Mystics & Statistics

Now, most accounts assume that the advancing Soviet 32nd Tank Brigade encountered the tank ditch in the morning. This is definitely the impression given by Ribbentrop’s account (6th panzer company/II Panzer Battalion). Some people add the Soviet 31st Tank Brigade to this mix. Zamulin has a different story. He states (page 327) that:

At 1300….[Soviet units] broke into the Oktiabr’skii State Farm. Having finally overrun the first line of antitank defense on Hill 252.2, a group of 29th Tank Corps tanks poured down the hill’s southwestern slopes in pursuit of the retreating enemy in the direction of the Komsomolets State Farm. But after several hundred meters of the chase, something happened which shocked their crews. Several T-34s, moving in the lead at high speed, suddenly vanishing into the deep anti-tank ditch.

Zamulin does not give a source for this claim. He then describes the tank ditch and then quotes the Wilhelm Roes account (from 7th panzer company/II Panzer Battalion). Is this a second encounter with the tank ditch, different than the one in the morning mentioned by Ribbentrop; or was the tank ditch only encountered in the afternoon; or was it run into twice; or have the accounts simply gotten garbled?

This is a very different construct, as it would have the attack being held up at Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz long before the attackers got to the tank ditch. It turns the tank ditch into a minor part of the story, as opposed to being one of reasons that the 32nd Tank Brigade was halted.

I did not include Zamulin’s version of the tank ditch story in my book as I did not have confidence in its validity. It did not help that he did not footnote it.

According the standard history of the Battle of Prokhorovka, the attack was originally scheduled at 1000 but moved up to 0830 (Moscow time). This is an odd event but one that is documented. Dr. Wheatley recently commented to one of my blog post about this. The blog post is here:

So did the Soviet 31st Tank Brigade attack on the morning of 12 July 1943?

He quotes Roman Toeppel’s book:

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From Toeppel, Roman. Kursk 1943: The Greatest Battle of the Second World War (Modern Military History) . Helion and Company.

‘According to Soviet combat reports, Rotmistrov radioed the signal to attack at 0830, whereupon the 18th and 29th Tank Corps at once began their advance. However, this is unlikely, as German combat messages reported that the first Soviet tanks reached Hill 252.2 only at 1015 Moscow time, which, in turn, is in agreement with a report from the Soviet 31st Tank Brigade advancing behind the 32nd Tank Brigade, which states: ‘At 1030 the tanks reached the area of the Oktyabrskiy Sovkhoz.’75 It seems absurd that it took the Soviet tanks almost two hours to drive the few kilometres from their assembly area at Prokhorovka to the forward German lines at said Sovkhoz (on Hill 252.2). It is more likely that the Soviet commanders wanted to allow their soldiers some rest before the operation and then launched the attack at 1000 Moscow time, as initially scheduled.’

Footnote 75 reads: Otchët o boevykh deystviyakh 29 tankovogo korpusa za period s 7.7. po 24.7.1943 g. [Report on the operations of the 29th Tank Corps, 7 July to 24 July 1943], p. 4, copy from the document collection (‘Materialsammlung’) of the ZMSBw.

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So…..this is a case where the historian is using logic or interpretation to override a documented historical event. This is kind of part of the trade, but you do have to be careful when you do this. Let my quote the times I have from multiple records:

XVIII Tank Corps

Account of 18th TC’s Combat Activities, July 12-24, 1943: “At 0830 the corps’ units attacked.”

No times given in Combat Report #37, 1400, July 12, 1943 or Combat Report #38, 0300 July 13, 1943

XXIX Tank Corps

No times given in Combat Report #74, 1900, July 12, 1943 or Combat Report #75, 2400, July 12, 1943 except: “At 1300 a group of our assault aircraft attacked 32nd Tank Bde and 170th Tank Bde/18th TC”

Fifth Guards Tank Army

Operational Report #1, 1900, July 12, 1943: “The army’s units and formations, following a 30-minute artillery preparation, attacked at 0830 in the general direction of the Komsonolets Sovkhoz-Bol’shie Maiachki-Pokrovka.”

and

“Enemy aircraft, in groups of up to 25-50 planes, uninterruptedly bombed the army’s lines from 0530.”

Fifth Guards Tank Army’s Combat Activities from July 7-24, 1943: “The initial time of 1000 set for the attack was moved back by the Front commander [Vatutin] to 0830 on July 12. At 0830, following a short artillery preparation, the corps moved into the attack.”

