Tag Defensive Counter Air (DCA)

The Cold War Roots of the Integrated U.S./Japan/NATO Air Defense Network

Continental U.S. Air Defense Identifications Zones [MIT Lincoln Laboratory]

My last post detailed how the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 prompted the U.S. to undertake emergency efforts to bolster its continental air defenses, including the concept of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). This post will trace the development of this network and its gradual integration with those of Japan and NATO.

In the early 1950s, U.S. continental air defense, designated the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment air defense system or SAGE, resembled a scaled-up version of the Dowding System, pioneered by Great Britain as it faced air attack by the Luftwaffe in 1940. SAGE was initially a rudimentary and analog affair:

The permanent network depended on each radar site to perform GCI [Ground Control & Intercept] functions or pass information to a nearby GCI center. For example, information gathered by North Truro Air Force Station on Cape Cod was transmitted via three dedicated land lines to the GCI center at Otis AFB, Massachusetts, and then on to the ADC Headquarters at Ent AFB, Colorado. The facility at Otis AFB was a regional information clearinghouse that integrated the data from North Truro and other regional radar stations, Navy picket ships, and the all-volunteer GOC [Ground Observer Corps]. The clearinghouse operation was labor intensive. The data had to be manually copied onto Plexiglas plotting boards. The ground controllers used this data to direct defensive fighters to their targets. It was a slow and cumbersome process, fraught with difficulties. Engagement information was passed on to command headquarters by telephone and teletype. At Ent AFB, the information received from the regional clearinghouses was then passed on to enlisted airmen standing on scaffolds behind the world’s largest Plexiglas board. Using grease pencils, these airmen etched the progress of enemy bombers onto the back of the Plexiglas board so that air defense commanders could evaluate and respond. This arrangement impeded rapid response to the air battle.

It is hard to imagine an air defense challenge of the magnitude that potentially faced the U.S. and USSR by 1955. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) bomber fleet peaked at over 2,500 in 1955-1965, with 2,000 B-47s (range of 2,013 statute miles) and 750 B-52s (range of 4,480 statute miles). The range of U.S. bombers was extended considerably by the ~800 KC-135 aerial re-fueling tanker aircraft fleet as well.

In spite of the much publicized “bomber gap,” taking Soviet production numbers (and liberally adding aircraft of shorter range or unavailable until 1962…) produces an approximate estimate for a Soviet bombing fleet:

  • M-4 “Bison” (range of 3480 statute miles) = 93
  • Tu-16 “Badger” (range of 3888 statute miles) = 1507
  • Tu-22 “Blinder” (range of 3000 statute miles) = 250-300
  • Tu-95 “Bear” (range of 9400 statute miles) = 300+

That gave the U.S. an advantage in bombers of 2,750 to ~2,200 over the Soviets. Now, imagine this air battle being conducted with manual tracking on plexiglass with grease pencils…untenable!

Air Defense and Modern Computing

However, the problem proved amenable to solutions provided by the pending computer revolution.

At the Lincoln Laboratory development continued on an automated command and control system centered around the 250-ton Whirlwind II (AN/FSQ-7) computer. Containing some 49,000 vacuum tubes, the Whirlwind II became a central component of the SAGE system. SAGE, a system of analog computer-equipped direction centers, processed information from ground radars, picket ships, early-warning aircraft, and ground observers onto a generated radarscope to create a composite picture of the emerging air battle. Gone were the Plexiglas TM boards and teletype reports. Having an instantaneous view of the air picture over North America, defense commanders would be able to quickly evaluate the threats and effectively deploy interceptors and missiles to meet the threat.

The SAGE system was continually upgraded through the mid-to-late 1950s.

By 1954, with several more radars in the northeast providing data, the Cambridge control center (a prototype SAGE center) gained experience in directing F-86D interceptors against B-47 bombers performing mock raids. Still much development, research, and testing lay ahead. Bringing together long-range radar, communications, microwave electronics, and digital computer technologies required the largest research and development effort since the Manhattan Project. During its first ten years, the government spent $8 billion to develop and deploy SAGE. By 1958, Lincoln Laboratory had a professional staff of 720 with an annual budget of $22.5 million, to conduct SAGE-related work. The contract with IBM to build sixty production models of the Whirlwind II at $30 million each provided about half of the corporation’s revenues for the 1950s and exposed the corporation to technologies that it would use in the 1960s to dominate the computer industry. In the meantime, scientists and electronic engineers in the defense industry strove to install better radars and make these radars invulnerable to electronic countermeasures (ECM), commonly called jamming.

