Mystics & Statistics

Situation in Ukraine, 3 February 2025

I have not blogged for a while. Been focused on books recently (and they do require some focus).

Anyhow, nothing earthshaking has been going on in Ukraine and it does not appear that we are on the verge of achieving “peace for our time,” so the war does continue. Wanted to tag for a moment where the front lines are, tapping into War Mapper’s efforts:

Oskil River:

West of Pokrovsk:

Andriivka:

“Kursk salient”

West of Terny:

East of Siversk:

Around Toretsk:

Velyka Novosilka:

Overview map for 3 February 2025:

 

We do like War Mapper. War Mapper Links:

War Mapper on X: “Ukraine updates: In Kharkiv, Russia has significantly expanded its positions on the western bank of the Oskil River. They have taken positions both north and south of the previous area of control in Dvorichna. https://t.co/a4qUzciCNL” / X

War Mapper on X: “The advance wrapping around the west of Pokrovsk has continued to develop with Russian forces taking Solone and entering Udachne. https://t.co/T29GdEWwb0” / X

War Mapper on X: “Further south, they have advanced into Andriivka after taking a series of fortifications east of the Town. https://t.co/L9DkVLNGaX” / X

War Mapper on X: “Russian forces in the south of the Kursk salient have pushed up to the southern outskirts of Sudzha. https://t.co/5Qp8ETnDbv” / X

War Mapper on X: “Russia has reached and potentially already secured positions in the first Ukrainian defensive line west of Terny after previously crossing and taking Ivanivka in January. https://t.co/rr2Wp8Obac” / X

War Mapper on X: “East of Sivers’k, Russia has entered the eastern outskirts of the settlement of Verkhnokamianske. https://t.co/TTskiMSphi” / X

War Mapper on X: “Russia continues to consolidate its positions around Toretsk after recently taking control of the city. https://t.co/DKoiw3HN1J” / X

War Mapper on X: “Last week, Velyka Novosilka was fully occupied by Russian forces. https://t.co/qoqRWnRcqk” / X

War Mapper on X: “An overview map of the situation in Ukraine as of 03 March 2025. https://t.co/h3LHd4Zxzz” / X

 

The quote from Neville Chamberlain is:

“My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honor. I believe it is peace for our time… Go home and get a nice quiet sleep.”

September 30, 1938

 

 

The Current Ukrainian Offensive – resolved?

Well, so far it doesn’t look like the current Ukrainian offense, that started on Sunday 5 January, was not all that much. They took the town of Berdin and I gather 20 or so square kilometers of territory. To put that in perspective, Washington DC is 177 sq km.

Anyhow, it appeared the Ukrainian attack went on for two days (Sunday and Monday), at then stopped. Meanwhile other actions continued around Pokrovsk where Russia took some more territory in the slowest moving offensive since 1917 (this is probably not entirely correct… but you get the point). 

What did get my attention was the claim that “Ukrainian officials have indicated this is part of a larger operation.” We will see if that is true. We will see if Ukraine has anything more in hand.

The Current Ukrainian Offensive

Ukrainian offensives do get my attention because I believe that to negotiate a peace settlement that does not permanently surrender 20% of their country Ukraine will probably need to start retaking some of that ground. They really have not reclaimed any more of their own territory since November 2022.

But they are on the offensive again. Curiously, just before the Trump inauguration. To quote twitter account @timkmak from yesterday (bolding is mine): (1) Tim Mak on X: “Here’s what we are reading today: Ukraine has launched a new offensive in Kursk region, the Russian Defence Ministry said. Ukrainian officials have indicated this is part of a larger operation. This follows territorial setbacks for Ukraine in the Kursk region in recent months. https://t.co/CEMHisnLqv” / X

“Ukraine has launched a new offensive in Kursk region, the Russian Defence Ministry said. 

Ukrainian officials have indicated this is part of a larger operation.

The follows territorial setbacks in Ukraine in the Kursk region in recent months.”