II Tank Corps: No times given

II Guards Tank Corps:

Operational Report #185, 0700, July 12, 1943: “By 0600 on July 12 an enemy tank attack on Prokhorovka was beaten off by units of 5th Gds Tank Army. Corps’ units reached their areas in readiness to carry out the army commander’s orders.”

Operational Report #186 is missing.

Fifth Guards Army (which was very much involved in this effort):

From a summary (5 Gv.A Opisaniye Operatsii): “At 0830 the army’s troops attacked decisively along the entire front in the general direction of Bol’shie Maiachki, launching their major blow along the left flank.”

Also worth noting (as this would be Totenkopf’s attack): “The enemy, stubbornly resisting our units, launched at 1215 a counterattack with up to 100 tanks, plus infantry, in the direction of ht. 226.6, developing the success toward ht. 236.7.”

Operational Report #200, 0700, July 12, 1943: “At 0530 a group of aircraft bombers the positions of 95th Gds RD and 9th Gds AbnD.”

Missing operational report #221.

9th Guards Airborne Division: “At 0540 28 bombers bombed 23rd GdsAbnRgt.”

6th Guards Airborne Division: “At 1200 enemy tanks forced the Psel River in the Krasnyi Oktiabr-Prokhorovka-Kozlovka-Vasilevka-Prelestnoe area, throwing back units of the 95th Gds RD and taking Pol…(?) and Veselyi. Tanks reach pt. 236.7 (?)”

13th Guards Rifle Division: “By 0500 on July 12 the division’s units reached its jumping-off positions for the attack along the following lines….”

and

“At 0830, following a 30-minute artillery, the division’s units attacked.”

95th Guards Rifle Division: “At 1000 units of 42nd RD and tanks from 1st Tank Army attacked through 287th RRgt.”

97th Guards Rifle Division: “The division’s units, following an artillery bombardment at 0830 on July 12, pushed aside the enemy’s forward detachments and by 0900 had reached the line pt. 183.1-Il’inskii.” 

Zhadov’s bio (a secondary post war account, perhaps partly ghost-written): “Morning arrived. At 0830, after a short artillery barrage, 5th Guards Tank Army’s 18th and 29th tank corps, and 2nd Gds TC, launched the main attack….” (it just happened to be in front of me in our Fifth Guards Army files).

 

So, we have two different headquarters in the Fifth Guards Tank Army reporting the attack time of 0830 in their summaries. We have one report made at the time from the Fifth Tank Army Daily Operation Report that reports that time. I do have a Xerox copy of that report. So in this case, it was probably not something doctored, edited or created later. It is what the documented at the time.

We also have the neighboring Fifth Guards Army launching their attack at 0830. This is declared in their summary report and in two of the reports we have from the divisions.

Would they have rested? Well, they supposedly were under air attack from 0530. Not the most restful of situations.

Now, could they have been allowed to rest from 0830 to 1000 before they started the attack? Maybe, but only if the senior command allowed it. The commander of the Voronezh Front was Vatutin with Khrushchev as his commissar (yet, that Khrushchev). The STAVKA rep was Vasilevskii (who outranked Vatutin). The order to move the attack up to 0830 was made by Vatutin, but I am sure with Vasilevskii’s concurrence. Rotmistrov’s command post was at height 252.4 where he could see parts of both the XXIX and XVIII Tank Corps. With him, in his command post was Vasilevskii. So, for them not to attack on time would have required the tank corps’ commanders to disobey orders in the sight of both the army commander and the STAVKA representative. Not likely, unless they also agreed to this delay. In the case of the XVIII Tank Corps, Rostmistrov attached his chief of staff, Major General Baskakov to Bakharov’s headquarters to make sure the attack was properly conducted. So, Bakharov was being directly overseen. Again, hard not to attack on time in that situation.

To delay the attack until 1000 would have required the agreement of Rotmistrov and Vasilevskii. This was to be a coordinated offensive with neighboring units, like the Fifth Guards Army, and that army was also attacking at 0830.

I am not aware of anything in the German records on the time of the attack. I gather Roman Toeppel has located in the message traffic a German report that the Soviets reached Ockyabrskii Sovkhoz at 0915 (Berlin time), if I read his passage correctly. If I believe Captain Ribbentrop’s account, the attack occurred fairly early in the morning because when the attack started they were still drinking Muckefuck (which is not a dirty word, but a coffee substitute).

