Tag Force Ratios

Spotted In The New Books Section Of The U.S. Naval Academy Library…

Christopher A. Lawrence, War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2017) 390 pages, $39.95

War by Numbers assesses the nature of conventional warfare through the analysis of historical combat. Christopher A. Lawrence (President and Executive Director of The Dupuy Institute) establishes what we know about conventional combat and why we know it. By demonstrating the impact a variety of factors have on combat he moves such analysis beyond the work of Carl von Clausewitz and into modern data and interpretation.

Using vast data sets, Lawrence examines force ratios, the human factor in case studies from World War II and beyond, the combat value of superior situational awareness, and the effects of dispersion, among other elements. Lawrence challenges existing interpretations of conventional warfare and shows how such combat should be conducted in the future, simultaneously broadening our understanding of what it means to fight wars by the numbers.

The book is available in paperback directly from Potomac Books and in paperback and Kindle from Amazon.

How Does the U.S. Army Calculate Combat Power? ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

The constituents of combat power as described in current U.S. military doctrine. [The Lightning Press]

One of the fundamental concepts of U.S. warfighting doctrine is combat power. The current U.S. Army definition is “the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. (ADRP 3-0).” It is the construct commanders and staffs are taught to use to assess the relative effectiveness of combat forces and is woven deeply throughout all aspects of U.S. operational thinking.

To execute operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as the warfighting functions. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information. [ADP 3-0, Operations]

Yet, there is no formal method in U.S. doctrine for estimating combat power. The existing process is intentionally subjective and largely left up to judgment. This is problematic, given that assessing the relative combat power of friendly and opposing forces on the battlefield is the first step in Course of Action (COA) development, which is at the heart of the U.S. Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Estimates of combat power also figure heavily in determining the outcomes of wargames evaluating proposed COAs.

The Existing Process

The Army’s current approach to combat power estimation is outlined in Field Manual (FM) 6-0 Commander and Staff Organization and Operations (2014). Planners are instructed to “make a rough estimate of force ratios of maneuver units two levels below their echelon.” They are then directed to “compare friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses, and vice versa, for each element of combat power.” It is “by analyzing force ratios and determining and comparing each force’s strengths and weaknesses as a function of combat power” that planners gain insight into tactical and operational capabilities, perspectives, vulnerabilities, and required resources.

That is it. Planners are told that “although the process uses some numerical relationships, the estimate is largely subjective. Assessing combat power requires assessing both tangible and intangible factors, such as morale and levels of training.” There is no guidance as to how to determine force ratios [numbers of troops or weapons systems?]. Nor is there any description of how to relate force calculations to combat power. Should force strengths be used somehow to determine a combat power value? Who knows? No additional doctrinal or planning references are provided.

Planners then use these subjective combat power assessments as they shape potential COAs and test them through wargaming. Although explicitly warned not to “develop and recommend COAs based solely on mathematical analysis of force ratios,” they are invited at this stage to consult a table of “minimum historical planning ratios as a starting point.” The table is clearly derived from the ubiquitous 3-1 rule of combat. Contrary to what FM 6-0 claims, neither the 3-1 rule nor the table have a clear historical provenance or any sort of empirical substantiation. There is no proven validity to any of the values cited. It is not even clear whether the “historical planning ratios” apply to manpower, firepower, or combat power.

During this phase, planners are advised to account for “factors that are difficult to gauge, such as impact of past engagements, quality of leaders, morale, maintenance of equipment, and time in position. Levels of electronic warfare support, fire support, close air support, civilian support, and many other factors also affect arraying forces.” FM 6-0 offers no detail as to how these factors should be measured or applied, however.

FM 6-0 also addresses combat power assessment for stability and civil support operations through troop-to-task analysis. Force requirements are to be based on an estimate of troop density, a “ratio of security forces (including host-nation military and police forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants.” The manual advises that most “most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1,000 residents in an area of operations. A ratio of twenty counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective counterinsurgency operations.”

While FM 6-0 acknowledges that “as with any fixed ratio, such calculations strongly depend on the situation,” it does not mention that any references to force level requirements, tie-down ratios, or troop density were stripped from both Joint and Army counterinsurgency manuals in 2013 and 2014. Yet, this construct lingers on in official staff planning doctrine. (Recent research challenged the validity of the troop density construct but the Defense Department has yet to fund any follow-on work on the subject.)

