This weekend’s edition of TDI’s Friday Read is a collection of posts on the current state of U.S. airpower by guest contributor Geoffery Clark. The same factors changing the character of land warfare are changing the way conflict will be waged in the air. Clark’s posts highlight some of the way these changes are influencing current and future U.S. airpower plans and concepts.
The U.S. Air Force (USAF) has fielded a formidable force, demonstrating air dominance in conflicts fought, as well as those threatened, across the globe for decades through the Cold War (1945-1991); think Strategic Air Command (SAC) under Gen Curtis LeMay. Pax Americana has been further extended to the present. A “pax” (Latin for peace) being a period of relative peace due to a preponderance of power. The French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine famously defined the U.S. as a “hyperpower”, or “a country that is dominant or predominant in all categories” (NY Times, 1999-02-05). The ability to project power by the U.S. military, especially by the USAF, is and was unparalleled.
According to Gen David Goldfein, Air Force Chief of Staff, “We’re everywhere. Air power has become the oxygen the joint team breathes. Have it, you don’t even think about [it]. Don’t have it, it’s all you think about. Air superiority, ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance], space, lift [airlift, or transport services] are just a few examples.”
Indeed, “Land-based forces now are going to have to penetrate denied areas to facilitate air and naval forces. This is exact opposite of what we have done for the last 70 years, where air and naval forces have enabled ground forces,” according to General Mark Milley, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. War on the Rocks claims “there is no end in sight to the [U.S.] Army’s dependence on airpower.”
The USAF Fights as a Joint Force
The photo above illustrates a joint team across U.S. and allied forces, by combining assets from the USAF, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), as well as the Royal Air Force (RAF), and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) into a single fighting force. But it also demonstrates this preponderance of power by the USAF, which provided almost all of the aircraft used by the operation. Pictured aircraft include (clockwise from left):
U-2S (USAF) – provides ISR.
PAC-3 (USAF) – surface-to-air missile to attack airborne targets.
KC-10 (USAF) – provide in-flight refueling services.
F-15E (USAF) – provides both air superiority and precision strike capabilities.
E-3D Sentry (RAF or USAF) – provides command, control, communications and computers, plus ISR, which happily forms the unique acronym C4ISR, rather than “CCCCISR”
F/A-18C (USMC or RAAF) – provides both air superiority and precision strike capabilities.
F/A-22 (USAF) – provides penetrating strike and air dominance capabilities.
A330 MRTT (RAF?) – provides both in-flight refueling and airlift services.
Emergency Medical and Firefighting ground vehicles.
Thus, I’d assert, we have seen some strong evidence of great plans, and more importantly a planning capability by the U.S. military, including and especially the USAF.
According to a RAND study on the USAF pilot shortage, the real issue is experience levels in “Operational Units (i.e., those with combat responsibilities) are the only assignment options for newly trained pilots while they mature and develop their mission knowledge. Thus, these units require enough experienced pilots to supervise the development of the new pilots. As the proportion of experienced pilots in a unit drops, each one must fly more to provide essential supervision to an increasing number of new pilots. If the unit’s flying capacity cannot increase, new pilots each fly less, extending the time they need to become experienced themselves.”
Given that the career path from military pilot to airlines pilot has been in operation since the 1940’s, why should this be a critical issue now? Because the difference in pay has changed. “The Air Force believes much of the problem comes from commercial airlines that have been hiring at increased rates and can offer bigger paychecks.” All major U.S. Airlines, however, must report not only pilot quantities and salaries, but many other financial details to the Office of Airline Information (OAI), which provides this data to the public for free. Does the USAF not have the capability to analyze and manage the economics of pilot demand and supply? It seems they have been caught reacting, rather than proactively managing their most critical resource, trained human pilots.
“Drone pilots suffer a high rate of burnout, as they work 12 to 13 hour days, performing mainly intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, but also some strikes where mistakes caused by tired eyes can cost lives.” Given the autopilot capabilities of commercial airliners, why are Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) aircrews working so much? Why has autonomy not been granted to a machine for the long, boring and tedious tasks of loiter, and then a human alerted when required to make decisions? Perhaps because the RPA concept is not developed enough to allow for man-machine teaming, perhaps because military leaders do not trust technology to deliver the right alerts.
According to Goldfein, “I believe it’s a crisis: air superiority is not an American birthright. It’s actually something you have to fight for and maintain.”
