Category Research & Analysis

Four Friendly Fire Reports

I did a blog past month fishing around for what else has been done on Friendly Fire: A Friendly Fire Discussion – The Dupuy Institute.

As a result of that post asking about where else had been done, Paul Syms (UK), a former Dstl analyst, sent me the following five files. With his permission they are posted here:

First is Chuck Hawkins’ 1991 paper on the issue: “Friendly Fire Casualties: A Vietnam War Perspective”. This effort I was aware of.

C F Hawkins 1991 RVN FF

Next is Gene Visco’s 1995 presentation at ISMOR in the UK: “Friendly Fire Data and Analysis.” This effort I was also familiar with. I had a copy of different briefing from him. At one point was in my lower right hand desk drawer. I probably have a copy of that briefing somewhere in my files.

Visco 1995 Friendly fire 12 ISMOR

Chuck Hawkins and Gene Visco really pushed to get a proper analysis of the subject. I was aware of their efforts. They were unable to get a proper study funded by the U.S. DOD. Chuck Hawkins was the former VP of DMSI (Trevor Dupuy’s company before TDI). Gene Visco was with DUSA (OR) until it was shut down.

Next were two British efforts I was not familiar with, one from 2006 and one a study dated 2008 done by Paul Syms:

Gadsden & Outteridge 2006 Friendly fire HA 23 ISMOR V1.0

Syms 2008 25 ISMOR FF HA slides V1.0

Syms 2008 25 ISMOR FF HA paper V1.0

This last one is presented as both slides (34 slides) and an 8-page paper. It is pretty extensive. The slides are definitely worth flipping through.

I particularly like slides 28-29: Database size, and also the next two slides. In parallels some of the points I made in my one Phalanx article: Phalanx Article: What We Have Learned from Doing Historical Analysis – The Dupuy Institute

9 Books

Finally here is a picture of all nine of my published books. It includes two copies of The Battle for Kyiv, as one is the hardback and one is the paperback version. The paperback version does have some revisions and an expanded photo section.

We are looking to add two more books to that collection in the next six months. An additional book on the Russo-Ukrainian War should be out in the next 2 to 3 months, and The Battle of Tolstoye Woods should be out hopefully this spring. The editing process on all my books is slow, primarily because the large amount of charts, tables and tabular data in them that are a pain to edit and proof.

A Friendly Fire Discussion

I have decided to turn one of my email discussions I was having with several people into a blog post. As they got into a discussion of friendly fire (I gather based upon one addressee’s personal experience), I ended up making the following statement:

Friendly fire (FF):

1. The original figure that came out of WWII was 2% of the casualties were due to friendly fire (Beebe and Debakey?).

2. This was probably low.

3. Since WWII there has been no definitive studies on FF casualties that I am aware of.

4. It was much higher than 2% in the 1991 Gulf War.

5. In the 1990s Chuck Hawkins (Vietnam company commander) and Gene Visco (DUSA OR) did some preliminary work looking at FF casualties. They were attempting to get a contract to do an actual proper survey of the subject. That did not happen.

6. By default, the preliminary work by Hawkins and Visco (both deceased) is the only significant work on FF casualties that has been done since WWII. I may have a copy somewhere in my files. Not sure anything has been published or is on the internet. I think they presented their findings at ISMOR.

Dermot, you are welcome to discuss what the UK has done.

Dermot Rooney, the author of Slog or Swan (see: Slog or Swan – The Dupuy Institute) came back with the following response:

Here’s the Slog or Swan quote:

Meanwhile, fragile radio communications separated infantry and artillery, contributing to a high rate of fratricide. A Canadian study conducted during Veritable put the number of Allied casualties to friendly artillery at between seven and 21 percent of the total. The actions examined for the current assessment support splitting the difference at around 15 percent.11 This figure is alarmingly close to the 19 percent attributed to German small arms, and considerably greater than the six percent benchmark for friendly fire casualties in a First World War barrage. Artillery fratricide was also a major factor in five of the failed attacks in the current assessment and, considering the tendency to underreport such events, was likely a factor in as many more. The high chance of fratricide very probably undermined the essential trust between infantryman and gunner, the coordination of fire and assault, and therefore the value of suppression.12

 

[11] This is another of those tantalising glimpses mentioned earlier. The figures are the extremes presented in Brigadier E. C. Plow’s study of munition fragments removed from casualties and could only be found in Appendix L of Copp’s Cinderella Army. Copp and Buckley opt for ‘as high as 19 percent’. Copp, Cinderella Army, pp.291, 338–340; Buckley, Monty’s Men, p.272.

