Mystics & Statistics

Summation of Open Questions on Prokhorovka

This discussion on Prokhorovka has been going on for a few weeks. It has included a collection of well thought out comments from Dr. Ben Wheatley. These are worth reading, so please scroll down to the comments at the end of each article. Let’s take a moment and account for what are the open issues:

1. Did the attack start at 0830 or 1000?

08:30 or 10:00 at Prokhorovka?

Now, I think Dr. Wheatley, based upon Roman Toeppel’s speculation, favors 1000. The documentation is pretty clear on this. The weight of the evidence leans towards at 0830 start time, including a reading of Ribbentrop’s and Schuele’s post-war accounts.

2. Was there one or two tank brigades in the initial attack that hit the tank ditch (32nd and 31st)?

So did the Soviet 31st Tank Brigade attack on the morning of 12 July 1943?

I think as it was a typical Soviet echeloned attack, it was only initially the 32nd Tank Brigade. The 31st Tank Brigade may never have gotten that far.

3. Did the attack on the tank ditch occur in the morning or after 1300 (Moscow time)?

Was the Tank Ditch encountered in the morning, the afternoon, or both?

I think it occurred in the morning. Someone probably needs to talk to Zamulin and find out why he thinks it occurred in the afternoon (and what his sources are).

4. Were there other tank units in LSSAH Division besides the 3 companies of II Panzer Bn and the Tiger company of 4 tanks?

Panzer Battalions in LSSAH in July 1943

Panzer Battalions in LSSAH in July 1943 – II

I am pretty certain there was at least additional medium panzer company, as there is no way the organization works out for LSSAH Panzer Regiment otherwise. They had more tanks than the other two SS panzer grenadier divisions, and both of those had two battalions. Dr. Wheatley does have them with an 8th medium panzer company, but mysteriously disappears it before the battle. I think there was either an 8th medium panzer company or an ersatz panzer battalion (like Das Reich has done).

5. Who all was facing XVIII Tank Corps attack?

Who all was facing the XVIII Tank Corps?

Some accounts seem to have gotten a little fanciful in this discussion. It is clear that there was a number of other battalions in the area, and probably other armor (including StuG IIIs and Marders).

6. What other tanks and tank-like vehicles were engaged:

So What Were the LSSAH Tigers Doing?

So What Were the Assault Guns Doing at Prokhorovka?

7. Where were the 181st and 170th Tank Brigades?

Where were the 181st and 170th Tank Brigades on 12 July 1943?

8. Did the events we are discussing even occur as they are claimed?

Basis of the Tank Ditch Story of 12 July 1943

Basis of the LSSAH Tiger Story on 12 July 1943

Ben Wheatley did post up a third post-war account of the tank ditch story, which is good. The actions of the Tiger company appears to be based upon one post-war account. Now Dr. Wheatley’s work with the photo recon pictures may help confirm the veracity of these stories.

And the post that started this latest round of discussion:

Comments on the Photo Recon Article

And the previous summation post that lists 9 other blog posts:

Summation of the Prokhorovka Blog Posts

And this summary is 7 blog posts is worth looking at:

TDI Friday Read: Tank Combat at Kursk

Top 20 Countries by Annual GDP (PPP) from 1800 to 2040

In the past, I have made a number of posts comparing countries by GDP (Gross Domestic Product). I always use GDP (Nominal) vice GDP (PPP – Purchasing Power Parity). Some people have asked why I don’t use GDP (PPP). Well here is a youtube.com video based upon that: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-2nqd6-ZXg

One will note that the video starts in 1800 with China by far the richest country in the world and India second. Yet during the 1800s the much poorer (by this video) United Kingdom already occupied parts of India and continued expanding their control. The “poorer” European powers then started carving up China. In 1937 the GDP (PPP) of Japan is 220 million while the GDP (PPP) of China is 530 million. Yet who is invading whom?

Here is a video based upon GDP (Nominal), covering 1960 -2017. It is curious as it leaves out the Soviet Union completely (but does include Russia): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wykaDgXoajc

Here is one on projected GDP (Nominal), projecting from 2018 to 2100: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T9l2yCH5wBk

Some of these figures are hard to explain in light of the demographic challenges facing countries like China and Japan. In the case of China they will most likely experience negative population growth by 2030. Japan has already reached that point.

