Category Research & Analysis

Interesting review of The Battle for Kyiv

Just stumbled last night across this review of The Battle for Kyiv. It is an interesting take on the subject. The reviewer is someone I know.

Draft history in The Battle of Kyiv: The Fight for Ukraine’s Capital by Christopher A. Lawrence – Armchair Dragoons

Now, my nagging suspicion is that it will be a while (decades) before anything other than a “draft” history can be written. Might be more than a few decades to get access to Russian archives. We were not able to get access to Soviet archives on Kursk (1943) until 1993, and that was only by using some round about means and a project budget not available to most historians. We have still not gotten access to Chinese records from the Korea War (1950–1953). So, one is certainly looking at least at 50 to 75 years in these cases.

Measuring Unit Effectiveness in Italy

We are in discussion over revisiting the measurement of combat effectiveness of select units in Italy 1943-1945. This was done by Trevor Dupuy in Numbers, Predictions and Wars (1977) by division using the QJM (Quantified Judgment Model) and was done in aggregate by me in War by Numbers (2017) using simply comparative statistics. If you feel lifeless reading blogs like this, you can rest for a bit through sites such as 홈카지노.

For a little background on page 115 of Understanding War is a chart of German, UK and U.S. units in the Italian Campaign and their CEVs (Combat Effectiveness Values). Their values range from 0.60 to 1.49. The German Hermann Goering Division is the highest rated division at 1.49. This is based upon five engagements. The German 3rd PzGrD was rated 1.17 based upon 17 engagements and 15th PzGrD was rated 1.12 based upon 11 engagements. This was done using the QJM.

For reference, I would recommend reading the following four books:

1. Understanding War

2. War by Numbers

3. Attrition (optional)

4. Numbers, Predictions and War (optional)

There are two ways to measure combat effectiveness. 1) Do a model run and compared the results of the model run to historical data. This requires 1) a historically validated combat model (there are very few), and 2) confidence in the model. 2) The other option is to do a statistical comparison of a large number of engagements. This is what I did in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of War by Numbers.

One can measure combat effectiveness by three means: 1) Casualty effectiveness, 2) special effectiveness (distance opposed advance) or 3) Mission effectiveness. This is all discussed in Trevor Dupuy’s work and in War by Numbers.

To date, the only people I am aware of who have published their analysis of combat effectiveness is Trevor Dupuy, me (Chris Lawrence) and Niklas Zetterling. See: CEV Calculations in Italy, 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and his book Normandy 1944 (recently revised and republished). There is also a six-volume quantitative effort related to Operation Barbarossa by Nigel Askey, which I have never looked at. Everyone else has ignored quantifying this issue, although there are no shortage of people claiming units are good, bad or elite. How they determine this is judgment (and it is often uncertain as to what the basis is for this judgment).

Now, the original work on this was done by Trevor Dupuy in the late 1970s based upon his data collection and the QJM. Since that time the model has been updated to the TNDM. The engagements used for the QJM validation were then simplified (especially in weapons counts) and assembled into the LWDB (Land Warfare Data Base). The LWDB had around 70 engagements from the Italian Campaign. Since that time we have created the DuWar series of databases which includes the DLEDB (Division-Level Engagement Data Base). See: The History of the DuWar Data Bases | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). We have doubled the number of Italian Campaign engagements to around 140.

There are a total of 141 Italian Campaign division-level engagements in the DLEDB. The first 140 engagements cover from September 1943 to early June 1944. There is almost 12 months of war not covered and not all units in the first part of the campaign are covered. With all the various nationalities involved (i.e German, Italian, U.S., UK, Free French, Moroccan, New Zealand, South African, Poland, Indian, Canadian, Brazilian, Greek, etc.), the Italian Campaign is a fertile field for this work. We are looking at stepping back into this.

Units involved in engagements in the DELDB:

German:

3rd PzGrD: 25 cases

15th PzGrD: 39 cases

16th PzD: 7 cases

26th PzD: 8 cases

29 PzGrD: 6 cases

65th ID: 5 cases

94th ID: 8 cases

305th ID: 4 cases

362nd ID: 3 cases

715th ID: 2 cases

4th Para D: 3 cases

HG PzGrD: 26 cases

LXXVI Pz Corps: 4 cases

12th Para Rgt: 1 case

American:

1st AD: 3 cases

3rd ID: 19 cases

34th ID: 15 cases

36th ID: 12 cases

45th ID: 20 cases

85th ID: 7 cases

88th ID: 4 cases

509th PIB: 1 case

1st SSF: 1 case

British:

7th AD: 6 cases

1st ID: 9 cases

5th ID: 2 cases

46th ID: 18 cases

56th ID: 24 cases

Current book release schedule

I have four books in process or about to be released. They are:

The Battle for Kyiv:
– UK release date: 28 November
– U.S. release date: 18 January 2024

Aces at Kursk:
– UK release date: 30 January 2024
– U.S. release date: posted as 18 January 2024, but suspect release date will be in March 2024.