[12] Contrary to the mines and mud narrative, the Canadian wounds study also found 4 percent of casualties were caused by the combination of mines and grenades, way behind German artillery, German small arms, and Allied artillery. J. B. Coates and J. C. Beyer (eds), Wound Ballistics in World War II: Supplemented by experiences in the Korean War (Washington: Office of the Surgeon General, 1962) has mines accounting for 0 to 10 percent of total casualties depending on the sampling method. The battle descriptions for this assessment suggest the effect of mines on advance rates was marginal and appears no greater than in other operations.

If anyone has a copy of any presentations made or write-ups done by Charles Hawkins or Gene Visco on fratricide, please forward them to me (LawrenceTDI@aol.com).

I do note that the links to Cornwallis Group, founded in 1996 by Gene Visco, is no longer connected to the ISMOR site. It does seem like we are losing knowledge. The earliest ISMOR link I can find is ISMOR 39 (with the Eugene Visco prize): ISMOR – ISMOR 39 | ORS. There were links to earlier ISMOR conferences and papers, and links in ISMOR to the Cornwallis Group, but I cannot find these. 

Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions

The link here is to Andy Marshall’s memorandum in August 1993 about “Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions – Second Version.” See: Unknown. It is eight pages long (and is repeated in this file).

I have decided to post it here primarily so I can easily find it for future reference. It is not posted here because I agree, disagree, or wish to debate the memo, I just want it somewhere so I can easily look it up. This memo was nominally the start of the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs). I have always believed in an EMA (Evolution in Military Affairs).

It is worth your while the read the entire memo and not to speed read it.

Related post: The Closing of OSD Net Assessment – The Dupuy Institute

I do note that he says in this 1993 memo that: “I believe that the most important thing for the next few years, given that we face no immediate large challenges, is to undertake a more active search for insights as to appropriate longer term changes in doctrine, concepts of operation, and organizational change.”

 

The Closing of OSD Net Assessment

Turns out that OSD Net Assessment is being closed down. Pete Hegseth shutters Pentagon office that helped military leaders plan for possible future wars and Hegseth ‘disestablishing’ Office of Net Assessment, Pentagon’s strategic analysis specialists – Breaking Defense. Hegseth has instructed DOD to come up with a replacement organization “within 30 days.”

This was a small office in OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) that developed legendary status over the years: Andrew Marshall (foreign policy strategist) – Wikipedia

The Dupuy Institute did a number of contracts for Andy Marshall, specifically (see: TDI Reports – The Dupuy Institute)

1. SR-1 Soviet/Russian Influence on Chinese Military Doctrine (Jul. 2003).

2. SA-1: Measuring the Value of Situational Awareness (May 2004)

3. OSD-1: The Applicability of Classical Counterinsurgency Theory to Counterinsurgency Operations (Jan. 2008).

The original Iraq Casualty Estimate (Chapter 1 of America’s Modern Wars) that we did in 2004 was primarily funded by Andy Marshall. He contributed $75K based upon a phone call from Vandiver (CAA) and then CAA chipped in $20K, although CAA ran the project. I did brief Andy Marshall.

The office was funded with about $20 million a year. This supported maybe a dozen people and a budget of $12 or $13 million that he used to pay for various contracts (I accidently saw one of his big omnibus contracts). 

He retired in 2015 and an Air Force colonel that I did not know took over. They then issued out a giant omnibus contract which we bid on. They did not contract us.

OSD Net Assessment did an annual “net assessment” of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Apparently, his last net assessment was done in 1991. After that he focused on a range of issues, including orienting towards China and the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs). Note that he funded our Situational Awareness report in 2004, which really did not provide overwhelming support for the RMA. It is two chapters in my book War by Numbers and I will be doing a briefing on it on 8 April at the Virtual Connections Conference.

