Mystics & Statistics

Accidently Downing Airliners

Iran has admitted that an Iranian air defense system downed the Ukrainian airliner yesterday. Sadly, this is becoming an all too common occurrence. The major incidents like this include:

Ukrainian Airlines, 8 January 2020 – It was shot down by an Iranian missile (picture shown above). 176 people killed.

Malaysian Flight MH-17, 17 July 2014 – Shot down by a Russian air defense missile. Russian claims the Ukrainians shot it down, but not too many people outside of Russia believe this. 296 people killed.

Siberia Airlines Flight 1812, 4 October 2001 — A Russian airliner shot down over the Black Sea by Ukrainian air defense missile while conducting training exercise. 78 people killed.

Iran Air Flight 655, 3 July 1988 — An Iranian airliner going from Iran to Saudi Arabia was shot down by a missile from the USS Vincennes. Even though it was an accident, many in Iran still claim it was deliberate. The Iranian newspaper Tehran Times recently published a letter asking Captain Rogers, the former CO of the Vincennes, to “confess.” 290 people killed.

Korea Air Lines Flight 007, 1 September 1983 — Shot down by the Soviet Union. In this case, the plane made a navigation error and wandered into Soviet air space. The intercepting Soviet pilots had sight of the plane and were still ordered to shot it down. 269 people killed, including a U.S. congressman.

There are a lot more incidents than those. Just to list some of them (I do not know if this list is exhaustive):

 

Date……………Incident…………Plane…..Locale……………Killed….Perpetrator

24 Aug 1938…..Kweilin Incident…DC-2……near Hong Kong…..14….Japan aircraft

14 June 1940….Kaleva…………..Ju-52……Baltic Sea……………9….USSR DB-3T

29 Oct 1940……Chungking………DC-2……China………………..9…..Japan aircraft

3 March 1942….KNILM PK-AFV…DC-3……Australia…………….4….Japan A6M Zero

1 June 1943……BOAC Flt 777…..DC-3……Bay of Biscay……..17….German Ju-88C-6

22 Oct 1943……AB Aero…………DC-3……Sweden…………….13…German Ju-88

 

23 July 1954……Cathy Pacific…….DC-4……Hainan Island……10……Chinese La-11

27 July 1955……El Al Flight 402….L-149…..Bulgaria……………58…..Bulgaria MIG-15

 

30 June 1962….Aeroflot Flt 902….Tu-104A..Russia…………….84…..USSR missile

21 Feb 1973……Libyan Flt 114……727………Sinai……………108…..Israeli F-4s

 

20 April 1978….Korean Flt 902…..707……..Russia……………….2…….USSR Su-15

3 Sep 1978……Rhodesia 825…Viscount….Rhodesia…………..48…….ZIPRA Strela-2

12 Feb 1978….Rhodesia 827….Viscount…Rhodesia…………..59…….ZIPRA Strela-2

27 June 1980…Itavia Flt 870…….DC-9…….Italy………………..81…….Missile?

8 Feb 1980…….Angola D2-TYC…Yak-40…Angola……………..19……..Zambian J-6

1 Sep 1983……Korean Flt 007…..747………USSR……………269…….USSR Su-15

 

24 Feb 1985….Polar 3……………Do-228…..West Sahara……..3………Polisario

4 Sep 1985……Bakhtar YA-BAM..An-26……Afghanistan……..52………SAM

11 June 1987…Bakhtar YA-BAL…An-26…..Afghanistan………53………SAM

14 Oct 1987……Zimex…………….L-100…..Angola……………..8………unknown

6 Nov 1987…….Air Malawi……….Skyvan….Mozambique…….10………?

3 July 1988…….Iran Air 655………A300……Persian Gulf……290……..U.S. RIM-66

 

8 Dec 1988……US AID………….DC-7………W. Sahara………5……Polisario

27 March 1992…………………….Yak-40…….Armenia………..0……Azerbaijan Su-25

21 Sep 1993….Transair…………Tu-134……..Georgia………..27…..Abkhazia Strela 2

22 Sep 1993….Transair…………Tu-154……..Georgia………108…..Abkhazia SAM

23 Sep 1993….Transair…………Tu-134A……Georgia………..1..Abkhazia BM-21 Grad

6 April 1994………………………..Falcon 50….Rwanda……….12……SAM

29 Sep 1998….Lionair 602…….An-24RV……Sri Lanka…….55..Tamil Tiger MANPADS

20 April 2001………………..Cessna A185E…Peru…………….2…Peru Cessna A-37B

4 Oct 2001……Siberian 1812…Tu-154………Black Sea…….78…….Ukrainian S-200

22 Nov 2003…DHL OO-DLL….A300………..Iraq……………….0…….SAM

9 Jan 2007………………………….An-26……….Iraq………….34…Islamic Army missile?

23 Mar 2007…TransAVIA……..Il-76…………Somalia………….11…..Hizbul Islam 9K38?

17 July 2014…Malaysia MH-17…777……….Ukraine………..298..Russian 9M38 SA-11

8 Jan 2020…..Ukraine Flt 752….737………..Iran…………….176….Iran SA-15

 