The Army Has Known About The Problem For A Long Time

The Army has tried several solutions to the problem of combat power estimation over the years. In the early 1970s, the U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis (CAA; known then as the U.S. Army Concepts & Analysis Agency) developed the Weighted Equipment Indices/Weighted Unit Value (WEI/WUV or “wee‑wuv”) methodology for calculating the relative firepower of different combat units. While WEI/WUV’s were soon adopted throughout the Defense Department, the subjective nature of the method gradually led it to be abandoned for official use.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College (CGSC) published the ST 100-9 and ST 100-3 student workbooks that contained tables of planning factors that became the informal basis for calculating combat power in staff practice. The STs were revised regularly and then adapted into spreadsheet format in the late 1990s. The 1999 iteration employed WEI/WEVs as the basis for calculating firepower scores used to estimate force ratios. CGSC stopped updating the STs in the early 2000s, as the Army focused on irregular warfare.

With the recently renewed focus on conventional conflict, Army staff planners are starting to realize that their planning factors are out of date. In an attempt to fill this gap, CGSC developed a new spreadsheet tool in 2012 called the Correlation of Forces (COF) calculator. It apparently drew upon analysis done by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center (TRAC) in 2004 to establish new combat unit firepower scores. (TRAC’s methodology is not clear, but if it is based on this 2007 ISMOR presentation, the scores are derived from runs by an unspecified combat model modified by factors derived from the Army’s unit readiness methodology. If described accurately, this would not be an improvement over WEI/WUVs.)

The COF calculator continues to use the 3-1 force ratio tables. It also incorporates a table for estimating combat losses based on force ratios (this despite ample empirical historical analysis showing that there is no correlation between force ratios and casualty rates).

While the COF calculator is not yet an official doctrinal product, CGSC plans to add Marine Corps forces to it for use as a joint planning tool and to incorporate it into the Army’s Command Post of the Future (CPOF). TRAC is developing a stand-alone version for use by force developers.

The incorporation of unsubstantiated and unvalidated concepts into Army doctrine has been a long standing problem. In 1976, Huba Wass de Czege, then an Army major, took both “loosely structured and unscientific analysis” based on intuition and experience and simple counts of gross numbers to task as insufficient “for a clear and rigorous understanding of combat power in a modern context.” He proposed replacing it with a analytical framework for analyzing combat power that accounted for both measurable and intangible factors. Adopting a scrupulous method and language would overcome the simplistic tactical analysis then being taught. While some of the essence of Wass de Czege’s approach has found its way into doctrinal thinking, his criticism of the lack of objective and thorough analysis continues to echo (here, here, and here, for example).

Despite dissatisfaction with the existing methods, little has changed. The problem with this should be self-evident, but I will give the U.S. Naval War College the final word here:

Fundamentally, all of our approaches to force-on-force analysis are underpinned by theories of combat that include both how combat works and what matters most in determining the outcomes of engagements, battles, campaigns, and wars. The various analytical methods we use can shed light on the performance of the force alternatives only to the extent our theories of combat are valid. If our theories are flawed, our analytical results are likely to be equally wrong.

TDI Friday Read: The Validity Of The 3-1 Rule Of Combat

Canadian soldiers going “over the top” during the First World War. [History.com]

Today’s edition of TDI Friday Read addresses the question of force ratios in combat. How many troops are needed to successfully attack or defend on the battlefield? There is a long-standing rule of thumb that holds that an attacker requires a 3-1 preponderance over a defender in combat in order to win. The aphorism is so widely accepted that few have questioned whether it is actually true or not.

Trevor Dupuy challenged the validity of the 3-1 rule on empirical grounds. He could find no historical substantiation to support it. In fact, his research on the question of force ratios suggested that there was a limit to the value of numerical preponderance on the battlefield.

Trevor Dupuy and the 3-1 Rule

Human Factors In Warfare: Diminishing Returns In Combat

TDI President Chris Lawrence has also challenged the 3-1 rule in his own work on the subject.