That he was doing lots of analysis but no net assessments became an issue and at some point in the last decade, there were rumors that some of the JCS staff took over the net assessment function. I gather after he retired (he was in his 90s), the new guy was supposed to direct the department back to net assessment. So, I am not sure, but I gather there is now no real department in OSD that is doing net assessment. 

 

Two missing reports – #26 and #27

As I was going through our early reports, it again came to my attention that we were missing two early reports. See: TDI – The Dupuy Institute Publications. They are:

26. Target/Range Experience for Tank & Antitank Weapons (1969) (Batelle) – Pages: NA

27. Historical Data on Tactical Air Operations: The Rome Campaign, 11 May-17 June 1944 (1970) (AFS&A) – Pages: NA

They have been missing for a while. Our report list comes from the 1980s, and even then their pages were listed as “N/A.” I gather that means we were missing them at that time. They may have been classified. When DMSi/HERO was shut down in the early 1990s, any classified reports had to be burned.

Anyhow, the customers for those reports were Batelle and AFS&A. If anyone has access to these reports, we would love to get a copy for our files.

Personnel Attrition Rates….

While searching the internet for something else, I ran across this April 1996 report by Dr. Robert L. Helmbold of CAA (Center for Army Analysis). Personnel Attrition Rates in Historical Land Combat Operations: Losses of National Populations, Armed Forces, Army Groups, and Lower Level Land Combat Forces. (dtic.mil)

I am surprised that I have not seen that before. At the time of its publication we were under contract with CAA for work on the Kursk Data Base (KDB). I gather Dr. Helmbold retired shortly thereafter. I was asked if I wanted to take over his slot at CAA, but being the executive officer of TDI, I was not willing to step back down to a non-management position. I had gotten spoilt.

Anyhow, a few notes:

Page 1-1 (page 22 in the pdf file): They list six supporting reports done between 1992-1995. I assume there are all available from DTIC.

Page 2-1 (page 27): This chapter addresses the question of losses in wars as a whole. This might have some value in looking at mobilization levels for Ukraine.

Page 3-1 (page 55): This chapter addresses variation of loses by nationality, theater and major operations or campaigns.

Page 4-1 (page 66): The Chapter addresses losses by Army Groups. This chapter is mostly based upon George Kuhn’s work the LMI, as is some of the next two chapters. Some of George Kuhn’s data was collected under contract with HERO (our predecessor company).

Page 5-1 (page 75): This chapter address losses by Army. This chapter does include a number of graphs from the CDB90 data base (which was built from our work) as does the next chapter.

Page 6-1 (page 99): This chapter addresses losses by Corps.

Anyhow, two Dupuy books are referenced in this report, along with four HERO reports. In the study directive the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base (ACSDB) and the Kursk Data Base (KDB) was both referenced but they were not used. I was the program manager for both of those databases.

The 40% Rule

Hadn’t done a blog post in the while. Been focused on getting a book done. Sorry.

There is a rule of thumb often quoted out there and often put in war games that a unit becomes ineffective or reaches a breakpoint at 40% casualties. The basis for this rule is a very limited body of studies and analysis.

First, I have never seen a study on when a unit become ineffective. Even though it is now an accepted discussion point, I have not seen such a study establishing this relationship and do not think that such a study exists. I am not saying that there is not a relationship between casualties and unit effectiveness, what I am saying that I have never seen a study establishing that 1) this relationship exists, and 2) what are its measurements, and 3) what is the degree of degradation.

What has been done is studies on breakpoints, and over time, a rule of thumb that at 40% a unit “breaks” appears to be widely accepted. It appears that this rule has then been transferred to measuring unit effectiveness.

The starting point for “breakpoints” study is Dorothy Clark’s study of 43 battalions from World War II done in 1954. That study showed that the average casualties for these battalions was around 40%, although the ranged from around 1% to near 100%. Her conclusion was that “The statement that a unit can be considered no longer combat effective when it has suffered a specific casualty percentage is a gross oversimplification not supported by combat data.” She also stated “Because of wide variations in data, average loss percentages alone have limited meaning.”. We have discussed this before, see: C-WAM 4 (Breakpoints) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and April | 2018 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Breakpoints in U.S. Army Doctrine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Response 3 (Breakpoints) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). 