As fighter pilots seem to be more likely to leave the USAF, these issues seem to be related. As “drones” (more properly RPA) became the star of the global war on terrorism since 2001, many USAF fighter pilots who were formerly physically flying USAF aircraft such as the F-16 were tasked with sitting in a cargo container and staring at a screen, while their inputs to controls were beamed across the world at the speed of light to the controlled drone, which was often loitering for hours over a target area that required persistent ISR. Several Hollywood movies (such as Good Kill (2014)) have been made about this twofold life of USAF pilots. Did the USAF not know that these circumstances would erode morale? Do they know why pilots sign up for service, and why they stay?
How About Battlefield Networking?
In previous posts in this blog, we’ve seen that information is a critical resource. The ability to share information on a battlefield network is the defining capability about how we will win future wars, according to Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work. Most units in the USAF (as well as most NATO units) have the Link 16 network (depicted in blue above). This was conceived in 1967 by MITRE, demonstrated in 1973 by MITRE, and developed as the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) in 1981 by what is now BAE Systems. “Fielding proceeded slowly throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s with rapid expansion (following 9/11) in preparation for Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom.”
Not all units are equipped with Link 16 capability, especially the new stealth fighters, since broadcasting over this network gives away a units position. Instead, the F-22 was equipped with the In-Flight Data Link (IFDL), the red lines in diagram above. Since only the F-22 was equipped with this type of data link, legacy fighters like the F-15C could not communicate easily with F-22 units. Similarly, the F-35 program is being deployed with its own, the Multi-Function Advanced Data Link (MADL), which likewise preserves stealth, but also impedes communications with units not so equipped.
The difficulty and complexity of fielding a battlefield network which allows aircraft to communicate without compromising their stealth is tough, which is why Lt Col Berke stated that “these networks have yet to be created.” The Talon HATE pod is a stopgap capability, requested by the Pacific Air Forces, prototyped and deployed by Boeing Phantom Works. “With the stealthy F-22 buy truncated at 183 aircraft and F-35s being introduced into service far more slowly than planned, the Air Force is being forced to devise a connectivity regimen among these platforms to maximize their capabilities in battle.” The Talon HATE pod also includes an IRST, which the USAF has learned is effective at detecting stealth fighters.
Indeed, as reported by Aviation Week, the USAF is still in the process to rolling out Link 16 to its older tankers the KC-135, which are among the oldest aircraft still flown by the USAF. Perhaps this is a reaction to the Chinese operationalized stealth fighter, the J-20. It has recently been photographed carrying four external fuel tanks, which may give it the range to attack potentially vulnerable targets, such as tankers.
The US Marine Corps (USMC) is practicing some new concepts of operation (CONOPS), using their new F-35B aircraft. The combination of a stealthy, Short-Take-Off-Vetical-Landing (STOVL) fighter with great sensors, with the aviation-centric configuration of the America Class vessels; the “Lightening Carrier (CV-L)” concept, and the flexible basing options from their CONOPS have some great potential to rapidly extend the power of the USMC ashore. “After fifteen years of emphasizing sustained operations ashore, the Marine Corps is refocusing on its naval and expeditionary roots and full-spectrum operations across the range of military operations (ROMO).” (2017 Marine Aviation Plan)
The 21st century Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) conducts maneuver warfare in the physical and cognitive dimensions of conflict to generate and exploit psychological, technological, temporal, and spatial advantages over the adversary. The 21st century MAGTF executes maneuver warfare through a combined arms approach that embraces information warfare as indispensable for achieving complementary effects across five domains – air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. The 21st century MAGTF avoids linear, sequential, and phased approaches to operations and blends maneuver warfare and combined arms to generate the combat power needed for simultaneity of action in its full range of missions. The 21st century MAGTF operates and fights at sea, from the sea, and ashore as an integrated part of the naval force and the larger combined/joint force. (emphasis added) (ibid)
The concepts laid out in the USMC document are:
Distributed Aviation Operations (DAO) – this is a plan to reduce predictability and operate from austere locations, “independent of specialized fixed infrastructure”
Distributed STOVL Operations (DSO) – similar to DSO, but with “[F]uel and ordnance resupply conducted at mobile forward arming and refueling points (M-FARPS) located closer or within the operating area.”
“Complementing…is the mobile distribution site (MDS) concept, a vehicle-mobile site located away from the M-FARP, intended to re-arm and re-fuel the M-FARP while maintaining an element of deception and decoy. DSO is sustainable using surface connectors, land-based MDSs and host nation support, enabling readiness and sortie generation for the MAGTF.”
We might never need to employ this way…but to not lean forward to develop this capability, to train and exercise with it, is to deny ourselves a force multiplier that highlights the agility and opportunity only the Navy-Marine Corps team can provide. (ibid)
How Do These USMC Lightening Carriers Compare?
