The Fourth HAAC is scheduled for 21-23 October 2025. We currently have 38 presentations scheduled (and 2 group discussions). We are, of course, looking for more quality presentations. The current schedule is:
Schedule: Pike & Gallows Conference Center
Revised 11 April 2025
Day 1: Analysis of Conventional Combat
0900 – 0930 Introductory remarks – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)
0930 – 1030 Studying Combat: The “Base of Sand” Problem – Dr. Shawn R. Woodford
1030 – 1130 Slouching Towards Wabash: The Withering of Historical Analysis in the American Profession of Arms – Ivan Torres (Jomini of the West, Major, U.S. Army, ret.)
1130 – 1230 Measuring the Value of Situational Awareness – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)
1230 – 1400 Lunch
1400 – 1500 The History of TND’s models and theories – Dr. Shawn R. Woodford
1500 – 1600 Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII – Sasho Todorov, esquire
1600 – 1700 Difficulties in Measuring Morale and Effectiveness – Dr. Dermot Rooney (Wapentakes) – virtual
1700 – 1800 Price of Paradise – Dr. Iain Overton (AOAV) – virtual
Evening (1900): Group Dinner – Rangos
Day 2: Analysis of Unconventional Warfare
0900 – 1000 Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)
1000 – 1100 Close Combat Overmatch Weapons (SLAMMER) – Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)
1100 – 1200 Reserved for Dr. David Cuberes
1200 – 1300 Lunch
1300 – 1400 1916 Easter Rising – Robert A. Mosher
1400 – 1500 Terrorism and Afghanistan – Dr. Christopher Davis
1500 – 1600 open
1600 – 1700 Group Discussion: The Next Middle East Wars
Evening (1900): Group Dinner – BJs
Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare
0900 – 1000 Summoning the specter of “Beweglichkeit”: A critical analysis of the U.S. Army’s new FM 3-0 Operations and observed Ukrainian battlefield trends – Ivan Torres (Jomini of the West, Major, U.S. Army, ret.)
1000 – 1100 History’s Lessons on Technological Surprise in War – Dr. Alexander Kott
1100 – 1200 Results from the Taiwan Analytical Efforts – Alexandru Filips
1200 – 1300 Lunch
1300 – 1400 Revitalization of TDI – Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)
1400 – 1500 The Hermann Goeing Division in North Africa, Sicily and Salerno 1942-1943 and Measuring Combat Effectiveness – Dr. James Slaughter
1500 – 1600 Syrskyi’s Gambit: A Critical Analysis of Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive – Ivan Torres (Jomini of the West, Major, U.S. Army, ret.)
1600 – 1700 Group Discussion: Russo-Ukrainian War
1700 – 1715 Closing Remarks
Evening: Happy hour – Rangos
Schedule: Einstein Conference Room
Day 1: Naval Warfare Analysis
0930 – 1030 Naval Theory and War Causation – Alexandru Filip
1030 – 1130 Modeling the Invasion of Taiwan – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill, et al.
1130 – 1230 A Review of the CSIS gaming effort – Walker Gargagliano
1230-1400 Lunch
1400 – 1500 Modeling ATC Amphibious Landings on Taiwan – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill
1500 – 1600 Taipei Has Fallen!: Wargaming the Invasion of Taiwan – Clinton Rielly – virtual
1600 – 1700 Floating Fortresses: American Carriers Invulnerability to Battle Damage – Walker Gargagliano
1700 – 1800 Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII (part 2 or overflow presentation) – Sasho Todorov, esquire
Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat
0900 – 1000 The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud – William F. Owen – virtual?
1000 – 1100 Salvation Only in Arms: A Critical Historical Analysis of Operational Maneuver during the 1814 Campaign in France – Ivan Torres (Jomini of the West, Major, U.S. Army, ret.)