Other people are reporting that Ukraine has taken Berdin and has gone 2.7 kilometers past the Russian zero line (Def Mon on X: “Ukrainian forces likely went about 2.7km past the Russian zero line. https://t.co/WDFs2bGxZU” / X and Def Mon on X: “The developments in Kursk oblast looks something like this. We do not know if Ukraine managed to consolidate positions. We think we have geolocated UA units inside Berdin and Novosotnitskii. Geos: https://t.co/RNty0eKLQL https://t.co/ouerMmm9y4” / X).

Reports that this is a significant attack (“AT LEAST a 6 brigade attack): david D. on X: “im tracking about 10 “attacks” by ukr forces around kursk and north Belgorod. keep in mind that some will be real attacks, and some will be feints to draw in russian forces. russians are saying this is AT LEAST a 6 brigade attack… things will be clear later today expect” / X

There are reports of significant Russian losses (which must always be taken with a grain of salt): Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | on X: “BURN RATE: In the last 48 hours in Kursk Oblast, the Russian army lost up a battalion of North Korean infantry and VDV paratroopers. Since AUG, Moscow has deployed 50K troops to Kursk Oblast: approximately 38K are assessed as killed, wounded, missing or surrendered.” / X

Some maps of the area:  Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | on X: “UKRAINE’S KURSK OFFENSIVE: Latest from the BBC. https://t.co/QLSOk09HmP https://t.co/8xx9goK4kl” / X and Aurora Borealis 🤫 on X: “katsaps report the loss of the village of #Berdin, #Kursk region. https://t.co/QBeVLm9C81” / X and david D. (@secretsqrl123) / X and MAKS 24 🇺🇦👀 on X: “🔼🇺🇦 AFU managed to advance 8 km in the Kursk region, according to Russian voenkors. Map from ISW 🗺️👇👀 https://t.co/ebSfskuV9p” / X.

Anyhow, more to come, but all these reports must be taken with a grain of salt.

The Kursk offensive in August of 2024 was an interesting exercise but fundamentally did not retake any of their own territory and did not take enough of Kursk province to give them a lot they could trade off. It did not fundamentally change the situation on the ground, which is what was needed to give them advantage at the negotiation table. Unconditional surrender is very rare. Most wars end in a negotiated settlement.

The strength and loss figures being reported represent some fraction of reality. I do not know what that is (is it 1/10th or is it 9/10s?). I seriously doubt that the people posting these figures know that either, although some may indicate otherwise.

I was very disappointed in the failed Ukrainian offensive in early June 2023. For the sake of negotiating a positive resolution to the conflict, they really needed to take ground. I thought the Kursk offensive was a good stunt, but only that. Still, they have turned it into an extended fight that may yet yield dividends. If this offensive in Kursk is the start of a series of offensive that extend to Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, then this could become very significant. We shall see.

A key element in warfare is surprise (I do have a chapter on that in my book War by Numbers). If I can predict what Ukraine is going to do, that is not a good sign, as so to can the Russians. Therefore, if the Ukraine General Staff is doing their job right, they should be taking both Russian and me by surprise. That they appear to be doing. 

An Old Book Review for War by Numbers

This link below is a book review of War by Numbers published in the Army University Press. It was published in 2017 (the same year the book came out): War by Numbers. It just got forwarded to me by an associate but I have been aware of this favorable review for a while.

Of course, in the real world I get lots of review, some are favorable, some are very unfavorable, and some are in between. I have never published or commented on them for obvious reasons. I have since met some of the reviewers. In this case, I have never met and am not familiar with this reviewer, Frederick A. Baillergeon. What got my attention was that he was out in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. That is the center of the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College (C&GS). This has also traditionally been the center of anti-Dupuy anti-QJM writings, with some senior people there having had an openly hostile relationship with Trevor Dupuy. A number of students there also took exception to the claims made by Trevor Dupuy that the German divisions in Italy in from late 1943 to mid-1944 were more competent (had a higher CEV) than the American and UK divisions. This actually led to a number of books trying dispute this, not that they really succeeded (Dupuy’s claims were based upon data… their refutations were not).

I did get an email a few months ago from a lady apologizing for a negative review of War by Numbers that her brother wrote. She felt it was wrong and written out of animus. Every now and then people do something that make you realize that the vast majority of people are really decent, even if a few “scholars” are not. 

Anyhow, this was a nice review by Mr. Baillergeon. It is clear that he knew his subject and had read the book carefully.

