Tag Stealth

Status Update On U.S. Long Range Fires Capabilities

Soldiers fire an M777A2 howitzer while supporting Iraqi security forces near al-Qaim, Iraq, Nov. 7, 2017, as part of the operation to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. [Spc. William Gibson/U.S. Army]

Earlier this year, I noted that the U.S. is investing in upgrading its long range strike capabilities as part of its multi-domain battle doctrinal response to improving Chinese, Russian, and Iranian anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. There have been a few updates on the progress of those investments.

The U.S. Army Long Range Fires Cross Functional Team

A recent article in Army Times by Todd South looked at some of the changes being implemented by the U.S. Army cross functional team charged with prioritizing improvements in the service’s long range fires capabilities. To meet a requirement to double the ranges of its artillery systems within five years, “the Army has embarked upon three tiers of focus, from upgrading old school artillery cannons, to swapping out its missile system to double the distance it can fire, and giving the Army a way to fire surface-to-surface missiles at ranges of 1,400 miles.”

The Extended Range Cannon Artillery program is working on rocket assisted munitions to double the range of the Army’s workhouse 155mm guns to 24 miles, with some special rounds capable of reaching targets up to 44 miles away. As I touched on recently, the Army is also looking into ramjet rounds that could potentially increase striking range to 62 miles.

To develop the capability for even longer range fires, the Army implemented a Strategic Strike Cannon Artillery program for targets up to nearly 1,000 miles, and a Strategic Fires Missile effort enabling targeting out to 1,400 miles.

The Army is also emphasizing retaining trained artillery personnel and an improved training regime which includes large-scale joint exercises and increased live-fire opportunities.

Revised Long Range Fires Doctrine

But better technology and training are only part of the solution. U.S. Army Captain Harrison Morgan advocated doctrinal adaptations to shift Army culture away from thinking of fires solely as support for maneuver elements. Among his recommendations are:

  • Increasing the proportion of U.S. corps rocket artillery to tube artillery systems from roughly 1:4 to something closer to the current Russian Army ratio of 3:4.
  • Fielding a tube artillery system capable of meeting or surpassing the German-made PZH 2000, which can strike targets out to 30 kilometers with regular rounds, sustain a firing rate of 10 rounds per minute, and strike targets with five rounds simultaneously.
  • Focus on integrating tube and rocket artillery with a multi-domain, joint force to enable the destruction of the majority of enemy maneuver forces before friendly ground forces reach direct-fire range.
  • Allow tube artillery to be task organized below the brigade level to provide indirect fires capabilities to maneuver battalions, and make rocket artillery available to division and brigade commanders. (Morgan contends that the allocation of indirect fires capabilities to maneuver battalions ended with the disbanding of the Army’s armored cavalry regiments in 2011.)
  • Increase training in use of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) assets at the tactical level to locate, target, and observe fires.

U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy Face Long Range Penetrating Strike Challenges

The Army’s emphasis on improving long range fires appears timely in light of the challenges the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy face in conducting long range penetrating strikes mission in the A2/AD environment. A fascinating analysis by Jerry Hendrix for the Center for a New American Security shows the current strategic problems stemming from U.S. policy decisions taken in the early 1990s following the end of the Cold War.

In an effort to generate a “peace dividend” from the fall of the Soviet Union, the Clinton administration elected to simplify the U.S. military force structure for conducting long range air attacks by relieving the Navy of its associated responsibilities and assigning the mission solely to the Air Force. The Navy no longer needed to replace its aging carrier-based medium range bombers and the Air Force pushed replacements for its aging B-52 and B-1 bombers into the future.

Both the Air Force and Navy emphasized development and acquisition of short range tactical aircraft which proved highly suitable for the regional contingencies and irregular conflicts of the 1990s and early 2000s. Impressed with U.S. capabilities displayed in those conflicts, China, Russia, and Iran invested in air defense and ballistic missile technologies specifically designed to counter American advantages.

The U.S. now faces a strategic environment where its long range strike platforms lack the range and operational and technological capability to operate within these AS/AD “bubbles.” The Air Force has far too few long range bombers with stealth capability, and neither the Air Force nor Navy tactical stealth aircraft can carry long range strike missiles. The missiles themselves lack stealth capability. The short range of the Navy’s aircraft and insufficient numbers of screening vessels leave its aircraft carriers vulnerable to ballistic missile attack.

Remedying this state of affairs will take time and major investments in new weapons and technological upgrades. However, with certain upgrades, Hendrix sees the current Air Force and Navy force structures capable of providing the basis for a long range penetrating strike operational concept effective against A2/AD defenses. The unanswered question is whether these upgrades will be implemented at all.