1100 – 1200 Reserved – Dr. Dermot Rooney (Wapentakes) – virtual
1200 – 1300 Lunch
1300 – 1400 Quantifying Mahan’s Hypotheses – Dr. Julian Spencer Churchill
1400 – 1500 open
1500 – 1600 Systems Analysis and Strategy – Alexandru Filip
1600 – 1700 The New Science of Evidence and Causality – Dr. Douglas Samuelson
Day 2: Air Warfare Analysis
0900 – 1000 open
1000 – 1100 open
1100 – 1200 open
1200 – 1300 Lunch
1300 – 1400 open
1400 – 1500 Aces at Kursk – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)
1500 – 1600 open
1600 – 1700 open
Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare
0900 – 1000 Isserson: The Architect of Victory – Dr. Richard Harrison
1000 – 1100 Audacity versus Friction: Evaluating Operational Autism in Operation Barbarossa. – Dr. Robert Kirchubel and Dr. Sorin Adam Matei (Purdue)
1100 – 1200 Reserved for Dr. James Slaughter
1200 – 1300 Lunch
1300 – 1400 The Red Army’s Plans for a Preemptive Attack in 1941 – Dr. Richard Harrison
1400 – 1500 New Advances in Digital Military Cartography – Gavin Ho, Joseph Hupy, Sorin Adam Matei and Robert Kirchubel.
1500 – 1600 Arctic Defense Concerns – Alexandru Filip
1600 – 1700 open
Reserve presentations:
Measuring Human Factors – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)
Breakpoints – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)
Friday, October 11: Tour of a Civil War Battlefield – Antietam: bloodiest day of the U.S. Civil War (and in the Western Hemisphere?). – we will arrange transport there and back ($20 charge for tour).
See this link below for costs ($150), address, conference description, hotels, and call for presentations: The Fourth HAAC is scheduled for 21 – 23 October 2025 – The Dupuy Institute
Last year’s schedule is here: October’s Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) 8 – 10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute
Hello, I am reading your book about Kursk. A question about the number of troops. Are you aware that in a German division, infantry battalions, even fully staffed, accounted for a maximum of 20 percent of the total number of the division. The Germans had greatly inflated rear services. Soviet divisions are completely opposite. Infantry battalions make up 50 percent of the total number of the division. In a Soviet division, rear services are maximally compressed. Thus, on the battlefield, where infantry battalions are fighting, if two conditional divisions of 10,000 people each clash, there will be 2,000 Germans against 5,000 Soviet infantrymen on the battlefield. Although the total number, taking into account rear services such as cooks, veterinarians, communications personnel, and so on, is the same for the divisions. I did not see this in your book.
I currently have three books out on Kursk. We did collect the unit strengths of the archives for all the units involved and do discuss their organization in my original 1,662 page book. With 2 or 3 regiments of three battalions each, the Germans had considerable infantry.
I believe that the information in the memoirs of German generals about the ratio of 1 to 7 in favor of the Soviet troops is correct (although in Operation Citadel there was no such ratio). They count the infantry on the battlefield, without the rear guards.
We provide direct strength comparisons in my book for each battle for each day. This includes all attachments. Data is drawn from the unit records from each side.
I recommend reading. Based on archival data, a comparison of the Soviet and German divisions in terms of infantry.
https://dzen.ru/a/Z63KwNTxH2wovrqw
And about 1943
https://dzen.ru/a/ZuSQqQKm8w-I3DQc?ysclid=m6yy6kw2ba65377078
To sum up both articles
Soviet rifle divisions of 5,000-5,500 men are six medium battalions. For the second half of 1943 and later, it was already difficult to find a stronger division on the Eastern Front. As I remember, by the beginning of Operation Citadel in the 9th Army, infantry divisions were recruited with six battalions, of which four or five were strong.
That is, from 1943, Soviet divisions of 6,000 men were already stronger than German ones in terms of infantry component, and there is nothing to say about a larger number.
I missed one word in the post above and the meaning completely changed
For the second half of 1943 and later, it was already difficult to find a stronger German division on the Eastern Front