Force Ratios in Conventional Combat

The 3-to-1 Rule in Histories

Aussie OR

Comparing Force Ratios to Casualty Exchange Ratios

The validity of the 3-1 rule is no mere academic question. It underpins a great deal of U.S. military policy and warfighting doctrine. Yet, the only time the matter was seriously debated was in the 1980s with reference to the problem of defending Western Europe against the threat of Soviet military invasion.

The Great 3-1 Rule Debate

It is probably long past due to seriously challenge the validity and usefulness of the 3-1 rule again.

TDI Friday Read: How Many Troops Are Needed To Defeat An Insurgency?

A paratrooper from the French Foreign Legion (1er REP) with a captured fellagha during the Algerian War (1954-1962). [Via Pinterest]

Today’s edition of TDI Friday Read is a compilation of posts addressing the question of manpower and counterinsurgency. The first four posts summarize research on the question undertaken during the first decade of the 21st century, while the Afghan and Iraqi insurgencies were in full bloom. Despite different research questions and analytical methodologies, each of the studies concluded that there is a relationship between counterinsurgent manpower and counterinsurgency outcomes.

The fifth post addresses the U.S. Army’s lack of a formal methodology for calculating manpower requirements for counterinsurgencies and contingency operations.

Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency

Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency II

Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency III

Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency IV

https://dupuyinstitute.org/2016/06/29/has-the-army-given-up-on-counterinsurgency-research-again/

TDI Friday Read: Principles Of War & Verities Of Combat

[izquotes.com]

Trevor Dupuy distilled his research and analysis on combat into a series of verities, or what he believed were empirically-derived principles. He intended for his verities to complement the classic principles of war, a slightly variable list of maxims of unknown derivation and provenance, which describe the essence of warfare largely from the perspective of Western societies. These are summarized below.

What Is The Best List Of The Principles Of War?

The Timeless Verities of Combat

Trevor N. Dupuy’s Combat Attrition Verities

Trevor Dupuy’s Combat Advance Rate Verities

War By Numbers Published

Christopher A. Lawrence, War by Numbers Understanding Conventional Combat (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2017) 390 pages, $39.95

War by Numbers assesses the nature of conventional warfare through the analysis of historical combat. Christopher A. Lawrence (President and Executive Director of The Dupuy Institute) establishes what we know about conventional combat and why we know it. By demonstrating the impact a variety of factors have on combat he moves such analysis beyond the work of Carl von Clausewitz and into modern data and interpretation.

Using vast data sets, Lawrence examines force ratios, the human factor in case studies from World War II and beyond, the combat value of superior situational awareness, and the effects of dispersion, among other elements. Lawrence challenges existing interpretations of conventional warfare and shows how such combat should be conducted in the future, simultaneously broadening our understanding of what it means to fight wars by the numbers.

The book is available in paperback directly from Potomac Books and in paperback and Kindle from Amazon.

Urban Combat in Mosul

battle-of-mosul-11-nov-2016The Iraqi Interior Ministry announced on Tuesday that Daesh fighters have been cleared from a third of the city of Mosul east of the Tigris River. Pre-battle estimates by the Iraqis credited Daesh with 5,000-6,000 fighters in the city. The Iraqi government has deployed a polyglot force of 100,000 Defense and Interior Ministry troops, Kurdish peshmerga militia, and Shi’ite paramilitary fighters, supported by Western ground and air support, which have mostly surrounded the city. While official casualty estimates have not been announced, the Iraqis claimed to have killed 955 Daesh fighters and captured 108 on the southern front alone.

Despite the months of preparation and a clear objective, The Washington Post‘s Loveday Morris recently reported that Iraqi Army commanders were still “shaken” by the character of the fighting in Mosul’s urban environs. Although confident they will ultimately prevail, they doubt they will meet the objective set by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to bring the city under control by the end of the year.

Although the Iraqi military leaders profess surprise at the complexity of urban combat, their descriptions of do not reveal anything unprecedented in historical experience. Many comments reflect recurring problems the Iraqi Army has faced in its recent operations to clear Daesh from central and western Iraq.