The SAGE development effort became one of the foundations of modern computing, giving IBM the technological capability to dominate for several decades, until it outsourced two key components: hardware to Intel and software to a young Microsoft, both of which became behemoths of the internet age. It is also estimated that this effort brought a price tag which exceeded that of the Manhattan Project. SAGE also transformed the attitude of the USAF towards technology and computerization.

Current Air Defense Networks

In the 1950s and 60s, the U.S. continental air defense network gradually began to expand geographically and integrate with NADGE and JADGE air defense networks of its NATO allies and Japan.

NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE): This was approved by NATO in December 1955, and became operational in 1962 with 18 radar stations. This eventually grew to 84 stations and provided an inter-connected network from Norway to Turkey before being superseded by the NATO Integrated Air Defense System (NATINADS) in 1972. NATINADS was further upgraded in the 1980s to include data from the E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft (AEGIS (Airborne Early-warning/Ground Environment Integrated Segment); not to be confused with the USN system with the same acronym.)

Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE): This was the automated system, in the same fashion as SAGE, which replaced the manual system in place with the JASDF since 1960. The requirement was stated in July 1961, and was actually modeled on the Naval Tactical Information System (NTDS), developed by Hughes for the US Navy. This was ordered in December 1964, and operational in March 1969. This was superseded by Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) in July 2009.

Japanese Air Defense and the Cold War Origins of Air Defense Identification Zones

Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) in the South China Sea [Maximilian Dörrbecker (Chumwa)/Creative Commons/Wikipedia]

My previous posts have discussed the Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) and the aircraft used to perform the Defensive Counter Air (DCA) mission. To accomplish this, the JASDF is supported by an extensive air defense system which closely mirrors U.S. Air Force (USAF) and U.S. Navy (USN) systems and has co-evolved as technology and threats have changed over time.

Japan’s integrated air defense network and the current challenges it faces are both rooted in the Cold War origins of the modern U.S. air defense network.

On June 25, 1950, North Korea launched an invasion of South Korea, drawing the United States into a war that would last for three years. Believing that the North Korean attack could represent the first phase of a Soviet-inspired general war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered Air Force air defense forces to a special alert status. In the process of placing forces on heightened alert, the Air Force uncovered major weaknesses in the coordination of defensive units to defend the nation’s airspace. As a result, an air defense command and control structure began to develop and Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) were staked out along the nation’s frontiers. With the establishment of ADIZ, unidentified aircraft approaching North American airspace would be interrogated by radio. If the radio interrogation failed to identify the aircraft, the Air Force launched interceptor aircraft to identify the intruder visually. In addition, the Air Force received Army cooperation. The commander of the Army’s Antiaircraft Artillery Command allowed the Air Force to take operational control of the gun batteries as part of a coordinated defense in the event of attack.

In addition to North America, the U.S. unilaterally declared ADIZs to protect Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan in 1950. This action had no explicit foundation in international law.

Under the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention), each State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory. While national sovereignty cannot be delegated, the responsibility for the provision of air traffic services can be delegated.… [A] State which delegates to another State the responsibility for providing air traffic services within airspace over its territory does so without derogation of its sovereignty.

This precedent set the stage for China to unilaterally declare ADIZs its own in 2013 that overlap those of Japan in the East China Sea. China’s ADIZs have the same international legal validity as those of the U.S. and Japan, which has muted criticism of China’s actions by those countries.

Recent activity by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and nuclear and missile testing by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) is prompting incremental upgrades and improvements to the Japanese air defense radar network.

In August 2018, six Chinese H-6 bombers passed between Okinawa’s main island and Miyako Island heading north to Kii Peninsula. “The activities by Chinese aircraft in surrounding areas of our country have become more active and expanding its area of operation,” the spokesman [of the Japanese Ministry of Defense] said.… “There were no units placed on the islands on the Pacific Ocean side, such as Ogasawara islands, which conducted monitoring of the area…and the area was without an air defense capability.”

Such actions by the PLAAF and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) have provided significant rationale in the Japanese decision to purchase the F-35B and retrofit their Izumo-class helicopter carriers to operate them, as the Pacific Ocean side of Japan is relatively less developed for air defense and airfields for land-based aircraft.

My next post will look at the development of the U.S. air defense network and its eventual integration with those of Japan and NATO

Evolution of the Roles and Missions of the Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF)

[Sources: IHS Jane’s All the World’s Fighting Aircraft, Wikipedia, militarymachine.com, author’s estimates}

In my previous posts, I explored impact the political aftermath of the Pacific War on Japan and the gradual restoration of sovereignty had on its air power policy. During this time, aircraft and air defense technology changed rapidly and the roles and mission of the Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) evolved rapidly as well.