The next point is the U.S. Army’s Maneuver Control manuals (FM 105-5) which in 1964 set the attacker’s breakpoint at around 20 percent casualties and the defender’s breakpoint at around 40 percent at the battalion-level. Charts in the 1964 Maneuver Control field manual showed a curve with the probability of unit break based on percentage of combat casualties. Once a defending unit reached around 40 percent casualties, the chance of breaking approached 100 percent. Once an attacking unit reached around 20 percent casualties, the chance of its halting (type I break) approached 100 percent, and the chance of its breaking (type II break) reached 40 percent. These data were for battalion-level combat. 

We have never found any studies establishing the data for these Maneuver Control manuals and we do not think they exist. Something may have been assembled when they were writing these manuals, but we have not been able to find any such files. Most likely, the tables were extension of the Dorothy Clark study, even though she said that it should not apply.

Anyhow, that is kind of it. Other stuff had been published on breakpoints, Helmbold in 1972, McQuie in 1987 (see: Battle Outcomes: Casualty Rates As a Measure of Defeat | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)) and Dupuy in the late 1980s, but I have not seen anything of significance since, as it appears that most significant studies and analysis work stopped around 1989. 

Now, Dr. Richard Harrison, who spends a lot of time translating old Soviet documents, has just sent me this: 

“Supposing that for the entire month not a single unit will receive reinforcements, then we will have a weakening of 30%, with 70% of the troops present. This is a significant weakening, but it does not yet deprive the unit of its combat strength; the latter’s fall begins approximately with losses of 40%.”

His source is: 

N.N. Movchin, Posledovatel’nye Operatsii po Opytu Marny i Visly (Consecutive Operations on the Experience of the Marne and Vistula) (Moscow and Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1928), page 99.

So, the U.S. came up with the 40% rule in 1954 which it disowned and then adopted in 1964 regardless. And here we have a 1928 Russian writing which is directly applying a 40% rule to unit effectiveness. I have no idea what the analytical basis is for that statement, but it does get my attention.  

Encyclopedia of Military History

Long before the internet, people used to write (and read) encyclopedias. I still have a few in my house, including a Funk & Wagnalls (as in “look that up in your Funk & Wagnalls”). Just saw a twitter post yesterday that referenced Dupuy & Dupuy’s Encyclopedia of Military History: Paul Poast on X: “To identify war outcomes, Stam’s study drew on military histories, notably the encyclopedic volume by Dupuy & Dupuy (cc @dupuyinstitute). https://t.co/oGJR4ZZuNQ” / X (twitter.com)

This was apparently part of a thread Dr. Paul Poast had on coding victories. As he notes, in a “pioneering work on war outcomes by Alan Stam” (Paul Poast on X: “This can be seen by considering the pioneering work on war outcomes by Alan Stam. https://t.co/8R6IY1JQOd” / X (twitter.com)), he drew heavily on Dupuy & Dupuy’s Encyclopedia of Military History. Now, that is gratifying. I am not familiar with Allan C. Stam and his work. In fact, this is the first I have heard of it (I do not get out much). It was first published in 1996. But, as they are referencing Trevor Dupuy’s work, I figured I should at least mention it in a blog post.

Interesting review of The Battle for Kyiv

Just stumbled last night across this review of The Battle for Kyiv. It is an interesting take on the subject. The reviewer is someone I know.

Draft history in The Battle of Kyiv: The Fight for Ukraine’s Capital by Christopher A. Lawrence – Armchair Dragoons

Now, my nagging suspicion is that it will be a while (decades) before anything other than a “draft” history can be written. Might be more than a few decades to get access to Russian archives. We were not able to get access to Soviet archives on Kursk (1943) until 1993, and that was only by using some round about means and a project budget not available to most historians. We have still not gotten access to Chinese records from the Korea War (1950–1953). So, one is certainly looking at least at 50 to 75 years in these cases.