Top Twenty blog posts

What are our twenty most popular blog posts (based upon the most number of hits on the blog):

1. U.S. Tank Losses and Crew Casualties in World War II – The Dupuy Institute

2. The Russian Artillery Strike That Spooked The U.S. Army – The Dupuy Institute

3. Wounded-To-Killed Ratios – The Dupuy Institute

4. Population over Time (US vs USSR) – The Dupuy Institute

5. New WWII German Maps At The National Archives – The Dupuy Institute

6. How Does the U.S. Army Calculate Combat Power? ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ – The Dupuy Institute

7. A story about planning for Desert Storm (1991) – The Dupuy Institute

8. Tank Loss Rates in Combat: Then and Now – The Dupuy Institute

9. Wounded-to-killed ratios in Ukraine in 2022 – The Dupuy Institute

10. Panzer Aces Wittmann and Staudegger at Kursk – part 1 – The Dupuy Institute

11. Counting Holes in Tanks in Tunisia – The Dupuy Institute

12. What Is The Relationship Between Rate of Fire and Military Effectiveness? – The Dupuy Institute

13. German versus Soviet Artillery at Kursk – The Dupuy Institute

14. Artillery Effectiveness vs. Armor (Part 1) – The Dupuy Institute

15. Artillery Survivability In Modern Combat – The Dupuy Institute

16. Where Did Japan Go? – The Dupuy Institute

17. Was Kursk the Largest Tank Battle in History? – The Dupuy Institute

18. Assessing the 1990-1991 Gulf War Forecasts – The Dupuy Institute

19. Some initial observations on the Russian Army Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) concept – The Dupuy Institute

20. How many brigades did Ukraine start with war with? – The Dupuy Institute

 

You are welcome to list in the comments any other blog posts that you think are worthy. 

 

The Ninth Anniversary of the Blog

The first post on this blog was made December 27, 2015. See: Welcome to Mystics & Statistics – The Dupuy Institute.

This was done at the instigation of Dr. Shawn Woodford. He came up with the idea, sold it to me, designed the blog and did most of the really popular posts on the blog in those first four years. The first five posts (and the only posts in 2015) were:

Welcome to Mystics & Statistics – The Dupuy Institute

President Obama’s Casualty Estimates – The Dupuy Institute

Iraq/Syria Intervention Scenarios – The Dupuy Institute

Defeating an Insurgency by Air – The Dupuy Institute

Is Your Washroom Breeding Bolsheviks? – The Dupuy Institute

As of 27 December, the blog has had 1,909 posts, or over 200 a year. We also have had at least 3,168 comments made to the blog. We did early on cross post the blog to Twitter, Facebook and LinkedIn. We are currently cross posting to Twitter (now known as X), Blue Sky and Threads. See: We are on Blue Sky and Threads – The Dupuy Institute

 

Before there was the blog we did have an active forum: The Dupuy Institute Forum – powered by Infopop. We started it in March 2001 and it was very active for a few years. It was fueled primarily with postings by Richard Anderson, Niklas Zetterling, me and others.  It was through the forum that we met Shawn Woodford. Over time it became less active, people moved on, and it was being spammed. As I was busy writing books and maintaining The Dupuy Institute, I no longer had the time to regularly patrol it and maintain it, so I locked out any new sign-ins (to stop the spamming). It has been inactive since then. We have considered re-establishing it, except there really needs to be someone to watch over and maintain a forum. That really cannot be me. 

Dupuy’s Verities vs the Russo-Ukrainian War

So, we have had almost three full years of conventional war in and around Ukraine. Back in the 1970s- 1980s Trevor Dupuy assembled a list of factors (or verities) that influence and describe conventional combat. They covered combat in three different areas. They were 1) The Timeless Verities of Combat (13 verities), 2) Combat Attrition Verities (29 verities), and 3) Combat Advance Rates (15 verities).

They are listed below in these three posts:

The Timeless Verities of Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Trevor N. Dupuy’s Combat Attrition Verities – The Dupuy Institute

Trevor Dupuy’s Combat Advance Rate Verities – The Dupuy Institute

They are listed in detail in my book War by Numbers, although I edited a few for brevity.

