In a previous post, I presented information on the actions of the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 Panther battalion in January 1944.
During late January and February, the battalion had usually been attacking. In March, it found itself embroiled in defensive fighting. This would show up in its losses. On 1 February, it reported 30 operational Panthers and 8 in workshops. No less than 24 had been sent off by train for more extensive engine repairs. Eleven Panthers had been irrevocably lost in combat (five due to hits that caused permanent damage, five had been damaged but could not be recovered and one had suffered an accident and could not be recovered). Two Panthers had been lost to engine room fires during march.
The battles fought 1-20 February only cost the battalion one Panther destroyed by enemy action (burned out due to AT round hit). Also, one more Panther spontaneously caught fire in the engine room and burned out. In the same period, no less than 97 Panthers were repaired by the workshop units, a very high damaged to destroyed ratio. Note that these repairs are due to combat damage as well as non-combat damage.
On 12 February, 20 Panthers were operational, 25 in workshop and 14 were to be recovered from various locations.
From 21 February, the battalion shifted to defensive operations and would retreat. This would lead to an increasing number of tanks being irrevocably lost. On 6 and 7 March, eight Panthers were blown up by the battalion. Of these only two had been damaged by enemy fire. The remaining six suffered from mechanical breakdowns.
The report (I./Pz.Rgt. 26 “Zusammengefasster Bericht über Panzerlage”) gives causes for each Panther being put out of action these days. It is clear that of 15 Panthers put out of action 5-7 March, only three had been hit by enemy fire and it seems that none received irreparable damage.
The battalion continued to retreat and on 8 March two Panthers were cannibalized for parts and subsequently blown up. These two (numbers 132 and 332) had not been knocked out by the enemy. They had simply got stuck in the terrain, one of them had also damaged a final drive. Lack of towing vehicles meant that they could not be recovered.
Late on 8 March it was decided to blow up another three Panthers, all of which had technical problems but could not be recovered in time, due to lack of towing vehicles and mounting enemy pressure.
On 9 March, another six Panther were blown up. Three had been hit by enemy fire, but as they were blown up, it seems unlikely that they had received terminal damage before being blown up. Finally, on 14 March two more Panthers were blown up. They both had technical damage.
After the actions in the Uman–Zvenigorodka area, the battalion retreated southwest, to the Kishinev–Balta area. During the retreat, another 19 Panthers were blown up, none of which had been damaged by enemy fire. Instead, demolition was carried out because vehicles had crashed off bridges, suffered technical damage, got stuck in the terrain, but could not be recovered in time before enemy pressure got to strong.
Despite these problems, the repair services repaired 41 Panthers in the period, which indicates that they worked hard.
During the first three months of 1944, the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 lost 60 Panthers irrevocably. Of these 37 were blown up without being damaged by the enemy. Four destroyed themselves by engine room fires. This left 19 being hit by enemy fire. Of these, its seems only 7 were actually destroyed by the hits received.
It seems clear that enemy fire was not the main cause of losses. As long as the Germans could recover damaged tanks, and had spare parts, few total losses occurred. Also, it is obvious that tanks were put out of action mainly by other causes than enemy fire. However, advancing Soviet ground units had much to do with the German tank losses, as such action could prevent recovery and force the Germans to blow up otherwise repairable tanks.
I have previously encountered claims that the Germans kept destroyed tanks on the rosters and thereby their true losses would appear smaller than they actually were. That notion finds no support in the very detailed war diary of the I./Pz.Rgt 26. I cannot find one single such case in the three months I have studied. Instead, it is clear that they far more often had to blow up perfectly repairable tanks.
During the three months discussed here, the workshops of the battalion repaired well over 200 Panthers, perhaps as many as 300, which can be contrasted to only about 7 being directly destroyed by enemy fire. This shows that it can be very problematic to infer tank losses from changes in the number of operational tanks from one time to another. Also, it shows the importance of controlling the terrain after the action has been fought.
All information is from the war diary, with annexes, of the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 (Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, RH 39/599).
It will be rather difficult to persuade the doubters, most net information is based on the French and British assessments of the Panther. Commonly accepted is also the version that they could not keep up their strength, as well as being generally undersupplied with tanks.