  • It is a bitter fight: street to street, house to house, with the presence of civilians slowing the advancing forces. Car bombs — the militants’ main weapon — speed out of garages and straight into advancing military convoys.
  • “If there were no civilians, we’d just burn it all,” said Maj. Gen. Sami al-Aridhi, a counterterrorism commander. He was forced to temporarily pause operations in his sector Monday because too many families were clogging the street. “I couldn’t bomb with artillery or tanks, or heavy weapons. I said, ‘We can’t do anything.’ ”
  • Militants wait to move between fighting positions until people fill the streets, using their presence as protection from airstrikes.
  • Col. Arkan Fadhil calls in airstrikes from the U.S.-led coalition, but they are less forthcoming than in previous battles because of the presence of families, and are used only to defend Iraqi forces rather than backing them when they attack.
  • Just a few Islamic State militants hidden in populated areas can cause tremendous chaos. [E]lite units stormed [six neighborhoods on] Nov. 4, on a day that was initially trumpeted as a success before it became clear that their early gains were not sustainable. After pushing forward with relatively little resistance, the forces were ambushed and cut off.
  • Low-ranking officers in the field made some mistakes…such as pushing forward without waiting for other units or without properly clearing and securing areas, later getting ambushed and becoming surrounded and trapped. Since the pitched battles of Nov. 4, the [Iraqi] counterterrorism troops have adjusted their pace.
  • [Iraqi counterterrorism forces] said they have had to slow down as they wait for other fronts to advance on the city. Whether they can fight inside when they reach it also remains to be seen. In the battle for the city of Ramadi, the elite counterterrorism troops ended up leading the entire fight after police and army forces struggled to move forward in their sectors.
  • Restrictions in the use of airstrikes also slow their advance. But on Tuesday morning, more than half a dozen rockets roared overhead into the Mosul neighborhood of Tahrir. Officers identified them as TOS-1 short-range missiles, which unleash a blast of pressure over an area of several hundred square meters, devastating anything in their wake. The officers said they had been informed that there were no civilians in the target area. “We only use these missiles in empty areas,” Aridhi said. “We don’t use them in places with families in it.” They sometimes are used when Iraqi forces are under heavy direct fire, he said, because it is faster than sending coordinates to the coalition.

The Iraqi government has not yet released casualty figures for the fighting, but losses are perceived to be heavy by the combatants themselves.

Given the extreme ratio of forces involved, it would seem that Iraqi military leaders are on firm ground in their confidence of ultimate success. It also seems likely they are correct about the amount of time that will be needed to secure Mosul. The defending Daesh fighters are unlikely to be reinforced and cannot replace their combat losses. Simple arithmetic will do them in sooner or later. It also appears clear that the Iraqis are holding open an avenue of retreat to the west, in the hopes that surviving Daesh forces will simply withdraw rather than fight to the last.

It is somewhat unexpected that the Iraqi Army would be surprised by the character of urban fighting in Mosul, given that they have a good deal of recent experience with it. Although they did not lead the fights, Iraqi Army elements participated in the battles for Fallujah in 2004 and Sadr City in 2008. Iraqi government forces cleared Basra with Coalition assistance in 2008, and recaptured Tikrit, Ramadi, and Fallujah (again) over the last year.

There exists a significant body of conventional wisdom that holds that urban combat is bloodier than non-urban combat, requires a higher ratio of attackers to defenders to be successful, and will be prevalent in the future. None of these conclusions is borne out by historical evidence. TDI has done a significant amount of analysis challenging the basis and conclusions of this conventional wisdom. War by Numbers, the forthcoming book by TDI President Chris Lawrence, goes into this research in great detail.

Trevor Dupuy and the 3-1 Rule

rulesDr. Reina Pennington, a professor of history at Norwich University, recently published an analysis of the Eastern Front during World War II which made the case that the Soviet superiority in manpower over Germany was not as large as is often claimed. In support of her argument, Pennington provided a table comparing the total number of Soviet and German combat forces and force ratios at different times during the conflict. She pointed out that for much of the war, Soviet forces were either outnumbered, or achieved modest numerical superiorities that did not exceed 3 to 1 until late in 1944. “A 2:1 advantage is significant,” Pennington argued, “but falls short of the 3:1 force ratio that is generally regarded as necessary for attacking forces, and it’s a long way from the double-digit advantage that is often claimed.”

To support her assertion of the relevance of the 3-1 force ratio, Pennington linked to an article by Trevor N. Dupuy, “Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule,” published in the summer 1989 edition of International Security. The problem with citing Dupuy is that his assessment of the 3-1 rule contradicts her assertion of it.

