Mystics & Statistics

Did the 170th Tank Brigade get to Ivanovskii Vyiselok?

In Valeri’s Zamulin’s book, the map on the page before page 385 shows the 170th Tank Brigade (XVIII Tank Corps) and the 1/32 Tank Brigade (XXIX Tank Corps) driving all the way to the village of Ivanovskii Vyiselok. I am not sure either of those units got that far. It shows their attack being halted by the 2nd SS Panzer Regiment, which is the Panzer Regiment of the neighboring Das Reich SS Division.

The records I have from the XVIII Tank Corps records has the 170th Tank Brigade by 1200 losing 60% of its equipment, taking Okyabrskii Sovkhoz “despite these losses” and 1200 are fighting along the line “the ravine southeast of Mikhailovka.” As of the Corps’ 1400 daily report the 170th Tank Brigade is still fighting along the line of the ravine southeast of Mikhailovka. ” The records then state that: “the corp’s units, continuing to carry out their mission, by the end of the day had reached the line 200 meters east of the Bororodiskoye church–southern outskirts of Vasilevka-Andreyevka-two windmills at Prelsstnoye–further along the northern slopes of the ravine southeast of Andreyevka–the Okyabrskii Sovkhoz.“

Some of the quotes from those records are in this post:

Where were the 181st and 170th Tank Brigades on 12 July 1943?

In the XXIX Tank Corps records I have, there is no mention of this either. For the 1900 report from the corps, they report that the 32nd Tank Brigade “…is attacking the enemy along the line Okyabrskii Sovkhoz, where it was halted by enemy artillery and tank fire, and by his aircraft.” and from the 2400 report they reported that “32nd Tank Brigade, having encountered stubborn enemy resistance, at 1300 forced to go over to the defensive along the line of the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz.”

The Fifth Guards Tank Army 1900 daily report shows a little more forward movement, with the XVIII Tank Corps reported to have captured Mikhailovka by 1400. It notes that “The Corps’ further advance was contained by the enemy’s powerful artillery and mortar fire from the Greznoye area, and by tank fire from the Bogoroditskoye area.” That same report has the XXIX TAnk Corps by 1400 taking the Komsomolets Sovkhoz and then notes: “…having encountered an enemy counterattack supported by 200 tanks from the Yar Zoslonnyi-Komsomolets Sokhoz, the corps abandoned the Sovkhoz. Units fell back to the line Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz–Storozhevoye, repelling enemy tank counterattacks.”

The Fifth Guards Tank Army’s 0700 13 July report has the XVIII Tank Corps taking the eastern outskirts of Vasilevka by the end of the 12 July, “…but its further advance was halted by the enemy’s artillery and tank fire from the area of the western outskirts of Vasilevka.” The report has the XXIX Tank Corps “…on the line Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz (excl.) Storozhevoye and is repelling enemy counterattacks by a large group of tanks from the Komsomolets Sovkhoz area.”

The Fifth Guards Tank Army’s summary report for 12-24 July has “the 170th and 181st Tank Brigade “…by 1430, after fierce fighting, had taken the Okyabrskii Sovkhoz and had reached Andreyevka and Vasilevka, an advance of 6-7 kilometers (which is putting a good face on a disastrous attack). This is also the report that states “In Andreyevka 181st Tank Brigade met a large column of enemy tanks.” For the XXIX Tank Corps they have “At 1300 32nd and 31st Tank Brigades, following a fiece meeting engagement with enemy tanks along the approaches to the road south of the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz, were halted by strong enemy tank and AT fire, as well as by aerial bombardment; the brigades went over to the defensive along this line and repulsed four strong tank counterattacks, which resulted in heavy enemy losses.”

So there is simply no mention of such an advance all the way to Ivanovskii Vyiselok in the XVIII Tank Corps records we have, nor in the XXIX Tank Corps records, nor in the Fifth Guards Tank Army records.

I don’t recall the SS records (which are very sparse this day) ever mentioning this.

The Germans have one intelligence map which shows two penetrations. One, probably by the 181st Tank Brigade, on the left flank of the LSSAH Division, and one, probably by the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade later in the day at the Storozhevoye woods. I don’t have a convenient version of this map that I can put at the top of this post, but it is on page 950 in my original Kursk book and page 343 in the Prokhorovka book.