So, I understand Roman Toeppel’s argument, but there are multiple arguments against it:

1. We have the attack time documented in multiple Soviet unit reports.
2. More to the point, we have the attack time recorded in a report made at that time.
3. The units involved were overseen by senior commanders (including those who gave the order that they should attack at 0830).
4. All these units were probably supposed to attack together and the Fifth Guards Army was also attacking at 0830.
5. The one German account we have indicates that the attack occurred early morning vice mid-morning.

Do these five points outweigh the one interpretive argument provided by Toeppel?

But Totenkopf’s activities are of interest in this case. They report that the last elements for the SS attack finally crossed into the bridgehead at 0900 (Berlin time) and at 0930 the armored group jumped off from hill 226.6 to the northeast. If the XVIII Tank Corps started attacking at 1000 (Moscow time, 0900 Berlin time), would Totenkopf really conduct this push to the northwest just as the attack started. Conversely, if the XVIII Tank Corps started attacking at 0830 (Moscow time), does that mean everything was brought under control by 1000 (Moscow time, 0900 Berlin time)? Does it means the entire initial attack has burned itself out in less than an hour and a half? This actually does appear to be the case from reading the various personal accounts.

This armor attack by Totenkopf is marked on the situation map for July 12 (see page 922/305). It shows it starting at 0930 (Berlin time) and the attack had moved forward about a kilometer by 1230. Not a directly analogous situation to the XXIX Tank Corps attack, but Toeppel’s argument why that attack did not occur at 0830 was because: “It seems absurd that it took the Soviet tanks almost two hours to drive the few kilometres from their assembly area at Prokhorovka to the forward German lines at said Sovkhoz (on Hill 252.2).”

The discussion in the previous blog post was about the appearance in Dr. Ben Wheatley’s article that somehow four Tiger tanks appear to stop two attacking Soviet tank brigades. There clearly was more than that in the area defending:

So What Were the LSSAH Tigers Doing?

So, who all was there?

Well, we don’t really know. This is one of the mysteries of the battle. The XVIII Tank Corps ran into significant resistance, and it appears that some of that resistance was in place along the Psel River. Yet we actually do not know which units were resisting.

According to Ben Wheatley’s article, there was one regiment of the Totenkopf SS Division south of the Psel (6th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment). Hard to imagine that elements of it were not engaged this day. Also I am not sure where LSSAH’s 2nd SS PzGr Regiment left flank was. I assume it went to the Psel. Finally there were the recon battalions and engineer battalions of both divisions. The Totenkopf engineer battalion was probably in the area, as the bridges for the armor to cross the Psel were placed west of Bogoroditskoye on the afternoon of the 11th. So there may have been two or three battalions in the area of XVIII Tank Corps attack that morning, along with their antitank assets. There may have been other armor in the area.

The LSSAH had five groups of armor assets:

1. II Panzer Bn of three companies (facing XXIX Tank Corps)
2. An unidentified ersatz panzer battalion or the eighth medium panzer company.
3. The Assault Gun Battalion of 10-20 StuG IIIs.
4. The Self-propelled Anti-tank Battalion (the Marders).
5. The heavy panzer company of 4 Tigers.

See:

Panzer Battalions in LSSAH in July 1943

Panzer Battalions in LSSAH in July 1943 – II

I do note that Dr. Wheatley does mention an eighth medium tank company in his account (“Therefore, Leibstandarte began Citadel with a panzer regiment containing a single panzer battalion consisting of four medium companies.”). He then disappears it later (“In reality, the regiment consisted of only one battalion of three companies of Pz IVs (it began the offensive with four companies and 79 operational Panzer IVs“). Not sure what the basis is for this disappearance of the medium panzer company.

So, we know where the II Panzer Bn with its three companies were and we know that the heavy panzer company moved to the left flank to ht. 241.6. We do not know where some of the other division assets are.

We have the same problem with Totenkopf. They have five groups of armor assets:

1. I Panzer Bn of three companies (two medium and one light)
2. II Panzer Bn of three companies (two medium and one light)
3. The Tiger company of 11 Tigers
4. The Assault Gun Battalion of 21 Stug IIIs
5. The Self-propelled Anti-tank Battalion (the Marders)

We only know for certain where the Totenkopf Tigers were, which were near ht. 226.6 firing on the XVIII Tank Corps. We believe both tank battalions were also north of the Psel.