Demographics of China

Demographics of Japan

 

One must treat all this “infoporn” with considerable caution.

It does seem that PPP overinflates the appearance of national power, although it may be perfectly valid for measuring per capita income and comparative standards of living.

Top 15 Countries by Military Spending (1914-2018)

I have noticed this five-minute youtube video being posted on twitter lately: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cw2Wm8T6tio

While it is interesting, it should be viewed with considerable caution. First, it does not state the source of its monthly data. I gather it is in U.S. dollars and not adjusted for inflation. The data is clearly very susceptible to exchange rates. The expenditures for the Soviet Union in the 1970s and the 1980s seems overinflated. At this time the ruble was pegged higher than the dollar at 1.11 dollars to the ruble if I remember correctly. In the early 1990s it dropped to like 3000 rubles to a dollar. Does the 1970s and 1980s data account for the real value of the currency, or is it based upon it obviously overinflated official exchange rate? I am guessing the later.

Where were the 181st and 170th Tank Brigades on 12 July 1943?

The XVIII Tank Corps attacked on the morning of 12 July with two tank brigades in the lead, the 181st and the 170th. It was supported by 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade. Further back, initially in reserve was the 32nd Guards Tank Regiment (armed with Churchill tanks) and their 110th Tank Brigade, which also took some losses this day. So the question is, where did these units end up going?

The Plan of Attack

From 18th Tank Corps Account covering 12-24 July (post-battle account):

The first echelon (181st and 170th tank brigade) is to attack the enemy, with the task of taking Malye Maiachki….

The second echelon (32nd MotRBde, with an artillery group consisting of 292nd Mortar Rgt, a 76mm antitank artillery regiment and a 57mm antitank artillery regiment) is to attack behind the first echelon, and by the end of the day relieve the 181st and 170th Tank Brigades.

36th Guards Tank Regiment is to attack behind the 170th Tank Brigade in the second echelon, securing the corps’ right flank….

The third echelon (110th Tank Brigade and a reconnaissance detachment) are to reach the area of ht. 251.2 by the end of the day.

Corps HQ is in the third echelon between 110th TBde and the reconnaissance detachment.

An artillery group, consisting of 292nd Mortar Rgt, 80th Gds Mortar Rgt [Katyushkas], and a tank group, consisting of 100th ATArtRgt and 36th Gds TRgt, has orders to support the corps’ infantry-tank attack.

The brigade are following in the third echelon under protection of 110th TBde. 

So, it appears that the initial attack was led by the two tank brigades and supported by the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade.

Corps Actions During the Day: The same report then notes:

The terrain in the corps’ attack zone is cut by three deep ravines, stretching from the left bank of the Psel River to the Belenikhino-Prokhorovka railroad, which is why 181st and 170th Tank Brigades, advancing in the first echelon, were forced to attack on the corps’ left flank near the enemy strong point at Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz. The 170th Tank Brigade, attacking on the left flank, by 1200 had lost 60% of its equipment.

Despite these losses, overcoming the enemy’s fire resistance, the corps’ units took the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz and by 1200 were fighting along the line: …..

So it appears that the 170th Tank Brigade was on the left flank. The 181st Tank Brigade may have been biased to its right and in front of it. Not sure the 170th Tank Brigade ever got much beyond the Obtyabrskii Sovkhoz.

The corps’ units, continuing to carry out their mission, by the end of the day had reached the line 200 meter east of the Bogoroditskoye church–southern outskirts of Vasilevka-Andreyevka–two windmills at Preselstnoye–further along the northern slopes of the ravine southeast of Andreyevka-the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz….

18 TC encounter the enemy’s well-organized and powerful anti-tank defense, consisting of tanks and assault guns along the line of ht. 217.9–ht. 241.6.

From Combat Report #37, 1400, July 12, 1943

The enemy is putting up stubborn resistance and is falling back in the pt. 217.9–Komsomolets Sovkhoz direction. Enemy artillery is firing intensively on our troops from the Greznoye area….Our neighbor on the left [XXIX Tank Corps] is fighting for Komsomolets Sovkhoz.