I do have a contemporary II Guards Tank Corps map that shows Ivanokskii Vyiselok on 12 July. It shows no action there, although this is not particularly meaningful. As the attacking units were with the XVIII and XXIX Tank Corps, it is not surprising that their operations were not shown on the II Guards Tank Corps maps.

So, where does this claimed attack come from? Well, the only description I know of such an effort is in Zamulin’s book, page 351. He says:

At the same time [1430 or 1600 Moscow time], the forces of the left wing of Bakharov’s corps (the 170th Tank Brigade, part of the 181st Tank Brigade, several tanks from the 31st Tank Brigade mounting infantry from the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade) struck out along the gully leading from Andreevka to the southwest in the direction of Hill 241.6. The group attacked resolutely. Taking advantage of the terrain and the dense smoke of the battlefield, the tanks broke through the line of the Leibstandarte’s reconnaissance battalion and unexpectedly burst into the firing positions of the division’s artillery regiment….Within a short time, the 170th Tank Brigade was already fighting in the area of Ivanovskii Vyselok….Hausser immediately concentrated panzer elements from both SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte and SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich against both our tank groups at Komsomolets State Farm and Ivanovskii Vyselok.

So this does put elements of the 170th Tank Brigade at Ivanovskii Vyiselok sometime after 1430. There are a few problems here: First, there are no footnotes on this page. So not sure of the source of this account. Second, it not quite match his map. The map shows the 1/32 Tank Brigade also there, whereas the text on page 351 clearly leaves them stuck in Komsomolets Sovkhoz (“At this moment, the crews of Major Ivanov’s 1st Tank Battalion and the motorized riflemen of Lieutenant Colonel Lipichev’s 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade from the 29th Tank Corps were still fighting for their lives on the State Farm.”). Third this is a late afternoon attack and a late afternoon penetration of the LSSAH position. This does differ in time from other accounts (as does his putting the Soviet T-34s hitting the tank ditch story after 1300).

Not sure what to make of this account. I assume it is based upon some evidence, but I have no idea what that evidence is.

Validating A Combat Model (Part II)

[The article below is reprinted from October 1996 edition of The International TNDM Newsletter.]

Validation of the TNDM at Battalion Level
by Christopher A. Lawrence

The original QJM (Quantified Judgement Model) was created and validated using primarily division-level engagements from WWII and the 1967 and 1973 Mid-East Wars. For a number of reasons, we are now using the TNDM (Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model) for analyzing lower-level engagements. We expect, with the changed environment in the world, this trend to continue.

The model, while designed to handle battalion-level engagements, was never validated for those size engagements. There were only 16 engagements in the original QJM Database with less than 5,000 people on one side, and only one with less than 2,000 people on a side. The sixteen smallest engagements are:

While it is not unusual in the operations research community to use unvalidated models of combat, it is a very poor practice. As TDI is starting to use this model for battalion-level engagements, it is time it was formally validated for that use. A model that is validated at one level of combat is not validated to represent sizes, types and forms of combat to which it has not been tested. TDI is undertaking a battalion-level validation effort for the TNDM. We intend to publish the material used and the results of the validation in the International TNDM Newsletter. As part of this battalion-level validation we will also be looking at a number of company-level engagements. Right now, my intention is to simply just throw all the engagements into the same hopper and see what comes out.

By battalion-level, I mean any operation consisting of the equivalent of two or less reinforced battalions on one side. Three or more battalions imply a regiment or brigade—level operation. A battalion in combat can range widely in strength, but that usually does not have an authorized strength in excess of 900. Therefore, the upper limit for a battalion—level engagement is 2,000 people, while its lower limit can easily go below 500 people. Only one engagement in the original OJM Database fits that definition of a battalion-level engagement. HERO, DMSI, TND & Associates, and TDI (all companies founded by Trevor N. Dupuy) examined a number of small engagements over the years. HERO assembled 23 WWI engagements for the Land Warfare Database (LWDB), TDI has done 15 WWII small unit actions for the Suppression contract and Dave Bongard has assembled four others from that period for the Pacific, DMSI did 14 battalion-level engagements from Vietnam for a study on low intensity conflict 10 years ago, and Dave Bongard has been independently looking into the Falkland Islands War and other post-WWII sources to locate 10 more engagements, and we have three engagements that Trevor N. Dupuy did for South Africa. We added two other World War II engagements and the three smallest engagements from the list to the left (those marked with an asterisk). This gives us a list of 74 additional engagements that can be used to test the TNDM.

