Summation of the five Taiwan invasion posts

As a result of discussions at the Third HAAC and two follow-up meetings with participants, I ended up making five posts last week on Chinese amphibious lift capacity and their ability to invade Taiwan, They are:

The final paragraph from the last post:

Anyhow, as we stated in our original post on this subject, “China has the ability to land over 20,000 soldiers on Tawain on the first wave.” They can supplement that capability by 1) Seizing a working port, 2) running a hundred old landing craft across 100 miles of sea, 3) enlisting China’s commercial fleet of RoRo ships, 4) enlisting their fishing fleet. We have addressed each of these issues in our posts and will probably continue to discuss some of these in the following weeks. Our original post concluded with the statement “It is clear, based upon their military capabilities, they currently have no real plans to invade Taiwan.”

We will be making further posts this week and subsequent weeks on China and Taiwan, many prepared by other members of our “HAAC community meetings” on the subject.

Christopher A. Lawrence

Christopher A. Lawrence is a professional historian and military analyst. He is the Executive Director and President of The Dupuy Institute, an organization dedicated to scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict and the resolution of armed conflict. The Dupuy Institute provides independent, historically-based analyses of lessons learned from modern military experience.
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Mr. Lawrence was the program manager for the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base, the Kursk Data Base, the Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets and for a number of other smaller combat data bases. He has participated in casualty estimation studies (including estimates for Bosnia and Iraq) and studies of air campaign modeling, enemy prisoner of war capture rates, medium weight armor, urban warfare, situational awareness, counterinsurgency and other subjects for the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, the Joint Staff and the U.S. Air Force. He has also directed a number of studies related to the military impact of banning antipersonnel mines for the Joint Staff, Los Alamos National Laboratories and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation.
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His published works include papers and monographs for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, in addition to over 40 articles written for limited-distribution newsletters and over 60 analytical reports prepared for the Defense Department. He is the author of Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (Aberdeen Books, Sheridan, CO., 2015), America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam (Casemate Publishers, Philadelphia & Oxford, 2015), War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat (Potomac Books, Lincoln, NE., 2017) , The Battle of Prokhorovka (Stackpole Books, Guilford, CT., 2019), The Battle for Kyiv (Frontline Books, Yorkshire, UK, 2023), Aces at Kursk (Air World, Yorkshire, UK, 2024), Hunting Falcon: The Story of WWI German Ace Hans-Joachim Buddecke (Air World, Yorkshire, UK, 2024) and The Siege of Mariupol (Frontline Books, Yorkshire, UK, 2024).
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Mr. Lawrence lives in northern Virginia, near Washington, D.C., with his wife and son.

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2 Comments

James Glick

December 12, 2024 / 6:50 pm Reply

How many tons of supplies does a PLA infantry brigade combat team need per day?

James D. Glick
PO1, USNR (ret.)
Clarksville, TN
- Christopher A. Lawrence
  
  December 12, 2024 / 8:10 pm Reply
  
  Good question and we have not looked at that yet. It does mean that some percent of the initial load will need to be supplies and, of course, they will be a need to bring in additional supplies. All this complicates the scenario.