We just got “shelled” by a dozen ballistic missiles fired from Iran to Iraq. These are the type of things that could be stopped by Patriot surface-to-air (SAM) missiles. Apparently we were given a heads up that the missiles were coming.
Not sure if we have any Patriot missile batteries deployed in Iraq. During the build up in May and June, we did deploy at least one Patriot battery to the Gulf. I assume they are still there defending facilities in the Gulf States. Do we have any Patriot missile batteries in Iraq?
One notes that the recent Iranian attack on the Saudi oil facilities on 14 September 2019 was not intercepted even though Saudi Arabia has six battalions of Patriot missiles and we also have at least one battery in the Gulf.
So did we have Patriots deployed in Iraq? If we did have them available, then did we decide not to use them?
GDP …………..$250 Billion…$458 Billion……N/A……………..$1,819 Billion….N/A
Texas is the second largest state in the U.S. (behind Alaska) and the second most populous state in the U.S. (behind California). Lake Superior is the largest fresh water lake in the world. Or to put it relative to Europe:
………………….Iraq……………Iran………..Persian Gulf…….France……..Baltic Sea
Area (sq. km)…437,072……….1,648,195…251,000……………551,695……..1,641,650
An elevated port side view of the forward section of a Soviet Oscar Class SSGN nuclear-powered attack submarine. (Soviet Military Power, 1986)
One person commented on this blog about the danger posed by Russian submarines. Probably a good time to look at what the threat is.
I did start my career in the U.S. defense industry working with submarine sonars and spectrum analyzers. This was back in the bad old days, when there were hundreds of subs out there. In our new found more peaceful world, there are a lot less.
Russian has around 56 submarines, according to Wikipedia. How many of these are fully operational is not something I know. Of those, 11 of them are boomers or ballistic missile submarines. These are submarines that carry nuclear missiles and would not be part of any fleet-on-fleet battle. They also list 6 “special-purpose submarines,” two are old converted attack submarines. The group of subs that threaten our control of the seas are 8 cruise missile submarines (SSGN) and 15 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). There are also 22 smaller diesel-power attack submarines. This is 45 or less operational subs to threaten our carrier fleets.
The biggest danger from Russian fleet is their 8 cruise missile submarines. These really are a threat to our carriers.
The United States has around 66 submarines. Of those, 14 are boomers.
Special purpose subs…………………………………………6………….600 – 18,200 tons
I did not bother to list landing craft (Russia has 37 of 555 tons or less), patrol boats (Russian has 37 of 139 tons or less), mine countermeasure vessels (Russian has 6 of 1,100 tons or less), auxiliaries (cargo ships, ice breakers, logistic vessels, salvage vessels, tugs, tankers, oilers, transports, etc.), LCCs (amphibious command ships), submarine tenders, maritime prepositioning ships (T-AK), the USS Pueblo, and the USS Constitution.
Niklas Zetterling’s revised and update version of his excellent book Normandy 1944 is being re-issued. According to Amazon.com it will be available January 10, 2020. The link is here: Normandy 1944
It is set up to “look inside” so you can get some idea what is in there. It is of course, not another war story but a two part discussion on “Campaign Analysis” and “German Combat Formations.”
The “look inside” feature did not include an ability to search the text, so I was not able to check the really important stuff, like how many times Trevor Dupuy and I are mentioned in the book. I am graciously acknowledged in the introduction (as is Richard Anderson). Now, I did write an appendix for the original book. Always the gentleman, Niklas did ask my permission to remove it from this edition.
The book does include a discussion of the relative combat efficiency of the German forces compared to British and U.S. units, always a sensitive subject. We have never invested a lot of time in analyzing Normandy. Most of our analysis of this subject is from Italy 1943-44, Ardennes (Battle of the Bulge) 1944-45 and Kharkov and Kursk 1943 (and shown in War by Numbers). So this is a nice independent look at the subject using additional data from a different campaign by a different scholar.
Combat models are designed to operate within their design parameters, but sometimes we forget what those are. A model can only be expected to perform well in those areas for which it was designed in and those areas where it has been tested (meaning validated). Since most of the combat models used in the US Department of Defense have not been validated, this leaves open the question as to what their parameters might be. In the cue of the TNDM, if the model is not giving a reasonable result, then you must ask, is it because the model is being operated outside of its parameters? The parameters of the model are pretty well defined by the 149 engagements of the QJM Database to which it was validated.
One of the areas where there is a problem with the TNDM is that while the analyst is capable of running a battle over any time period, the model was fundamentally validated to run 1 to 3 days engagements. This means that there should be a reduced confidence in the results of any engagement of less than 24 hours or over three days. The actual number of days used for each engagement in the original QJM data base is shown below:
By comparison, the 75 battalion level engagements that we are using to validate the TNDM for battalion-level engagements occur over the following time periods:
Three of the engagements used in the battalion-level validation are from the QJM database.
