Category Lessons of History

9 Books

Finally here is a picture of all nine of my published books. It includes two copies of The Battle for Kyiv, as one is the hardback and one is the paperback version. The paperback version does have some revisions and an expanded photo section.

We are looking to add two more books to that collection in the next six months. An additional book on the Russo-Ukrainian War should be out in the next 2 to 3 months, and The Battle of Tolstoye Woods should be out hopefully this spring. The editing process on all my books is slow, primarily because the large amount of charts, tables and tabular data in them that are a pain to edit and proof.

A Friendly Fire Discussion

I have decided to turn one of my email discussions I was having with several people into a blog post. As they got into a discussion of friendly fire (I gather based upon one addressee’s personal experience), I ended up making the following statement:

Friendly fire (FF):

1. The original figure that came out of WWII was 2% of the casualties were due to friendly fire (Beebe and Debakey?).

2. This was probably low.

3. Since WWII there has been no definitive studies on FF casualties that I am aware of.

4. It was much higher than 2% in the 1991 Gulf War.

5. In the 1990s Chuck Hawkins (Vietnam company commander) and Gene Visco (DUSA OR) did some preliminary work looking at FF casualties. They were attempting to get a contract to do an actual proper survey of the subject. That did not happen.

6. By default, the preliminary work by Hawkins and Visco (both deceased) is the only significant work on FF casualties that has been done since WWII. I may have a copy somewhere in my files. Not sure anything has been published or is on the internet. I think they presented their findings at ISMOR.

Dermot, you are welcome to discuss what the UK has done.

Dermot Rooney, the author of Slog or Swan (see: Slog or Swan – The Dupuy Institute) came back with the following response:

Here’s the Slog or Swan quote:

Meanwhile, fragile radio communications separated infantry and artillery, contributing to a high rate of fratricide. A Canadian study conducted during Veritable put the number of Allied casualties to friendly artillery at between seven and 21 percent of the total. The actions examined for the current assessment support splitting the difference at around 15 percent.¹¹ This figure is alarmingly close to the 19 percent attributed to German small arms, and considerably greater than the six percent benchmark for friendly fire casualties in a First World War barrage. Artillery fratricide was also a major factor in five of the failed attacks in the current assessment and, considering the tendency to underreport such events, was likely a factor in as many more. The high chance of fratricide very probably undermined the essential trust between infantryman and gunner, the coordination of fire and assault, and therefore the value of suppression.¹²

[11] This is another of those tantalising glimpses mentioned earlier. The figures are the extremes presented in Brigadier E. C. Plow’s study of munition fragments removed from casualties and could only be found in Appendix L of Copp’s Cinderella Army. Copp and Buckley opt for ‘as high as 19 percent’. Copp, Cinderella Army, pp.291, 338–340; Buckley, Monty’s Men, p.272.

[12] Contrary to the mines and mud narrative, the Canadian wounds study also found 4 percent of casualties were caused by the combination of mines and grenades, way behind German artillery, German small arms, and Allied artillery. J. B. Coates and J. C. Beyer (eds), Wound Ballistics in World War II: Supplemented by experiences in the Korean War (Washington: Office of the Surgeon General, 1962) has mines accounting for 0 to 10 percent of total casualties depending on the sampling method. The battle descriptions for this assessment suggest the effect of mines on advance rates was marginal and appears no greater than in other operations.

If anyone has a copy of any presentations made or write-ups done by Charles Hawkins or Gene Visco on fratricide, please forward them to me (LawrenceTDI@aol.com).

I do note that the links to Cornwallis Group, founded in 1996 by Gene Visco, is no longer connected to the ISMOR site. It does seem like we are losing knowledge. The earliest ISMOR link I can find is ISMOR 39 (with the Eugene Visco prize): ISMOR – ISMOR 39 | ORS. There were links to earlier ISMOR conferences and papers, and links in ISMOR to the Cornwallis Group, but I cannot find these.