Is The End Of Stealth Neigh?

Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor [Creative Commons]

Michael Peck made an interesting catch over at The National Interest. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is soliciting input on potentially disruptive technologies for future warfare. With regard to air warfare, the solicitation baldy states, “Platform stealth may be approaching physical limits.” This led Peck to ask “Did the Pentagon just admit that stealth technology may not work anymore?”

A couple of years ago, a media report that the Chinese had claimed a technological breakthrough in stealth-busting quantum radar capabilities led me to muse about the possible repercussions on U.S. military capabilities. This was during the height of the technology-rooted Third Offset Strategy mania. It seemed to me at the time that concentrating on technological solutions to the U.S.’s strategic challenges might not be the wisest course of action.

The notion that stealth might be a wasting asset seemed somewhat far-fetched when I wrote that, but it appears to have become a much more serious concern. As the DARPA solicitation states, “Our acquisition system is finding it difficult to respond on relevant timescales to adversary progress, which has made the search for next generation capabilities at once more urgent and more futile.” (p. 5)

Er, yikes.

TDI Friday Read: U.S. Airpower

[Image by Geopol Intelligence]

This weekend’s edition of TDI’s Friday Read is a collection of posts on the current state of U.S. airpower by guest contributor Geoffery Clark. The same factors changing the character of land warfare are changing the way conflict will be waged in the air. Clark’s posts highlight some of the way these changes are influencing current and future U.S. airpower plans and concepts.

F-22 vs. F-35: Thoughts On Fifth Generation Fighters

The F-35 Is Not A Fighter

U.S. Armed Forces Vision For Future Air Warfare

The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force Debate Future Air Superiority

U.S. Marine Corps Concepts of Operation with the F-35B

The State of U.S. Air Force Air Power

Fifth Generation Deterrence

 

The State of U.S. Air Force Air Power

Operation Inherent Resolve 2014. [Business Insider]

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) has fielded a formidable force, demonstrating air dominance in conflicts fought, as well as those threatened, across the globe for decades through the Cold War (1945-1991); think Strategic Air Command (SAC) under Gen Curtis LeMay. Pax Americana has been further extended to the present. A “pax” (Latin for peace) being a period of relative peace due to a preponderance of power. The French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine famously defined the U.S. as a “hyperpower”, or “a country that is dominant or predominant in all categories” (NY Times, 1999-02-05). The ability to project power by the U.S. military, especially by the USAF, is and was unparalleled.

According to Gen David Goldfein, Air Force Chief of Staff, “We’re everywhere. Air power has become the oxygen the joint team breathes. Have it, you don’t even think about [it]. Don’t have it, it’s all you think about. Air superiority, ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance], space, lift [airlift, or transport services] are just a few examples.”

Indeed, “Land-based forces now are going to have to penetrate denied areas to facilitate air and naval forces. This is exact opposite of what we have done for the last 70 years, where air and naval forces have enabled ground forces,” according to General Mark Milley, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. War on the Rocks claims “there is no end in sight to the [U.S.] Army’s dependence on airpower.”

The USAF Fights as a Joint Force

The photo above illustrates a joint team across U.S. and allied forces, by combining assets from the USAF, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), as well as the Royal Air Force (RAF), and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) into a single fighting force. But it also demonstrates this preponderance of power by the USAF, which provided almost all of the aircraft used by the operation. Pictured aircraft include (clockwise from left):

  • U-2S (USAF) – provides ISR.
  • PAC-3 (USAF) – surface-to-air missile to attack airborne targets.
  • KC-10 (USAF) – provide in-flight refueling services.
  • F-15E (USAF) – provides both air superiority and precision strike capabilities.
  • E-3D Sentry (RAF or USAF) – provides command, control, communications and computers, plus ISR, which happily forms the unique acronym C4ISR, rather than “CCCCISR”
  • F/A-18C (USMC or RAAF) – provides both air superiority and precision strike capabilities.
  • F/A-22 (USAF) – provides penetrating strike and air dominance capabilities.
  • A330 MRTT (RAF?) – provides both in-flight refueling and airlift services.
  • Emergency Medical and Firefighting ground vehicles.
  • RQ-4 Global Hawk (USAF) – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) providing ISR.

Thus, I’d assert, we have seen some strong evidence of great plans, and more importantly a planning capability by the U.S. military, including and especially the USAF.

