Category Iraq

Situation Currently in Afghanistan

I have not blogged about Afghanistan in a while, since:

Some Statistics on Afghanistan (April 2020) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Will probably be a addressing it more in the near future. There was New York Times article today that I thought was worthwhile. It is here: The Taliban Close In on Afghan Cities, Pushing the Country to the Brink

One of the odd things when we were doing the insurgency work on Iraq and our later more theoretical insurgency work, we never were asked by our various contracting agencies to look at Afghanistan in particular. This is odd, as we kind of nailed the prediction on Iraq (see Chapter One of America’s Modern Wars). In the end I do have a chapter on Afghanistan in that book and were asked to brief the military advisor to the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in late 2005 and again in late 2008. This also lead to a briefing with the Chairman of NIC.

I still think there is value in having us do an independent analysis of the situation in light of our correct predictions for Iraq and Bosnia (see Appendix II of America’s Modern Wars). I also have a very brief chapter in my book on “Withdrawal and War Termination.” Needless to say, this was a subject I proposed to several agencies that we do more work on, and there was absolutely no interest. So instead I write books. Now, I don’t control the budget over at DOD and other agencies. Sometimes their priorities mystify me.

Old Questions

We have over a thousand posts on this blog. Always interesting to go back and look a few of these older ones.

We had one blog post that simply asked on 9 November, 2016, after Donald Trump had been elected: What was going to be his foreign policy/national security policy. The old post is here: Questions | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The answers are:

1D (Afghanistan: Decrease U.S. effort)

2B (Iraq: Decrease U.S. effort)

3B (Syria: Decrease U.S. effort)

4C (Ukraine: Keep the same)

5C (Russia: Try to tone it down)

6D (NATO: Force our NATO allies to contribute more)

7B (Georgia: Continue working with them: Partnership for Peace)

8A (Iran: Cancel current deal and try to renegotiate)

9A (Yemen: Keep the same (remain disengaged))

10? (War on Terror)

11A (Defense Budget: Increase defense budget)

12? (East Asia)

13A (Trade: TTP cancelled)

14D (Oil and Climate Change: Interest and funding for clean energy declined)

 

It was followed-up on by this post on 14 December 2016: Questions II | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Mortality Rates of the Coronavirus by Country

In my morbid fascination with casualty rates it is hard for me not look at the statistics on the coronavirus and not calculate morbidity rates. Here are the stats:

Country…………………….Cases……..Deaths………Rate

World Wide…………………82,548…….2,810……………3.41%

China………………………..78,497…….2,744……………3.50%

S. Korea……………………..1,766…………13……………0.74%

Italy……………………………..528…………14…………..2.65%

Iran……………………………..245…………26…………10.61%

Japan…………………………..189…………..3……………1.59%
Singapore………………………93

Hong Kong……………………..92……………2……………2.17

United States…………………..60

Kuwait…………………………..43

Thailand………………………..40

Bahrain…………………………33

Taiwan………………………….32……………1…………….3.13

Germany……………………….26

Australia………………………..23

Malaysia……………………….22

France………………………….18……………2…………….11.11

Vietnam………………………..16

Philippines………………………3……………1…………….33.33

Cruise ships…………………705……………4………………0.57

Other countries……………..117

 

Data is from Johns Hopkins CSSE as of 9:03.03 this morning. It is here: Johns Hopkins CSSE

Now, it is suspected that the number of cases are underreported. There are people that get sick and recover that are never reported. Don’t know how many this is. Suspect that the population of unreported cases exceeds the population of reported cases. Have no data to support that suspicion.

A few takeaways are:

  1. Mortality rate worldwide is around 3.49%
    1. If the number of unreported cases is equal to the number of reported cases, then the real mortality rate is half that.
  2. Mortality rate is China is 3.50%
  3. Mortality rate in South Korea is 0.74%.
    1. This is a significant difference
    2. It may be a result of better health care
    3. It may be a result of early detection and quick treatment
    4. It may be a result of better statistical collection on number of cases.
    5. Is probably a combination of all three.
    6. The point it, it is less than 1% with a significant number of cases. So this is the standard that is achievable.
  4. Mortality rate of Italy is 2.65%
    1. Italian health care is good…so…
    2. Does this mean that there are still a lot of unreported cases out there?
      1. So Italy may have over a 1,000 cases?
  5. Mortality rate of Iran is 10.61%
    1. Now the Iranian health care system may not be as good as S.Korea and Italy…but….
    2. This strongly indicates that there is a large number of unreported cases.
      1. Maybe also over a 1,000 cases?
  6. Just for reference the mortality rate of the flu is something like 0.1%.