The smallest of these engagements is 220 people on both sides (100 vs I20), while the largest engagement on this list is 5,336 versus 3,270 or 8,679 vs 725. These 74 engagements consist of 23 engagements from WWI, 22 from WWII, and 29 post-1945 engagements. There are three engagements where both sides have over 3,000 men and 3 more where both sides are above 2,000 men. In the other 68 engagements, at least one side is below 2,000, while in 50 of the engagements, both sides are below 2,000.

This leaves the following force sizes to be tested:

These engagements have been “randomly” selected in the sense that the researchers grabbed whatever had been done and whatever else was conveniently available. It is not a proper random selection, in the sense that every war in this century was analyzed and a representative number of engagements was taken from each conflict. This is not practical, so we settle for less than perfect data selection.

Furthermore, as many of these conflicts are with countries that do not have open archives (and in many cases limited unit records) some of the opposing forces strength and losses had to be estimated. This is especially true with the Viet Nam engagements. It is hoped that the errors in estimation deviate equally on both sides of the norm, but there is no way of knowing that until countries like the People’s Republic of China and Vietnam open up their archives for free independent research.

TDI intends to continue to look for battalion-level and smaller engagements for analysis, and may add to this data base over time. If some of our readers have any other data assembled, we would be interested in seeing it. In the next issue we will publish the preliminary results of our validation.

Note that in the above table, for World War II, German, Japanese, and Axis forces are listed in italics, while US, British, and Allied forces are listed in regular typeface, Also, in the VERITABLE engagements, the 5/7th Gordons’ action continues the assault of the 7th Black Watch, and that the 9th Cameronians assumed the attack begun by the 2d Gordon Highlanders.

Tu-Vu is described in some detail in Fall’s Street Without Joy (pp. 51-53). The remaining Indochina/SE Asia engagements listed here are drawn from a QJM-based analysis of low-intensity operations (HERO Report 124, Feb 1988).

The coding for source and validation status, on the extreme right of each engagement line in the D Cas column, is as follows:

  • n indicates an engagement which has not been employed for validation, but for which good data exists for both sides (35 total).
  • Q indicates an engagement which was part of the original QJM database (3 total).
  • Q+ indicates an engagement which was analyzed as part of the QJM low-intensity combat study in 1988 (14 total).
  • T indicates an engagement analyzed with the TNDM (20 total).

A Single Four-Company Panzer Battalion in LSSAH?

The LSSAH Tank Regiment on 1 October 1943 (courtesy of Niklas Zetterling)

I am still trying to imagine the composition for a single four medium panzer company and one heavy company panzer battalion in LSSAH on 4 July 1943. The division had 173 tanks, more than the other two SS divisions in the corps. These other two divisions both had two panzer battalions, one created from an antitank battalion. Das Reich had its 166 tanks deployed in 7 medium and light companies and one heavy tank company; while Totenkopf had it 165 tanks in 6 medium and light companies and one heavy tank company. LSSAH may have only had four medium panzer companies (the heavy panzer companies with 12 Tigers and 5 Panzer IIIs are ignored for this discussion).

A German panzer company’s maximum authorized strength was 22 tanks. Rarely do you see overstrength panzer companies. Rarely did you actually see a panzer company at full strength. For example, the Das Reich SS Division with its 7 medium and light panzer companies would have averaged around 14 tanks per company at the start of the offensive. The Totenkopf SS Division with it 6 medium and light panzer companies would have averaged around 17 tanks per company at the start of the offensive. For the four panzer company construct to work the LSSAH, they pretty much have to be at authorized strength. So 4 tank companies = 88 tanks.

The LSSAH had on 4 July: 79 Pz IVs, 9 Pz III Command, 9 Pz III long, 2 Pz III short, 4 Pz IIs and 3 Pz Is.