And then there is the infantry and their supporting guns and antitank guns. Both of these divisions had two infantry regiments for three battalions. One battalion of the LSSAH was forward on hill 252.2. The other two, I assume were back in a line going up the Psel. The division also had the reconnaissance battalion and an engineer battalion. I do not know where they were during the battle.

Totenkopf also had two infantry regiments, one recon battalion and an engineer battalion. According to Wheatley, one regiment (6th SS) was south of the Psel. It probably was helping cover the left flank of the division, but do not know where all its battalions were. It also probably had elements across the Psel. It is reported on the 11th that the Eicke (6th) SS Regiment penetrated into the section of Vasilyevka north of the Psel. The other regiment was probably north of the Psel. The division’s recon battalion may have been south of the Psel. It was reported at the 10th to be at 1.5 kilometers south of Klyuchi.

There are two German maps the battlefield. The situation map for 12 July (page 922/305) and the German intelligence map for 12 July (page 950/343). The German situation map show four arrows coming out of the XVIII Tank Corps attack area. One, with a tank figure attached, is moving along the Psel River through Mikhailovka in two “pulses.” They actually go through what appears to be a German defensive line along the Psel River on the west edge of Mikhailovka. This may have been LSSAH units. The second “pulse” of the arrow is passing beyond this position, through Andreyevka, and between two rectangles. These rectangles are blacked on their top half, perhaps to show facing. I am guessing they are German units. There is also a front line south of the Psel and west of Andreyevka. This line is stopping the Soviet advance arrow. There is another line to the south of it. Both of these positions appear to be inside the Totenkopf SS Division boundary as the division boundaries are marked on the map. Also marked on the map in the area is “1 Rgt”, which may mean the 1st regiment of Totenkopf (5th SS PzGr Rgt) or the 1st regiment of LSSAH (1st SS PzGr Rgt).

Another arrow shows armor turning off from Mikhailovka to the south. There is then a tank symbol and the second arrow then heads to the southeast. That arrow goes right next at “AA1” which I gather is the LSSAH Reconnaissance Battalion. At the Komsomolets Sovkhoz is the battalion headquarters of the antitank battalion. This last marking may not be that significant as the unit’s antitank companies were often distributed out to the infantry battalions. The artillery regiment headquarters is shown well to the rear at Teterivino.

The intelligence maps show a similar but slightly different picture. You can see on that map the line held by Totenkopf to the west of the Psel, the bridgehead to the north of the Psel River (the dashed line) and then a position just south of the Psel River that is both turning back an attack and launching an attack (this may be the attack reported in the Soviet records). You do see two arrows with tank symbols on them coming from the XVIII Tank Corps attack. One is running along the line to the southeast (which matches the situation map) and the other penetrating the German lines going almost all the way to the Sovkhoz (which is not on the situation map). It is turned back.

These two maps strongly suggest that there was an existing position along the Psel that was hit by the XVIII Tank Corps attack, and that attack then drove into Andreyevka, where it was halted by forces of Totenkopf SS Division. The other attack turned to the south, where it encountered the LSSAH recon battalion, among other forces. There is also a breakthrough (only noted on the intelligence map) that goes to the Sovkhoz where it is turned back. As there were two attacking Soviet tank brigades, and two pairs of arrows on the situation map for the 12th, then I am guessing one brigade drove into Andeyevka and the other turn to the south and southwest. This second brigade is probably part of the story recounted by George Loetzsch. It appears that the breakthrough to the Sovkhoz consisted at best of one tank brigade, and may be been only a tank battalion (otherwise it is hard to explain the three arrows on the intelligence map).

The end result was that there was probably a number of units facing the three attacking brigades (two tank brigades and the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade) of the XVIII Tank Corps. And we still don’t know where both division’s Sturmgeshuetz IIIs and Marders were.