We did run sample engagements of 24 hours, 12 hours, 6 hours and 3 hours. The results of the 12-hour run was literally 1/2 the casualties and 1/2 of the advance for the 24-hour run. The same straight dividing effect was true for the 3- and 6-hour runs. For increments less than 24 hours the model just divided the results by the number of hours. As Dave Bongard pointed out to me, there are various lighting choices, including daylight and night, and these could vary the results some if used. But the impact for daylight would be 1.1 additional casualties and the reduction for night is .7 or .8.
The problem is that briefer battles will result in higher casualties per hour than extended battles. Also, in any extended battle, there are intense periods and un-intense periods, with the model giving the average result of those periods. For battles of less than 24 hours, there tends to be only intense periods. Therefore, it should be expected that battles lasting 3 hours should have more than 1/6 the losses of a 24 hours battle. This will be tested during the battalion-level validation.
For battles in excess of one day, there is a table in the TNDM that reduces the overall casualties and advance rate over time to account for fatigue.
(Standard rate in percent*) x (factor based on force size) x (factor based upon mission) x (opposition factor based on force ratios) x (day/night) x (special conditions**) = percent losses.
* Different for attacker (2.8%) and defender (1.5%)
** WWI and certain forces in WWII and Korea
For the attacker the highest this percent can be in one day is 13.44% not counting the special conditions, and the highest it can be for the defender is 5.76%.
The current Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model (TNDM) methodology is:
(Standard personnel loss factor*) x (number of people) x (factor based upon posture/mission) x (combat effectiveness value (CEV) of opponent. up to 1.5) x (factor for surprise) x (opposition factor based on force ratios) x (factor based on force size) x (factor based on terrain) x (factor based upon weather) x (factor based upon season) x (factor based upon rate of advance) x (factor based upon amphibious and river crossings) x (day/night) x (factor based upon daily fatigue) = Number of casualties
* Different for attacker (.04) and defender (.06)
The special conditions mentioned in Numbers, Predictions, and War are not accounted for here, although it is possible to insert them, if required.
All these tables have been revised and refined from Numbers, Predictions, and War.
In Numbers, Predictions and War, the highest multiplier for size was 2.0, and this was for forces of less than 5,000 men. From 5,000 to 10,000 is 1.5 and from 10,000 to 20,000 is 1.0. This formulation certainly fit the data to which the model was validated.
The TNDM has the following table for values below 15,000 men (which is 1.0):
The highest percent losses the attacker can suffer in a force of greater than 15,000 men in one day is “over” 100%. If one leaves out three large multipliers for special conditions—surprise, amphibious assault, and CEV—then the maximum percent losses is 18%. The multiplier for complete surprise is 2.5 (although this degraded by historical period), 2.00 for amphibious attack across a beach, and 1.5 for enemy having a noticeable superior CEVs In the case of the defender, leaving out these three factors, the maximum percent casualties is 21.6% a day.
This means at force strengths of less than 2,000 it would be possible for units to suffer 100% losses without adding in conditions like surprise.
The following TNDM tables have been modified from the originals in Numbers, Predictions, and War to include a casualty factor, among other updates (numbers in quotes refer to tables in the TNDM, the others refer to tables in Numbers, Predictions, and War):
As far as I can tell, Table “20”: Maximum Depth Factor has a very limited impact on the model outcomes. Table “1”: OLIs, has no impact on model outcomes
I have developed a bad habit, if I want to understand or know something about the TNDM, to grab my copy of Numbers, Predictions, and War for reference. As shown by these attrition calculations, the TNDM has developed enough from its original form that the book is no longer a good description of it. The TNDM has added in an additional level of sophistication that was not in the QJM.
The TNDM does not have any procedure for calculating combat from before 1900. In fact, the TNDM is not intended to be used in its current form for any combat before WWII.
I just heard that Charles Hawkins, or Chuck Hawkins, passed away September 13, 2019 in Ninilchik Alaska. He was born in 1946.
Chuck Hawkins joined Trevor Dupuy’s Data Memory Systems Inc. (DMSI) as a vice-president in 1988. He was a former army captain who fought in Vietnam with a strong interest in analysis of combat. He came into the organization while it was at its peak but was about to crash due to the deep budget cuts that occurred at the end of the Cold War. He struggled on with the collapsing DMSI until around 1992 and closed it down. He then continued work in the industry with a number of efforts, eventually becoming an expert on the North Korea. He spent some time at their border, which always produced a great slide show.
He also worked briefly with me in 1993 on the report I did on Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). A copy is here:
As a result of a comment by Tom from Cornwall, we ended up adding three posts to this discussion that looked at terrain and amphibious operations and river crossings in Italy:
The previous posts on this discussion on force ratios are presented here. These were the posts examining the erroneous interpretation of the three-to-one rule as presented in Army FM 6-0 and other publications:
We are going to end this discussion for now. There is some additional data from the European Theater of Operations (ETO) and Ardennes that we have assembled, but it presents a confusing picture. This is discussed in depth in War by Numbers (pages 32-48).
I am assembling these discussions on force ratios and terrain into the opening chapters for a follow-on book to War by Numbers.