The USAF Faces Some Significant Challenges

According to a RAND study on the USAF pilot shortage, the real issue is experience levels in “Operational Units (i.e., those with combat responsibilities) are the only assignment options for newly trained pilots while they mature and develop their mission knowledge. Thus, these units require enough experienced pilots to supervise the development of the new pilots. As the proportion of experienced pilots in a unit drops, each one must fly more to provide essential supervision to an increasing number of new pilots. If the unit’s flying capacity cannot increase, new pilots each fly less, extending the time they need to become experienced themselves.”

Given that the career path from military pilot to airlines pilot has been in operation since the 1940’s, why should this be a critical issue now? Because the difference in pay has changed. “The Air Force believes much of the problem comes from commercial airlines that have been hiring at increased rates and can offer bigger paychecks.” All major U.S. Airlines, however, must report not only pilot quantities and salaries, but many other financial details to the Office of Airline Information (OAI), which provides this data to the public for free. Does the USAF not have the capability to analyze and manage the economics of pilot demand and supply? It seems they have been caught reacting, rather than proactively managing their most critical resource, trained human pilots.

“Drone pilots suffer a high rate of burnout, as they work 12 to 13 hour days, performing mainly intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, but also some strikes where mistakes caused by tired eyes can cost lives.” Given the autopilot capabilities of commercial airliners, why are Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) aircrews working so much? Why has autonomy not been granted to a machine for the long, boring and tedious tasks of loiter, and then a human alerted when required to make decisions? Perhaps because the RPA concept is not developed enough to allow for man-machine teaming, perhaps because military leaders do not trust technology to deliver the right alerts.

  • According to Goldfein, “I believe it’s a crisis: air superiority is not an American birthright. It’s actually something you have to fight for and maintain.”

As fighter pilots seem to be more likely to leave the USAF, these issues seem to be related. As “drones” (more properly RPA) became the star of the global war on terrorism since 2001, many USAF fighter pilots who were formerly physically flying USAF aircraft such as the F-16 were tasked with sitting in a cargo container and staring at a screen, while their inputs to controls were beamed across the world at the speed of light to the controlled drone, which was often loitering for hours over a target area that required persistent ISR. Several Hollywood movies (such as Good Kill (2014)) have been made about this twofold life of USAF pilots. Did the USAF not know that these circumstances would erode morale? Do they know why pilots sign up for service, and why they stay?

How About Battlefield Networking?

A Battle Network enabled by an F-15C with Talon HATE pod. [foxtrot alpha]

In previous posts in this blog, we’ve seen that information is a critical resource. The ability to share information on a battlefield network is the defining capability about how we will win future wars, according to Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work. Most units in the USAF (as well as most NATO units) have the Link 16 network (depicted in blue above). This was conceived in 1967 by MITRE, demonstrated in 1973 by MITRE, and developed as the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) in 1981 by what is now BAE Systems. “Fielding proceeded slowly throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s with rapid expansion (following 9/11) in preparation for Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom.”

Not all units are equipped with Link 16 capability, especially the new stealth fighters, since broadcasting over this network gives away a units position. Instead, the F-22 was equipped with the In-Flight Data Link (IFDL), the red lines in diagram above. Since only the F-22 was equipped with this type of data link, legacy fighters like the F-15C could not communicate easily with F-22 units. Similarly, the F-35 program is being deployed with its own, the Multi-Function Advanced Data Link (MADL), which likewise preserves stealth, but also impedes communications with units not so equipped.

The difficulty and complexity of fielding a battlefield network which allows aircraft to communicate without compromising their stealth is tough, which is why Lt Col Berke stated that “these networks have yet to be created.” The Talon HATE pod is a stopgap capability, requested by the Pacific Air Forces, prototyped and deployed by Boeing Phantom Works. “With the stealthy F-22 buy truncated at 183 aircraft and F-35s being introduced into service far more slowly than planned, the Air Force is being forced to devise a connectivity regimen among these platforms to maximize their capabilities in battle.” The Talon HATE pod also includes an IRST, which the USAF has learned is effective at detecting stealth fighters.

Indeed, as reported by Aviation Week, the USAF is still in the process to rolling out Link 16 to its older tankers the KC-135, which are among the oldest aircraft still flown by the USAF. Perhaps this is a reaction to the Chinese operationalized stealth fighter, the J-20. It has recently been photographed carrying four external fuel tanks, which may give it the range to attack potentially vulnerable targets, such as tankers.

