Mystics & Statistics

March’s Schedule for the Fourth Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) 21-23 October 2025

The Fourth HAAC is scheduled for 21-23 October 2025. We currently have 38 presentations scheduled (and 2 group discussions). We are, of course, looking for more quality presentations. The current schedule is:

Schedule: Pike & Gallows Conference Center
Revised 11 April 2025

Day 1: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 0930 Introductory remarks – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

0930 – 1030 Studying Combat: The “Base of Sand” Problem – Dr. Shawn R. Woodford

1030 – 1130   Slouching Towards Wabash: The Withering of Historical Analysis in the American Profession of Arms – Ivan Torres (Jomini of the West, Major, U.S. Army, ret.)

1130 – 1230    Measuring the Value of Situational Awareness – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1230 – 1400 Lunch

1400 – 1500   The History of TND’s models and theories – Dr. Shawn R. Woodford

1500 – 1600   Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII – Sasho Todorov, esquire

1600 – 1700   Difficulties in Measuring Morale and Effectiveness – Dr. Dermot Rooney (Wapentakes) – virtual

1700 – 1800   Price of Paradise – Dr. Iain Overton (AOAV) – virtual

Evening (1900): Group Dinner – Rangos

Day 2: Analysis of Unconventional Warfare

0900 – 1000    Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1000 – 1100    Close Combat Overmatch Weapons (SLAMMER) – Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)

1100 – 1200   Reserved for Dr. David Cuberes

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400   1916 Easter Rising – Robert A. Mosher

1400 – 1500   Terrorism and Afghanistan – Dr. Christopher Davis

1500 – 1600   open

1600 – 1700   Group Discussion: The Next Middle East Wars

Evening (1900): Group Dinner – BJs

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000   Summoning the specter of “Beweglichkeit”: A critical analysis of the U.S. Army’s new FM 3-0 Operations and observed Ukrainian battlefield trends – Ivan Torres (Jomini of the West, Major, U.S. Army, ret.)

1000 – 1100    History’s Lessons on Technological Surprise in War – Dr. Alexander Kott

1100 – 1200   Results from the Taiwan Analytical Efforts – Alexandru Filips

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400    Revitalization of TDI – Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)

1400 – 1500   The Hermann Goeing Division in North Africa, Sicily and Salerno 1942-1943 and Measuring Combat Effectiveness – Dr. James Slaughter

1500 – 1600   Syrskyi’s Gambit: A Critical Analysis of Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive – Ivan Torres (Jomini of the West, Major, U.S. Army, ret.)

1600 – 1700   Group Discussion: Russo-Ukrainian War

1700 – 1715     Closing Remarks

Evening: Happy hour – Rangos

Schedule: Einstein Conference Room

Day 1: Naval Warfare Analysis

0930 – 1030   Naval Theory and War Causation – Alexandru Filip

1030 – 1130  Modeling the Invasion of Taiwan – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill, et al.

1130 – 1230  A Review of the CSIS gaming effort – Walker Gargagliano

1230-1400   Lunch

1400 – 1500   Modeling ATC Amphibious Landings on Taiwan – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill

1500 – 1600 Taipei Has Fallen!: Wargaming the Invasion of Taiwan – Clinton Rielly – virtual

1600 – 1700   Floating Fortresses: American Carriers Invulnerability to Battle Damage – Walker Gargagliano

1700 – 1800 Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII (part 2 or overflow presentation) – Sasho Todorov, esquire

Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 1000   The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud – William F. Owen – virtual?

1000 – 1100    Salvation Only in Arms: A Critical Historical Analysis of Operational Maneuver during the 1814 Campaign in France – Ivan Torres (Jomini of the West, Major, U.S. Army, ret.)