Hunting Falcon:
– UK release date: 28 February 2024
– U.S. release date: posted as 29 February 2024, but suspect released date will be in April 2024.

The Siege of Mariupol:
– UK release date: sometime in 2024
– U.S. release date: sometime in 2024

Books under consideration for 2024/2025:
– The Battle for the Donbas
– The Battle of Tolstoye Woods (from the Battle of Kursk)
– More War by Numbers

We our down to our last 16 copies of Attrition

Just to give you all a heads-up, we are down to our last 16 copies of Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War. Hard to predict how long those remaining copies will last. It is still affordable at $19.95. Right now, Amazon is selling it used for $50 – $400. See: TDI Books For Sale (dupuyinstitute.org).

I do not control the rights to reprint it.

Ordering info is here: TDI Purchasing Publications (dupuyinstitute.org)

Third video posted to our YouTube site

Christopher A. Lawrence
August 9, 2023

We have now published the third video from the first Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC) to our YouTube site. It is here: (1) Data for Wargames: Lawrence – YouTube

The briefing in this third video goes for most of the video, as discussion and comments were made mostly during the briefing. The briefing ends at 55:30 the video ends at 59:27.

A few discussions of note:

At 10:10 – A discussion of what TDI does

At 18:52 – A discussion of Breakpoints

At 32:54 – A discussion of Suppression

At 37:18 – A discussion of what we don’t know

There were some issues with sound from virtual attendees, but one of these was Robert Helmbold, so, please bear with us.

The viewgraphs for these briefings were previous posted here: Presentations from HAAC – Data for Wargames | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The schedule for our next conference is here: Schedule for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17 – 19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Historical Analysis Annual Conference Modeling, Simulation & Wargaming Research & Analysis War by Numbers

The War in Ukraine – Economist Article

The Economist published an article last month called “The war in Ukraine shows how technology is changing the battlefield.” The subtitle is “But mass still counts, argues Shashank Joshi in the first of seven chapters of a special report on the future of warfare.” The link is here: The war in Ukraine shows how technology is changing the battlefield (economist.com). The headline in the actual (hard-copy) July 8-14 issue was “Ypres with AI: The war in Ukraine shows how technology has changed the battlefield. But mass still counts, argues Shashank Joshi.” Not sure why they have two different headlines.

I am quoted in the article. This took me by surprise as I had not talked or exchanged emails with Mr. Joshi in a few months. A well-read friend called and told me.

The specific quote is:

This jeopardy is reflected in a curiously sparse battlefield. In Ukraine some 350,000 Russian troops are arrayed on a front line stretching 1,200 km (750 miles) – around 300 men per km and, at times last year, less than half that. That is around a tenth of the average for the same area in the second world war, notes Chirstopher Lawrence, head of the Dupuy Institute, which collects such data. Battalions of several hundred men fill areas that would once have been covered by brigades of a few thousand.

In theory, say Mr. Lawrence, this seems a ripe environment for attackers. Thin front lines are easier to break through. And new sensors, more accurate munitions and better digital networks make it easier to find and strike targets. The catch is that attackers must concentrate their forces to pierce well-defended front lines, as Ukraine is now trying to do with its counter-offensive. And such concentrations can be detected and struck – not always, but more often than in the past…

Yea, I said something like that. Don’t remember exactly when or where.

Anyhow, thank you Mr. Joshi for the quote.

P.S. A few related references:

Density of Deployment in Ukraine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Economist Article on Urban Warfare | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Economist Article on Russian Casualty Estimates | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Unstructured Comments on “The Relationship of Battle Damage to Unit Combat Performance”

Thanks to Russell1200 (see comments to Count of Opposing Forces | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)), I now found out about a report “The Relationship of Battle Damage to Unit Combat Performance” by Leonard Wainstein of IDA prepared back in April 1986. Both the report and Wainstein are unknown to me.

