Mystics & Statistics

A2/D2 and Jam Gee-Cee in the Western Pacific

western-pacific-oceanOne of the primary scenarios the Third Offset Strategy is intended to address is a potential military conflict between the United States and the People’s Republic of China over the sovereignty of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and territorial control of the South and East China Seas. As surveyed by James Holmes in a wonderful Mahanian geopolitical analysis, the South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea at the intersection between East Asia and the Indian Ocean region, bounded by strategic gaps and choke points between island chains, atolls, and reefs, and riven by competing territorial claims among rising and established regional powers.

China’s current policy appears to be to develop the ability to assert military control over the Western Pacific and deny U.S. armed forces access to the area in case of overt conflict. The strategic dimension is framed by China’s pursuit of anti-access/area denial (A2/D2) capabilities enabled by development of sophisticated long-range strike, sensor, guidance, and other military technologies, and the use of asymmetrical warfare operational concepts such as psychological and information operations, and “lawfare” (the so-called “three warfares.”) China is also advancing its interests in decidedly low-tech ways as well, such as creating artificial islands on disputed reefs through dredging.

The current U.S. approach to thwarting China’s A2/D2 strategy is the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC, aka “Jam Gee Cee”), or the concept formerly known as AirSea Battle. As described by Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, the current iteration of JAM-GC

…is designed to preserve U.S. access to the Western Pacific by combining passive defenses against Chinese missile attack with an emphasis on offensive action to destroy or disable the forces that China would use to establish A2/AD. This offensive action would use “cross-domain synergy” among U.S. space, cyber, air, and maritime forces (hence the moniker “AirSea”) to blind or suppress Chinese sensors. The heart of the concept, however, lies in physically destroying the Chinese weapons and infrastructure that underpin A2/AD.

The brute, counterforce character of JAM-GC provides the logic behind proposals for new long-range precision strike weapons such as the Air Force’s stealthy Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B) program, recently designated the B-21 Raider.

The JAM-GC concept has not yet been officially set and continues to evolve. Both the A2/D2 construct and the premises behind JAM-GC are being challenged. As Biddle and Oelrich conclude in their detailed analysis of the strategic and military trends in the region, it is not at all clear that China’s A2/D2 approach will actually achieve its goal.

[W]e find that by 2040 China will not achieve military hegemony over the Western Pacific or anything close to it—even without ASB. A2/AD is giving air and maritime defenders increasing advantages, but those advantages are strongest over controlled landmasses and weaken over distance. As both sides deploy A2/AD, these capabilities will increasingly replace today’s U.S. command of the global commons not with Chinese hegemony but with a more differentiated pattern of control, with a U.S. sphere of influence around allied landmasses, a Chinese sphere of influence over the Chinese mainland, and contested battlespace covering much of the South and East China Seas, wherein neither power enjoys wartime freedom of surface or air movement.

They also raise deeper concerns about JAM-GC’s emphasis on an aggressive counterforce posture. In an era of constrained defense spending, developing and acquiring the military capability to execute it could be costly. Also, long-range air and missile strikes against the Chinese mainland runs the distinct risk of escalating a regional conflict into a general war between nuclear armed opponents.

A recent RAND analysis echoed these conclusions. The adoption of counterforce strategies by both the U.S. and China would result in heavy military losses by both sides that would make it difficult to constrain a longer, broader conflict. Although the RAND analysts foresee the U.S. prevailing in such a conflict, it would not be quick and the ramifications to both sides would be severe.

Dissatisfaction with these options and potential outcomes is partly what motivated the development of the Third Offset Strategy in the first place. It is not clear whether leveraging technological innovation can provide new operational capabilities that will enable successful solutions to these strategic dilemmas. What does seem apparent is that fresh thinking is needed.

