Category Air Warfare

F-22 vs F-15

Hard to pass by this article: http://www.businessinsider.com/watch-one-f-22-five-f-15s-2017-3

This video at the end shows one F-22 in a simulated exercise in 2003 against five F-15s. Spoiler alert: The F-22 wins. Apparently the F-15s could not see or get a lock on the Raptor, effectively allowing it to freely shot them without receiving any return fire (meaning missiles).

This has also been the case in the past, like in the 1980s when U.S. F-14s engaged Libyan MIGs over the Gulf of Sirte.

U.S. Army Record Keeping

The Dupuy Institute was involved in three record keeping contracts done for the U.S. Army from 1998-2000. This effort generated six reports. They are:

R-1: U.S. Army Records Survey (March 1999)

R-2: Records Management Survey Meeting (Oct. 20 1998)

R-3: War Records Workshop (March 23, 1999)

R-4: U.S. Army Force XXI Records Analysis (March 2000)

R-5: Analysis of U.S. Army Force XXI Record Keeping (May 2000)

R-6: Final Report of the Test Record Redesign Matrix (June 15, 2000)

The list of TDI publications is here: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tdipub3.htm

This work came about because I was working in the Vietnam records in 1968-1970 for the I Corps area and saw how poorly they were kept. They were the worst U.S. Army records I had ever seen. The U.S. Army World War II combat records were much better kept, and they were at least as busy at the time. In fact, U.S. Army records during Red Cloud’s War (1866-1868) were much better. Hundred year later, the U.S. Army records were incomplete, majors potions of the records had been thrown away, there were significant gaps in the daily operational reports, basic statistical data was missing, etc.

We ended up flagging this issue up to senior leadership in the Army, and were pleasantly surprised when they gave us a contract to look further into it. We ended up doing a survey of U.S. Army record keeping at that time (the peacekeeping effort in Bosnia was the major operation going on).

Several years later, well after we had completed our work, we did go back to the Army to recommend that we do a second survey. This time “the suits” showed up at the meeting (senior SES government managers) and assured the command that everything was fine, they had it under control and another survey was not needed. I am not sure the general we were talking to believed them, but this was the end of the discussion. We went back to analyzing warfare instead of record keeping.

Spotted this article today in the Military Times. It is worth reading in its entirety: http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/airstrikes-unreported-syria-iraq-afghanistan-islamic-state-al-qaeda-taliban

The problem may be as simple as the Army was not sharing its record keeping of helicopter sorties and drone strikes with the Air Force. If that is the problem, then it can be simply corrected. I kind of doubt it is that simple.

Anyhow, record keeping is not as exciting as tanks, but it is part of the nuts-and-bolts issues of running an army.

The Yemen Raid

Hard to ignore this one. According to White House reports 14 members of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) were killed. We lost one person, three  four injured and a $70 million Osprey. There were 10, 15, or 16 civilians killed. According to one report there were a total of 30 people killed (14 + 16 = 30?).

A few news reports:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/civilians-likely-killed-us-raid-yemen-pentagon-014654537.html

This article provides the figures of 16 civilians killed (8 women and 8 children)

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/us-military-probing-more-possible-civilian-deaths-in-yemen-raid_us_5892bf5de4b0af07cb6b8930?

This article provides the estimate of 30 people killed at the site, including 10 civilians. It also say at least 15 civilians killed, according to U.S. military officials. “The military officials who spoke to Reuters on condition of anonymity said “a brutal firefight” killed Owens and at least 15 Yemeni women and children.” It also notes that “Some of the women were firing at the U.S. force, Pentagon spokesman Captain Jeff Davis told reporters.”

Also:

U.S. military officials….said, the attacking SEAL team found itself dropping onto a reinforced Al Qaeda base defended by landmines, snipers, and a larger than expected contingent of heavily armed Islamist extremists.

One of the three U.S. officials said on-the-ground surveillance of the compound was “minimal, at best.”

“The decision was made—to leave it to the incoming administration, partly in the hope that more and better intelligence could be collected,” that official said.