1100 – 1200   Reserved – Dr. Dermot Rooney (Wapentakes) – virtual

1200 – 1300 Lunch

1300 – 1400   Quantifying Mahan’s Hypotheses – Dr. Julian Spencer Churchill

1400 – 1500    open

1500 – 1600   Systems Analysis and Strategy – Alexandru Filip

1600 – 1700   The New Science of Evidence and Causality – Dr. Douglas Samuelson

Day 2: Air Warfare Analysis

0900 – 1000   open

1000 – 1100   open

1100 – 1200   open 

1200 – 1300   Lunch

1300 – 1400   open

1400 – 1500  Aces at Kursk – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1500 – 1600   open

1600 – 1700   open

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000   Isserson: The Architect of Victory – Dr. Richard Harrison

1000 – 1100   Audacity versus Friction: Evaluating Operational Autism in Operation Barbarossa. – Dr. Robert Kirchubel and Dr. Sorin Adam Matei (Purdue)

1100 – 1200   Reserved for Dr. James Slaughter

1200 – 1300   Lunch

1300 – 1400   The Red Army’s Plans for a Preemptive Attack in 1941 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1400 – 1500   New Advances in Digital Military Cartography – Gavin Ho, Joseph Hupy, Sorin Adam Matei and Robert Kirchubel.

1500 – 1600   Arctic Defense Concerns – Alexandru Filip

1600 – 1700   open 

 

Reserve presentations:

Measuring Human Factors – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

Breakpoints – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

 

 

 

Friday, October 11: Tour of a Civil War Battlefield – Antietam: bloodiest day of the U.S. Civil War (and in the Western Hemisphere?). – we will arrange transport there and back ($20 charge for tour).



See this link below for costs ($150), address, conference description, hotels, and call for presentations: The Fourth HAAC is scheduled for 21 – 23 October 2025 – The Dupuy Institute

Last year’s schedule is here:  October’s Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) 8 – 10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute

 

The Closing of OSD Net Assessment

Turns out that OSD Net Assessment is being closed down. Pete Hegseth shutters Pentagon office that helped military leaders plan for possible future wars and Hegseth ‘disestablishing’ Office of Net Assessment, Pentagon’s strategic analysis specialists – Breaking Defense. Hegseth has instructed DOD to come up with a replacement organization “within 30 days.”

This was a small office in OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) that developed legendary status over the years: Andrew Marshall (foreign policy strategist) – Wikipedia

The Dupuy Institute did a number of contracts for Andy Marshall, specifically (see: TDI Reports – The Dupuy Institute)

1. SR-1 Soviet/Russian Influence on Chinese Military Doctrine (Jul. 2003).

2. SA-1: Measuring the Value of Situational Awareness (May 2004)

3. OSD-1: The Applicability of Classical Counterinsurgency Theory to Counterinsurgency Operations (Jan. 2008).

The original Iraq Casualty Estimate (Chapter 1 of America’s Modern Wars) that we did in 2004 was primarily funded by Andy Marshall. He contributed $75K based upon a phone call from Vandiver (CAA) and then CAA chipped in $20K, although CAA ran the project. I did brief Andy Marshall.

The office was funded with about $20 million a year. This supported maybe a dozen people and a budget of $12 or $13 million that he used to pay for various contracts (I accidently saw one of his big omnibus contracts). 

He retired in 2015 and an Air Force colonel that I did not know took over. They then issued out a giant omnibus contract which we bid on. They did not contract us.

OSD Net Assessment did an annual “net assessment” of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Apparently, his last net assessment was done in 1991. After that he focused on a range of issues, including orienting towards China and the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs). Note that he funded our Situational Awareness report in 2004, which really did not provide overwhelming support for the RMA. It is two chapters in my book War by Numbers and I will be doing a briefing on it on 8 April at the Virtual Connections Conference.

That he was doing lots of analysis but no net assessments became an issue and at some point in the last decade, there were rumors that some of the JCS staff took over the net assessment function. I gather after he retired (he was in his 90s), the new guy was supposed to direct the department back to net assessment. So, I am not sure, but I gather there is now no real department in OSD that is doing net assessment. 