The JASDF has been closely tied to the U.S. Air Force (USAF) since its inception. This was true in terms of missions, doctrine, technology and equipment. The primary role of the JASDF has been air defense and the protection of Japanese sovereignty (Defensive Counter Air, DCA), since 1958 when this mission was transitioned back from the USAF. The 1978 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) mandated this, and also prohibited mid-air refueling and precision-strike munitions. These missions were gradually permitted as the threat environment evolved. (See this thesis for a good summary.)

The role of offensive air power (i.e. Offensive Counter Air or OCA; attacking enemy airbases, missile launch sites and similar military facilities) has traditionally been reserved for the USAF due to legal limits on the possible missions by the JASDF. Specifically the U.S. Armed Forces, Japan, 5th Air Force is a considerable force, including the 18th Wing at Kadena, Okinawa with four squadrons of F-15s, and the 35th Wing at Misawa in Northern Japan with four squadrons of F-16s, among other support squadrons to tankers, AWACs, etc.

This posture and division of responsibilities between the JSADF and USAF has gradually changed over time, or “emerging as it really is”:

  • In the early 1980’s, the F-1 attack aircraft had a strike capability against shipping with the ASM-1 and ASM-2 missiles.
  • In the late 1990’s, the F-4EJ upgraded “Kai” version added ground attack and the ability to strike with the ASM-1 and ASM-2 missiles.
  • In the early 2000’s, the F-2 aircraft was introduced, with ground attack with precision-guided munitions and the ability to strike with the ASM-2.
  • Currently, as the F-35A is adopted, it will have state-of-the-art precision strike capabilities, and likely use the Joint Strike Missile (JSM).

Nonetheless, the primary mission of the JASDF remains air superiority and interception. The data visualization above illustrates the different types of air superiority aircraft in service with the JASDF over time. This chart is based on six quantitative measures of analysis, and has a moderate level of information density:

  1. Service Year – on the horizontal axis; when was this type introduced into service by the JASDF? This is often significantly after the similar type was introduced into service with the USAF. In some cases, this is an estimate, or in the case of the hypothetical “F-22J”, alternative history (aka wild speculation).
  2. Aircraft Type – each bubble represents an aircraft type.
  3. Range SMI (statute miles) – the color of the bubble, with darker being longer range; this is a the combat range of the aircraft type, often with optional drop tanks.
  4. Max Speed MPH (statute miles per hour) – the size of the bubble represents the maximum speed of the aircraft, measured from a base of 100 MPH. This is typically at high altitude.
  5. Rate of Climb FPM (feet per minute) – this is the ability of the aircraft to climb to altitude, and a key metric for an interceptor with a mission to rise to bombers which have violated the airspace of a nation.
  6. Thrust to Weight Ratio – this measures the ability to propel the aircraft compared with the loaded weight of the aircraft. This is often used to express the capability to climb, for when an aircraft has a high angle of attack, thrust becomes lift, so when an aircraft has more lift than weight, it can climb, and even accelerate while moving straight up.
  7. Wing Loading LBS/SquareFoot – this measures the size of the wing (and thus by proxy the lift generation capability) as compared to the weight of the aircraft, it is typically used to indicate the ability to turn quickly (i.e. change in degrees per second).

A few insights become clear when visualizing the data in this way. First, the F-104J in the role of interceptor was a huge leap in capability over the F-86 Sabre types. In many ways the F-104J set the standard to which later aircraft would match. Next, the linear progression between 1960 and 1980 of aircraft performance capability reached an apex with the F-15J, with a period of upgrades reflected in the “Kai” versions. Also, with some knowledge of these airframes, it can be seen that the Japanese market for military aircraft has been dominated by the Americans as opposed to the Europeans (or Russians). There are many aspects of these aircraft which are not captured in this chart, including weaponry, sensors, and stealth. I have discussed the relevance of these metrics in previous blog posts.

Today, the JSDF operates a wide range of aircraft, specialized in missions ranging across the spectrum of domains, with modern air force capabilities. A list of aircraft currently operated by force, and with numbers is presented in the annex, based upon the most current authoritative sources, but also updated for recent decisions by the Japanese government on procurement.

An “F-22J” is included as an “alternative history” in the chart above since the Japanese government has repeatedly sought to purchase this aircraft from Lockheed Martin for the JASDF. They have been stymied by the Obey amendment to the 1998 Defense Appropriations Act, which specifically forbade the export of the F-22 in order to protect the secrecy of its advanced technology.