From Combat Report #38, 0300, July 13, 1943

In attempting to reach the Belgorod highway, 18th TC unexpectedly ran into the enemy’s well-organized resistance, which featured buried tanks and assault guns along the line ht. 217.9–ht. 241.6….

I have ordered the corps’ units to go over to the defensive along the following lines:….

From Fifth Guards Tank Army Operational Report #1, 1900, July 12, 1943.

18th TC, with 80th Gds Mortor Rgt [Katyushas], advancing from the line Prelestnoye-Prokhroovka, by 1400 captured Mikhalovka.

At 1400 the corps repulsed an enemy counterattack by 50 tanks from the Bogoroditskoye area, and by 13 “Tigers” from the area of ht. 226.6.

The corps’ further advance was contained by the enemy’s powerful artillery and mortar fire from the Greznoye area, and by tank fire from the Bogoroditskoye area.

Note that this counterattack by 50 tanks seems to be missing in most primarily German-based accounts. Not sure if it occurred. On the other hand, these last two paragraphs do put German tanks in Vasilyevka.

From Fifth Guards Tank Army Operational Report #2, 1700, July 13, 1943.

18th TC, with the 80th Gds Mortar Rgt, by the end of July 12 had taken the eastern outskirts of Vasilyevka, but its further advance was halted by the enemy’s artillery and tank fire from the area of the western outskirts of Vasilevka. The corps is on the line Petrovka-Mikhailovka and has consolidated and is regrouping.

From Fifth Guard Army Report from July 7-24, 1943 (prepared 30 September 1943):

170th and 181st Tank Brigades were to attack….and by 1430, after fierce fighting, had taken the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz and had reached Andreyevka and Vasilyevka, an advance of 6-7 kilometers.

At 1330 the first-echelon brigades were fired on by 13 “Tiger” tanks from the area of ht. 226.6, which were moving in the direction of the northwestern outskirts of Mikhailovka.

At 1800 on July 12 the corps’ brigades finally took Vasilevka and reached Kozlovka.

The corps, on the line ht. 219.9–3 km southwest of Kozlovka–ht. 241.6, encountered heavy enemy fire resistance from assault guns, tanks buried in the ground, and fierce aerial bombardment, which made any further advance impossible.

The corps commander orders his units to consolidate along the line achieved and organize an all-around defense; 32nd MotRBde and 170th TBade, with the remains of 36th Gds TBde, in the center of Vasilyevka–Mikhailovka–Prelestnoye area; 181st TBde in Petrovka; 110th TBde in the (excl.) Petrovka–Beregovoye area.

 

181st Tank Brigade:

From XVIII Tank Corps Account covering 12-24 July (post-battle account):

…by 1200 were fighting along the line: 181st TBde Andreyevka-ht. 241.6

From Combat Report #37, 1400, July 12, 1943

181st TBde: Occupied Okyabrskii Sovkhoz and is fighting along the line Andreyevka-ht. 241.6.

From Combat Report #38, 0300, July 13, 1943

…181st Tank Brigade: Petrovka area

From Fifth Guard Army Report from July 7-24, 1943 (prepared 30 September 1943):

In Andreyevka 181st TBde met a large column of enemy tanks. As a result of the battle that followed, the Germans suffered heavy casualties and were thrown back on Kozlovka.

Note that this puts the 181st Tank Brigade at the front of the Corps and in Andreyevka.

170th Tank Brigade:

From XVIII Tank Corps Account covering 12-24 July (post-battle account):

The 170th Tank Brigade, attacking on the left flank, by 1200 had lost 60% of its equipment.

….by 1200 were fighting along the line:….170th TBde the ravine southeast of Mikhalilovka

From Combat Report #37, 1400, July 12, 1943

170th TBde: fighting along the line of the ravine southeast of Mikhailovka.

32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade:

….by 1200 were fighting along the line:…..32nd MotRBde was fighting for Andreyevka.