The America Class amphibious assault ship, which at ~45,000 ton displacement is larger that the French nuclear carrier Charles De Gaulle (~42,000 tons), and approaching the size of the Russian and Chinese Kuznetsov class carriers (~55,000 tons), about the same size as the Indian modified Kiev class carrier (~45,000 tons), and bigger than the Japanese Izumo Class “helicopter destroyer” (~27,000 tons), which to a layman’s eyes is an aircraft carrier; even though these vessels operate only helicopters today, the capability to operate F-35B aircraft in the future is certainly exists. Of course the dominant carrier force is the US Navy’s Nimitz class, and newer Ford class (~100,000 tons), which operate aircraft using Catapult-Assisted-Take-Off-But-Arrested-Recovery (CATOBAR). Interestingly, the British initially designed their Queen Elizabeth class carriers (~70,000 tons) to be CATOBAR, which gives the advantage of being able to launch heavier fighters (i.e. more weapons and fuel). A doubling of the estimated cost for CATOBAR forced a redesign back to a STOVL design back in 2012.
Are STOVL Aircraft Inherently Inferior?
This is an excellent question. The physical laws of nature have a vote here, because a STOVL aircraft must carry a smaller payload, than a CATOBAR aircraft, since it lacks the initial thrust provided by the catapult. David Axe of War is Boring has delivered a scathing account of the STOVL concept and history, (to again target the F-35). The USMC pursued STOVL technology, in spite of ” …crash-plagued experimentation throughout the early years of the jet age — every STOVL or V/STOL prototype from 1946 to 1966 crashed. “USMC interest in a working V/STOL attack aircraft outstripped the state of aeronautical technology.”
The British, meanwhile, concerned about Russian bomber and missile attacks on their airfields during the Cold War, developed the Harrier Jump Jet, which did not require a lengthy, fixed runway.
But the Harrier, so appealing in theory, has been a disaster in practice … In the 1991 Gulf War, the front-line concrete lily pads never showed up, so the jump jet had to fly from distant full-size bases or assault ships. With their very limited fuel, they were lucky to be able to put in five or 10 minutes supporting Marines on the ground — and they proved tremendously vulnerable to machine guns and shoulder-fired missiles.
Indeed, Mr. Axe quotes the infamous Pierre Sprey – “The Harrier was based on a complete lie.” (emphasis added).
Harrier jump-jets performed well beyond the performance expectations of most military experts. The remarkable record of the aircraft is attributed not only to relatively sophisticated gadgetry, such as warning receivers and electronic countermeasures to confuse Argentine antiaircraft weapons, but also to the skilled British pilots…and the older Argentine planes…. In spite of its spectacular successes against British ships, Argentina lost the air-to-air war decisively. Argentine fighter aircraft failed to shoot down a single Harrier. British Harrier losses totaled nine–four to accidents and five by surface-based air defenses–surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA).
The USMC concepts specifically called out the ability to exploit spatial advantages, which also played a key roll in the Falklands:
The 400 miles from Argentina to the islands partially explained why the score was so lopsided. To make the 800-mile round trip from the Rio Gallegos Air Base on the coast severely strained the maximum operating range of the Argentine aircraft. Consequently, Argentine pilots had all they could do to reach the conflict area undetected and deliver their ordnance, “getting in and getting out” as quickly as possible.” (Ibid)
This geo-spatial situation is reminiscent of the Battle of Britain, where the RAF operated fighter aircraft nearby the battle location, while the Luftwaffe operated at the edge of their range, a limitation which was also widely credited as an important factor in the outcome.
[T]he Royal Navy was forced to go to war with only two short vertical takeoff and landing (STOVL) ships and their STOVL aircraft, the Harrier…. [T]hese units performed very well. It has been stated that had the British not had aircraft with the capabilities of the Harrier (STOVL, high reliability, and high availability) and the two small ships to operate them, it is unlikely the United Kingdom would have committed itself to hostilities in the South Atlantic…. Perhaps its greatest feature was surprising flexibility…. One of the best features of the Harrier was versatility in operating from a variety of platforms under actual combat conditions.
It is precisely this flexibility that STOVL aircraft—both the F-35B and the Harrier before it—which is leveraged in the USMC concepts. The F-35B has the added advantage that one of its key capabilities is the delivery of timely, accurate information. This information is delivered across the battle network at the speed of light, and weighs nothing, so the STOVL limitations do not apply in the same way. It seems clear that any evaluation of the F-35B’s capabilities need to consider these advantages, rather than focusing exclusively on metrics related to the Energy-Maneuverability Theory, such as wing loading, thrust to weight ratio.