So 66 Pz IVs in companies 5, 6 and 7 (22 each) and 13 Pz IVs, 3 Pz III Command, 4 Pz III longs and 2 Pz III short in company 8 (22 tanks). This leaves 3 Pz III Command for the battalion command and for the regiment headquarters 3 Pz III Command, 4 Pz IIs and 3 Pz I (and the other 5 Pz III longs are with the Tiger company).

It works. Not sure this is what was done. The problem is that come the evening of 11 July we have LSSAH with 47 Pz IVs, 7 Pz III Command, 4 Pz III long, 1 Pz III short, 4 Pz II and 2 Pz I. Ribbentrop says his 6th company had 7 Pz IVs. So:

Company 5: 18 Pz IVs (guess)

Company 6: 7 Pz IVs

Company 7: 18 Pz IVs (guess)

Company 8: 4 Pz IVs, 1 Pz III Command, 1 Pz III short (guess…with Pz IV losses being proportional to the Pz III losses)

Bn HQ: 3 Pz III Command

Rgt HQ: 3 Pz III Command, 4 Pz II and 2 Pz I

Tiger Company: 4 Pz IIIs (guess) and 4 Pz VIs

I have two issues with this:

  1. Why would you put the weakened 6th company forward (7 tanks) and hold the healthy 5th and 7th companies in the rear?
  2. The division’s Pz IV strength had declined around 40% from 79 to 47.
    1. This means that 6th company lost 70% of its tanks while company 5 and 7 lost 20% or less. This seems odd.
    2. It also appears to put the 8th company with very high losses also (as they lost 4 of their 6 Pz IIIs and I assume a proportional number of Pz IVs).

It is also possible that they had removed all the tanks from the 8th panzer company and put them in the 5th and 7th. I believe this is Ben Wheatley’s claim. This would leave these two companies with 21 tanks and the 6th panzer company with 7.

On the other hand, if the 6th panzer companies losses were in equal proportion to the division’s losses, then a company of 7 tanks started with 12 tanks (79/47 = 1.68 x 7 = 12). If LSSAH had two battalions of 3 panzer companies each with 12-13 tanks then this equal 72-78 tanks. The 9 command tanks are split equally between two battalions and the regiment HQ. This is an organizational arrangement more in line with other two SS divisions.

So, we are back to the construct that either LSSAH had one battalion of four medium panzer companies or two panzer battalions of around six medium panzer companies. But regardless, it does not appear that the LSSAH had just one battalion of three medium panzer companies. It is debatable that there were only three medium panzer companies at Prokhorovka on 12 July 1943.

Validating A Combat Model

The question of validating combat models—“To confirm or prove that the output or outputs of a model are consistent with the real-world functioning or operation of the process, procedure, or activity which the model is intended to represent or replicate”—as Trevor Dupuy put it, has taken up a lot of space on the TDI blog this year. What this discussion did not address is what an effort to validate a combat model actually looks like. This will be the first in a series of posts that will do exactly that.

Under the guidance of Christopher A. Lawrence, TDI undertook a battalion-level validation of Dupuy’s Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model (TNDM) in late 1996. This effort tested the model against 76 engagements from World War I, World War II, and the post-1945 world including Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli Wars, the Falklands War, Angola, Nicaragua, etc. It was probably one of the more independent and better-documented validations of a casualty estimation methodology that has ever been conducted to date, in that:

  • The data was independently assembled (assembled for other purposes before the validation) by a number of different historians.
  • There were no calibration runs or adjustments made to the model before the test.
  • The data included a wide range of material from different conflicts and times (from 1918 to 1983).
  • The validation runs were conducted independently (Susan Rich conducted the validation runs, while Christopher A. Lawrence evaluated them).
  • The results of the validation were fully published.
  • The people conducting the validation were independent, in the sense that:

a) there was no contract, management, or agency requesting the validation;
b) none of the validators had previously been involved in designing the model, and had only very limited experience in using it; and
c) the original model designer was not able to oversee or influence the validation. (Dupuy passed away in July 1995 and the validation was conducted in 1996 and 1997.)

The validation was not truly independent, as the model tested was a commercial product of TDI, and the person conducting the test was an employee of the Institute. On the other hand, this was an independent effort in the sense that the effort was employee-initiated and not requested or reviewed by the management of the Institute.

Descriptions and outcomes of this validation effort were first reported in The International TNDM Newsletter. Chris Lawrence also addressed validation of the TNDM in Chapter 19 of War by Numbers (2017).