 

While S. Korea and Italy are tragic and concerning, what really scares me is the uncontrolled outbreak in Iran. If there are over a thousand cases and it is not locked down and controlled, then it can spread, both in Iran and out of Iran. Iran’s neighbor to the west in Iraq (which reports 6 cases). Iraq is a country that is not always in good order. To their west is Syria, which is in civil war. What happens if the coronavirus arrives in a country in civil war. What containment is there? What government run health care is there?

To the east of Iran is Afghanistan (which reports 1 case) and Pakistan (which reports 2 cases). What happens if it spreads there? Afghanistan is in civil war as are parts of Pakistan. Are the Taliban really going to implement thorough and complete containment and provide proper healthcare?

So while the virus may be able to be contained in places like S. Korea and Italy, is it going to be contained in places like Iran, Iran, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan? Will this then become a permanent source of further transmission of the virus to the rest of the world, generating periodic outbreaks elsewhere and forcing systematic containment efforts for years to come?

Blast Injuries in Iraq

Photograph taken by Official War Photographer at an Australian Advanced Dressing Station near Ypres in 1917. The wounded soldier in the lower left of the photograph has the “thousand yard stare” indicative of shell-shock.

There were at least 50 people who suffered blast injuries from the Iranian missile attacks in Iraq. These are referred to by the acronym TBI for traumatic brain injuries. There were around 200 people in that blast zone who were screened for symptoms.

See: https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/28/politics/50-injuries-iran-strike/index.html

Of those 18 were evacuated to Germany for further evaluation and treatment and I gather at least 8 of these were then evacuated to the U.S. If the injury was serious enough to require evacuation out of the war zone, then this is clearly something a whole lot worse than a “headache.”

Blast injuries have been an ongoing problem in our combat forces for the better part of two decades. Some of this has been brought about by the extensive use of IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of these IEDs are tied to artillery shells and other large amounts of explosives, resulting in a significant blast. People can be “lightly wounded” in the traditional sense, and still have significant injuries from the blast.

Added to that, we now have a better understanding of the significance of these brain injuries, including concussions. This is not only from combat, but also from such contact sports as American Football and hockey. Hockey has instituted significant concussion protocols and this is now something that is monitored at both the junior levels and more advance levels of hockey. It is no more a matter of just getting rattled, shaking it off and keep on playing. American Football is still struggling to address these issues, especially with the large number of professional players reporting long term brain injuries. Needless to say, brain injures from blast can be significant and have long-term debilitating affects.

This of course is not entirely new, but we are just now beginning to understand the full extent and nature of TBIs. In World War I they used to talk about “shell shock.”

See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_shock

The Snowballing Effects of a Virus?

Again, this is not my area of expertise, since I’m mostly into Pfizer stock speculation and such, but as the Coronavirus does not seem to be going away any time soon, probably worthwhile to look at the effects of such a disease if it continues to expand, beyond the issues of health and mortality.

Economic Effects in China: Right now, around 60 million people are in partial or full lock down. The current population of China is over 1.4 billion, so this is 4% of the population. So lets say that their economic activity is reduced by at least 20% (it may be more). Let us say this is a ripple effect that impacts three times that amount of people (as they certainly trade with others). The most immediate economic impact of the virus is on consumption and travel. So 0.12 x 0.8 = 0.96 or basically a 1% decline in the Chinese economy/growth rate. The Chinese economy is growing at around 6% a year. Now, if this virus lasts for three months, it is simply a blip on the charts. If it lasts the better part of a year, we will see a reduction in the growth rate of the economy. On the other hand, if the virus continues to spread and more people and cities are on lock down, then the economic impact could be more significant.

Note: These are all the companies who have shut down operations….

International Economics: The Chinese economy now makes up 16% of the world economy. They are certainly the manufacturing hub in many industries (for example, my first Kursk book was printed there). So, any disruption in the Chinese economy will result in a decline worldwide. These fears were amplified this last Monday morning when the DOW declined by over 500 points, which is almost a 2% drop. Now it was recorded somewhat and as of 1:00 PM on Monday was at 337 (1.16%). Still this shows the economic impact on the markets. Of course, the market going down 1 or 2% does not mean the economy is in decline, but it does indicate that this is a global concern.

Oil Prices: U.S. oil prices were down on Monday morning by nearly 2% also to $53.13 a barrel. Now oil prices directly affect consumers as we can see the fluctuations from day to day at the gas pump, but…..if also significantly impacts the economy of Russia, which relies heavily upon taxes on oil and natural gas for its budget. As of 1 PM on Monday, the exchange rate for rubles to dollars went from 62 rubles to 63 rubles.