Of course, the Battle of Prokhorovka is famous for the hundred German Tiger tanks that were destroyed by the Fifth Guards Tank Army. In the Fifth Guards Tank Army report of 30 September 1943, they claimed to have killed 53 Tigers from 12-24 July. Somehow, this story grew to 70 Tigers killed on the tank fields of Prokhorovka (Rotmistrov, 1960) and I gather in some accounts it was rounded up to the nearest hundred. It became the standard Soviet story, and the figures 70 and or 100 Tiger tanks killed being repeated in many post-war accounts, including Rotmistrov’s. It was an absurd claim that oddly enough was picked up without critical analysis by many western historians and repeated. Yet the German unit records were readily available, but apparently no one thought of checking them. Literally dozens of books and articles were written over three decades with these false claims in them. The situation was so appalling that I ended up adding an appendix to my Kursk book called “A History of the Histories” that discusses how these obviously absurdly incorrect legends showed up in books by established historians like Goeffrey Jukes, Martin Caidin, John Erickson, and Glantz and House (When Titans Clashed, 1995).

In 1993, Trevor Dupuy warned me that the Battle of Prokhorovka did not go as the legend says it did. Even though his book Great Battles on the Eastern Front (1982) picked up the swirling tank battle story, they (Dupuy and Martell) were careful not to state any armor loss figures (“Both sides suffered heavy losses…”, page 79). So, the week before my first meeting in Moscow I ran over to the archives and pulled up the SS Panzer Corps unit records for the 11th, 12th and 13th of July. This basically took a half-day and from those records alone, the story was clear. Apparently for the last three decades none of the dozens of western historians writing about Prokhorovka had taken the time to do that.

We then flew to Moscow to meet with Col. Sverdlov and our Russian research team. Col. Fyodor Sverdlov was a war veteran who fought with an infantry battalion in the Battle of Moscow in 1941 and was a staff officer through most of the rest of the war. He was wounded three times. After the war he had written eight or more books (plus ghost-wrote some books for higher ups), became a PhD and was a professor at Frunze Military Academy. Col. Sverdlov started our conference in October 1993 by saying something like: “I was at Prokhorovka right after the war, and I didn’t see a hundred Tigers.”

This was the before I mentioned the SS unit records I came armed with. I was prepared for an extended and painful discussion on the subject, but it was clear from the start that Sverdlov, having served, did not believe the Communist propaganda (unlike so many of the western historians had). This would be a subject revisited multiple times in many other discussions. I found him opened minded and fairly unbiased. He was also very critical of the Soviet Army and the way that they operated. He was independent and analytical, and not overly nationalistic.

So, LSSAH had 4 Tigers operational on the 12th of July (most sources agree on this). According to Frieser, page 126, they did not start the day on the front line (which is not unusual). The company of four Tigers arrived during the battle and deployed on the division’s left wing. After that…..I don’t know what they did. This would have probably put them opposite to the XVIII Tank Corps. There are reports that in Andreyevka, the 181st Tank Brigade met a large column of German tanks (Kursk, page 932, Prokhorovka page 318). Andreyevka is marked on the map above (from page 317 of Prokhorovka).

Now, we do not know whose tanks are those that were in that “large column.” It could have been the tanks from one of the two panzer battalions of Totenkopf (Pz IIIs and IVs), or it could have been the Totenkopf SS Assault Gun Battalion (StuG IIIs), or the Totenkopf SS Self-propelled Antitank Company (Marders), or the unaccounted for extra panzer battalion or panzer company that LSSAH appears to have had (Pz IVs), or the LSSAH Assault Gun Battalion, or the LSSAH Self-propelled Antitank Company, or some combination of this above. Clearly, four Tigers by themselves don’t account for a “large column.”

In the thirty-third paragraph of Ben Wheatley’s article (starting with “On the other side of the ditch…”), he also has the four Tigers coming up and deploying on the division’s left wing. He then has an extended discussion of the Tiger’s operations starting at paragraph thirty-nine (“At the same time as Hill 252.2…”). He has them engaged in a major dual with the 170th Tank Brigade and then the 181st Tank Brigade. It almost appears from his account that these 4 Tigers single-handedly fought and halted breakthroughs by these two Soviet tank brigades. This seems a little much.

One source given is Frieser, page 127, which does quote Georg Loetsch, one of the four Tiger tank commanders. He states “In the morning, the company was on the left wing of II Armoured Battalion when about 50 enemy tanks, from the cover of copses and hedges, came storming towards us in a broad wedge formation…” He then claims to have shot two T-34s. It appears to be a big step from this quote to single handedly having four Tigers stop two attacking tank brigades. If he shot 2, and if the other 3 Tigers did as well, then this is only 8 tanks. Who shot the rest?

Now, I did not include the Loetzsch account in my books. Perhaps I should have.