Leavenworth Master’s Thesis on “Forecasting Approaches in Operations Desert Sheild and Desert Storm

In 2020 Major Aaron F. Anderson, a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth Kansas, published a master’s thesis called “Forecasting Approaches in Operations Desert Sheild and Desert Storm.” It was just sent to me. I was not aware of it even though the author quoted my book War by Numbers extensively. It is referenced 19 times in the paper, so of course, I have a bias towards it. Anyhow a link to the 45-page paper is here: Forecasting Approaches in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

Paper’s abstract:

Robert Helmbold has a second book out

Robert Helmbold, previously with RAND and a senior scientist at the Center for Army Analysis (CAA), has a new book coming out:

The Truth About Little Big Horn Finally Comes Out: Helmbold PhD, Robert L.: 9798280119437: Amazon.com: Books

It is his second book. His first one came out in 2021:

The Key to Victory: Machine Learning the Lessons of History: Helmbold PhD, Robert L.: 9798448616563: Amazon.com: Books

and

The Key to Victory: Machine Learning the Lessons of History – The Dupuy Institute

He is 93. Never too late to start publishing.

The Executive Order on “Restoring Truth and Sanity to American History”

The link provided here is the Presidential Executive Order signed yesterday on “Restoring Truth and Sanity to American History.” See: Restoring Truth and Sanity to American History – The White House

We have never done any work with the Smithsonian, or Department of Interior or National Park Service, so this has no impact on us. On the other hand, I am a historian “by trade,” so this does get my attention.

Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions

Christopher A. Lawrence
March 19, 2025

The link here is to Andy Marshall’s memorandum in August 1993 about “Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions – Second Version.” See: Unknown. It is eight pages long (and is repeated in this file).

I have decided to post it here primarily so I can easily find it for future reference. It is not posted here because I agree, disagree, or wish to debate the memo, I just want it somewhere so I can easily look it up. This memo was nominally the start of the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs). I have always believed in an EMA (Evolution in Military Affairs).

It is worth your while the read the entire memo and not to speed read it.

Related post: The Closing of OSD Net Assessment – The Dupuy Institute

I do note that he says in this 1993 memo that: “I believe that the most important thing for the next few years, given that we face no immediate large challenges, is to undertake a more active search for insights as to appropriate longer term changes in doctrine, concepts of operation, and organizational change.”

Lessons of History Research & Analysis

EMA versus RMA

Working on more than two books at the moment (not sure this is the best idea). Just proofing a chapter in one book on the Russo-Ukrainian War and noted the following paragraph I had written about the war. Is this meaningful dialogue or am I just stepping in it?

It has been claimed by one the authors that “Any war that lasts longer than six weeks becomes a war of attrition.”[1] This appear to be the case with this war. Six weeks of the dynamic maneuver warfare that made this modern military campaign looks vaguely like the revolution in military affairs (RMA) that some theorists had postulated. It had now ended. We now had transitioned into the next stage of the war, which looked much more like the typical day-by-day grind between extended front lines that more defined World War II. Eventually this would devolve down to something that looked more like World War I, leaving the RMA theorists surprisingly silent.[2]

[1] See Battle for Kyiv, page 204.

[2] Having worked in the U.S. defense analytical community for decades, we were all too familiar with the claims of the RMA theorists and their willingness to declare that warfare of the future was going to be nothing like the warfare of the past. As our specialty at The Dupuy Institute was analysis of historical data, this was particularly frustrating as they seemed dismiss the 3,300 years of military history as irrelevant, replaced by their appreciation of new technology and its proposed revolutionary impact on the battlefield. If anything has been established by the now extended war in Ukraine, is that there has not been a revolution in military affairs. New technology is clearly a factor in the war, but it is, shall we say, an evolution in military affairs (EMA) vice an RMA. As the author Jim Storr stated in a conversation in 2023 “Much of the story of the war in Ukraine is a story of old lessons learned again.”

