Category Urban Warfare

The Siege of Mariupol has been released

The Siege of Mariupol has been released in the U.S. today. It has been available in the UK since November 27, 2025. This is the second book in a series on the Russo-Ukrainian War. It was co-authored with Stefan Korshak. Stefan was an OSCE ceasefire observer in Mariupol for seven years.

We do have three other books in the works for 2026, one on the Battle of Kursk (it is the biggest battle of World War II), and two more on the Russo-Ukrainian War. More details on these later.

Last week to pre-order The Siege of Mariupol

The Siege of Mariupol is being released on 30 January and will be available on Amazon.com: The Siege of Mariupol: The Azovstal Steel Plant and Ukraine’s Battle for Survival: Lawrence, Christopher A, Korshak, Stefan: 9781399034203: Amazon.com: Books

They do offer a pre-release sale price of $34.95 (13% discount) if you order before 30 January. If you are thinking about buying, now would be a good time.

It is already available in the UK.

Stefan Korshak and the Siege of Mariupol book

While I am fairly well known in the historical analysis and military history community, my co-author of the Mariupol book is not. This video on a panel on the trauma of Ukraine’s children does provide a brief introduction of him and the book at around 15:00: War in Europe: The Trauma of Ukraine’s Children. What’s being done, what can be done to help?

It does sort of understate his qualifications. He was a U.S. Army officer in the 1980s, has a masters degree from Yale, and served as an OSCE representative in Mariupol for seven years (2014-2022), observing the ceasefire there and regularly meeting with units of the Ukrainian Army, Azov Regiment, Donets People’s Republic Army and the Russian Army. A little bit more than just a reporter.

9 Books

Finally here is a picture of all nine of my published books. It includes two copies of The Battle for Kyiv, as one is the hardback and one is the paperback version. The paperback version does have some revisions and an expanded photo section.

We are looking to add two more books to that collection in the next six months. An additional book on the Russo-Ukrainian War should be out in the next 2 to 3 months, and The Battle of Tolstoye Woods should be out hopefully this spring. The editing process on all my books is slow, primarily because the large amount of charts, tables and tabular data in them that are a pain to edit and proof.

Two books

These two books are my two analytical books. Both quantitative in approach. Notice the use of the word “Understanding” in both titles.

American’s Modern Wars cover our analysis of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies based upon an analysis of 89 post-WWII cases. There has been very little quantitative analysis of insurgencies. This is the most extensive effort I am aware of. We were blessed with budget and a staff that at one point included ten people. It is amazing what you can do when you have manpower (read $$$).

War by Numbers is our analysis of conventional warfare. It was built from a series of studies we did over the years for the DOD and other contractors. Probably the most extensive qualitative analysis of aspects of conventional war that has been done in the last few decades. Again, helps to have budget.

These are my two “theoretical” books. I am halfway through a book called More War by Numbers. I have stopped work on it to concentrate on other tasks. May get back to in 2027.

The analysis for America’s Modern Wars was based upon 89 post-WWII insurgencies, interventions and peacekeeping operations. We did expand the database to well over 100 cases but never went back and re-shot the analysis due to budget cuts. It would be my desire to expand the database up to around 120 cases, update the 20 or so that were on-going (our data collection stopped in 2008). and then re-shoot and expand the analysis. This would be a good time to do this instead of again waiting until we are in another insurgency and yet again chasing our tail. Our track record on these have not been good, we lost Vietnam, we lost Afghanistan and Iraq was touch-and-go for a while. While we are not in the middle of another insurgency is a good time to study and learn about them based upon real world experience (AKA history).

Sorry to get preachy, but I really don’t like losing wars.

The Siege of Mariupol is Available in the UK

My latest book, The Siege of Mariupol, co-authored by Stefan Korshak, is now available in the UK. The Amazon.com (UK) link is here: The Siege of Mariupol: The Azovstal Steel Plant and Ukraine’s Battle for Survival : Christopher A Lawrence, Stefan Korshak: Amazon.co.uk: Books

It is listed as “Temporarily out of stock” but I gather you can find it at your local UK bookstore. 

It can also be ordered directly from the publisher: Pen and Sword Books: The Siege of Mariupol – Hardback

The title will be released in the U.S. on January 20, 2026. The Amazon.com link is here: The Siege of Mariupol: The Azovstal Steel Plant and Ukraine’s Battle for Survival: Lawrence, Christopher A, Korshak, Stefan: 9781399034203: Amazon.com: Books

I can talk a lot about this book, but for today, I will let the book speak for itself.