Summation of Open Questions on Prokhorovka

This discussion on Prokhorovka has been going on for a few weeks. It has included a collection of well thought out comments from Dr. Ben Wheatley. These are worth reading, so please scroll down to the comments at the end of each article. Let’s take a moment and account for what are the open issues:

1. Did the attack start at 0830 or 1000?

08:30 or 10:00 at Prokhorovka?

Now, I think Dr. Wheatley, based upon Roman Toeppel’s speculation, favors 1000. The documentation is pretty clear on this. The weight of the evidence leans towards at 0830 start time, including a reading of Ribbentrop’s and Schuele’s post-war accounts.

2. Was there one or two tank brigades in the initial attack that hit the tank ditch (32nd and 31st)?

So did the Soviet 31st Tank Brigade attack on the morning of 12 July 1943?

I think as it was a typical Soviet echeloned attack, it was only initially the 32nd Tank Brigade. The 31st Tank Brigade may never have gotten that far.

3. Did the attack on the tank ditch occur in the morning or after 1300 (Moscow time)?

Was the Tank Ditch encountered in the morning, the afternoon, or both?

I think it occurred in the morning. Someone probably needs to talk to Zamulin and find out why he thinks it occurred in the afternoon (and what his sources are).

4. Were there other tank units in LSSAH Division besides the 3 companies of II Panzer Bn and the Tiger company of 4 tanks?

Panzer Battalions in LSSAH in July 1943

Panzer Battalions in LSSAH in July 1943 – II

I am pretty certain there was at least additional medium panzer company, as there is no way the organization works out for LSSAH Panzer Regiment otherwise. They had more tanks than the other two SS panzer grenadier divisions, and both of those had two battalions. Dr. Wheatley does have them with an 8th medium panzer company, but mysteriously disappears it before the battle. I think there was either an 8th medium panzer company or an ersatz panzer battalion (like Das Reich has done).

5. Who all was facing XVIII Tank Corps attack?

Who all was facing the XVIII Tank Corps?

Some accounts seem to have gotten a little fanciful in this discussion. It is clear that there was a number of other battalions in the area, and probably other armor (including StuG IIIs and Marders).

6. What other tanks and tank-like vehicles were engaged:

So What Were the LSSAH Tigers Doing?

So What Were the Assault Guns Doing at Prokhorovka?

7. Where were the 181st and 170th Tank Brigades?

Where were the 181st and 170th Tank Brigades on 12 July 1943?

8. Did the events we are discussing even occur as they are claimed?

Basis of the Tank Ditch Story of 12 July 1943

Basis of the LSSAH Tiger Story on 12 July 1943

Ben Wheatley did post up a third post-war account of the tank ditch story, which is good. The actions of the Tiger company appears to be based upon one post-war account. Now Dr. Wheatley’s work with the photo recon pictures may help confirm the veracity of these stories.

And the post that started this latest round of discussion:

Comments on the Photo Recon Article

And the previous summation post that lists 9 other blog posts:

Summation of the Prokhorovka Blog Posts

And this summary is 7 blog posts is worth looking at:

TDI Friday Read: Tank Combat at Kursk

Top 20 Countries by Annual GDP (PPP) from 1800 to 2040

In the past, I have made a number of posts comparing countries by GDP (Gross Domestic Product). I always use GDP (Nominal) vice GDP (PPP – Purchasing Power Parity). Some people have asked why I don’t use GDP (PPP). Well here is a youtube.com video based upon that: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-2nqd6-ZXg

One will note that the video starts in 1800 with China by far the richest country in the world and India second. Yet during the 1800s the much poorer (by this video) United Kingdom already occupied parts of India and continued expanding their control. The “poorer” European powers then started carving up China. In 1937 the GDP (PPP) of Japan is 220 million while the GDP (PPP) of China is 530 million. Yet who is invading whom?

Here is a video based upon GDP (Nominal), covering 1960 -2017. It is curious as it leaves out the Soviet Union completely (but does include Russia): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wykaDgXoajc

Here is one on projected GDP (Nominal), projecting from 2018 to 2100: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T9l2yCH5wBk

Some of these figures are hard to explain in light of the demographic challenges facing countries like China and Japan. In the case of China they will most likely experience negative population growth by 2030. Japan has already reached that point.