The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force Debate Future Air Superiority

F-35C of Strike Fighter Squadron 101 (VFA-101) flies in formation with a Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornet of VFA-122 near Eglin Air Force Base, Florida (USA) on 22 June 2013. (USAF via Wikimedia)

The U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force (USAF) are concerned about the ability to achieve and retain air superiority in future conflicts. In 2008, with the F-35 program underway, the USN issued a new requirement for an air superiority platform, the F/A-XX. The USAF, looking at its small fleet of F-22 Raptors–187 total, 125 combat-ready–and the status of the F-35 program, kicked off its own F-X program or Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) in 2012.

In 2015, Frank Kendall, the Pentagon’s “acquisition czar” combined these two programs into Penetrating Counter-Air (PCA) to be run by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). This means that some basic requirements will need to be agreed upon, such as stealth or low-observable characteristics. The USN and USAF have some differing viewpoints on this particular topic.

USAF Air Combat Command (ACC) chief Gen. Herbert “Hawk” Carlisle says stealth will be “incredibly important” for the F-X aircraft that the USAF is pursuing as an eventual F-22 replacement. This viewpoint is reinforced by statements that the USAF’s fourth-generation fighters, F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-18, are “obsolete” even after upgrade, and “they simply will not survive” against the threats of the future, such as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.

Meanwhile, USN Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert, has said that “stealth may be over-rated.” In a speech at the Office of Naval Research Naval Future Force Science and Technology Expo in Washington, D.C., Greenert said “I don’t want to necessarily say that it’s over, but let’s face it, if something moves fast through the air and disrupts molecules in the air and puts out heat–I don’t care how cool the engine can be–it’s going to be detectable.”

Aviation Week detailed these advances in counter-stealth capability, including both radars and Infra-Red Search and Track (IRST):

U.S. Air Force is the latest convert to the capabilities of IRST. The U.S. Navy’s IRST for the Super Hornet, installed in a modified centerline fuel tank, was approved for low-rate initial production in February, following 2014 tests of an engineering development model system, and the Block I version is due to reach initial operational capability in fiscal 2018. Block I uses the same Lockheed Martin infrared receiver—optics and front end—as is used on F-15Ks in Korea and F-15SGs in Singapore. This subsystem is, in turn, derived from the IRST that was designed in the 1980s for the F-14D. 

While the Pentagon’s director of operational test and engineering criticized the Navy system’s track quality, it has clearly impressed the Air Force enough to overcome its long lack of interest in IRST. The Air Force has also gained experience via its F-16 Aggressor units, which have been flying with IRST pods since 2013. The Navy plans to acquire only 60 Block I sensors, followed by 110 Block II systems with a new front end.

The bulk of Western IRST experience is held by Selex-ES, which is the lead contractor on the Typhoon’s Pirate IRST and the supplier of the Skyward-G for Gripen. In the past year, Selex has claimed openly that its IRSTs have been able to detect and track low-RCS targets at subsonic speeds, due to skin friction, heat radiating through the skin from the engine, and the exhaust plume.

Are Fourth and Fifth Generation Fighters Comparable?

Then on 21 December 2016, in the middle of this ongoing debate, president-elect Donald Trump tweeted: “Based on the tremendous cost and cost overruns of the Lockheed Martin F-35, I have asked Boeing to price-out a comparable F-18 Super Hornet!”

Many have asked, can an upgrade to a “legacy” fighter like the Super Hornet be comparable to a fifth-generation fighter like the F-35? Some have said that an advanced Super Hornet is an “Impossible Magic Fantasy Jet.” Others flatly state “No, Mr. Trump, You Can’t Replace F-35 With A ‘Comparable’ F-18.” More eloquently stated: “In this modern era of stealth combat, there are two kinds of fighters. Stealth fighters and targets.”

The manufacturers of the two aircraft mentioned in Trump’s tweet have been debating this topic over the past few years. In 2014, Boeing questioned the relative capabilities of the F-35C and the E/F-18G “Growler”, an electronic attack variant of the Super Hornet. “Stealth is perishable; only a Growler provides full spectrum protection.”

Indeed, that same year, Boeing developed an Advanced Super Hornet. The idea was basically to enclose the weapons that current Super Hornets sling beneath their wings into a low-observable pod and thus bring the overall radar cross section (RCS) i.e. the main metric of stealth, down to a level that would provide some of the penetration capability that a fifth generation fighter enjoys.

F/A-18 XT Block III Advanced Super Hornet [GlobalSecurity.org]

The current version of the advanced Super Hornet has “matured” after additional conversation with their primary customer, and low-observability has taken a less important role than range, payload, and battle-network capability. Indeed, Mr. Trump responded “We are looking seriously at a big order.”

For the USN, the F-35 seems to have evolved from a strike fighter into a platform for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (C4ISR). This is an important role to play, undoubtedly, but it may mean fewer F-35Cs on carrier decks, which puts more money back into the pocket of the USN for other purposes.