Internal Stability in China: Keep in mind that China had a major internal unrest incident in 1989 with Tiananmen Square. They have been hesitant since then to run over people with tanks. More to the point, the continued growth of the Chinese economy has dampened much of the political and internal unrest, and will probably continue to do so as long as the economy continues to grow. Many people (and I am one of them) does consider that the development of a capitalist economy under control of a communist regime is a fundamental contradiction that at some point will lead to political unrest. This was the case 30 years ago, and if the economy stagnates or decline, I have no doubt will be the case again. Added to that, right now there has been an extended pro-democracy protest in the Chinese city of Hong Kong that has not been resolved. Is this an isolated case, being a former British colony; or is it the first of many others? I do get the sense that the stability of China is not guaranteed and could be quickly become an issue if the economy declines.

Internal Stability of Russia: The Russian economy is tied to oil prices, maybe not as much as Iran and Saudi Arabia, but enough that this is a big issue. In 2012 oil, gas and petroleum products account for over 70% of their total exports. Russia already had one extended economic decline from 2014-2015 where is actually saw its GDP decline by 3.7% in 2015. This is significant. We do note today that the when the stock markets declined by over 1%, the price of oil declined by 2% and the ruble declined by 2% also. So……what happens if the decline continues? The Russian GDP grew by only 1.2% in 2019. The next Russian election is in 2024, so they have some time to ride out any problems, but as they are busy changing the constitution into who knows what; then if we actually do see a significant decline in the Russian economy over an extended time, then the elections, or even internal stability, could become an issue.

Ukraine and sanctions and such: Not unrelated to the Russian economic problems are the sanctions imposed by the U.S. and European as a result of its actions in Ukraine, including the seizure of Crimea. This have been an issue since then, both in Russia and in U.S. politics. Needless to say, if the Russian economy declines, these issues will remain at the forefront.

Iran and Iraq: Cannot help but notice that Iran has a lot of internal turmoil and unrest, in addition to occasional head-to-head confrontations with the U.S. The Iranian economy is also heavily tied to the price of oil. Nothing fuels a protest movement like a declining economy. One could also say the same of Iraq. Of course, we have troops in Iraq.

Current Deployment of Patriot Missile Battalions

Our air defense artillery assets consists of Patriot, THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) and the SHORAD (Short Range Air Defense) battalions and batteries, among other elements.

A Patriot Missile Battalion consists of four or five Patriot Missile Batteries. A Patriot Missile Battery consists of four or six launchers, each with four missiles. The United States has 16 Patriot battalions. There is one battalion in Germany and three battalions in South Korea and I gather at least one battery in the Gulf (not sure which). I gather the most elements of the other 11 battalions are in the U.S. As of 2010 it was reported that the U.S. Army operates a total of 1,106 Patriot launchers (1,106/16 = 60 launchers per battalion). According to a count developed from multiple open sources, our air defense battalions and batteries are located at:

Baumholder, Germany

5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriots)

5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (equipped with 36 Avenger SHORAD systems, with 36 in prepositioned storage).

 

Fort Bliss, Texas:

1st Battalion/43rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

2nd Battalion/43rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

3rd Battalion/43rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

5th Battalion/52rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

Battery A, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

Battery B, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

Battery E, 3rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

Battery A, 4th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

 

Guam:

Battery A, 5th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

 

Fort Sill, Oklahoma

3rd Battalion, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

4th Battalion, 3rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

5th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar)

2nd Battalion, 6th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (C-RAM, Sentinal, Stinger/Avenger)

3rd Battalion, 6th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

 

Fort Hood, Texas

4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

1st Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

1st Battalion, 62nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

3rd Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot/Avenger?)

1st Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

 

Fort Campbell, Kentucky

2nd Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery Rgt  (Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar)

 

Suwon Air Base, South Korea

6th Battalion, 52nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

2nd Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

D Battery, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THADD)

1st Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

 

Location unknown:

B Battery, 62nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD) – activated 2016

 

This listing does not include National Guard units. It is also not definitive.

So Where are the Patriots?

We just got “shelled” by a dozen ballistic missiles fired from Iran to Iraq. These are the type of things that could be stopped by Patriot surface-to-air (SAM) missiles. Apparently we were given a heads up that the missiles were coming.

Not sure if we have any Patriot missile batteries deployed in Iraq. During the build up in May and June, we did deploy at least one Patriot battery to the Gulf. I assume they are still there defending facilities in the Gulf States. Do we have any Patriot missile batteries in Iraq?

Current U.S. and Allied Forces in the Gulf (mid-June 2019)

And:

Did The Patriot BMD Miss Again In Saudi Arabia?

One notes that the recent Iranian attack on the Saudi oil facilities on 14 September 2019 was not intercepted even though Saudi Arabia has six battalions of Patriot missiles and we also have at least one battery in the Gulf.

So did we have Patriots deployed in Iraq? If we did have them available, then did we decide not to use them?

 

 

P.S. (added at 1:40 9 Jan 2020): 3 Hours from Alert to Attacks

  1. We had a three hour alert
  2. There were no Patriot batteries deployed to protect the Ain Al-Asad base
  3. 16 missiles were fired at Ain Al-Asad base.