Now….between 1938-1983 (45 years) there were 16 incidents resulting on the loss of 804 lives. Of these, 12 were caused by hostile aircraft (some firing air-to-air missiles), three by surface-to-air missiles and one possibly by an errant air-to-air missile. Two of the airliners shot down by missiles were clearly accidental. From 1985 to 2020 (45 years) there were 20 incidents resulting in the loss of 1,223 lives. Of these, two were caused by aircraft and 14 caused by surface-to-air missiles.

 

Current Deployment of Patriot Missile Battalions

Our air defense artillery assets consists of Patriot, THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) and the SHORAD (Short Range Air Defense) battalions and batteries, among other elements.

A Patriot Missile Battalion consists of four or five Patriot Missile Batteries. A Patriot Missile Battery consists of four or six launchers, each with four missiles. The United States has 16 Patriot battalions. There is one battalion in Germany and three battalions in South Korea and I gather at least one battery in the Gulf (not sure which). I gather the most elements of the other 11 battalions are in the U.S. As of 2010 it was reported that the U.S. Army operates a total of 1,106 Patriot launchers (1,106/16 = 60 launchers per battalion). According to a count developed from multiple open sources, our air defense battalions and batteries are located at:

Baumholder, Germany

5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriots)

5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (equipped with 36 Avenger SHORAD systems, with 36 in prepositioned storage).

 

Fort Bliss, Texas:

1st Battalion/43rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

2nd Battalion/43rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

3rd Battalion/43rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

5th Battalion/52rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

Battery A, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

Battery B, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

Battery E, 3rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

Battery A, 4th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

 

Guam:

Battery A, 5th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

 

Fort Sill, Oklahoma

3rd Battalion, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

4th Battalion, 3rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

5th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar)

2nd Battalion, 6th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (C-RAM, Sentinal, Stinger/Avenger)

3rd Battalion, 6th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

 

Fort Hood, Texas

4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

1st Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

1st Battalion, 62nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

3rd Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot/Avenger?)

1st Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

 

Fort Campbell, Kentucky

2nd Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery Rgt  (Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar)

 

Suwon Air Base, South Korea

6th Battalion, 52nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

2nd Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

D Battery, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THADD)

1st Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

 

Location unknown:

B Battery, 62nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD) – activated 2016

 

This listing does not include National Guard units. It is also not definitive.

So Where are the Patriots?

We just got “shelled” by a dozen ballistic missiles fired from Iran to Iraq. These are the type of things that could be stopped by Patriot surface-to-air (SAM) missiles. Apparently we were given a heads up that the missiles were coming.

Not sure if we have any Patriot missile batteries deployed in Iraq. During the build up in May and June, we did deploy at least one Patriot battery to the Gulf. I assume they are still there defending facilities in the Gulf States. Do we have any Patriot missile batteries in Iraq?

Current U.S. and Allied Forces in the Gulf (mid-June 2019)

And:

Did The Patriot BMD Miss Again In Saudi Arabia?

One notes that the recent Iranian attack on the Saudi oil facilities on 14 September 2019 was not intercepted even though Saudi Arabia has six battalions of Patriot missiles and we also have at least one battery in the Gulf.

So did we have Patriots deployed in Iraq? If we did have them available, then did we decide not to use them?

 

 

P.S. (added at 1:40 9 Jan 2020): 3 Hours from Alert to Attacks

  1. We had a three hour alert
  2. There were no Patriot batteries deployed to protect the Ain Al-Asad base
  3. 16 missiles were fired at Ain Al-Asad base.

Size of Theater

Seeing how Iran and Iraq are back in the news (as I suspect so will be the Persian Gulf), let me just remind everyone the size of these “theaters.”