 

Slog or Swan

Dr. Dermot Rooney was a presenter at the Third HAAC and will be presenting on Measuring Military Effectiveness at the Fourth HAAC. See: The Fourth HAAC is scheduled for 21 – 23 October 2025 – The Dupuy Institute

He has a new book out based upon his work: Slog and Swan: British Army Effectiveness in Operation Veritable: February and March 1945. See: Slog or Swan | Military History Book | Helion & Company

As he describes it:

The book is based on my Corvisier Award-winning PhD thesis so be warned, it’s a bit geeky. It’s got 43 maps, 300 sources, a good handful of graphs and photos, and loads of footnotes.

On the upside it’s about fighting. The maps are mainly those used by the units at the time and they’re marked up to show the detail of how British and a few Canadian troops fought in 1945. It tells the story of how those men defeated the last competent Wehrmacht formation in the west –1. Fallschirm-Armee– despite suffering from a bunch of force design problems that still matter today.

And the book is about a massive operation that’s not been seriously examined before. If you count the Germans, Op Veritable had half a million men fighting for a month in what is close to the biggest named op that Britain ever fought. It started with a (nearly) thousand-bomber raid and the biggest artillery barrage of the war, it’s got one of the few confirmed deployments of the Sturmtiger, dozens of battles where plucky Tommies took on fanatical Fallschirmjäger, and it ended with the German Dunkirk – an orderly withdrawal where they blew up the last bridge behind them.

Yet even hardened WW2 buffs are often unsure where Veritable was fought and hardly anybody knows what it was about.

So, Slog or Swan might not be for you, and it might be a little bit late for the 80th anniversary of Veritable, but it’s the perfect Christmas Easter gift for the war geek in your life.

30-Day Ceasefire?

The U.S. and Ukraine have agreed to a thirty-day ceasefire. Russia now has to agree.

Terms are (according to the news reports):

  • Immediate 30-day ceasefire.
  • The United States immediately lifts its pause on sharing intelligence with Ukraine and resumes security assistance to that country.
    • This appears to occur even if Russia does not agree to the plan. 
  • U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy agreed to conclude “as soon as possible a comprehensive agreement for developing Ukraine’s critical mineral resources.”

The ceasefire would halt all hostilities, “not just for missiles, drones and bombs, not just in the Black Sea, but along the entire front line.” (Zelenskyy)

The U.S. and Ukrainian delegations said the interim, month-long ceasefire “can be extended by mutual agreement of the parties.” (joint statement)

Now, have no idea if this has been properly prepped with Russia or not. They could turn it down. I would not be surprised if they insist on Ukraine withdrawing from Kursk area before they agree. 

Anyhow, it is a proposed 30-day ceasefire.

  1. It does not guarantee it will be extended.
  2. Does not address any of the issues that caused the war.
  3. Does not provide any security guarantees for Ukraine.
  4. It leaves 20% of Ukraine in Russia hands.

We shall see if it is agreed to and, if agreed to, how long it stands. We have been down this road before (2014-2022).

 

 Copy of Joint Statement:

Text of US-Ukraine statement paving way for resumption of aid, intelligence sharing

Other Sources:

Ukraine agrees to U.S.-led ceasefire plan if Russia accepts

US and Ukraine call for 30-day ceasefire following Saudi talks

We have uploaded nine videos from the Third HAAC (2024) to our YouTube channel

We have uploaded nine videos from the Third HAAC (8 – 10 October 2024) to our YouTube Channel: The Dupuy Institute – YouTube. We have also loaded over the weekend the last five videos from the First HAAC: We have finally uploaded the last five videos from the First HAAC (2022) – The Dupuy Institute. It is amazing how much you can do when you are not obsessing over getting the next book over to the publisher. Did receive considerable help on this from Jack Flairty.