I’ve been listening to Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work speak on the Third Offset Strategy. He spoke at Defense One Production forum (2015-09-30), and again to Air Command and Staff College students, (2016-05-27). What follows are some rough notes and paraphrasing, aimed at understanding the strategy, and connecting the F-35 platform and its capabilities to the strategy.
Work gives an interesting description of his job as Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the Department of Defense (DOD), which is “one of the biggest corporations on the planet,” and having a “simple” mission, “to organize, train and equip a joint force that is ready for war and that is operated forward to preserve the peace.”
The Roots of the Third Offset Strategy
Why do we care about Third Offset? “We have to deal with the resurgence of great power competition.” What is a great power? Work credits John Mearsheimer’s definition, but in his own words, it is “a large state that can take on the dominant global state (the United States) and really give them a run for their money, and have a nuclear deterrent force that can survive a first strike. Don’t really care about economic power, or soft power, the focus is only on military capabilities.”
This is quite interesting, since economic power begets military capabilities. A poor China and a rich China are worlds’ apart in terms of the military power that they can field. Also, the stop and start nature of basing agreements with the Philippines under Duterte might remove key bases close to the South China Sea battlefield, having a huge impact on the ability of the US military to project power, as the RAND briefing from yesterday’s post illustrated in rather stark terms.
What has changed to require the Third Offset? Great power rivals have duplicated our Second Offset strategy, of precision guided munitions, stealth and operational (campaign) level battle networks. This strategy gave the US and allies an advantage for forty years. “We’ve lived in a unique time in post-Wesphalian era, where one state is so dominant relative to its peers.” He sees a dividing line in 2014, when two events occur:
China starts to reclaim islands in the South China Sea
Russia annexes Crimea and destabilizes Ukraine
Also, the nature of technology development has changed as well. In the Cold War, technological innovation happens in government labs:
1950’s – nuclear weapon miniaturization
1960’s – space and rocket technology
1970’s – precision guided munitions, stealth, information technology
1980’s – large scale system of systems
From 2012, militarily-relevant technologies are happening in the commercial sphere:
Artificial Intelligence (AI)
Autonomous Weapons Systems
Robotics
Digitization
Fight from Range
Operate from inside their battle network
Cyber and EW, how to take down their network?
“This means we know where to start, but we don’t know where it ends.” Of this list of technologies, he calls out AI and Autonomy as at the forefront. He defines Autonomy as “the delegation of decision authority to some entity in the battle network. Manned or unmanned system … what you are looking for is human-machine symbiosis.“
What do you need to do this? First, deep-learning systems. “Up until 2015, a human analyst was consistently more accurate at identifying an object in an image than a machine. In 2015, this changed. … when a machine makes a mistake, it makes a big one.” He then tells the story of a baby holding a baseball bat, “which the machine identified as an enemy armed combatant. … machines looked for patterns, and then provide them to humans who can use their intitive and strategic acuity to determine what’s going on.“
The F-35 and Strategy
As an example of how this might play out, a machine can generate the Air Tasking Order (ATO – which is a large document that lists all of the sorties and targets to be prosecuted by joint air forces in a 24-hour period, per Wikipedia) … in minutes or hours, instead of many analysts working for hours or days. “We are after human-computer collaborative decision-making.” In 1997, super computer “Deep Blue” beat Gary Kasparov in chess, which was a big deal at the time. In 2005, however, two amateur chess players using three computers beat a field of grand masters and field of super computers. “It was the human strategic guidance combined with the tactical acuity of the computer that we believe will be the most important thing.” He then goes on to highlight an example of this human-machine collaboration:
The F-35 is not a fighter plane. It shouldn’t even be called the F-35. It should be called the BN-35, the “Battle Network”-35. It is a human-machine collaboration machine that is unbelievable. The Distributed Aperture System (DAS), and all the sensors, and the network which pours into the plane; the plane processes it and displays it to the pilot, so that the pilot can make accurate, relevant and quick decisions. That’s why that airplane is going to be so good.
Work also covers another topic near and dear to me, wargaming. Perhaps a war game is a great opportunity for humans and machines to practice collaboration?
We are reinvigorating wargaming, which has really gone down over the past years. We’re looking at more at the service level, more at the OSD level, and these are very, very helpful for us to develop innovative leaders, and also helpful for us to go after new and innovative concepts.
He mentions the Schriever Wargame. “[O]nce you start to move forces, your great power rival will start to use cyber to try to slow down those forces … the distinction between away games and home games is no longer relevant to us.”
Next, I’ll look at the perspectives of the services as they adopt the F-35 in different ways.