Mystics & Statistics

What has been released by Ukrainian intelligence is the Russian march tables for the forces coming down from Belarus and down to Kyiv. It was only the first page, so was not complete.

The units are listed down the left and the locations they are supposed to be at are listed across the top. The times are all the numbers on the chart.

Now, a few things can be derived from this.

First, it gives us a partial order of battle. They list 19 units on this chart, and we gather there is a second page that lists the rest. Listed are the 5th Guards Tank Brigade and the 76th Air Assault Division.

Second, that order of battle does not include the third battalion of any of the air assault regiments. So they list 1/104th, 2/104th, 1/234th, 2/234th, 1/237th and 2/237th… but no 3rd battalion for any of these regiments. This is because, we believe the 3rd battalion were manned by conscripts and according to Russian law, they cannot be deployed outside of Russia. Therefore, they are not. We believe that this is the case for all air assault units. This is partly the reason why these air assault forces have not played a larger role in this campaign. An air assault division does not have an armor battalion, so if their third battalion in each regiment remains at home, then a division at best fields six maneuver battalions. A number of the divisions (98th and 106th) have only two regiments. Therefore, they field only 4 maneuver battalions. Most Ukrainian brigades field at least 4 maneuver battalions.

Third, it is clear from their planning that they intended to be on the outskirts of Kyiv the afternoon of the 24th in force in three separate locations.

Fourth, this is not what happened. They did all get to their final destinations, but almost 24 hours later. So, their carefully calculated march tables turned out to be too fast by a factor of two, meaning it took them two days to get to their objectives when they were planning on one.

Fifth, this, of course, is a classic case of Clausewitzian friction in action.

Sixth, the fact that it took them two days, when they were planning on one, gave the Ukrainians time to organize a defense.

Seventh, once their got to their destinations, they really did not do much after that, because the routes were now well defended.

One does wonder if the “Ukrainians” got hold of this march order before or after the 24th of February.

Eighth, this does raise an issue related to the captured of Hostomel airport. Some accounts have claimed that the Ukrainians had seized the entire airport in the counterattack and then held it. Yet, these forces continue on their march as if that never happened. Furthermore, some of these forces were marching right by the airport. If the Ukrainians had seized the airport, then you think some of these forces would have been diverted. It does not appear that they were. Therefore, we concluded that Ukraine did not seize and hold Hostomel Airport for any extended period of time. They clearly counter attacked there, but the extent of that attack is not really known. It was probably not as successful as some have claimed.

As I note in my book (page 104) “Between 2000 and 2200 Kyiv time [24 February 2022], it was reported that the Ukrainians had retaken the airport, but this may not have been entirely the case. It does appear that they made some progress in closing with the Russian defenders and neutralizing the airstrip. By 1400 the next day, Russia declared that it had control of the airport. The airport and the neighboring town of Hostomel (population 17,534) now appeared to be in Russian hands.”

Ninth: March route was between 186 to 223 kilometers.

Tenth: The number of vehicles was 495. Imagine that in a line. These are long columns winding their way down two-line highways. There were additional units to these.

A translation of this table is provided here. It was translated by Sasho Todorov, who originally brought this chart to my attention: Transcribed Time Table 5th Tank Bde and 76th VDV Div

Related posts:

The Russian First Tank Army Report from 24 February – 15 March 2022 – The Dupuy Institute

Tank Losses and Crew Casualties in the Russo-Ukrainian War – The Dupuy Institute

It appears that Ukraine has retaken parts of Kharkiv province: Zelenskiy Confirms Ukrainian Forces Regain Control Over Kharkiv Border Amid Russian Offensive (msn.com). The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelelskyy, announced on Friday (24 May) that Ukraine had retaken control over the border areas. Russia is still claiming to control half of Vovchansk, which is 3 miles (5 km) inside the Ukrainian border. 

Map of Vovchansk area (courtesy of @War_Mapper).

My conclusion is that this Kharkiv attack was a diversion. Not sure I believe the claims of high Russian losses.

There is still fighting around Kupiansk and in the Pokrovsk sector (in the center of front in the Donbas region, to the west of Bakhmut, Donetsk and Avdiivka). See: General Staff: Most Combat Engagements Recorded In Pokrovsk Sector (menafn.com) and Ukrainian defenders hit 16 clusters of Russian military personnel – General Staff (msn.com). There is fighting around Ocehretyne, which is less than 10 miles (16 kilometers) NW of Avdiivka (which is just NW of Donetsk).

(courtesy of @War_Mapper).

I am beginning to think I might actually be right about this: There may not be a major Russian spring/summer offensive – The Dupuy Institute

There is a Rusi article on the subject that I am not sure of: In Ukraine, Russia is Beginning to Compound Advantages | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org)

First, where does the figure of 510,000 troops come from?