From Combat Report #38, 0300, July 13, 1943

….32nd MotRBde, with the 110th TBde and 36th Gds TRgt,: the area of the center of Vasilyevka–Mikhailovka–Prelestnoye

Other units:

From Combat Report #37, 1400, July 12, 1943

110th TBde: 500 meters east of Mikhailovka.

Headquarters is on the northern outskirts of Petrovka.

From Combat Report #38, 0300, July 13, 1943

…110th TkBde: the (excl.) Petrovka-Bergovoye area.

….1694th AA ArtRgt is to cover the defensive area from enemy air attacks, having its main firing positions in the Beregovoye area.

From Fifth Guard Army Report form July 7-24, 1943 (prepared 30 September 1943):

36th Gds TRgt encountered heavy fire from “Tigers” and AT guns from the ravines 2 km south of Mikhalovka, where it suffered heavy casualties.

This last account may be a reference to this LSSAH Tiger tanks.

Needless to say, these accounts do not support a narrative that the 181st and 170th Tank Brigade were primarily engaged with 4 Tigers at height 241.6. In fact, they don’t support the narrative that they penetrated the German positions, then the German reconnaissance battalion, and then engaged the German artillery. Because of (one?) German post-war interview(s) and the German intelligence map created at the time, we do believe there was such a penetration. This penetration may well have been only a part of one brigade.

It is also not certain if the 170th Tank Brigade ever got beyond the ravine southeast of Mikhailovka.

Basis of the LSSAH Tiger Story on 12 July 1943

The story of the actions of the four LSSAH Tiger’s on this day are also not based upon any documentation I am aware of. As far as I know (and I admit that I have not exhaustively researched this aspect of the battle), the only source of its operations is a post-war account by Georg Loetzsch, who was in command of the one of the four Tigers on the 12 July. The account as provided by Karl-Heinz Frieser (page 127). It simply states that:

‘In the morning, the company was on the left wing of the II Armoured Battalion when about 50 enemy tanks, from the cover of copses and hedges, came storming towards us in broad wedge formation….I shot two T-34s, one of which drove towards me in flames. At the last moment I managed to avoid the burning bomb.’

Frieser footnotes Wendt, Tiger, pages 29-20. There may be more to the account than that, but I have not pursued it.

The German intelligence map for 12 July (see page 950 in my Kursk book or page 343 in my Prokhorovka book) does show a breakthrough that is turned back. It does not show what forces were engaged or turned them back. This whole fight, and who might of been involved has already been discussed in more depth in an earlier post:

Who all was facing the XVIII Tank Corps?

I did not include the Georg Loetzsch account in my book, as I was not familiar with its source. Perhaps I should have. I do tend to be suspicious of personal accounts that I cannot otherwise confirm.

Basis of the Tank Ditch Story of 12 July 1943

Figure 12 showing the tank ditch on 16 July 1943

The story of the Soviet tank ditch disrupting the operations of one or more attacking Soviet tank brigades at Prokhorovka is not based upon any documented records. It is entirely based upon post-war interviews and post-war accounts. This is always an uncomfortable basis from which to build an account from.

The primary source for this story of Captain Rudolf Ribbentrop’s account, who was the company commander of the 6th Panzer Company and was in the midst of the fight. As he was the eldest son of the German foreign minister, there is reason to be concerned that he may not have given an unbiased or unvarnished account. I still moved forward and accepted his account, but only after Major General Brand (Bundeswehr, ret) had discussed it with him and Ribbentrop had again discussed it with one or more crew members that were with him at the time. So there was reason to believe that this account is valid, even though it was originally published in a publication that was raising funds for SS veterans (see page 933, footnote 36 in my Kursk book; or page 320, footnote 60 in my Prokhorovka book).

The only other source for the tank ditch story is an account from Wilhelm Roes of the 7th Panzer Company. In this case, I drew his account from Zamulin’s writing, and his source is footnoted that the story came from the “author’s personal archive” (see page 328, footnote 64 in my Prokhorovka book). There may a more detailed Wilhelm Roes’ account in German sources, but I have not taken the time to chase them down. As it is, Zamulin’s used Roes account in Zamulin’s claim the tank ditch was encountered in the early afternoon.