But, there clearly were other German forces in the area. The XVIII Tank Corps records are a little confused and spotty on this action, but there are a few lines that stand out:

From: Combat Report #37, 1400, July 12, 1943:

The enemy is putting up stubborn resistance and is falling back in the pt, 217.9-Komsomolets Sovkhoz direction. Enemy artillery is firing intensively on our troops from the Greznoye area.

Our neighbor on the left [XXIX Tank Corps] is fighting for Komsomolets Sovkhoz.

The XVIII Tank Corps reached the following lines:

110th TBde: 500 meters east of Mikhalovka

181st TBde: occupied Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz and is fighting along the line Andreyevka-ht. 241.6

170th TBde: fighting along the line of the ravine southeast of Mikhalovka.

 

From: Combat Report #38, 0330, July 13, 1943

In attempting to reach the Belgorod highway, XVIII Tank Corps unexpectedly ran into the enemy’s well-organized resistance, which featured buried tanks and assault guns along the line ht. 217.9-ht. 241.6

From: Account of 18th TC’s Combat Activities, July 12-24 1943:

Time of attack is 0830 on July 12…At 0830 the corps’ units attacked (just mentioned because Ben Wheatley appears to use a different time in his account).

The terrain in the corps’ attack zone is cut by three deep ravines….which is the 181st and 170th Tank Brigades, advancing in the first echelon, were forced to attack on the corps’ left flank near the enemy strong point at Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz. 170th TBde, attacking on the left flank, by 1200 had lost 60% of its equipment.

Despite these losses, overcoming the enemy’s fire resistance, the corps’ units took the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz and by 1200 were fighting along the line: 181st TBde-Andreyevka-ht. 241.6; 170th TBde-the ravine southeast of Mikhailovka; 32nd MotRBde was fighting for Andreyevka.

The corps’ units, continuing to carry out their mission, by the end of the day had reached the line 200m east of the Bogoroditskoye church-southern outskirts of Vasilyevka-Andreyevka-two windmills at Preslestnoye-further along the northern slopes of the ravine southeast of Andreyevka-the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz.

By the end of the day the enemy attempts a frontal tank attack from the Kozlovka-Greznoye area, with the simultaneous attempt bypass the corps; units from the Kozlovka-Polezheyva direction, using Tiger tanks and self-propelled guns and intensively bombarding our lines from the air.

This last reference was clearly to the actions of the Totenkopf SS Division north of the Psel. I have been there. It is called the Psel River. It looks like a creek. There are pictures of it at Prelestnoye in my book (see pages 241 or 184, depending on which book you have access to).

XVIII Tank Corps encountered the enemy’s well-organized and powerful anti-tank defense, consisting of tanks and assault guns along the line of ht. 217.9-ht. 241.6.

In order to avoid excessive losses in men and equipment, I ordered the corps’ units to take up defensive positions along it new lines.

A certain irony in the last paragraph. Bakharov (XVIII Tank Corps) was relieved of command shortly after the battle, although the XXIX Tank Corps had suffered worse losses.

From: Operational Report #1, 1900, July 12, 1943, 5th GTA

18th TC, with 80th Gds Mortar Rgt, advancing from the line Prelestnoye-Prokhorovka, by 1400 captured Mikhalovka.

At 1400 the corps repulsed an enemy counterattack by 50 tanks from the Bororoditskiye area, and by 13 “Tigers” from the area of ht. 226.6

If the first part of this last sentence in correct, then that would mean there were certainly more tanks than 4 Tigers in the area. Which German tanks were there and where did they come from? The second part of this sentence is clearly an attack by up to 11 Tigers of Totenkopf SS.

The Corps’ further advance was contained by the enemy’s powerful artillery and mortar fire from the Greznoye area, and by tank fire from the Bogoroditskoye area.

Again, tanks in Bogoroditskoye, which is on the Psel, between Andreyevka and Vasilyevka.

From: Operational Report #2, 0700, July 13, 1943, 5th GTA

18th TC, with 80th Gds Mortar Rgt, by the end of July 12 had taken the eastern outskirts of Vasilyevka, but its further advance was halted by the enemy’s artillery and tank from the area of the western outskirts of Vasilyevka. The corps is on the line Petrovka-Mikhalovka and has consolodated and is regrouping.