The videos are (in order they were presented): HAAC 2024: Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8-10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute

Naval Power Index: The U.S. Navy vs three challengers by Geoffrey Clark

Redux: Quantifying Warfare by Alexandru Filip (Canadian Center for Strategic Studies)

National Guard Bureau Chief George Leach by Dr. Johannes Allert (Swansea University Wales)

Native American Wars and Conflicts, 1500 -1900 by Dr. David Cuberes

Haiti: The Risks of a Failed State in the Western Hemisphere by Dr. Christopher Davis

Data for Air Combat Modeling in Network Centric Warfare by Geoffry Clark

The Islamic State of Khorasan: The Evolution of Terrorism by Dr. Christopher Davis

Making Military Decisions in Plateau Eras – Michael Benhamou (Director, OPEWI)

Chernobyl Compromised: The story of a Russian cyber attack – Joseph Weiss

 

More to come, but probably not any time soon. The Fourth HAAC is upcoming. Looking for presenters and presentations: The Fourth HAAC is scheduled for 21 – 23 October 2025 – The Dupuy Institute

We have finally uploaded the last five videos from the First HAAC (2022)

The First HAAC (Historical Analysis Annual Conference) was held on 27-29 September 2022. We have finally uploaded all the videos we have from that conference to The Dupuy Institute site on YouTube. The original final conference schedule is here: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 16 – The Dupuy Institute. It was a total of 31 presentations given and two group discussions. Of those, 20 presentations have been loaded to YouTube. We do not have recorded copies of the rest of the presentations.

The last five presentations we uploaded are here:

    1. The AEF and Consolidation of Gains Operations during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 1918 by Dr. Davis
    2. Evaluating German Aerial Photography at the Battle of Kursk, 1943 by Eugene Matyukhin
    3. The Decline of War since 1950 by Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University of London)
    4. Drone Warfare and the Nagorno Karabakh War of 2020 by Dr. Alexander Kott (ARL)
    5. Red Army’s War in Ukraine 1943-44 by Dr. Richard Harrison

The slides for all 31 presentations are here: Presentations from the first HAAC – all three days – The Dupuy Institute

The links to the previous presentations are here: 

  1. Video presentations from the first day of the First HAAC – The Dupuy Institute
  2. Five presentations from the second day of the First HAAC (2022) – The Dupuy Institute

We are going to upload some of the 2024 presentations next and then pick up the 2023 presentations. 

Also: The Fourth HAAC is scheduled for 21 – 23 October 2025 – The Dupuy Institute

 

The Hunting Falcon is available in the UK

Hunting Falcon, as of today, is now available on Amazon.com UK. The site has the release date of 6 March 2025. It has a list price of £25 and they are selling it right now at a 25% discount for £18.71:  The Hunting Falcon: The Story of WW1 German Ace Hans-Joachim Buddecke: Amazon.co.uk: Lawrence, Christopher A, Karamales, Jay: 9781399085014: Books

It is available for £17.50 directly from Pen & Sword: Pen and Sword Books: The Hunting Falcon – Hardback

Amazon.com U.S. is listing its available date of April 3, 2025. It is available for pre-order at $42.95: Amazon.com: The Hunting Falcon: The Story of WW1 German Ace Hans-Joachim Buddecke: 9781399085014: Lawrence, Christopher A, Karamales, Jay: Books

 

The Fourth HAAC is scheduled for 21 – 23 October 2025

The Fourth Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) is scheduled for 21 – 23 October 2025 at Tysons Corner, VA (just outside of DC). 

It is at the same facility, same times, and same type of schedule as the previous three conferences. Also, same price ($150 for three days). Virtual attendance is possible.

The conference is at 1934 Old Gallows Road, Suite 350, Vienna, VA 22182. This is basically across the street by Tysons Corner Shopping mall and the Marriot Hotel on Route 7. It is right off the Route 7 exit from 495 (the Beltway). It is at the corner of Route 7 (Leesburg Pike) and Old Gallows Road. It is in the building above the restaurant called Rangos. Parking is in the parking garage next door to it.

Seeing how things remain constant here are:

Accommodations: Hotels for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 – The Dupuy Institute

Costs: Cost of the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17 -19 October 2023 – The Dupuy Institute

It will be possible to register through EventBrite: Fourth Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) Tickets, Tue, Oct 21, 2025 at 9:00 AM | Eventbrite

I am looking for new presentations and new presenters. If you are interested in contributing, please email me at LawrenceTDI@aol.com or call me (703) 289-0007.