They are listed in detail in Trevor Dupuy’s 1987 book Understanding War. They are also listed in his 1980 book Evolution of Weapons and Warfare.

They have been around for a while. I think they are a significant list and of course have been coded into his combat models the QJM and TNDM, which actually have proven track record of making good predictions. I do think they have been underutilized and underappreciated by the wider defense community.

Anyhow, my questions for the community that reads our blog is:

1. Which of these verities have been re-confirmed by war in Ukraine?, and
2. Which of these verities have been called in doubt by the war in Ukraine?

Interested to see the responses.

 

 

 

P.S. Some related links:

TDI Friday Read: Principles Of War & Verities Of Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Offensive Action – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Power Of Defense – The Dupuy Institute

The Combat Value of Surprise – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Utility Of Defense – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Initiative – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Fortification – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Advantage Of The Offensive – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Requirements For Successful Defense – The Dupuy Institute

A Comment On The Importance Of Reserves In Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Surprise – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Effects of Firepower in Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Inefficiency of Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Combat Power =/= Firepower – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Complexities of Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Response to Question on Dupuy’s Combat Attrition Verities – The Dupuy Institute

Average Losses per Day in Division-level Engagements on the Eastern Front in 1943 – The Dupuy Institute

People keep referencing us on the 3-to-1 Rule – The Dupuy Institute

Last Six Blog Posts – The Dupuy Institute

Shout out to Echoes of Past – The Dupuy Institute

These are all the posts you get if you click on the category “Dupuy’ Verities”:  Dupuy’s Verities – The Dupuy Institute

Shout out to Echoes of Past

I do want to make a shout out to Echoes of Past who keeps posting quotes by my book War by Numbers and from Trevor Dupuy’s books. His twitter account is here: Echoes of Past (@EchoesofpastX) / X

This includes: Echoes of Past on X: “4/5 “We can still lose this war. . . . The Germans are colder and hungrier than we are, but they fight better. —GEN. GEORGE S. PATTON, January 4, 1945, in Dupuy et al., Hitler’s Last Gamble” (Christopher A. Lawrence, War by Numbers) @dupuyinstitute https://t.co/fcgMxVkEV0″ / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “”#Combat is too complex to be described in a single, simple #aphorism.” (Christopher A. Lawrence, #War by Numbers) https://t.co/kioG46QbI2″ / X

and from our blog: Echoes of Past on X: “#Ukraine #Kursk operation does three things for them: 1. Propaganda value. 2. Ukraine 🇺🇦 captured over 100 Russian prisoners which they can later exchange. Ukraine had thousands captured in 2022 & have never held enough Russian prisoners to exchange for people Russia holds. https://t.co/SWHSFkoSLn” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “War by Numbers assesses the nature of conventional warfare through the analysis of historical combat. Christopher A. Lawrence establishes what we know about conventional combat and why we know it. ⁦@dupuyinstitute⁩ https://t.co/Gryxkdtvho” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “Depressing insight for Tank Enthusiasts from book “War by Numbers” by Christopher A. Lawrence. Tank loss rates are 5-7 times higher than personnel casualties in combined arms engagements. #WarByNumbers #ArmoredForces #MilitaryStrategy @dupuyinstitute https://t.co/d5WWTuH3bT” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “@AmosFox6 @dupuyinstitute Hi Amos, it will be an excellent opportunity to hear him. I just finished one of his classics “War by Numbers”. Sharing few insights and I will be building it further. You may bookmark 🔖 it.👇” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “According to Christopher A. Lawrence in War by Numbers, the expenditure of artillery ammunition in urban operations is not significantly greater than in nonurban operations. 🏙️ #UrbanLogistics #MilitaryOperations #WarfareStudies https://t.co/mXBHvEHFDr” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “@vtchakarova 5/n Casualty rates are higher for small forces vs. large forces. Theodore Dodge noted this trend nearly 100 years ago. Size matters in battle 🛡️ #militaryhistory #warfare #smallvslargeforces https://t.co/jjLil3rKbM” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “@vtchakarova 4/n According to Christopher A. Lawrence in War by Numbers, the expenditure of artillery ammunition in urban operations is not significantly greater than in nonurban operations. 🏙️ #UrbanLogistics #MilitaryOperations #WarfareStudies https://t.co/NrINYgN5qd” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “3️⃣/n In warfare, combat effectiveness plays a crucial role in inflicting casualties. The Germans in WWI and WWII, as well as the Israelis in the Arab-Israeli wars, showcased higher casualty-inflicting rates. 💥 #warfare #combat #effectiveness Pic 2 :@vtchakarova https://t.co/WQR8JwwPfU” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “2/n Historical fortifications like Maginot Line, Mannerheim Line, Siegfried Line, & Bar Lev Line were overcome not due to their failure, but because of a powerful relentless effort. It’s important to recognize context, rather than jumping to conclusions. https://t.co/nV3bxn1KSD https://t.co/ywrGBhFvNP” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “1️⃣st thought from “War by Numbers” by Christopher A Lawrence Tank loss rates are 5 to 7 times higher than personnel casualty rates. This applies to combined arms engagements in which armored forces make up a substantial proportion of fighting strength on one or both sides. https://t.co/Dshm8nopA4” / X