Boeing’s sixth-generation fighter concept. Notable features are the optionality of the pilot, the lack of visibility from the cockpit which indicates some sort of “distributed aperture system” a la the F-35, and lack of a tail, which might limit air combat maneuverability. [Aviation Week]

Of course, Lockheed is not resting still – they’ve recently demonstrated a manned and unmanned teaming capability, working with the Air Force Research Laboratory.

What both companies and both services state publicly must be taken in the context of politics and business, as they are in constant competition, both with each other and potential opponents. This is a natural way to come up with good concepts, good options, and a good price.

More on autonomous capabilities to follow.

Technology, Eggs, and Risk (Oh, My)

Tokyo, Japan --- Eggs in a basket --- Image by © JIRO/Corbis
Tokyo, Japan — Eggs in a basket — Image by © JIRO/Corbis

In my last post, on the potential for the possible development of quantum radar to undermine the U.S. technological advantage in stealth technology, I ended by asking this question:

The basic assumption behind the Third Offset Strategy is that the U.S. can innovate and adopt technological capabilities fast enough to maintain or even expand its current military superiority. Does the U.S. really have enough of a scientific and technological development advantage over its rivals to validate this assumption?

My colleague, Chris, has suggested that I expand on the thinking behind this. Here goes:

The lead times needed for developing advanced weapons and the costs involved in fielding them make betting on technological innovation as a strategy seem terribly risky. In his 1980 study of the patterns of weapon technology development, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, Trevor Dupuy noted that there is a clear historical pattern of a period of 20-30 years between the invention of a new weapon and its use in combat in a tactically effective way. For example, practical armored fighting vehicles were first developed in 1915 but they were not used fully effectively in battle until the late 1930s.

The examples I had in mind when I wrote my original post were the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), both of which derive much, if not most, of their combat power from being stealthy. If that capability were to be negated even partially by a technological breakthrough or counter by a potential adversary, then 20+ years of development time and hundreds of billions of dollars would have been essentially wasted. If either or both or weapons system were rendered ineffective in the middle of a national emergency, neither could be quickly retooled nor replaced. The potential repercussions could be devastating.

I reviewed the development history of the F-35 in a previous post. Development began in 2001 and the Air Force declared the first F-35 squadron combat operational (in a limited capacity) in August 2016 (which has since been stood down for repairs). The first fully combat-capable F-35s will not be ready until 2018 at the soonest, and the entire fleet will not be ready until at least 2023. Just getting the aircraft fully operational will have taken 15-22 years, depending on how one chooses to calculate it. It will take several more years after that to fully evaluate the F-35 in operation and develop tactics, techniques, and procedures to maximize its effectiveness in combat. The lifetime cost of the F-35 has been estimated at $1.5 trillion, which is likely to be another underestimate.

The U.S. Navy anticipated the need for ships capable of operating in shallow coastal waters in the late 1990s. Development of the LCS began in 2003 the first ships of two variants were launched in 2006 and 2008, respectively. Two of each design have been built so far. Since then, cost overruns, developmental problems, disappointing performances at sea, and reconsideration of the ship’s role led the Navy to scale back a planned purchase of 53 LCSs to 40 at the end of 2015 to allow money to be spent on other priorities. As of July 2016, only 26 LCSs have been programmed and the Navy has been instructed to select one of the two designs to complete the class. Initial program procurement costs were $22 billion, which have now risen to $39 billion. Operating costs for each ship is currently estimated at $79 million, which the Navy asserts will drop when simultaneous testing and operational use ends. The Navy plans to build LCSs until the 2040s, which includes replacements for the original ten after a service life of 25 years. Even at the annual operating cost of a current U.S. Navy frigate ($59 million), a back of the envelope calculation for a lifetime cost for the LCS is around $91 billion, all told; this is also likely an underestimate. This seems like a lot of money to spend on a weapon that the Navy intends to pull out of combat should it sustain any damage.

It would not take a technological breakthrough as singular as quantum radar to degrade the effectiveness of U.S. stealth technology, either. The Russians claim that they already possess radars that can track U.S. stealth aircraft. U.S. sources essentially concede this, but point out that tracking a stealth platform does not mean that it can be attacked successfully. Obtaining a track sufficient to target involves other technological capabilities that are susceptible to U.S. electronic warfare capabilities. U.S. stealth aircraft already need to operate in conjunction with existing EW platforms to maintain their cloaked status. Even if quantum radar proves infeasible, the game over stealth is already afoot.