Last year’s schedule is here: HAAC 2024: Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8-10 October 2024 – The Dupuy Institute

 

Force Ratios in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Lots of discussion going on about strengths in Ukraine and Russia and therefore force ratios. I have stayed away from talking about this, because I have other things going on (primarily writing and editing books). In the end, you don’t get a book done by blogging and engaging in debates on Twitter (now called X).

But one recent twitter debate got my attention, which was a conversation between Sashank Joshi, the defense editor at the Economist, and J.D. Vance, Vice-President of the United States.  I have exchanged a few emails with Joshi over the years. I have never talked to J.D. Vance.

Anyhow, as far as I can tell, both sides have 500,000 to 600,000 troops deployed in the field. My last discussion on this subject was in the middle of last year: Density of Deployment in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute. At the time, Putin was claiming he had 617,000 deployed, while Ukraine was stating that it was only 450,000. I have not seen any new data since December 2023.

The 2025 Military Balance records 450,000 Russian forces in Ukraine.  They provide overall figures for the Russian Army of 550,000, Naval Infantry 10,000 and Airborne 35,000. They also report 20,000 in private military companies. Around 21,000 are reported deployed from Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova and in the Middle East and Africa). So a maximum total available ground strength of 594,000. 

The 2025 Military Balance gives Ukrainian Army strength as 500,000, Marine Corps at 30,000 and Airborne Assault Troops at 45,000 for a total ground strength of 575,000. This is not counting Territorial Defense Forces and National Guard.

Of those 15,000 to 30,000 Ukrainians are up and round Kursk oblast in Russian territory, and the rest are defending Ukraine, from Sumy down to Kherson. The 2025 Military Balance says it was 20,000 Ukrainians in Kursk oblast.

Conversely, Russian has a rumored 40,000 to 50,000 around Kursk oblast. There are also maybe 12,000 North Koreans around Kursk oblast and maybe 2,000 Chechins fighting for Russia elsewhere in Ukraine. The Lugansk and Donets People’s Republics together are still fielding I am guessing between 15,000 to 30,000 troops for Russia.  

Anyhow, this all points to close to parity between Russian and Ukraine, with Russian perhaps having more troops. perhaps as much as a 1.2-to-1 force ratio advantage. Inevitable some commentators quoted the discredited 3-to-1 rule, but there is still an advantage to defense. We did look at this recently for Army-level operations and produced the following blog posts:

Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – The Dupuy Institute

Analysis for Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – continued – The Dupuy Institute

Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – second continuation – The Dupuy Institute

Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – third continuation – The Dupuy Institute

Analysis of Force Ratios using the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) – fourth and final continuation – The Dupuy Institute

The 3-to-1 rule and the War in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute

Now, if you really wanted to properly analyze the scenarios, then you would need to account for weapons, especially mix and quality; and logistics, especially ammunition; and of course, Human Factors. This is possible to do but is not a small task. We won’t be taking this on soon (if ever), and I gather no one else will either. 

It is clear with proper aid and support, Ukraine can hold out forever in defense (assuming the morale and desire are there). The only Russian option to change this equation is to greatly increase recruitment. There is a reason, three years into this war, they have not done this.  Therefore, it is possible to continue this war for years until someone decides to compromise.

Now, as long as Russan morale and desire reman sufficiently high (and it is probably a bigger variable than Ukrainian morale and desire), then it does not appear that Ukraine will not be able to retake the occupied territories. The question becomes: how solid is Russian morale and desire? We did see in June 2023 a revolt against the government by the Wagner mercenary company. In World War I we saw multiple countries armies collapse at various times during the third and fourth years of the war. Army morale collapses are not improbable or maybe not even unlikely. It does mean that the strategy becomes to maintain the war until Russia either modifies its negotiating position to give up territory, or the army or the government starts to collapse. 

Three long years of war

Three long years of war, sad to say. This book covers the first six weeks of the war.

It is an attempt at a military history of the war. It is the first in a series, with The Siege of Mariupol being the second book and currently in editing. The third book in the series is The Battle for the Donbas covering operations in the spring and summer of 2022. Both of these books are co-authored by Stephan Korshak. Expect to eventually have six or eight or more books covering the operations in this war. They are, unfortunately, giving us plenty to write about.