Taiwan Invasion: What is everyone else saying and why? – part 1

In our internal discussions, even though several of us could only find the means for China to lift 20,000 to 30,000 troops to Taiwan in the first wave, there was always people quoting from a range of sources that were saying something far different (see: The Chinese amphibious lift capacity – The Dupuy Institute). Who were those sources, what were they saying and why were they saying that? We are looking to 20-30K in a first wave, these guys are claiming hundreds of thousands or more. So what is the difference?

First: There was a 2,000,000 invasion force projected by writers for USNWC back in 2001.  Big difference between 2 million and 20K. 

To quote (my bolding):

“China has a large merchant fleet, with an enormous capacity for personnel and cargo. Its fifty naval amphibious ships and between two hundred and 350 landing craft, however, would be utterly unable to carry the entire combined-arms force. …

Extract of text is here:

The critical argument is here:

Meanwhile, the Chinese merchant fleet could be transporting upward to two million troops, in regular passenger ships and on cargo vessels temporarily adapted for troops…

They do footnote this last claim:

So basically they state that:

  1. There are 50 amphibious transports ships. We currently count 46 but are otherwise in agreement: The load on PLA Navy Amphibious Assault Ships – The Dupuy Institute
  2. There are 200 to 350 landing craft. This was written in 2001. The PLA have let this force decay and degrade, which I think is telling. We currently count 99: Other Chinese landing craft – The Dupuy Institute
  3. And then they get to 2 million by counting the entire Chinese merchant fleet as first wave amphibious assets (actually they don’t say that, it is only implied). We have discussed this: The RoRo Ships – The Dupuy Institute. Needless to say, there are some problems with this concept:
    1. They are not first wave assets.
    2. Gathering this fleet together would give Taiwan weeks if not months of notice.
      1. And of course, in the meantime it will kill their trade and therefore their economy while doing this.
    3. They would need a port or some kind of dock to unload at, which might be a challenge in a hostile combat environment.
      1. Especially if these ports are well defended and,
      2. if there is a plan in place to ensure these ports are not usable if captured.

I really don’t take this claim seriously. Counting the entire Chinese commercial fleet as an amphibious asset is a reach, to say the least. 

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Christopher A. Lawrence
Christopher A. Lawrence

Christopher A. Lawrence is a professional historian and military analyst. He is the Executive Director and President of The Dupuy Institute, an organization dedicated to scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict and the resolution of armed conflict. The Dupuy Institute provides independent, historically-based analyses of lessons learned from modern military experience.
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Mr. Lawrence was the program manager for the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base, the Kursk Data Base, the Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets and for a number of other smaller combat data bases. He has participated in casualty estimation studies (including estimates for Bosnia and Iraq) and studies of air campaign modeling, enemy prisoner of war capture rates, medium weight armor, urban warfare, situational awareness, counterinsurgency and other subjects for the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, the Joint Staff and the U.S. Air Force. He has also directed a number of studies related to the military impact of banning antipersonnel mines for the Joint Staff, Los Alamos National Laboratories and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation.
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His published works include papers and monographs for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, in addition to over 40 articles written for limited-distribution newsletters and over 60 analytical reports prepared for the Defense Department. He is the author of Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (Aberdeen Books, Sheridan, CO., 2015), America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam (Casemate Publishers, Philadelphia & Oxford, 2015), War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat (Potomac Books, Lincoln, NE., 2017) , The Battle of Prokhorovka (Stackpole Books, Guilford, CT., 2019), The Battle for Kyiv (Frontline Books, Yorkshire, UK, 2023), Aces at Kursk (Air World, Yorkshire, UK, 2024), Hunting Falcon: The Story of WWI German Ace Hans-Joachim Buddecke (Air World, Yorkshire, UK, 2024) and The Siege of Mariupol (Frontline Books, Yorkshire, UK, 2024).
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Mr. Lawrence lives in northern Virginia, near Washington, D.C., with his wife and son.

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One comment

  1. Do we know anything about the lift capacity of China’s helicopter, paratrooper and cargo aircraft? I am thinking of the invasion of Crete in WWII.

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