Last Six Blog Posts

I was quiet last week because I was on travel. Here are my last six blog posts before I went silent:

The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – rev. 1 – The Dupuy Institute

Density of Deployment in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute

People keep referencing us on the 3-to-1 Rule – The Dupuy Institute

The Russo-Ukrainian War is still a limited war – The Dupuy Institute

Definition of Limited War – The Dupuy Institute

Aces at Kursk is available in the UK – The Dupuy Institute

The Aces at Kursk book is listed on Amazon.com (U.S.) as being available as of 25 July. Do not have confirmation of that yet. It was available in the UK as of 9 July.

 

Density of Deployment in Ukraine

It appears that both sides have deployed between 300,000 to 617,000 troops in this war. Putin claimed 617,000 deployed in mid-December. To quote “The front line is over 2,000 kilometers long, there are 617,000 people in the conflict zone.” See: Putin Says Over 600K Russian Servicemen in Ukraine – The Moscow Times. Ukraine shortly afterwards stated it was 450,00. I tend to lean towards the lower figures. As Russian advances over the last six months have been fairly limited, I am guessing that Ukraniain deployment is at least 300,000. It is probably closer to 400,00. They have put out a few figures noticeably higher than this, but if this was the case (and they were deployed forward), then we probably would not be seeing many advances by the Russians. So most likely the deployed figures for both sides are between 300,000 to 450,000. Let’s just use the figure 450,000 for the sake of simplicity.

The effective front line of Ukraine is around 700 kilometers. See: The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – rev. 1 – The Dupuy Institute. Ukraine obviously has to maintain troops in mobile positions from Chernihiv to Sumy, but there are probably forces still being stood up and trained, with their defense being supplemented by National Guard and Territorial Defense Forces, to be stood up as needed.  There is also the area opposite of the Khakhovka Reservoir, which is only light held by both sides. Then there is the area from the Dnipro River down to Kherson. This is an inactive front, because of the logistics issues caused by the river. While this does have to be held by forces on both sides, they basically have done no major operations since November 2022.  That will almost certainly be the case going forward. So, the active front is only around 700 kilometers (435 miles) 

S0, 450,000 divided by 700 km equals 643 troops per kilometer. This would be 429 per kilometer if there were only 300,000 troops. Obviously, they are not equally distributed across those 700 kilometers, but they really can’t leave large parts of the line seriously undermanned.

So, how does this compare to the last war in Ukraine (1941-1944)? 

During World War II, on the Western Front, the troops were often deployed to a density of 2,000 troops per kilometer of front line. On the Eastern Front in World War II, it was often over 1,000 troops per kilometer. Now we do have a division-level database of 752 cases. Of those, 267 are from the Eastern Front 1943-1945.  Let’s take a look at some examples from that:

For example, before the start of the Battle of Kursk the density of the front was (@ 1800, 4 July 1943):

  • 57th ID: 684 vs 683
  • 255th ID: 467 vs 495
  • 48th PzC (-): 2,458 vs 651
  • 11th PzD+: 1,976 vs 1,038
  • LSSAH GzGrD: 3,763 vs 1,261
  • DR SS PzGrD: 5,207 vs 899
  • T SS PzGrD: 2,416 vs 940
  • 6th PzD+: 2,282 vs 1,168
  • 19th PzD+: 6,086 vs 3,104
  • 7th PzD+: 2,766 vs 558
  • 106th ID: 2,419 vs 511
  • 320th ID: 2,572 vs 540

Just before the Battle of Prokhorovka we have the densities at (@1800, 11 July 1943):

  •  57th ID: 395 vs 483
  • 255th ID: 482 vs 399
  • 332nd ID+: 504 vs 463
  • 48th PZC (-): 1,694 vs 1,353
  • 11th PzD+: 1,669 vs 3,373
  • 167th ID: 725 vs 917
  • T SS PzGrD: 1,371 vs 782
  • LSSAH PzGrD: 2,904 vs 1,692
  • DR SS PrGrD: 1,851 vs 1,291
  • 168th ID: 1,430 vs 282
  • 19th PzD: 1,084 vs 195
  • 6th PzD: 2,077 vs 1,348
  • 7th PzD: 3,701 vs 1,743
  • 198th ID: 1,779 vs 669
  • 106th ID: 1,690 vs 1,658
  • 320th ID: 1,302 vs 1,032

Now, we do have engagements from the fighting around Kharkov in February, March and August of 1943. Some sample cases (again keying of the German unit:

15 February 1943:

  • GD ID: 888 vs 1,143
  • DR SS: 800 vs 1,794

12 March 1943:

  • LSSAH D: 753 vs 473
  • DR SS D: 2,205 vs 450
  • T SS D: 306 vs 2
  • 11th PzD: 914 vs 498

22 August 1943:

  • 106th ID: 1,341 vs 875
  • 320th ID: 1,007 vs 1,210


Now World War I was a lot more dense, especially on the western front. For example:

  • Br 8th Division, 1 July 1916: 8,071 vs 2000 (Battle of the Somme)
  • Dr. Fourth Army (-), 14 July 1916: 10,000 vs 3,333 (Somme)
  • U.S. 4th Bde (+), 6 June 1918: 2,145 vs 1,463 (Belleau Wood)
  • U.S. 3rd Bde, 1 July 1918: 7,118 vs 5,754
  • U.S. 2nd Bde (+), 12 September 1918: 11,007 vs 1,742.
  • U.S. 2nd Div (+), 3 October 1918: 4,063 vs 2,031
  • U.S. 36th Div, 8 October 1918: 4,500 vs 2,500

During the Arab-Israeli Wars we see a lower deployment density, for example, in the 16 engagements in our division-level database from the 1967 war, the densities (for offense) range from 813 to 3,567 men per kilometer (with four exceptions, Mitla Pass, Zaoura-Kala, Jerin and Kabtiya). In the 1973 war we have 32 division-level engagements.  The densities (for offense) range from 444 to 4,900. There are no outliers.

In the 1991 Gulf War, we also see a lower deployment density. In the 15 engagements in our division-level database we have the densities ranging from 89 to 1,200 men per kilometer.

Keep in mind this is a single dimension measurement of a two-dimensional construct. The units also deploy in depth. So, there is not one man standing there every two meters, any more than with a WWII density of 2,000 there are people standing shoulder-to-shoulder across the front line. The minority of troops deployed are shooters.

The main point is that the density is around a fourth of the typical density on the Western Front in WWII. And again, that is in one dimension.

I will leave this blog post without a conclusion, as I am not sure what it should be. For now, this is just an observation.

Presentations from HAAC – Urban Warfare

The sixth presentation of Day 2 in the Einstein Conference Room was supposed to be virtual presentation on Artillery Suppression. This was cancelled due the presenter’s workload. Maybe next HAAC. As we had gathered all the participants back into the main conference room, I choose to skip the seventh presentation on Urban Warfare that was planned for the Einstein Conference Room. It is discussed in some depth in two chapters of my book War by Numbers. But the presentation is here: Urban I & II & III.1

This ends all the presentations for Day 2 of the First Annual Historical Analysis Annual Conference. Next will be the day 3 presentations. We are tentatively planning the next conference for 17-19 October 2023). It will be at the same locale and similarly structured.

 

In the Pike and Gallows Conference Center, day 2:

The first presentation of the day was my monstrosity, Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (which I later turned into the book America’s Modern Wars): NIC Compilation 3.1

The second presentation of the day was Lessons Learned from Haiti 1915-1934 by Dr. Christopher Davis of UNCG: History as an Enemy and Instructor

The third presentation of the day was Estimating War Deaths (in Iraq) by Dr. Michael Spagat of Royal Holloway University of London: Iraq Deaths

We then had a group discussion on whether we could have won the war in Afghanistan. I opened the discussion with a brief 12-slide presentation, built from my original presentation that morning. It is here: Could We Have Won

This was followed by presentation by Joe Follansbee (Col. USA, ret) on a proposed Close Combat Overmatch Weapon.

The sixth presentation of the second day was Contentious Issues in Syria: the Alawi Religion, their Political Struggles, Chemical Warfare in Syria and a Hypothesized Religicide of the Alawis by Jennifer Schlacht: Temporarily deleted.

The seventh presentation of the second day was The Silent Killers: A Quick Historical Review of Biological Threats by Dr. Douglas A. Samuelson: HAAC Bio Threats 09282.

 

In the Einstein Conference Room, day 2:

The first presentation was A Statistical Analysis of Historical Land Battles: What is Associated with Winning? by Dr. Tom Lucas of the Naval Post-Graduate School: Historical Battles what is associated with winning.

The second presentation was The Combat Assessment Technique by William Sayers: The Combat Assessment Technique.

The third presentation was Machine Learning the Lessons of History by Dr. Robert Helmbold: The Key To Victory-0017A. His supporting text is here: TEXT-0031.

The fourth presentation was Penetration Division: Theory, History, Concept by LtC. Nathan A. Jennings, PhD: HAAC Presentation_LTC Jennings.

The fifth presentation was Learning from History: The Army’s Future Study Program by LtC. Adam L. Taliaferro: HAAC_Presentation.

——

We had a total of 30 presentations given at the first Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC). We have the briefing slides from most of these presentations. Over the next few weeks, we are going to present the briefing slides on this blog, maybe twice a week (Tuesdays and Thursday). In all cases, this is done with the permission of the briefer. We may later also post the videos of the presentations, but these are clearly going to have to go to another medium (Youtube.com). We will announce when and if these are posted.