Then the is the issue of the length of the front. They are saying 1,200 kilometers. That is really not a properly representative figure. If Kharkiv province is back of list of contested areas west of Kupyansk, then we are really looking at a front from Kupyansk to Kakhovka Reservoir of maybe 400-500 kilometers (250 – 300 miles). This is the action front. Vovchansk is around 80 kilometers from Kupyansk. See: The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – The Dupuy Institute

In the end nibbling is not the same as a major offensive.

Lot’s of people throw out the figure that the front line is 1,200 kilometers long. Not really. The length of the border of Ukraine (pre-2014) with Russia is 1,974 kilometers (1,227 miles). This is the land border. The length of the border with Belarus (which I do not think is going to re-enter this contest) is 891 kilometers (554 miles). The entire coastline of Ukraine is 3,783 kilometers (2,351 miles).  I think this last figure includes Crimea.

(courtesy of @War_Mapper, map dated 18 May 2024)

But, they really are not fighting from Chernihiv to Sumy and have not done so since April 2022. This is a large portion of that 1,200 kilometer figure. They do share a border with Russia so Ukraine obviously has to protect these areas, but there really has not been any fighting in these areas for over two years. We do not expect that will change.

Second, they really cannot do major operations along the Dnipro River from Kherson up to the Kakhovka Reservoir. There was, in the best of times only three bridges across this river, and I gather that number is three less now. This creates supply issues and with all the drones, missiles and air support, hard to see how this is corrected. No one has yet to do any major military operations across the Kakhovka Reservoir. This takes a significant chunk of miles off any active front.

Therefore, for all practical purposes the front runs from the western border of Kharkiv province over to Kupyansk, down through the Donbas and then through Zaporizhzhia Oblast to the Kakhovka Reservoir. This is about 800 kilometers, vice 1,200.

Slightly more precise measurement using Google Earth:

Distance along Kharkiv Oblast border (To Kupyansk): 225 kilometers
From Kupyansk to Bakhmut: 124 kilometers
From Bakhmut to Vuhledar: 107 kilometers
From Vuhledar to Reservoir: 144 kilometers
Total = 600 kilometers
Multiply by 1.25 (a little figure borrowed from Napoleon): 750

If it was measured more precisely the front might be a little longer. 

One kilometer is 0.62 miles. Therefore an active front of roughly 800 kilometers or roughly 500 miles.

There may not be an actual major spring/summer Russian offensive. Let’s look at the scenario for a moment:

1. They are aware that their deployed strength is similar to the Ukraniain strength. They have at best a 1.5-to-1 advantage and may have less. See: Overview of the War in Ukraine going into the Spring/Summer Offensive Season – The Dupuy Institute

2. They are aware that they are not outspending their opponent. See: Dueling Defense Budgets – The Dupuy Institute

3. While they have not achieved the objectives initially set for this campaign, they still hold territory. They may have decided that holding that territory is the best they can do and they are satisfied with that.

4. They may be warring to improve their position at the negotiating table.

Let us take a look for a moment at that. They have conducted a few limited offensive efforts in recent times. The most significant was the attacking and taking of Avdiivka (10 October 2023 – 17 February 2024). This was the town closest to the city of Donetsk, capital of DPR. In fact, it was only 9 miles (14 kilometers) away from it. They have taken that, and then expanded their control beyond this. This is all part of Donetsk province, which Russia has annexed as of 30 September 2022.

Now, they are doing a limited advance in Kharkiv province to set up buffer zones according to them. They have advanced up to 6 miles (10 kilometers) into Kharkiv province taking some rural areas and small towns and taking parts of Vovchansk (pop. 17,459 2022 est,). Maybe we should take them at their word that this is not a major offensive, but instead are just them creating buffer zones.

(courtesy of @War_Mapper)

They have made marginal advances in a few other areas, including around Kupyansk, towns around Bakhmut (Bilohorivka and Chasiv Yar), the areas to the west and northwest of Donetsk and some very limited advances in  Zaporizhhia province.

Right now they hold the majority of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces. There are still two major cities from Donetsk province not in their hands (Slovyansk and Kramatorsk). They tried to take them during the summer of 2022, but could not. They hold all of Crimea and Sevastopol. They hold a minority of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provinces and in neither case hold the main city/capital, although they have annexed both provinces. In the case of the part of Kherson province that they hold, it is naturally well defended by the Dnipro River and the Kakhovka Reservoir. Holding these two areas gives them overland access to Crimea and secures their water supply there (this was an issue before). They also have control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station since March 2022.

Their air and missile campaign is focused (once again) on shutting down the Ukranian power grid. They are having some success. This may all be an attempt to force Ukraine to the negotiating table.

Perhaps their focus is on 1) taking as much territory that they can easily grab, 2) setting up a buffer zone north and east of Kharkiv, 3) increasing the pain on the Ukrainians, 4) and holding what they have until they can force Ukraine to the negotiating table. This might be victory for now for them,

Are we looking at no major Russian offensive this spring and summer?