The abstract of the report says

The purpose of this study is to investigate the historical basis for the assumption that a military formation will cease to be effective after having lost a pre-ordained percentage of its strength. Battles from the First World War to the 1982 Falklands campaign are reviewed for insight into the validity of this assumption.

The effect of heavy battte damage on units has been both variable and unpredictable. There is a relationship between losses and the continued willingness to fight, but it defies precise definition. So long as some men in the formation continue to fight as an organized entity, either in attack or defense, for whatever reason, the formation they represent cannot be termed ‘ineffective.”

My notes made while reading it:

Page v: Contents: section on earlier studies references ORO report of 1954 (known to me… the Dorothy Clark report on Breakpoints) and an RAC report of 1966 (not known to me).
Page 1: “The battle cases cited run from army level to battalion level, from single day engagements to those lasting several months” – my bias is to collect and analysis data based upon the same level of combat, i.e. division-level, battalion-level, etc.
Page 1: Only 54 actions were examined (this seems small) and “only 11 represent cases where a formation collapsed, surrendered, was repulsed, was stalemated, or had to be taken out of the line after suffering some degree of damage.” (this seems like a really small sample).
Page 2: “Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, in describing the 1973 Middle East War, has written ‘The human element has always been important in war, and despite the technology available to both sides, the human element was undoubtedly the most significant feature in this war.’ The same comment could obviously be made about all the actions described in this paper.”
Page 3: “There is no agreement among national armies, combat commanders, military historians or defense analysts as to the point when battle damage renders a formation impotent.”
Pages 1-5, Summary: This is worth reading in its entirety.
Page 6: “The modeling community have developed a set of formulae for use in this determination, but it is not clear to what extent these formulae reflect actual battle experience.” (stated in 1986… pretty certain the “modeling community” has not taken significant corrective action).
Page 8: Paragraph on perceived resistance is interesting.
Pages 1-10: No mention of artillery.
Page 11: “Despite the interest in and significance of the subject, relatively little research has been done across the years on casualty-effectiveness relationships.”
Pages 11-12: Description of the Dorothy Clark 1954 ORO report, measuring 44 battalions. To quote Clark “the statement that a unit can be considered no longer combat effective when it has suffered a specific casualty percentage is a gross oversimplification not supported by combat data.”
Pages 12-13: Description of Robert Best 1966 RAC report.
Page 23: Trevor Dupuy quoted again.
Page 24: “Oriental fanaticism.”
Page 44: HERO report from 1967 is referenced (HERO became TDI).
Page 69: Trevor Dupuy is referenced.
Page DL-2: A copy of this report went to CAA (Concepts Analysis Agency, now Center for Army Analysis).
Page DL-3: A copy went to HERO. I was there in 1987, do not recall seeing this report.

The IDA report is here: TheRelationshipBetweenBattleDamageAndCombatPerformance.

A few related past posts:

Count of Opposing Forces | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Breakpoints | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Historians and the Early Era of U.S. Army Operations Research | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Article: “How Western Experts Got the Ukraine War so Wrong”

Just got in my email box from the Geopolitical Monitor dated 13 October 2022 written by Taras Kuzio called “How Western Experts Got the Ukraine War so Wrong.” I think this is worth repeating, so I have posted it here: How Western Experts Got the Ukraine War So Wrong | Geopolitical Monitor. Hopefully this does not violate any policies of theirs.

In the fourth paragraph, they name the guilty parties (the experts who were wrong). They continue naming them in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 10. This is always a controversial step, but I think one that sometimes needs to be done. If people’s scholarship is leading them to make predictions, then the accuracy of their predictions directly reflect on their scholarship. Perhaps it is time for the “community” to ignore those scholars who are consistently wrong.

Note this article also addresses issues with Net Assessment.

Anyhow, this is worth reading.

Land Operations and Combined Arms Seminar: Lessons Identified from the War in Ukraine, 6-8 December 2022

Christopher A. Lawrence
October 14, 2022

The Land Operations and Combined Arms Seminar: Lessons Identified from the War in Ukraine, in occurring in Oslo Norway, 6-8 December 2022. It is hosted by the Norwegian Military Academy. I will be giving a presentation there on “Some Observations from the War in Ukraine.”

See: International R&D seminar 6th – 8th of December 2022 – Norwegian Armed Forces (forsvaret.no). It is open invitation. It will be conducted in English.