Would it be wise to compare these operational losses in the later stages of the war, to the losses in the initial phase of Barbarossa or the May of 1940, suffered by the Soviets/Allies?
It is often argued that T-34s were not taken out in direct confrontations, but rather due to abandonment, supply/fuel insufficiencies and that territorial losses prevented evacuation, i.e. it is possible that they only suffered minor damage.
I have no data on causes for T-34 losses in 1941, but it is certainly possible that a substantial share of the T-34 irrevocably lost had were not destroyed by German fire.
Control of the battlefield at the end of an engagement is crucial for avoiding tank losses.
“Control of the battlefield at the end of an engagement is crucial for avoiding tank losses.”
I am perfectly aware of this fact, but it is this phenomenon that makes it particularly difficult to assess the combat rating of a war asset.
Many thanks for these articles. Very interesting.
Do you know the Battalion’s strength as at 1 May 1944 just prior to Targu
Thanks in advanc.
Nick
Just a few thoughts. I am not sure who the doubters are and what they doubt, so it’s hard for me to comment on that.
The commonly accepted version that the Germans could not keep their units up to strength seems correct, as I interpret the data, so I am unsure what you are looking for here.
“It seems clear that enemy fire was not the main cause of losses. As long as the Germans could recover damaged tanks, and had spare parts, few total losses occurred. Also, it is obvious that tanks were put out of action mainly by other causes than enemy fire. ”
I have stated these facts numerous times on forums or discussions regarding tank engagements, usually it was just dismissed and I do not think that this view is merely confined to my personal experiences and probably reaches beyond these encounters (in fact, amongst them were also individuals who posted on TDI forums). That is of course, if the history of Pz.Rgt. 26 would stand isolated, which I do not believe that it does.
Operational readiness can show considerable fluctuations not only due to overcommitment (that also factors in a higher survivability of a vehicle in regards to repair rates) and focusing on unit preservation can save resources.
I noticed that it is generally difficult to persuade a reader that only a smaller fraction of the losses were a consequence of enemy fire.
Furthermore, the capabilities of the Panther tank often quoted on the net (and partially literature) are derived from the analysis of Panther No. 213101 (WS 413, at FVPE, STT). Literature and information on AFVs is in many ways unsatisfactory (perhaps, with the exception of e.g. Rowland, Ogorkiewicz or Cimpoeru), especially when it comes to the difference between paper characteristics, field conditions and the realities of 1940s combat (and the technological standards of that era) – the issues seem neither unique nor surprising. Not to mention war economy in general, the importance of tanks for the German art of war has been notoriously overstated, but that is another matter.
“The commonly accepted version that the Germans could not keep their units up to strength seems correct, as I interpret the data, so I am unsure what you are looking for here.”
You will quite often stumble upon the notion that even in the absence of fighting and or large territorial gains, the Germans would have been unable to resupply their units (or even if there had been no impact of other fronts, independent of a shortage of manpower/spare parts). The situation in the later phases of the war or generally just the observation of the conflict through the narrow lens of tanks, created the view of the poorly supplied Wehrmacht (not merely referring to the later stages of the war but factoring in the entire protracted war of attrition). I think this view is incorrect, as there was considerably more leeway in the inventory (utilization and expansion), than for example for the RKKA, already in 1941 (as demonstrated by Askey). The exchange rate was to a large extent influenced and defined by the economic strength and development level of the nation and the absorption of the entire capital stock of Western Europe.
It can be summarized as a result of circumstances and choices (this certainly befell the other belligerents to a similar degree) than just mere constraints, in fact the only noteworthy and significant factor here would be fuel. I do not think that the Allies maintained their strength better in the 1940 campaign, nor in the opening stage of Barbarossa or even the fighting around Kursk. I believe everything else is a somewhat flawed analogy and in a certain way a comparison of apples and oranges.
I think the Panther is due for a new full study including a critical look at those British and French reports. There’s an awful lot being written about the Panther as a near total failure which appears to be motivated by the desire to create a controversial position.