and: Echoes of Past on X: “Casualty rates are higher for small forces vs. large forces. Theodore Dodge noted this trend nearly 100 years ago. Size matters in battle 🛡️ #militaryhistory #warfare #smallvslargeforces @dupuyinstitute @WarMonitors @WarintheFuture @AmosFox6 @VertigoWarrior @warmatters https://t.co/IJHwBVdcrO” / X

 

Also a shout out to Mountain Navy: Mountain Navy 🎲🗺⚔️ on X: “Usually think of Lawrence @dupuyinstitute as Mr. “Tanks at Kursk” so this new #militaryhistory #book looks to be an interesting adjacent read. https://t.co/v7XyyGT6tc” / X

and Robert Gilbey: Robert Gilbey on X: “‘The Battle for Kyiv’ by Christopher A. Lawrence from the @dupuyinstitute This is a very insightful & indifferent analysis of the opening invasion of Ukraine, leveraging metrics from OSINT & official sources it breaks down the context, actions & effects of combat ops around Kyiv https://t.co/OMX5C6kYL6” / X

and Amos Fox: Amos Fox on X: “Part I of my conversation with Chris Lawrence from the @dupuyinstitute. Part II drops tomorrow. After that the Revolution in Military Affairs podcast will take a 4 week break. https://t.co/fTCrKkoes6” / X

and Mark Galeotti: Mark Galeotti on X: “I then look at 4 books to help explain Russian adaptation: 1. Christopher Lawrence of @dupuyinstitute, The Battle for Kyiv (@Frontline_Books), useful for insights into the various forms of military capability 2/” / X

and Paul Poast: Paul Poast on X: “To identify war outcomes, Stam’s study drew on military histories, notably the encyclopedic volume by Dupuy & Dupuy (cc @dupuyinstitute). https://t.co/oGJR4ZZuNQ” / X

 

I am sure there are a few I missed this year. Only two of these people are known to me. Sorry for anyone I have missed.

 

Aces at Kursk and Soviet Kill Claims

The following 2019 blog post is getting some attention lately on military history forums: So What Was Driving the Soviet Kill Claims? – The Dupuy Institute

This was drawn from my original 1,662 page Kursk book and was repeated in my new book Aces at Kursk: Aces at Kursk: The Battle for Aerial Supremacy on the Eastern Front, 1943: Lawrence, Christopher A: 9781399081436: Amazon.com: Books

It is fully discussed in those two books.

I will be presenting on Aces at Kursk at WWIIDF on Wednesday, 8 PM, 19 February.  See: World War II Discussion Forum | Home.

 

We are on Blue Sky and Threads

In addition to re-posting on Twitter (now known as X), we are on Blue Sky and Threads.

Our social media outreach includes:

X: The Dupuy Institute (TDI) (@dupuyinstitute) / X

Bluesky: @dupuyinstitute.bsky.social — Bluesky

Threads: (2) Christopher Alan Lawrence (@dupuyinstitute) • Threads, Say more

Facebook: (20+) Facebook

LinkedIn: The Dupuy Institute | LinkedIn

Right now, we are regularly cross posting to X, Bluesky and Threads. We may expand that.