Was the Tank Ditch encountered in the morning, the afternoon, or both?

It appears that these are the only two accounts for the tank ditch story. There may be others, but I have not located them. Now, there is not much question that the tank ditch existed. But, the basis of the story that Soviet tanks drove into and/or were stopped by the tank ditch is primarily (or only) based upon two post-war German accounts.

The interesting aspects of Dr. Wheatley’s research (which I do think is worthwhile, even if I disagree with him over a number of interpretations) is that his photo reconnaissance research could help confirm these stories. In particular in his article Visual Examination…. there are figures 12, 14, 15, 19 and 20 which actually show the tank ditch on 16 July 1943 and 7 August 1943. Figure 12 is displayed at the head of this blog post. Now, I don’t see any Soviet tanks in the ditch, but if there was, this would be very useful confirmation for an otherwise poorly documented action. Does anyone see any tanks in and around the tank ditch in these five pictures?

Now, Dr. Wheatley does note:

By closely comparing the photographs of 16 July and 7 August we can see the location of the destroyed tanks in the anti-tank ditch in the later, though by no means as clearly as on 16 July. The track in front of anti-tank ditch is less worn on 7 August which only goes to highlight (given its clear marking on 16 July) how many tanks on 12 July must have traversed the route whilst looking for a crossing.

I’ll be honest. I don’t see anything identifiable. They may be there and others may see them, but I do not. I see lots of black splotches in the pictures, but I cannot tell what they are. Are they tanks, are they shell holes? I can clearly see planes on airfields on the pictures I copied (see pages 575-576 of my Kursk book) and I can clearly see shell holes in the pictures I copied (see pages 573 and 600 of my Kursk book). There may be a resolution problem with the pictures attached to his article. They may be clear on his copies.

What probably should be done is to make a map and plot all the tanks that can be observed in these pictures on that map. Not sure who, if anyone, is going to take this on.

What is Lethality?

Shawn Woodford did a blog post last month about Trevor Dupuy’s Definitions of Lethality:

Trevor Dupuy’s Definitions of Lethality

As he noted in a recent email to me:

I went back to look at the blog post on how TND defined lethality and it dawned on me that he actually stated it in at least two different ways:

AND

 

Well, I am not sure that Trevor invested a whole lot of time in the definition or discussion of the meaning of lethality. I did work directly with him for several years and I don’t recall it ever coming up in conversation.

I think lethality is both, the destructive power of weapons and the ability to injure and kill people. It depends on the weapon and what you are shooting at. Also, depends on the measuring construct you are using. Trevor Dupuy’s models, the QJM/TNDM, were focused on estimating human losses in combat. Other combat models are built around a SSPK (Single-Shot Probability of Kill) calculation and “lethal area” calculations. This certainly includes CAA’s  COSAGE/ATCAL/CEM and the RAND/CAA’s COSAGE/ATCAL/JICM hierarchy of models. This approach is oriented toward measuring weapons system losses. Their personnel casualties are then calculated from there. I think they are both trying to measure lethality, just using slightly different metrics.

Lethality is clearly not the same as combat effectiveness. There is a lot more to combat effectiveness then what comes out of the barrel of a gun.

Cost and Lethality

While searching around the internet on discussions of lethality I found one my old forum posts from 2001. It is here:                                                                                               . http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum1/HTML/000006.html

It was written in response to a question about the “cost/lethality ratio over time.” I think this post is worth repeating in its entirety, so let me post it here (with a few typos corrected):

I think this is a very important metric and one that the Institute has never been contracted to look into. To date, I have never seen any analysis that compares combat effectiveness, or lethality, to cost.

The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare was the start of a series of books that explored Trevor Dupuy’s combat models and theories of war. This book sets up the theoretical constructs behind his model. The book Numbers, Predictions and War actually discusses the first versions of the model (1977) and Understanding War (1987), which is Trevor Dupuy’s greatest book, discusses his theories of warfare. None of these address cost.