There were two Osprey’s used in the raid. One suffered engine failure (remember Operation Eagle Claw: Operation_Eagle_Claw).

The UK Guardian is more direct: http://theweek.com/speedreads/677442/trumps-disastrous-first-military-strike-previously-been-rejected-by-Obama

[Colonel John] Thomas said he did not know why the prior administration did not authorize the operation, but said the Obama administration had effectively exercised a “pocket veto” over it.

A former official said the operation had been reviewed several times, but the underlying intelligence was not judged strong enough to justify the risks, and the case was left to the incoming Trump administration to make it own judgment.”

Colonel Thomas is the Central Command spokesman:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-acknowledges-civilian-deaths-in-trump-authorized-yemen-raid/2017/02/01/e1f56c3c-e8e0-11e6-80c2-30e57e57e05d_story.html?utm_campaign=pubexchange&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=huffingtonpost.com&utm_term=.76e64d7a6149

Anyhow, I think people will be talking about this one for a while.

 

DOD Successfully Tests Micro-Drones

The Defense Department announced yesterday a successful test of the world’s largest micro-drone swarm. Conducted at China Lake, California in October 2016 by the DOD’s Strategic Capabilities Office, in partnership with Naval Air Systems Command, three F/A-18 Super Hornets launched 103 Perdix micro-drones. According to the DOD press release, “the micro-drones demonstrated advanced swarm behaviors such as collective decision-making, adaptive formation flying, and self-healing.”

The micro-drone swarm comprises an autonomous system.

“Due to the complex nature of combat, Perdix are not pre-programmed synchronized individuals, they are a collective organism, sharing one distributed brain for decision-making and adapting to each other like swarms in nature,” said [Strategic Capabilities Office] Director William Roper. “Because every Perdix communicates and collaborates with every other Perdix, the swarm has no leader and can gracefully adapt to drones entering or exiting the team.”

The Perdix micro-drones were originally designed by Massachusetts Institute of Technology engineering students, and modified for military use by the MIT Lincoln Laboratory in 2013.

To get an idea of the military potential of this technology, watch the demo video tracking the simulated mission.

In related news, the U.S. Army Research Laboratory and Georgia Technical Institute is developing the capability for soldiers in the field to 3D-print swarms of mini-drones to specific specifications within 24 hours. As reported by Defense One,

“A soldier with a mission need uses a computer terminal to rapidly design a suitable [drone],” says a poster by project chief engineer Zacarhy Fisher. “That design is then manufactured using automated processes such as laser cutting and 3D printing. The solution is sent back to the soldier and is deployed.”

Inspired by the modular adaptability of Legos, Fisher says the each drone could be fabricated in less than a day, with total turnaround time of less than three days.

Economics of Warfare 1

If you look at our “Interesting Links” down towards the bottom of the right side of the page, you will see a link to a blog called Wars, Numbers and Human Losses with the byline “The Truth Counts”: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

This is the blog of Professor of Economics Michael Spagat of England’s Royal Holloway University. He is American. We think highly of Dr. Spagat’s work. In particular, there a series of blog posts that publish the lectures of his course “Economics of Warfare.” A look at the first lecture is worthwhile: economics-of-warfare-lecture-1

The link to the lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%201.pdf

A couple of highlights:

  1. Slides 13 & 14 on the causes of casualties among civilians in Iraq.
  2. Slide 20 is damn interesting. More on civilian casualties over the first years of the Iraq War.

For those few who have read my book America’s Modern Wars, I do address civilian casualties, primarily in Chapter 9 “Rules of Engagement and Measurements of Brutality.”

Over 50,000 killed

OK…latest estimate from DOD is that they have killed over 50,000 ISIL fighters over the last two years: Body count = 50K+

Here is my post on the subject in August when the count was a mere 45,000: some-back-of-the-envelope-calculations

I don’t think I have much more to add to this without getting very sarcastic. Note that they refer to it as a “conservative estimate.”  Something does not add up somewhere (either their loss estimates are way too high or their force size estimates have been way too low).