 

We probably need to keep talking about Afghanistan

image description

Shawn posted a very nice summary a couple of days ago. It is worth reading if you have not already: Meanwhile in Afghanistan

Recent article reports the same trends: Afghan-government-lost-2-percent-territory

A couple of things get my attention in all this:

  1. They are talking about control of territory. I believe control of population is a lot better metric.
    1. One notes in Shawn’s write up that control of population is 68.5% (vice 61.3% of area).
  2. The insurgent level of activity is very high:
    1. 5,523 Afghan Army and police killed (15,000 casualties)
    2. 22,733 incidents from 8/1/2015 to 8/15/2016

Based on Chapter 11 (Estimating Insurgent Force Size) of my book America’s Modern Wars, working backward from this incident data would mean that there are something like 60,000 – 80,000 full-time and part-time insurgents operating. There is a lot comparing apples to oranges to get there: for example, how are they counting incidents in Afghanistan vice how were they counting incidents in the past cases we use for this estimate, what is the mix of full-time and part-time insurgents, how active and motivated are the insurgents, and so forth; but that level of activity is similar to the level of activity in Iraq at its worse (26,033 incidents in 2005, 45,330 in 2006 and 19,125 in 2007 according to one count). We had over 180,000 U.S. and coalition troops there to deal with that. The Afghani’s have 170,000 Army and Air Force or around 320,000 if you count police (and we did not count police in our database unless there were actively involved in counterinsurgent work). The 5,500+ Afghan Army and police killed a year indicates a pretty active insurgency. We lost less than 5,500 for the entire time we were in Iraq. The low wounded-to-killed ratio in the current Afghan data may well be influenced by who they choose to report as wounded and how they address lightly wounded (as discussed in Chapter 15, Casualties, in my upcoming book War by Numbers). Don’t know what current U.S. Army estimates are of Afghan insurgent strength.

Now, in Chapter Six of my book America’s Modern Wars, we developed a force ratio model based upon 83 historical cases (see chart at top of this post). It was very dependent on the cause of the insurgency, whether it was based on a central idea (like nationalism) or was regional or factional, or whether it was based on a overarching idea (like communism). I don’t still don’t really know the nature of the Afghan insurgency, and we were never funded to study this insurgency (we were only funded for Iraq work). So, I have not done the in-depth analysis of the Afghan insurgency that I did for Iraq. But…….nothing here looks particularly positive.

We never did an analysis of stalemated insurgencies. It could be done, although there are not that many cases of these. One could certainly examine any insurgency that lasts more than 15 years for this purpose. Does a long stalemated insurgency mean that the government (or counterinsurgents) eventually win? Or does a long stalemated insurgency mean that the insurgents eventually win? I don’t know. I would have to go back through our database of 100+ cases, update the data, sort out the cases and then I could make some predictions. That takes time and effort, and right now my effort is focused elsewhere. Is anyone inside DOD doing this type of analysis? I doubt it. Apparently a stalemate means that you can now pass the problem onto the next administration. While it solves the immediate political problem, is really does not answer the question of whether we are winning or losing. Is what we are doing good enough that this will revolve in our favor in the next ten years, or do we need to do more? I think this is the question that needs to be addressed.

Isolation of Mosul

mosul_battle_zone_map_medium01

Well, it looks like Mosul is isolated, sort of: mosul-iraq-advance

The Shiite militia have cut the main road to the west of Mosul. As no one wants the Shiite militia to go into the city, this is a good use for them. Also the Turks don’t want them to advance on the Turkmen town of Tal Afar. Not sure who is supposed to take it, but it appears that Mosul is not yet completely isolated. But, I suspect that anyone ISIL wanted to stay are still in Mosul and anyone they wanted to leave has left.

Are there 5,000 ISIL fighters in Mosul? I doubt that. I suspect there is a holding force of hundreds and probably no more than a thousand. If they left more than that behind, then it is just a gift for the Iraqi Army, for the insurgents are nicely gathered together ready to be killed. They are a bigger problem is they go back to being guerillas, which is what I assume most of them are doing.