While a lot of people in the military don’t like to discuss cost, as a taxpayer, I think it is important. There are several issues here:

First, how does one measure combat effectiveness? While OLI’s (Operational Lethality Indexes) is one method, it is a scoring system for a model, and is really not intended for use as an analytical tool outside of the model. Beyond what are sometimes perjoratively refered to as “static measures” (scoring systems), there are several other more esoteric (more time consuming) ways of measuring combat effectiveness.

Second, how does one measure the synergistic effects of weapons systems? Meaning, just because weapon A is more cost effective per square meter of killing more than all other weapons, does not mean one should create an armed force of just one weapon. For example, the army of nothing but 155mm Howitzers does have severe limitations. There is a lot more that goes into weapon choice than just “bang for buck”.

Third, how does one measure the value of enabling systems? There is a lot of money spent on systems that do not shoot. This includes communications, support vehicles, engineering equipment, medical facilities, command facilities, transport, etc.

Fourth, how does one measure the value of logistic and supply support structure that backs up a military (including U.S. and forward basing)? This is also quite expensive.

Fifth, how does one measure the value and cost of personnel? The single largest cost in the U.S. defense budget is personnel. Is a $55,000 a year Captain 10% more combat effective than a $50,000 a year Captain? It includes retirement and benefits programs. Training cost is significant. What is the combat value of additional training, compared to the additional cost? The one thing our research continues to show is that the human factors are significant in military operations. Usually, the human factors are more significant than weapons or technology. If one is measuring the cost and contribution of weapons, then one also needs to measure the cost and contribution of human factors.

Sixth, what is the cost and combat value of morale building efforts? This includes housing for troops and families, recreational facilities and activities for troops and families, medical evacuation, family medical care, aid for disabled veterans and the Veterans Administration (VA), aid for widowed and orphaned families, national graveyards, Px priviledges, counciling, chaplains and ministers, USO shows, etc.

Seventh, what is the cost and combat advantage to intelligence efforts? This includes the DIA, CIA, NSA and even the DMA (Defense Mapping Agency). It also includes the various space and satillite efforts, spy planes, etc.

Eight, what is the cost and advantage of a “revolution” or further “evolution” of warfare (if there is one)?

Ninth, what is the cost and advantage of a unilateral advantage? For example, what is the combat (and political) advantage of the U.S. being able to bomb Afghanistan, Serbia/Kosovo, Iraq/Kuwait at will and relatively unmolested. This unilateral advantage is hard to measure with a simple “bang for bucks” measurment.

What you are asking is a very complex multi-faceted problem. Given sufficient time and analytical skills (and budget!!!), these issues can all be addressed to some extent. To date, I have not seen anyone try. I do not see how you are going to be able to adequently address the issues with the limited time frame, budget and page count of an Atlantic Monthly article.

So What Were the Assault Guns Doing at Prokhorovka?

There were three assault gun battalions in the SS Panzer Corps at Prokhorovka, one in each of the three SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions (Leibstandarte, Das Reich, Totenkopf). They all started the offensive (on 4 July) with 34, 33 and 28 Sturmgeschuetz IIIs (in that order). These “tanks” were armed with the 75mm L48 guns (the same as the Panzer IVs) and has 80mm of frontal armor (which is more than the Panzer IVs, which had 80mm for the glacis but only 50mm for the turret).

As of the evening of 11 July I have them with 10 operational in the Leibstandarte (with one destroyed and 9 damaged that day), 27 operational in Das Reich (with one destroyed that day), and 21 operational in Totenkopf. So where were they and what did they do this day?

Well, according to multiple Russian accounts, there were some assault guns opposite the XVIIII Tank Corps. This is specifically stated as follows:

From: Combat Report #38, 0330, July 13, 1943

In attempting to reach the Belgorod highway, XVIII Tank Corps unexpectedly ran into the enemy’s well-organized resistance, which featured buried tanks and assault guns along the line ht. 217.9-ht. 241.6

From: Account of 18th TC’s Combat Activities, July 12-24 1943:

By the end of the day the enemy attempts a frontal tank attack from the Kozlovka-Greznoye area, with the simultaneous attempt bypass the corps; units from the Kozlovka-Polezheyva direction, using Tiger tanks and self-propelled guns and intensively bombarding our lines from the air.