Slow and Low

Slow progress in retaking Mosul and low casualties: mosul-battle

A couple of points that caught my attention:

  1. “Baghdad doesn’t release official casualty figures, but some medics estimate that it is at least in the low dozens.”
  2. “As of late October, US officials said ISIS had lost roughly 900 fighters.”
  3. From 17 October to 1 November, 2,400 precision bombs, artillery rounds, missiles, and rockets were launched into the Mosul area.

So, Iraqi casualties less than 60?…..I have some doubts about the claimed 900 ISIL fighters killed.

Now….tempted to count number of bombs, artillery rounds, etc. per ISIL fighter killed….but not sure this is a particularly meaningful metric.

Anyhow, Mosul is effectively isolated. The main roads have been cut. I gather there is a open area of desert to the west that is not occupied, but any significant movement in the open with our airplanes and drones overhead is probably not advisable. This is fundamentally a mop-up operation, and not surprisingly, it is going slow and with low casualties. We shall see if they take the city in 6 weeks or so.

I still wonder how many ISIL fighters they actually left behind in Mosul.

Colonel Toon

One more article from The National Interest, this one is from the past about the “famous” North Vietnamese Ace: Colonel Toon: The Legend the Vietnam Wars Mystery Fighter Ace

I remember one company even issued out a plastic model of the MIG flown by Col. Toon. Such is the stuff of legends.

Wikipedia has a list of Vietnam War flying aces: List of Vietnam War flying aces

The guy third on that list served 7 years in prison for taking $2.4 million in bribes.  A pretty sad end to a career. He also supposedly shot down Col. Toon (and they made a documentary of this dog fight).

 

SU-35 Flanker vs F-15 Eagle

Another comparative analysis article from The National Interest: America’s F-15 Eagle vs Russia’s Su-35 fighter: Who Wins?

This article lacks the depth of the nicely done article in the Armata Tank vs the M-1 Abrams Tank and the TOW missile. A few points:

  1. F-15C Eagle is now nearly 40 years old.
  2. It may be in service for another 20 years.
  3. The Flanker-E clearly has the advantage at low speeds.
  4. The F-15C and F-15E have the advantage at long ranges.
  5. I gather the author considers them overall roughly equal.

But the lines that catch my attention are:

“More likely to happen is that a F-15 would run into a Su-35 operated by some Third World despot. The pilots are not likely to have the training, tactics or experience to fight against an American aviator with a realistic chance of winning.”

I am not sure which “Third World despots” he is considering for his analysis. Indonesia is a democracy. Indonesia is not on bad terms with the U.S. I gather only Russia has the SU-35 with China and Indonesia having ordered them. Indonesia is using them to replace their aging fleet of U.S. F-5E Tiger IIs. The initial buy is something like 8 planes. Perhaps Algeria, Egypt, India, Pakistan, or Vietnam may purchase them at some point, but these are also not countries we are likely to conflict with. It does not appear that places like North Korea, Venezuela, and what remains of the government of Syria is going to obtain them (although Russia deployed at least 4 Su-35s in Syria). I think the author of the article probably needs to re-examine who is actually going to have and use these aircraft. So far, it seems to be only Russia, China (24 of them) and Indonesia (8 of them).

What does A2/AD look like?

r2d2

A2/AD stands for anti-access/aerial denial. There is a recently published article from The National Interest that laid out a potential scenario concerning such an effort in the Baltic Sea. It is only 4-pages and makes for a good read: Entering the Bear’s Lair: Russia’s A2/D2 Bubble in the Baltic Sea

There are a number of NATO members on the Baltic Sea: Denmark, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Non-NATO members are Sweden, Finland and Russia.

Kaliningrad is part of Russia. It is the old German city of Konigsberg and surrounding former Prussian territory. It was given to the Soviet Union at the end of World War II and they attached it to Russian SFSR (which became the independent country of Russia in 1991). The Kaliningrad Oblast had a population of 941,873 in 2010. It is named after the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mikhail Kalinin (1975-1946), one of the original Bolsheviks.

baltic

This keys off of the previous post by Shawn about the “Third Offset Strategy,” of which A2/AD is a part of.