The Iraqi army has not yet entered the city. The front line in the east is just 200 meters from Mosul (two Canadian football fields away).

Meanwhile, In Afghanistan…

The latest quarterly report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has been released. America’s military involvement in Afghanistan passed its 15th anniversary in October.

The data presented in the SIGAR report show some disturbing trends. Through the first eight months of 2016, Afghan national defense and security forces suffered approximately 15,000 casualties, including 5,523 killed. This from a reported force of 169,229 army and air force personnel (minus civilians) and 148,480 national police, for a total of 317,709. The casualty rate undoubtedly contributed to the net loss of 2,199 personnel from the previous quarter.

sigur-02Afghan forces suffered 5,500 killed-in-action and 14,000+ wounded in 2015. They have already incurred that many combat deaths so far in 2016, though the number of wounded is significantly lower than in 2015. The approach of winter will slow combat operations, so the overall number of casualties for the year may not exceed the 2015 total.

The rough killed-to-wounded ratio of 3 to 1 for Afghan forces for 2016 is lower than in 2015, and does not compare favorably to rates of 9 to 1 and 13 to 1 for U.S. Army and Marine forces in combat from 2001-2012. This likely reflects a variety of factors, including rudimentary medical care and forces operating in exposed locations. It also suggests that even though the U.S. has launched over 700 air strikes, already more than the 500 carried out in all of 2015, there is still insufficient fire support for Afghan troops in contact

Insurgents are also fighting for control of more of the countryside than in 2015. The Afghan government has lost 2.2% of its territory so far this year. It controls or influences 258 of 407 total districts (63.4%), while insurgents control or influence 33 (8.1%),  and 116 are “contested” (28.5%).

sigur-03The overall level of violence presents a mixed picture. Security incidents between 20 May 20 and 15 August 2016 represent a 4.7% increase over the same period last year, but a 3.6% decrease from the same period in 2014.

sigur-01The next U.S. president will face some difficult policy choices going forward. There are 9,800 U.S. troops slated to remain the country through the end of 2016, as part of an international training and counterterrorism force of 13,000. While the Afghan government resumed secret peace talks with the Taliban insurgents, a political resolution does not appear imminent. There appear to be no appealing strategic options or obvious ways forward for ending involvement in the longest of America’s ongoing wars against violent extremism.

They are on Schedule

Well, they are on schedule: iraqi-forces-attempt-first-push-mosul

Two weeks ago Peshmerga Brigadier General Sidwan Barzani (nephew of the president and telecom millionaire) said that there would be a two-week advance and a six-week mop up. So far, they appear to be on schedule. I do note that a number of the talking heads on U.S. TV seemed to discount this prediction.

Anyhow, they have entered the eastern suburbs of Mosul today (Monday). We shall see if this is over in six weeks.

Syria and Iraq After The Islamic State

As Iraqi forces close in on the northern city of Mosul, the commander of U.S Joint Task Force-INHERENT RESOLVE, Army Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend, indicated on Wednesday that preparations are being accelerated for isolating Raqaa, Syria, the capital of the Islamic State. The attack could begin within two weeks, The Daily Beast’s Nancy Youssef reported on Thursday. Townsend stated that the timing is being influenced by evidence of Daesh planning for terrorist attacks on unidentified targets in the West.

According to Townsend, the projected offensive against Raqaa will include elements of the Syrian Kurd YPG militia. “The only force that is capable on any near term timeline are the Syrian Democratic Forces, of which the YPG are a significant portion,” Townsend said. “We’ll move soon to isolate Raqqa with the forces that are ready to go.”

Although YPG has not stated whether it is willing to participate in an attack on Raqaa, Turkey has expressed its opposition to involving the Syrian Kurds, which it says will “endanger the future of Syria.” Turkey is actively fighting a domestic Kurdish insurgency and has launched military strikes on Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish forces.