………………….Iraq………….Iran…………Persian Gulf……Texas……Lake Superior
Area (sq. km)…437,072……..1,648,195……251,000…………..696,241…….82,000

Population…….38,433,600…82,531,700……N/A……………..28,995,881…….N/A

GDP …………..$250 Billion…$458 Billion……N/A……………..$1,819 Billion….N/A

Texas is the second largest state in the U.S. (behind Alaska) and the second most populous state in the U.S. (behind California). Lake Superior is the largest fresh water lake in the world. Or to put it relative to Europe:

………………….Iraq……………Iran………..Persian Gulf…….France……..Baltic Sea
Area (sq. km)…437,072……….1,648,195…251,000……………551,695……..1,641,650

Population…….38,433,600……82,531,700….N/A………………64,834,000…….N/A

GDP ……………$250 Billion…$458 Billion….N/A………………$2,707 Billion….N/A

The area and population given is for “Metropolitan France,” meaning those parts of France that are in Europe.

U.S. Navy Compared to Russian Navy

An elevated port side view of the forward section of a Soviet Oscar Class SSGN nuclear-powered attack submarine. (Soviet Military Power, 1986)

One person commented on this blog about the danger posed by Russian submarines. Probably a good time to look at what the threat is.

I did start my career in the U.S. defense industry working with submarine sonars and spectrum analyzers. This was back in the bad old days, when there were hundreds of subs out there. In our new found more peaceful world, there are a lot less.

Russian has around 56 submarines, according to Wikipedia. How many of these are fully operational is not something I know. Of those, 11 of them are boomers or ballistic missile submarines. These are submarines that carry nuclear missiles and would not be part of any fleet-on-fleet battle. They also list 6 “special-purpose submarines,” two are old converted attack submarines. The group of subs that threaten our control of the seas are 8 cruise missile submarines (SSGN) and 15 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). There are also 22 smaller diesel-power attack submarines. This is 45 or less operational subs to threaten our carrier fleets.

The biggest danger from Russian fleet is their 8 cruise missile submarines. These really are a threat to our carriers.

The United States has around 66 submarines. Of those, 14 are boomers.

 

Comparative Ship Count:

…………………………U.S……Size…………………….Russia…….Size

Aircraft Carriers………11…….100,000-106,300………..1….,…….58,600 tonnes

LHA/LHD……………….9……..41,150-45,693 tons (these are carriers !!!)

Battlecruisers………….0……………………………………2…………28,000 tons

Cruisers……………….22……..9,800 tons………………..3………….12,500 tons

Destroyers…………….69……..8,315-9,800…………….11…………7,570 – 7,940 tons

LCS…………………….20…….3,104-3,900 (“Littoral Combat Ships”)

Frigates…………………0…………………………………..10………….1,930 – 5,400 tons

Large Corvettes………………………………………………6………….2,200 tons

Corvettes……………………………………………………..76………..500 – 1050 tons

 

LPD…………………….11……25,300 (“Landing Platform Dock”)

LSD…………………….12…..15,939-16,100 (“Landing Ship Dock”)

LST (Landing Ship Tank)…………………………………..20…………..4,080 – 6,600 tons

Special-purpose………7…..895-23,000…………………18…………..500 – 23,780

Patrol Ships…………………………………………………..2…………..1,500

MCM……………………11……….1,312 tons (mine countermeasures)

PC………………………13………….331 tons (coastal patrol)

 

Large SSBN…………………………………………………..1………….48,000 tons

SSBNs………………..14……..18,750 tonnes……………10…………13,700 – 24,000 tons

SSGN…………………..4………18,750 tonnes…………….8………….19,400 tons

SSN……………………48…….6,927-12,139 tonnes…….15…………7,250 – 13,800 tons

SSK…………………….0……………………………………..22…………2,700 – 3,950 tons

Special purpose subs…………………………………………6………….600 – 18,200 tons

 

I did not bother to list landing craft (Russia has 37 of 555 tons or less), patrol boats (Russian has 37 of 139 tons or less), mine countermeasure vessels (Russian has 6 of 1,100 tons or less), auxiliaries (cargo ships, ice breakers, logistic vessels, salvage vessels, tugs, tankers, oilers, transports, etc.), LCCs (amphibious command ships), submarine tenders, maritime prepositioning ships (T-AK), the USS Pueblo, and the USS Constitution.

