Tag Trump administration

Looking At Recent Reported Combat Loss Rates In Afghanistan

Afghan National Army soldiers simulate clearing a compound with help from their instructors at the 2nd Brigade, 205th Corps ANA Non-commissioned Officer Academy on Forward Operating Base Eagle in Zabul province Jan. 10, 2012 [{Wikimedia]

Last Friday, Rod Nordland published an article in the New York Times alleging that Afghan security forces (Afghan National Army (ANA) and police) had suffered an average of 57 killed in action (KIA) per day during the previous week, up from 22 killed per day in 2016. If true, such reports would indicate a dramatic increase in loss rates over the previous years.

These reported figures should be regarded critically, however. It is not clear how Nordland arrived at the total of 22 KIA per day for 2016. His article cited another article by Thomas Gibbons-Neff, published in the Times on 30 October 2017. This reported Afghan security forces casualties for 2016 at 6,700 KIA and 12,000 wounded in action (WIA), which works out to an average of 18.36 KIA per day (6,700/365), not 22. The total number of KIA + WIA works out to an average of 51.23 per day (18,700/365).

The lede of Gibbons-Neff’s 2017 article was that the U.S. and Afghan governments had stopped providing official strength and loss figures for the Afghan security forces. Citing the last report of the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Gibbons-Neff reported Afghan security forces losses from 1 January-8 May 2017 (126 days) as 2,531 KIA and 4,238 WIA. This works out to an average of 20.08 KIA (2,531/126) and 53.72 KIA + WIA (6,679/126) per day.

Nordland arrived at the figure of 57 KIA per day based on a report of 400 Afghan security forces killed in the week leading up the publication of his article on 21 September 2018. He calculated it by averaging the total over the previous seven days (400/7). Casualty rates in combat have been highly variable, historically. Brief spikes in rates are common. In the same paragraph reporting the 400 KIA total, Nordland quoted senior Afghan government officials stating that the daily average for recent months had been 30 to 40 KIA per day.

It is possible to use the figures cited by Nordland and Gibbons-Neff to make ballpark estimates for Afghan security forces casualties in 2017 and 2018. Even if the weekly loss of 400 KIA for 14-20 September 2018 represents an abnormally high total, it is reasonable to conclude that the Afghan security forces are very likely incurring sharply higher combat losses in 2018 than the previous two years. These figures do not include counts of missing or captured and thus underestimate the actual numbers of battle casualties being suffered by the Afghan forces. It is also possible that the estimates of 30-40 KIA per day apply only to the peak spring-to-autumn fighting season, which would somewhat reduce the overall 2018 KIA and WIA totals.

As Nordland reported, these losses are resulting in an increasing strain on the Afghan forces. His article stated that the strength of the ANA and police in April 2018 was 314,000, 38,000 below the authorized total of 352,000, and that the actual total was likely even lower due to fraudulent reporting and unreported desertions. The ANA suffered a monthly attrition rate of 2.9 percent in early 2017 from combat casualties, desertion, and failed reenlistments, requiring one-third of the overall force to be replaced by new recruits annually. That attrition rate is undoubtedly far higher now and almost certainly not sustainable for long.

In comparison, the Afghan government reported in August that its security forces had killed 42 Taliban fighters per day, or 1,300 per month. For the year ending in March 2018, it claimed to have killed 13,600 insurgent fighters. There has been no independent confirmation of these claims and they should be treated skeptically.

Will Tax Reform Throttle A U.S. Defense Budget Increase?

John Conger recently reported in Defense One that the tax reform initiative championed by the Trump administration and Republican congressional leaders may torpedo an increase in the U.S. defense budget for 2018. Both the House and Senate have passed authorizations approving the Trump administration’s budget request for $574.5 billion in defense spending, which is $52 billion higher than the limit established by the Budget Control Act (BCA). However, the House and Senate also recently passed a concurrent 2018 budget resolution to facilitate passage of a tax reform bill that caps the defense budget at $522 billion as mandated by the BCA.

The House and Senate armed services committees continue to hammer out the terms of the 2018 defense authorization, which includes increases in troop strength and pay. These priorities could crowd out other spending requested by the services to meet strategic and modernization requirements if the budget remains capped. Congress also continues to resist the call by Secretary of Defense James Mattis to close unneeded bases and facilities, which could free spending for other needs. There is also little interest in reforming Defense Department business practices that allegedly waste $125 billion annually.

Congressional Republicans and Democrats were already headed toward a showdown over 2018 BCA limits on defense spending. Even before the tax reform push, several legislators predicted yet another year-long continuing resolution limiting government spending to the previous year’s levels. A bipartisan consensus existed among some armed services committee members that this would constitute “borderline legislative malpractice, particularly for the Department of Defense.”

Despite the ambitious timeline set by President Trump to pass a tax reform bill, the chances of a continuing resolution remain high. It also seems likely that any agreement to increase defense spending will be through the Overseas Contingency Operations budget, which is not subject to the BCA. Many in Congress agree with Democratic Representative Adam Smith that resorting to this approach is “a fiscal sleight of hand [that] would be bad governance and ‘hypocritical.’”

Are tax reform and increased defense spending incompatible? Stay tuned.

TDI Friday Read: Afghanistan

[SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, 30 October 2017, p. 107]

While it is too soon to tell if the Trump Administration’s revised strategy in Afghanistan will make a difference, the recent report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) to Congress documents the continued slow erosion of security in that country. Today’s edition of TDI Friday Read offers a selection of recent posts addressing some of the problems facing the U.S. counterinsurgent and stabilization missions there.

Afghanistan

Meanwhile, In Afghanistan…

We probably need to keep talking about Afghanistan

What will be our plans for Afghanistan?

Stalemate in Afghanistan

Troop Increase in Afghanistan?

Sending More Troops to Afghanistan

Mattis on Afghanistan

Deployed Troop Counts

Disappearing Statistics

 

 

Trump Administration Considering Keeping Robert Work On During Transition

Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work [DOD]

In a somewhat surprising move, The Washington Post is reporting that the transition team for the incoming administration of Donald J. Trump is considering keeping the current Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work in office for three to six months. Work would help maintain continuity for the incoming Secretary of Defense-designate James Mattis and assist in preparing the Trump administration’s first defense budget proposal. He also quietly rallied support for Mattis’s selection as Defense Secretary, vouching for bipartisan confidence in the former USCENTCOM commander.

Holding Work over could be seen as a sign that Mattis and the administration may intend to keep elements of the Third Offset Strategy, which Work developed under current Defense Secretary Ashton Carter.

A few days ago, The Post reported that Mattis had clashed with senior Trump transition team officials over Defense Department appointments. Mattis allegedly first learned of the appointment of Vincent Viola as Secretary of the Army from the media, leaving him “furious.” Several senior Defense Department office remain to be staffed and Mattis has been said to have rejected several individuals proposed by Trump’s transition staff.