From: 5th Guards Tank Army’s Combat Activities from July 7-24, 1943 (compiled September 30, 1943)

The initial time of 1000 set for the attack was moved back by the front commander to 0830 on July 12. At 0830, following a short artillery preparation, the corps moved into the attack.

170th and 181st Tank Brigades….and by 1430, after fierce fighting, had taken the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz and had reached Andreyevka and Vasilyevka, and advance of 6-7 km.

At 1330 the first-echelon brigades were fired on by 13 “Tiger” tanks from the area of ht. 226.6, which were moving in the direction of the northwestern outskirts of Mikhailovka.

This is Totenkopf firing at them. There is only one mention in the Soviet records I have of them engaging any Tigers to their west or south, meaning on their side of the Psel River (it is in the next paragraph). Dr. Wheatley’s account has the Tigers operating from “Hill” 241.6 (grid location 33.3 and 53.6 or four km from SW corner of Vasilyevka at 30-56).

36th Gds Tank Regiment [the Churchills] encountered heavy fire from Tigers and AT guns from the ravines 2 km south of Mikhailovka, where it suffered heavy casualties.

In Andreyevka 181st TBde met a large column of enemy tanks. As a result of the battle that followed, the Germans suffered heavy casualties and were thrown back on Kozlovka.

Now, I put the first part about the “large column” in my book(s). I did not put the second part in, as this is the usual exaggeration of results that appears in this report written by Rotmistrov and Grishin. In their defense, bad results in their actions could have resulted in their arrest. Self-preservation clearly was a factor influencing this account, especially in light of Stalin’s call the evening of 12 July (see pages 1024-1025 or 404-405).

At 1800 on July 12 the corps’ brigade finally took Vasilyevka and reached Kozlovka.

The corps, on the line ht. 279.9-3 km southwest of Kozlovka-ht. 241.6, encountered heavy enemy fire resistance from assault guns, tanks buried in the ground, and fierce aerial bombardment, which made any further advance impossible.

Again, the mention of assault guns (which a lot of sources seem to forget about) and dug-in tanks. Not sure about the dug-in tanks, but both Totenkopf SS and LSSAH Division’s had an assault gun battalion of 10 to 21 StuG IIIs ready for action Armed with a 75mm gun and well armored, these were the second best “tanks” on the battlefield (after the Tigers).

Anyhow, it is clear the XVIII Tank Corps was facing a lot more than just 4 Tigers. The question is, who else was there?

In the thirty-fifth paragraph of Ben Wheatley’s article he states that “The 32nd and 31st Tank Brigades advanced with the railway embankment on their left flank and the Oktiabrskiy State Farm (and the surrounding area) on their right flank (See Figures 4-7).” See: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16161262.2019.1606545

This is news to me. Perhaps because such an attack by the 31st Tank Brigade on the morning of 12 July 1943 is not clearly reported by the Fifth Guards Tank Army or XXIX Tank Corps in the Soviet unit records that I have. To quote from their records:

XXIX Tank Corps (Combat Report #74, 1900, July 12, 1943):

31st TBde is attacking behind 32nd TBde to the right of the highway in the direction of Kosomolets Sovkhoz-ht. 258.2-Luchki-Bolshie Mayachki. By 1400 the brigade had reached the area 1 km northwest of the Oktyabrkii Sovkhoz.

XXIX Tank Corps (Combat Report #75, 2400, July 12, 1943):

31st TBde, upon reaching the northeastern outskirts of the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz, was delayed by the enemy’s artillery and mortar fire and by his ceaseless air activity. Four enemy tank and artillery counterattacks on the Okyabrskii Sovkhoz were repulsed. Losses: 20 T-34s and 18 T-70s knocked out and burned. Tanks in line: 3, with the location and condition of the remained being investigated. 

Fifth Guards Tank Army’s Combat Activities from July 7-24, 1943 (compiled September 30, 1943 by army commander Lt. General Rotmistrov and military council member Maj. General Grishin):

The corps was deeply echeloned: 32nd TBde was on the right flnak in the first echlon; 31st TBde was in the second echelon, attacking in the Krasnyi Oktyabr-Ht. 242.5-Komsomolets Sovkhoz direction….53rd MotRBde attacked behind 32nd and 25th Tank Brigade along the railroad in the direction of the Komsomolets Sovkhoz.