Dupuy criticized the 3-1 rule on empirical grounds. The so-called “3-1 rule” is a military aphorism that holds that attacking forces require a 3 to 1 advantage over defending forces in order to succeed. Although this rule has become widely-known and widely-held, especially in Western militaries, its origin is unknown and unattributed. It is not exactly clear to what exactly it refers, and there is no known original statement of the rule that can be consulted for clarification.

Dupuy questioned the ambiguity of the rule, which in turn undermined its relevance.

[W]hat is the force ratio to be used with the 3:1 force ratio planning factor? Is it numbers of men, or weapons? Is it firepower? Is it some other calculation of a combat power ratio? In any event, it is clear that neither numbers nor firepower tells us much unless we know the circumstances under which these numbers face each other and the manner in which the firepower is applied.[1]

In 1984, Dupuy’s Historical Evaluation Research Organization (HERO) compiled a database of battles from 1600 to 1973 for the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA; now known as the U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis). CAA’s examination of the numerical force ratios in the database showed that attackers with advantages of 3-1 or more in manpower succeeded 74% of the time. It also showed that attackers won between 58% and 63% of the time when attacking with between a 1.5-1 numerical disadvantage and less than a 3-1 advantage. Attackers also managed to obtain a manpower advantage of 3-1 or greater in just 106 of 598 cases (17.7%) examined.[2]

CAA, Battle Outcome vs. Force Ratio

Dupuy concurred that a 3-1 ratio based on a simple numerical total of troop numbers had limited use as a general rule-of-thumb guide for military planning, but asserted that it was useless for analytical purposes Simply put, while there are many historical cases where an attacking force with a 3-1 numerical advantage succeeded, there are also many cases where attackers won with less than a 3-1 advantage, and even with a numerical inferiority. On the Eastern Front during World War II, for example, the German Army regularly conducted successful attacks against numerically superior Soviet forces.

Dupuy was so certain of the validity of the data on this that he made it an aphorism of his own: In the average modem battle, the attacker’s numerical strength is about double the defender’s.

This is because the attacker has the initiative and can initiate combat at a time and place of his choosing and in the manner of his choosing. The attacker can mass his forces at critical points on the battlefield to gain the advantage in strength which he believes necessary to assure the success of the attack.

A battle usually does not take place unless each side believes it has some chance for success. Otherwise, the attacker would avoid taking the initiative. The defender, if he could not avoid battle by withdrawal, would make every possible effort to reinforce the prospective battle area sufficiently to have a chance for successful defense. One circumstance in which a battle occurs without the tacit agreement or acceptance of the defender, is when the attacker achieves surprise. Alternatively, surprise by a defender (for instance, by ambush) may result in a battle taking place before the prospective attacker is ready.

Most military men are aware of the rule of thumb that an attacker can count on success if he has a three-to-one numerical superiority, while a defender can expect success if his inferiority is not less than one-to-two. But the side achieving surprise can count on the effects of surprise multiplying its force strength by a factor ranging between 1.5 and 2.5 (or even more in some cases). Thus, an attacker expecting to achieve surprise would be willing to attack with less than a three-to-one superiority.

Another factor which can influence an attacker to seek battle with less than a three-to-one superiority is confidence in the superior quality of his troops. This accounts for many instances in which the Germans attacked in World War II with less than the desirable numerical superiority, and for the similar instances of Israeli attacks in the Arab-Israeli wars without great numerical superiority.[3]

Dr. Pennington is on fairly firm ground in rejecting the idea that numerical superiority was the sole reason the Red Army defeated the German Army in World War II, but numbers did play an extremely important role in the Soviet success. The lack of a 3-1 manpower advantage did not preclude the Soviets from battlefield success; 2-1 was sufficient. By the time the Soviets achieved a 3-1 advantage, success was well in hand and the end in sight.

NOTES

[1] Trevor N. Dupuy. Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles. Indianapolis; New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1979, p. 13

[2] Joshua M. Epstein, “Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe,” International Security, Spring 1988, p. 156; Robert Helmbold and Aqeel A. Khan. “Combat History Analysis Study Effort (CHASE): Progress Report for the Period August 1984-June 1985,” Bethesda, MD: U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, August 1986

[3] Trevor N. Dupuy. Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War. Falls Church (VA): Nova Publications, 1995, pp. 98-99