What is a ton:

Short ton (U.S.) = 2,000 pounds

Metric Tonne = 2,204.6 pounds

Long ton (UK) = 2,240 pounds

 

Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness

Niklas Zetterling’s revised and update version of his excellent book Normandy 1944 is being re-issued. According to Amazon.com it will be available January 10, 2020. The link is here: Normandy 1944

It is set up to “look inside” so you can get some idea what is in there. It is of course, not another war story but a two part discussion on “Campaign Analysis” and “German Combat Formations.”

The “look inside” feature did not include an ability to search the text, so I was not able to check the really important stuff, like how many times Trevor Dupuy and I are mentioned in the book. I am graciously acknowledged in the introduction (as is Richard Anderson). Now, I did write an appendix for the original book. Always the gentleman, Niklas did ask my permission to remove it from this edition.

The book does include a discussion of the relative combat efficiency of the German forces compared to British and U.S. units, always a sensitive subject. We have never invested a lot of time in analyzing Normandy. Most of our analysis of this subject is from Italy 1943-44, Ardennes (Battle of the Bulge) 1944-45 and Kharkov and Kursk 1943 (and shown in War by Numbers). So this is a nice independent look at the subject using additional data from a different campaign by a different scholar.

Time and the TNDM

[The article below is reprinted from December 1996 edition of The International TNDM Newsletter. It was referenced in the recent series of posts addressing the battalion-level validation of Trevor Dupuy’s Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model (TNDM).]

Time and the TNDM
by Christopher A. Lawrence

Combat models are designed to operate within their design parameters, but sometimes we forget what those are. A model can only be expected to perform well in those areas for which it was designed in and those areas where it has been tested (meaning validated). Since most of the combat models used in the US Department of Defense have not been validated, this leaves open the question as to what their parameters might be. In the cue of the TNDM, if the model is not giving a reasonable result, then you must ask, is it because the model is being operated outside of its parameters? The parameters of the model are pretty well defined by the 149 engagements of the QJM Database to which it was validated.

One of the areas where there is a problem with the TNDM is that while the analyst is capable of running a battle over any time period, the model was fundamentally validated to run 1 to 3 days engagements. This means that there should be a reduced confidence in the results of any engagement of less than 24 hours or over three days. The actual number of days used for each engagement in the original QJM data base is shown below:

By comparison, the 75 battalion level engagements that we are using to validate the TNDM for battalion-level engagements occur over the following time periods:

Three of the engagements used in the battalion-level validation are from the QJM database.

We did run sample engagements of 24 hours, 12 hours, 6 hours and 3 hours. The results of the 12-hour run was literally 1/2 the casualties and 1/2 of the advance for the 24-hour run. The same straight dividing effect was true for the 3- and 6-hour runs. For increments less than 24 hours the model just divided the results by the number of hours. As Dave Bongard pointed out to me, there are various lighting choices, including daylight and night, and these could vary the results some if used. But the impact for daylight would be 1.1 additional casualties and the reduction for night is .7 or .8.

The problem is that briefer battles will result in higher casualties per hour than extended battles. Also, in any extended battle, there are intense periods and un-intense periods, with the model giving the average result of those periods. For battles of less than 24 hours, there tends to be only intense periods. Therefore, it should be expected that battles lasting 3 hours should have more than 1/6 the losses of a 24 hours battle. This will be tested during the battalion-level validation.

For battles in excess of one day, there is a table in the TNDM that reduces the overall casualties and advance rate over time to account for fatigue.

U.S. Population Growth for 2019

The U.S. population grew 1.5 million in 2018 up to 328 million. This is around 0.5% growth rate. Over a third of that growth was immigrants.

Immigration in 2019 was 595,000 people, down from around 1 million in 2016. Guessing this refers to legal immigrants.

This is from an AP article: With births down, U.S. had slowest growth rate in the century

This is all related to our various discussions on demographics:

Demographics of the United States

For those following this subject for political interest, the projected votes swings by state after the 2020 census will be:

“Blue” states (tend to vote Democratic):

California – 1 representative and electoral college vote

Colorado: +1

Oregon: +1

Illinois: -1

Minnesota: -1

New York: -1

Rhode Island: -1

Total =  -3

 

Swing states:

Florida: +2

Michigan: -1

Ohio: -1

Pennsylvania: -1

Total: =  -1

 

“Red” states (tend to vote Republican):

Texas: +3

Arizona: +1

Montana: +1

North Carolina: +1

Alabama: -1

West Virginia: -1

Total =  +4

 

Anyhow, we tend to avoid “politics” on this blog, but these changes are worth noting.