The briefings will be posted in the order given at the conference. The conference schedule is here: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 16 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The nine presentations given on the first day are all here: Presentations from HAAC – Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front in 1944-45 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Economist Article on Urban Warfare

The Economist published an in-depth article this week on urban warfare. It is here: Armies are re-learning how to fight in cities | The Economist

You will not be able to read the entire article without a subscription, but I think I can quote the two most important paragraphs as fair use:

The biggest question is whether a lack of familiarity with city fighting has over-amplified its grim reputation. A study by Christopher Lawrence of the Dupuy Institute, which collects historical data on warfare, analysed urban operations towards the end of the second world war, including three battles over Kharkiv, a Ukrainian city which has been battered in the current conflict. It found, perhaps unsurprisingly, that cities slowed down armies: rates of advance were one-third to one-half what they were in non-urban combat.

But cities were not necessarily deadlier than other battlefields. The attacker’s casualties were no higher in urban operations than non-urban ones, and losses of vehicles were the same or lower. In more recent urban battles—those for Fallujah in Iraq in 2004 or Marawi in the Philippines in 2017—the attackers’ casualties were low, just over one death a day, and far lower than those of defenders. In fact the highest casualties in urban offensives have been borne by Soviet or Russian armies—a fact which says as much about Russian tactical prowess as it does about urban warfare.

Anyhow, thanks to the Economist for the shout-out. The three urban warfare studies that we did were done by both Richard C. Anderson and I. The first study (see: Microsoft Word – Urban Warfare Phase I _W2K_.doc (dupuyinstitute.org)) was a joint effort by the two of us. The sections on combat stress and logistical expenditures from pages 58 to 75 was Richard Anderson’s work based upon Richard Anderson’s idea.

The second study on the three battles of Kharkov was primarily my work. The third study, which covered Manila and Hue was mostly Richard Anderson’s study. The fourth study was cancelled by Hurricane Katrina: Urban Phase IV – Stalingrad | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

and then there is this following paragraph:

Nor does this sort of fighting seem to be uniquely traumatic (at least for those carrying guns). A report by the Rand Corporation, an American think-tank, concludes that rates of combat stress—what was once called shell shock—were no higher than usual in the battles for Brest in Brittany in 1944, Manila in the Philippines in 1945 or Hue in Vietnam in 1968 (though most civilians had, wisely, left before the fighting started). The report suggests that the intensity of urban combat paradoxically gave soldiers a greater sense of initiative, control and purpose than those fighting in open terrain. Anecdotally, Ukrainian forces facing distant and relentless shellfire in Donbas say that the inability to see the enemy is as demoralising and disempowering as anything else.

Now, this was really Richard Anderson’s work redone as a RAND study. In our first report, I put in a section called “Appendix VII: Recent MOUT Literature” (page 112-121). This was because I was appalled at what other people were claiming about urban warfare and their methodology for how they developed these ideas. While I usually try to refrain from addressing other people’s work, sometimes I can’t help myself. Anyhow, this resulted in RAND doing another study on urban warfare in 2005 called Steeling the Mind: Combat Stress Reactions and Their Implications for Urban Warfare (see: Steeling the Mind: Combat Stress Reactions and Their Implications for Urban Warfare | RAND) This effort included a section done by Dr. Todd C. Helmus (Chapter 4, pages 39-67) that was really the core of the RAND report. This effort repeated the research done by Richard Anderson. In fact, Dr. Helmus called us, and Richard ended up giving him a list of the exact NARA files we looked at. Our work is footnoted in Chapter Four the RAND study on pages 46 (along with the comment: “We would like to thank the authors of this report for their helpful comments”) and is listed in the bibliography on page 145. Otherwise, we are not mentioned, even though clearly the entire reason for their revised study was because of our study. 

Now, overall this is a good thing. We produced a report that contradicted previous RAND studies, they then conducted an independent effort to replicate our research and double-check our results. The end result is that they found our research was good and our finding were correct. This is kind of how part of the scientific process should work. 

Now, perhaps I am overly sensitive about this, but the RAND report that was published never stated up front that it was a revision of their previous work. In fact, it directly contradicted some of their previous work. Furthermore, they never stated that the basic idea for the research and the conclusions were The Dupuy Institute‘s or Richard Anderson’s. They kind of carefully avoided mentioning us other than one footnote in Chapter Four of the report. In my view, this kind of looks like they stole our ideas, claimed them as their own, and did not give us proper credit. Maybe I am truly overly sensitive about this, but this is not the first time that people at RAND have done that and this was not the last time it happened. So yea, still carrying a little bit of a grudge. Especially as before the end of 2005 I had to lay Richard Anderson off because of a lack of budget. In the end, it was our ideas, research and work, not RAND’s.