XVIII Tank Corps encountered the enemy’s well-organized and powerful anti-tank defense, consisting of tanks and assault guns along the line of ht. 217.9-ht. 241.6.

From: Operational Report #1, 1900, July 12, 1943, 5th GTA

At 1400 the corps repulsed an enemy counterattack by 50 tanks from the Bororoditskiye area, and by 13 “Tigers” from the area of ht. 226.6

The Corps’ further advance was contained by the enemy’s powerful artillery and mortar fire from the Greznoye area, and by tank fire from the Bogoroditskoye area.

From: Operational Report #2, 0700, July 13, 1943, 5th GTA

18th TC, with 80th Gds Mortar Rgt, by the end of July 12 had taken the eastern outskirts of Vasilyevka, but its further advance was halted by the enemy’s artillery and tank from the area of the western outskirts of Vasilyevka. The corps is on the line Petrovka-Mikhalovka and has consolodated and is regrouping.

From: 5th Guards Tank Army’s Combat Activities from July 7-24, 1943 (compiled September 30, 1943)

In Andreyevka 181st TBde met a large column of enemy tanks. As a result of the battle that followed, the Germans suffered heavy casualties and were thrown back on Kozlovka.

The corps, on the line ht. 279.9-3 km southwest of Kozlovka-ht. 241.6, encountered heavy enemy fire resistance from assault guns, tanks buried in the ground, and fierce aerial bombardment, which made any further advance impossible.

This is all discussed in this post:

So What Were the LSSAH Tigers Doing?

According to Ben Wheatley, the Leibstandarte SS Assault Gun Battalion was in reserve south of the Stalinskii Sovkhoz and later supported the LSSAH Marders and 1st PzGrRgt around the farm area. This locale is a little over 3 kilometers from ht. 241.6 where the Tigers are. Waiting for the source on this, but if so, then the LSSAH assault gun battalion is accounted for.

The Das Riech SS Assault Gun Battalion was operating with Das Reich, so out of the area of our discussion right now (which is the XVIII and XXIX Tank Corps attack).

The location of the Totenkopf SS Assault Gun Battalion is not given in any of the material I have. It may have been on the north side of the Psel River. These panzer grenadier divisions often lumped the assault gun battalions with the reconnaissance battalion. The Totenkopf reconnaissance battalion was at one point on the division left (west) flank and south of the Psel, but not sure where it was on this day.

Also of note, the Leibstandarte reconnaissance battalion ended up defending (and being penetrated) by the attacking Soviet tanks of the XVIII Tank Corps.

Was the Tank Ditch encountered in the morning, the afternoon, or both?

Now, most accounts assume that the advancing Soviet 32nd Tank Brigade encountered the tank ditch in the morning. This is definitely the impression given by Ribbentrop’s account (6th panzer company/II Panzer Battalion). Some people add the Soviet 31st Tank Brigade to this mix. Zamulin has a different story. He states (page 327) that:

At 1300….[Soviet units] broke into the Oktiabr’skii State Farm. Having finally overrun the first line of antitank defense on Hill 252.2, a group of 29th Tank Corps tanks poured down the hill’s southwestern slopes in pursuit of the retreating enemy in the direction of the Komsomolets State Farm. But after several hundred meters of the chase, something happened which shocked their crews. Several T-34s, moving in the lead at high speed, suddenly vanishing into the deep anti-tank ditch.

Zamulin does not give a source for this claim. He then describes the tank ditch and then quotes the Wilhelm Roes account (from 7th panzer company/II Panzer Battalion). Is this a second encounter with the tank ditch, different than the one in the morning mentioned by Ribbentrop; or was the tank ditch only encountered in the afternoon; or was it run into twice; or have the accounts simply gotten garbled?

This is a very different construct, as it would have the attack being held up at Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz long before the attackers got to the tank ditch. It turns the tank ditch into a minor part of the story, as opposed to being one of reasons that the 32nd Tank Brigade was halted.

I did not include Zamulin’s version of the tank ditch story in my book as I did not have confidence in its validity. It did not help that he did not footnote it.