The next sentence of this report claims: “The enemy also launched his main blow along the railroad toward Prokhorovka, hoping to break the resistance of our units and take Prokhorovka from the march.” This is, of course, not correct. It then states:

At 1300 32nd and 31st Tank Brigades, following a fierce meeting engagement with enemy tanks along the approaches of the road south of the Okyabrskii Sovkhoz, were halted by strong enemy tank and AT fire, as well as by aerial bombardment; the brigades went over to the defensive along this line and repulsed four strong tank counterattacks, which results in heavy enemy losses.

Needless to say, this paragraph is not entirely correct either.

I also checked Zamulin and he has does have a little more detail on the 31st Tank Brigade’s operations. To quote:

Colonel S. F. Moiseev’s 31st Tank Brigade was supposed to follow it [32nd Tank Brigade], but Moiseev’s battalions were slow in moving into the jumping-off positions (page 310)…Immediately after 1000, at the moment when the second echelon of Kirichenko’s 29th Tank Corps (the 31st Tank Brigade) entered the battle, the Germans began an intensified bombardment of the assault wedges of both our tank corps east of the Oktiabr’skii State Farm (page 317)….The situation in the 31st Tank Brigade at the start of the attack received only a brief description in combat documents: ‘The pace of the offensive has slackened; the brigade has begun to mark time in place.’ (pages 317-318)….[quoting from a corps account] ‘b) The 31st Tank Brigade: At 0830 following the signal (the rocket artillery salvo), the attack of the tanks and infantry began without artillery preparation or air cover…The tanks suffered heavy losses from the enemy’s artillery fire and aviation…At 1030 the tanks reached the border of the Oktiabr’skii State Farm. Further advance was stopped by the ceaseless influence of the enemy’s aviation.’ (page 319)….[and quoted from the brigades political officer] The large losses, especially in equipment, and the insufficiently active advance of our brigade by the strong influence of the enemy’s aviation….and the enemy’s strong artillery and mortar fire….The long presence of the tanks and personnel in their starting positions (eight hours) allowed the enemy….’ (page 319)…The brigade commander [32nd Tank Brigade] moved up into the first echelon, bringing with him the 277th and 278th Battalions of the 31st Tank Brigade and directing the remnants of that brigade toward the State Farm at top speed. (page 321)…at 1300 the tanks of the 181st, 32nd and 31st Tank Brigades, together with the infantry of the 136th Guards Rifle Regiment finally broke into the Oktiabr’skii State Farm (page 327)….”

So, it does not appear from Zamulin that the 31st Tank Brigade participated in the initial attack either. It also does not appear that the 31st Tank Brigade advanced much beyond Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz, if at all. This does contradict some Soviet maps of XXIX Tank Corps operations (which the map in this blog post is drawn from…see page 321 of the Prokhorovka book).

Just to confuse the discussion Zamulin then states (page 327):

At 1300….broke into the Oktiabr’skii State Farm. Having finally overrun the first line of antitank defense on Hill 252.2, a group of 29th Tank Corps tanks poured down the hill’s southwestern slopes in pursuit of the retreating enemy in the direction of the Komsomolets State Farm. But after several hundred meters of the chase, something happened which shocked their crews. Several T-34s, moving in the lead at high speed, suddenly vanishing into the deep anti-tank ditch.

Note that most other accounts have Soviet T-34s driving into the ditch in the morning. There are no footnotes or sources indicated for this paragraph.

The 31st Tank Brigade was deployed in second echelon behind the 32nd Tank Brigade. In Soviet doctrine, they usually attacked with the first echelon and held the second echelon until they could see how the battle was developing. Advancing behind the first echelon force of the 32nd and 25th Tank Brigades was the 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade. The tank ditch in question was one to one-half kilometers to the south, southwest and west of Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz (see pages 934 or 323 of my books for the map). So, where did this claim for an attack on the morning of the 12 July by both the 32nd and 31st Tank Brigades come from?

 

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P.S. One final note from the 30 September report by Rotmistrov and Grishin:

Losses suffered by Fifth Guards Tank Army in battle, July 12-24, 1943:

T-34s: 276

T-70s: 128

Mk-4 Churchill: 11….

122mm self-propelled gun: 14

76mm self-propelled gun: 10…

Killed, wound, missing: 14,393 men

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Losses Inflicted on the Enemy by Fifth Guards Tank Army, July 12-24, 1943

1. Tanks: 454 (including Tigers: 53)

2. Self-propelled guns: 20….

16. Killed and wounded: 15,164

17. Captured: 146