Size of Theater

Seeing how Iran and Iraq are back in the news (as I suspect so will be the Persian Gulf), let me just remind everyone the size of these “theaters.”

………………….Iraq………….Iran…………Persian Gulf……Texas……Lake Superior
Area (sq. km)…437,072……..1,648,195……251,000…………..696,241…….82,000

Population…….38,433,600…82,531,700……N/A……………..28,995,881…….N/A

GDP …………..$250 Billion…$458 Billion……N/A……………..$1,819 Billion….N/A

Texas is the second largest state in the U.S. (behind Alaska) and the second most populous state in the U.S. (behind California). Lake Superior is the largest fresh water lake in the world. Or to put it relative to Europe:

………………….Iraq……………Iran………..Persian Gulf…….France……..Baltic Sea
Area (sq. km)…437,072……….1,648,195…251,000……………551,695……..1,641,650

Population…….38,433,600……82,531,700….N/A………………64,834,000…….N/A

GDP ……………$250 Billion…$458 Billion….N/A………………$2,707 Billion….N/A

The area and population given is for “Metropolitan France,” meaning those parts of France that are in Europe.

Casualty Estimates for Conflict with Iran

I noted today, via tweet from President Trump, that “..when I asked, how many will die. 150 people, sir, was the answer from a General.”

Now, we have done a few casualty estimates for conflicts: 1) The 1991 Gulf War estimate done by Trevor Dupuy that was briefed to the House Armed Services committee in 1990 and was the source of his book If War Comes, 2)  the Bosnia casualty estimate that The Dupuy Institute did for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JSC) in 1995. This is discussed in depth in Appendix II of America’s Modern Wars, and 3) The Iraq casualty estimate that we did in 2004 for Center of Army Analysis (CAA) and OSD Net Assessment. This is discussed in depth in the first Chapter of America’s Modern Wars. So, we know something about casualty estimation and actually have a documented, provable track record.

We have no idea what casualty estimation was done for a strike or conflict with Iran. We have not been involved in that. Most likely, if a properly developed casualty estimation was done, it was done with a range of results. For example, our Bosnia estimate was that in the case of an extended deployment (which is what was done) it was estimated that there was a 50% chance that U.S. killed from all causes in Bosnia in the first year would be below 17 (12 combat deaths and 5 non-combat fatalities) and a 90% chance U.S. killed would be below 25 (see page 308 in America’s Modern Wars).

So, I am guessing that President Trump was not told that there would be 150 killed, he was probably given a range of estimates, of which that was probably the upper boundary of that range. Still, these numbers get people’s attention. I gave a briefing one morning on our Iraq estimate after a three-day weekend…and as one colonel commented during the briefing “This is a hell of a briefing to wake up to after a long weekend.” (see page 18, America’s Modern Wars).

Combat Adjudication

As I stated in a previous post, I am not aware of any other major validation efforts done in the last 25 years other than what we have done. Still, there is one other effort that needs to be mentioned. This is described in a 2017 report: Using Combat Adjudication to Aid in Training for Campaign Planning.pdf

I gather this was work by J-7 of the Joint Staff to develop Joint Training Tools (JTT) using the Combat Adjudication Service (CAS) model. There are a few lines in the report that warm my heart:

  1. “It [JTT] is based on and expanded from Dupuy’s Quantified Judgement Method of Analysis (QJMA) and Tactical Deterministic Model.”
  2. “The CAS design used Dupuy’s data tables in whole or in part (e.g. terrain, weather, water obstacles, and advance rates).”
  3. “Non-combat power variables describing the combat environment and other situational information are listed in Table 1, and are a subset of variables (Dupuy, 1985).”
  4. “The authors would like to acknowledge COL Trevor N. Dupuy for getting Michael Robel interested in combat modeling in 1979.”

Now, there is a section labeled verification and validation. Let me quote from that:

CAS results have been “Face validated” against the following use cases:

    1. The 3:1 rules. The rule of thumb postulating an attacking force must have at least three times the combat power of the defending force to be successful.
    2. 1st (US) Infantry Divison vers 26th (IQ) Infantry Division during Desert Storm
    3. The Battle of 73 Easting: 2nd ACR versus elements of the Iraqi Republican Guards
    4. 3rd (US) Infantry Division’s first five days of combat during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

Each engagement is conducted with several different terrain and weather conditions, varying strength percentages and progresses from a ground only engagement to multi-service engagements to test the effect of CASP [Close Air Support] and interdiction on the ground campaign. Several shortcomings have been detected, but thus far ground and CASP match historical results. However, modeling of air interdiction could not be validated.

So, this is a face validation based upon three cases. This is more than what I have seen anyone else do in the last 25 years.