The U.S.’s willingness to back the Syrian Kurdish forces over Turkey’s objections are a clear harbinger of the challenges facing the region even after Mosul and Raqaa are liberated from Daesh control. Liberating Raqaa will not end the civil war in Syria and will not spell the end of Daesh. Daesh forces still control wide swaths of territory in Syria. Will the U.S. remain committed to fighting Daesh in Syria after Raqaa falls?

U.S. and Iraqi military leaders have predicted that Daesh will continue to wage an insurgency in Iraq as a potent guerilla force. After Mosul falls, the Iraqi government faces the prospect of a grinding, open-ended counterinsurgency effort fueled by unresolved sectarian divisions. Is the U.S. prepared to maintain its support for open-ended Iraqi counterinsurgency operations after Mosul is recaptured?

Interwoven into these questions are bigger, regional questions. Will the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds be allowed political autonomy in those parts of Syria and Iraq liberated from Daesh control? Will the Free Syrian Forces become the de-facto government over the parts of Syria not under Assad’s control? What is Iraqi Kurdistan’s future in Iraq? While the liberation of Mosul and Raqaa will constitute manifest defeats for Daesh, these forthcoming victories do not appear that they will be decisive in resolving the ongoing local and regional political conflicts.

Wounded-To-Killed Ratios

Some wounded-to-killed ratios drawn from my upcoming book War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat. I have an entire chapter on the subject in my book (Chapter Fifteen: Casualties). This first chart is from Trevor Dupuy’s Attrition:

table01

A table I created to compare U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps ratios:

table02

A tabled I created looking at the U.S. units the I Corps area of Vietnam. This is after the Tet offensive, and these units are operating side-by-side and listed from north to south. The 1st Bde, 5th ID was up at the DMZ while the 23rd (Americal) Division was in the southern part of I Corps:

table03

And finally the ratios from Iraq and Afghanistan. Note these are higher ratios compared to what is reported in the previous post for the Iraqi Army and the Peshmerga.

table04

This is why the Iraq Army and Peshmerga wounded-to-kill ratio in the previous post caught my attention.

NOTES

[1] Table from Attrition: Forecasting Battles Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War, page 49. The dates for the wars were added by this author.

Body Counts

Have some estimate of losses from the operations around Mosul. See: us-general-says-800-900-fighters-killed-mosul

This operations have been going on since Monday, October 17, so I am guessing they cover a 10 day or so period.

A few factoids:

  1. Up to 900 Islamic State fighters killed (source: Gen. Joseph Votel, who heads the U.S. Central Command).
  2. There are between 3,500 – 5,000 ISIL fighters in Mosul (I assume we have not really engaged them yet).
  3. Up to another 2,000 ISIL fighters in the broader area (I assume this is who they have been fighting).
  4. As of late Tuesday Iraq Army had lost 57 killed and 255 or so wounded.
  5. For the Kurdish Peshmerga the numbers are 30 killed and 70- 100 wounded.

Let me do a little back-of-the-envelope calculations here:

  1. 900 ISIL killed versus 87 allied killed = 10.3-to-1 exchange ratio. This seems high.
  2. Wounded-to-killed ratio Iraq Army = 4.47 wounded per killed (this seems low)
  3. Wounded-to-killed ratio Peshmerga = 3.33 wounded per killed (this seems low)
  4. Wounded-to-killed ratio ISIL…unknown, but with 900 killed then are there 1,800 are 2,700 wounded…or are there no wounded?
  5. If there are wounded, then if total ISIL casualties (killed, wounded and missing) are 2,700 – 3,600 and there are 2,000 ISIL fighters in the broader area…..then…….

The body count seems high. What appeared to be more relevant in Vietnam was the number of rifles and other personal weapons taken after the battle. The assumption was that most dead warriors left a weapon on the battlefield. Often the weapon count was less than half the estimated number of killed.

It appears that the estimate of 900 ISIL killed may be high and the Iraq Army and Peshmerga reports of wounded are low. This seems to happen a lot.