sumy, and Shostka far to its north also came under attack on the first day. The Russians threatened the outskirts of Okhtyrka on the first day in the morning and then pulled back that night or the following day. They then did not attempt to take it again but did occasionally shell and send missiles at the town. Two Danish journalists were fired upon in their car and wounded on 26 February. On 28 February a military base was hit by an artillery strike that killed more than 70 Ukrainian soldiers. It is this strike that led to claims that a thermobaric (vacuum) bomb was used. This has not been confirmed. The claim that it was a thermobaric bomb was made by the Ukrainian ambassador to the U.S. I do not know if there is any other confirming evidence. For example see: Is Russia Using Thermobaric Weapons in Ukraine? International law does not prohibit the use of thermobaric munitions, fuel-air explosive devices, or vacuum bombs against military targets. 

On 26 March Russian forces withdrew from the area. At least ten civilians had been killed in Okhtyrka and over 70 Ukrainian soldiers.

In the case of Shostka it was occupied by Russian troops without fighting. They withdrew in early April. 

The town of Romny, the home of Ukrainian nationalist poet and writer Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), was never occupied.

The Value of the Counterattack:

What does stand out in these accounts to the presence of multiple counterattacks on the part of Ukranian armed forces. This includes the counterattack at Hostomel on day 1 of the invasion, the counterattack on day 2 of the invasion in Kherson which briefly reclaimed the city, and the counterattack at Sumy on day 3 of the invasion. This points to an army that was confident, competent and willing to fight. While these counterattacks did not save Kherson, they may have saved Sumy and certainly messed up Russian operations north of Kiev. There is an untold story of how and why these counterattacks were organized and who ordered them. 

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Christopher A. Lawrence
Christopher A. Lawrence

Christopher A. Lawrence is a professional historian and military analyst. He is the Executive Director and President of The Dupuy Institute, an organization dedicated to scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict and the resolution of armed conflict. The Dupuy Institute provides independent, historically-based analyses of lessons learned from modern military experience.
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Mr. Lawrence was the program manager for the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base, the Kursk Data Base, the Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets and for a number of other smaller combat data bases. He has participated in casualty estimation studies (including estimates for Bosnia and Iraq) and studies of air campaign modeling, enemy prisoner of war capture rates, medium weight armor, urban warfare, situational awareness, counterinsurgency and other subjects for the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, the Joint Staff and the U.S. Air Force. He has also directed a number of studies related to the military impact of banning antipersonnel mines for the Joint Staff, Los Alamos National Laboratories and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation.
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His published works include papers and monographs for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, in addition to over 40 articles written for limited-distribution newsletters and over 60 analytical reports prepared for the Defense Department. He is the author of Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (Aberdeen Books, Sheridan, CO., 2015), America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam (Casemate Publishers, Philadelphia & Oxford, 2015), War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat (Potomac Books, Lincoln, NE., 2017) , The Battle of Prokhorovka (Stackpole Books, Guilford, CT., 2019), The Battle for Kyiv (Frontline Books, Yorkshire, UK, 2023), Aces at Kursk (Air World, Yorkshire, UK, 2024), Hunting Falcon: The Story of WWI German Ace Hans-Joachim Buddecke (Air World, Yorkshire, UK, 2024) and The Siege of Mariupol (Frontline Books, Yorkshire, UK, 2024).
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Mr. Lawrence lives in northern Virginia, near Washington, D.C., with his wife and son.

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4 Comments

  1. Good observation about the counter-attack – digging into that will be key to understanding how and why this first phase unfolded. Where they part of a general plan, or simply local efforts that succeeded? How were they conducted and whom by? Mechanized elements, or lightly armed territorials? Was artillery important to these counterattacks?

  2. C.A.L: “As a BTG usually only has around 10 tanks, one wonders what formation or operation was being done that gathered that many tanks together…”

    -That would probably be typical for a motorized rifle BTG. A tank-heavy BTG might be 30-40 MBTs and 10 APCs/IFVs.

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