Now, the shop inside the pentagon that supposedly taking the lead on the RMA was OSD Net Assessment, under the leadership of Dr. Andrew Marshall. The Dupuy Institute was contracted to them to evaluate some aspects of the RMA and did a study for this office on “Measuring the Value of Situational Awareness (2004).” This was a study of the combat effects of superior situational awareness based upon a detailed examination of 295 World War II division-level engagements. So at least Andy Marshall (nicknamed “Yoda”) had not dismissed the value of historical analysis and was willing to fund such work. Many of the other RMA theorist did not show such wisdom. Our report on situational awareness is available from The Dupuy Institute and is also summarized in two chapters in the book War by Numbers (2017).

We have sold out of Attrition

Christopher A. Lawrence
July 29, 2024

Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War is no longer for sale by The Dupuy Institute. We sent out our last two copies last week. We still hold copies of everything else listed here: Books – The Dupuy Institute

If you want Attrition, it is available on Amazon.com, but at a hefty price of $180: Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War: Dupuy, Trevor N.: 9780963869234: Amazon.com: Books. We sold our copies for $19.95.

There is little chance we will publish it again. The rights are held by the Dupuy family, not us. We sold 54 copies over the course of 9 years. This hardly justifies a new print run.

You were warned: We our down to our last 16 copies of Attrition – The Dupuy Institute. We did sell those 16 copies in 9 months.

Casualty estimation Dupuy's Theory of Combat Lessons of History Modeling, Simulation & Wargaming

The False Lessons of Modern War

Hard to ignore an article that name checks Trevor Dupuy and I. Attached is an article by William F. Owen in the British Army Review, Autumn 2023 Issue. I hope I am not breaking some copyright by posting it up: Owen, The False Lessons of Modern War-Why Ignorance is Not Insight (2023). It is available on-line here: The false lessons of modern war: Why ignorance is not insight – Issuu. The full title of the article is “The False Lessons of Modern War: Why Ignorance is not Insight.”

Trevor Dupuy is namechecked in the article: “Much was less than certain, yet paradoxically, a book written in 1978, Trevor N Dupuy’s Elusive Victory, had got far more right than later writers were to get wrong.” That is a pretty strong endorsement.

He then footnotes the book in his third footnote, referencing losses in 1967.

In the following paragraph he states: “Simply put, no conflict today comes even close to these types of losses, yet the myth persists that war and warfare are becoming ‘more lethal.’ They are not, and a large body of literature proves it.” His footnote to this paragraph then states “See the collected work of Trevor N Dupuy and Christopher Lawrence, Understanding War, War by Numbers and Attrition.”

I like this guy, but I have never met him. He is certainly welcome to present at the third HAAC: The Third HAAC – October 2024? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

A few other quotes from the article worth mentioning:

“Lessons should be a product of analysis, not observation.” (I put this sentence in bold for a reason).
“Observations have often been wrong” (this is his following sentence)
“Warfare in the Russo-Ukrainian War is two or three generations behind the standard competent, well-trained armies should aspire to operate.”
“…fires lead manoeuvre in contrast to the opinions of the ‘manouverist approach.” (spell check is complaining about the British spellings).
“Fast forward to today and the war in Ukraine; there is far less to be learned than in 1973.”
“Why should the lessons from Ukraine be removed from the specific context of the participant’s differing training and equipment level and be relevant to the British Army?”
“Is something that is a lesson for the Ukrainians a lesson for everyone else?”
“In sharp contrast, the current war in Ukraine sees much-outdated equipment in ad-hoc combat formations, not seemingly underpinned by NATO equivalent training, doctrine and organisation levels.”

I will let you read the rest, but this is a definitely an article worth reading, even if you find yourself not in agreement with all parts of it.

I do want to thank Dr. Shawn Woodford for bringing this to my attention.

P.S.

Elusive Victory is available here: TDI Books For Sale (dupuyinstitute.org)

Understanding War is here: TDI Books For Sale (dupuyinstitute.org)

War by Numbers is here: War by Numbers : Nebraska Press (unl.edu) or here: War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat: Lawrence, Christopher A.: 9781612348865: Amazon.com: Books

Attrition is here: TDI Books For Sale (dupuyinstitute.org). Inventory is getting low for this one.