The French report in particular should be properly evaluated – two battalions ran Panthers from 1945-1947 What condition were these in? Were these properly maintained? Was there an adequate supply of spare parts? From whence were those parts sourced?
There’s an awful lot of silliness floating about as well, such as claims that Panthers were loaded on to trains for moves of 25km.
I agree.
@ Nick Budd
On 1 May, it reported 4 operational Panthers, 4 in short repair and 5 in long repair.
On 10 May, it reported 14 operational Panthers, 6 in short repair and 9 in long repair.
On 20 May, it reported 19 operational Panthers, 10 in short repair and 8 in long repair.
On 1 June, it reported 48 operational Panthers, 2 in short repair and 3 in long repair.
23 new Panther were received between 1-10 May and 16 more between 20-31 May
Total losses amounted to 6 between 1-10 May and 1 between 10-20 May. Also, one Panther was rebuilt to create a BergePz between 1-10 May, which caused it to be classified as a total loss.
@ Stiltzkin
I don’t follow forums frequently and has therefore not encountered such view in recent time. Nevertheless, I can say that in all operations were I have had hard data on causes of Panther (and Jagdpanther in Normandy) losses, the majority of losses were caused by the Germans blowing up or abandoning tanks that had either not been hit by enemy fore at all, or had only received perfectly repairable damage, but this could not be repaired in time.
Agree that operational readiness can be difficult to interpret due to the factors you mention.
I have not read that report (Panther No. 213101 (WS 413, at FVPE, STT)).
Obviously the Germans could have kept their units up to strength if attrition at the front had been sufficiently lower. In a way I am surprised that such a view you describe is expressed, but on the other hand there is so much garbage on WWII so maybe one should not be surprised.
And I agree that the fact that control of the battlefield is so important makes it more difficult to use tank losses for assessing combat rating.
The reports featured a battle damaged vehicle ported from the fields of Russia and another that was (inexpertly) assembled in a factory.
I am just saying that there are two fundamental problems still present with Panthers, Tigers etc. (or the perception of the mechanisms of AFV economy in general, for that matter):
1.) If you are stating that a significant amount of German AFVs in Normandy were abandoned, then quote “this is merely an excuse”….[rest of sentence deleted by the blog administrators].
2.) The belief that Germany was notoriously ill equipped throughout the conflict and that “Soviet weapon output was greater” (also asserted in “Blitzkrieg from the Ground up” I believe), which translated into their ability of keeping up the strength.
This is only partially correct, as a combination of factors matter.
In 1944 the German output of steel was 30,000,000 metric tons versus 10 for the USSR (even with LL), Germany allocated 6-8% for tank production, that is almost 8% of all sectors, which is approx. 40,000,000,000 Reichsmark worth of munitions, 550,000 metric tons of AFVs (315,000 tons for tanks), the Soviets allocated over 15-16% of their steel supply to AFV production (790,000 tons), so a larger amount of their overall smaller resource base, perfectly explicable by the fact that they possessed a larger Army, greater focus on tanks and suffered greater losses, for an increased demand. A german soldier had 5-6 times the munitions invested (relative to a Soviet), comparable to British, French and US levels, which translated into the casualty infliction potential.
Military assets are measured by allocations, total tonnage and their net worth including qualitative factors (not even Walter S. Dunn nor Glantz or Harrison understand this concept and will repeat the “myth of outproduction”, there is simply no such thing).
Resources are flexible, labour can be reallocated and plants expanded, production could have been easily increased, thus so I contend, it must have been the amount they chose to allocate and to work with.
With the setbacks of 1944, which also included envelopments (which I like to compare to 1940 and 1941), I do not think that any Army of that time would have been able to keep up its strength, under the existing conditions. A surplus would have resulted in a shift of personnel, weakening other sectors, while resulting in a greater number of AFVs falling into enemy hands than it was the case, historically.
That’s really interesting, Stiltzkin. Cheers!
That also lends an interesting aspect to what von Mellenthin wrote in his book, Panzer Battles, on the Soviets as soldiers that they needed far less material support than German or Western soldiers.
While production matters are very interesting, they tend to stray away from the issue of Panthers in the I./Pz.Rgt. 26. We’ll have to find another place to discuss them.