How Attrition is Calculated in the QJM vs the TNDM

French soldiers on the attack, during the First World War. [Wikipedia]

[The article below is reprinted from December 1996 edition of The International TNDM Newsletter. It was referenced in the recent series of posts addressing the battalion-level validation of Trevor Dupuy’s Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model (TNDM).]

How Attrition is Calculated in the QJM vs the TNDM
by Christopher A. Lawrence

There are two different attrition calculations in the Quantified Judgement Model (QJM), one for post-1900 battles and one for pre-1900 battles. For post-1900 battles, the QJM methodology detailed in Trevor Dupuy’s Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles (Indianapolis; New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1979) was basically:

(Standard rate in percent*) x (factor based on force size) x (factor based upon mission) x (opposition factor based on force ratios) x (day/night) x (special conditions**) = percent losses.

* Different for attacker (2.8%) and defender (1.5%)
** WWI and certain forces in WWII and Korea

For the attacker the highest this percent can be in one day is 13.44% not counting the special conditions, and the highest it can be for the defender is 5.76%.

The current Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model (TNDM) methodology is:

(Standard personnel loss factor*) x (number of people) x (factor based upon posture/mission) x (combat effectiveness value (CEV) of opponent. up to 1.5) x (factor for surprise) x (opposition factor based on force ratios) x (factor based on force size) x (factor based on terrain) x (factor based upon weather) x (factor based upon season) x (factor based upon rate of advance) x (factor based upon amphibious and river crossings) x (day/night) x (factor based upon daily fatigue) = Number of casualties

* Different for attacker (.04) and defender (.06)

The special conditions mentioned in Numbers, Predictions, and War are not accounted for here, although it is possible to insert them, if required.

All these tables have been revised and refined from Numbers, Predictions, and War.

In Numbers, Predictions and War, the highest multiplier for size was 2.0, and this was for forces of less than 5,000 men. From 5,000 to 10,000 is 1.5 and from 10,000 to 20,000 is 1.0. This formulation certainly fit the data to which the model was validated.

The TNDM has the following table for values below 15,000 men (which is 1.0):

The highest percent losses the attacker can suffer in a force of greater than 15,000 men in one day is “over” 100%. If one leaves out three large multipliers for special conditions—surprise, amphibious assault, and CEV—then the maximum percent losses is 18%. The multiplier for complete surprise is 2.5 (although this degraded by historical period), 2.00 for amphibious attack across a beach, and 1.5 for enemy having a noticeable superior CEVs In the case of the defender, leaving out these three factors, the maximum percent casualties is 21.6% a day.

This means at force strengths of less than 2,000 it would be possible for units to suffer 100% losses without adding in conditions like surprise.

The following TNDM tables have been modified from the originals in Numbers, Predictions, and War to include a casualty factor, among other updates (numbers in quotes refer to tables in the TNDM, the others refer to tables in Numbers, Predictions, and War):

Table 1/”2”: Terrain Factors
Table 2/“3″: Weather Factors
Table 3/“4″: Season Factors
Table 5/”6″: Posture Factors
Table 6/“9″: Shoreline Vulnerability
Table 9/”11″: Surprise

The following tables have also been modified from the original QJM as outlined in Numbers, Predictions, and War:

Table “1”: OLl’s
Table “13”: Advance Rates
Table “16”: Opposition Factor
Table “17”: Strength/Size Attrition Factors
Table “20”: Maximum Depth Factor

The following tables have remained the same:

Table 4/“5”: Effects of Air Superiority
Table 7/“12”: Morale Factors
Table 8/“19”: Mission Accomplishment
Table “14″: Road Quality Factors
Table “15”: River or Stream Factor

The following new tables have been added:

Table “7”: Qualitative Significance of Quantity
Table “8”: Weapons Sophistication
Table “10”: Fatigue Factors
Table “18”: Velocity Factor
Table “20”: Maximum Depth Factor

The following tables has been deleted and the effect subsumed into another table:

unnumbered: Mission Factor
unnumbered: Minefield Factors

As far as I can tell, Table “20”: Maximum Depth Factor has a very limited impact on the model outcomes. Table “1”: OLIs, has no impact on model outcomes

I have developed a bad habit, if I want to understand or know something about the TNDM, to grab my copy of Numbers, Predictions, and War for reference. As shown by these attrition calculations, the TNDM has developed enough from its original form that the book is no longer a good description of it. The TNDM has added in an additional level of sophistication that was not in the QJM.

The TNDM does not have any procedure for calculating combat from before 1900. In fact, the TNDM is not intended to be used in its current form for any combat before WWII.