Demographics of China

Demographics of Japan

 

One must treat all this “infoporn” with considerable caution.

It does seem that PPP overinflates the appearance of national power, although it may be perfectly valid for measuring per capita income and comparative standards of living.

Top 15 Countries by Military Spending (1914-2018)

I have noticed this five-minute youtube video being posted on twitter lately: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cw2Wm8T6tio

While it is interesting, it should be viewed with considerable caution. First, it does not state the source of its monthly data. I gather it is in U.S. dollars and not adjusted for inflation. The data is clearly very susceptible to exchange rates. The expenditures for the Soviet Union in the 1970s and the 1980s seems overinflated. At this time the ruble was pegged higher than the dollar at 1.11 dollars to the ruble if I remember correctly. In the early 1990s it dropped to like 3000 rubles to a dollar. Does the 1970s and 1980s data account for the real value of the currency, or is it based upon it obviously overinflated official exchange rate? I am guessing the later.

Where were the 181st and 170th Tank Brigades on 12 July 1943?

The XVIII Tank Corps attacked on the morning of 12 July with two tank brigades in the lead, the 181st and the 170th. It was supported by 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade. Further back, initially in reserve was the 32nd Guards Tank Regiment (armed with Churchill tanks) and their 110th Tank Brigade, which also took some losses this day. So the question is, where did these units end up going?

The Plan of Attack

From 18th Tank Corps Account covering 12-24 July (post-battle account):

The first echelon (181st and 170th tank brigade) is to attack the enemy, with the task of taking Malye Maiachki….

The second echelon (32nd MotRBde, with an artillery group consisting of 292nd Mortar Rgt, a 76mm antitank artillery regiment and a 57mm antitank artillery regiment) is to attack behind the first echelon, and by the end of the day relieve the 181st and 170th Tank Brigades.

36th Guards Tank Regiment is to attack behind the 170th Tank Brigade in the second echelon, securing the corps’ right flank….

The third echelon (110th Tank Brigade and a reconnaissance detachment) are to reach the area of ht. 251.2 by the end of the day.

Corps HQ is in the third echelon between 110th TBde and the reconnaissance detachment.

An artillery group, consisting of 292nd Mortar Rgt, 80th Gds Mortar Rgt [Katyushkas], and a tank group, consisting of 100th ATArtRgt and 36th Gds TRgt, has orders to support the corps’ infantry-tank attack.

The brigade are following in the third echelon under protection of 110th TBde. 

So, it appears that the initial attack was led by the two tank brigades and supported by the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade.

Corps Actions During the Day: The same report then notes:

The terrain in the corps’ attack zone is cut by three deep ravines, stretching from the left bank of the Psel River to the Belenikhino-Prokhorovka railroad, which is why 181st and 170th Tank Brigades, advancing in the first echelon, were forced to attack on the corps’ left flank near the enemy strong point at Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz. The 170th Tank Brigade, attacking on the left flank, by 1200 had lost 60% of its equipment.

Despite these losses, overcoming the enemy’s fire resistance, the corps’ units took the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz and by 1200 were fighting along the line: …..

So it appears that the 170th Tank Brigade was on the left flank. The 181st Tank Brigade may have been biased to its right and in front of it. Not sure the 170th Tank Brigade ever got much beyond the Obtyabrskii Sovkhoz.

The corps’ units, continuing to carry out their mission, by the end of the day had reached the line 200 meter east of the Bogoroditskoye church–southern outskirts of Vasilevka-Andreyevka–two windmills at Preselstnoye–further along the northern slopes of the ravine southeast of Andreyevka-the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz….

18 TC encounter the enemy’s well-organized and powerful anti-tank defense, consisting of tanks and assault guns along the line of ht. 217.9–ht. 241.6.

From Combat Report #37, 1400, July 12, 1943

The enemy is putting up stubborn resistance and is falling back in the pt. 217.9–Komsomolets Sovkhoz direction. Enemy artillery is firing intensively on our troops from the Greznoye area….Our neighbor on the left [XXIX Tank Corps] is fighting for Komsomolets Sovkhoz.

From Combat Report #38, 0300, July 13, 1943

In attempting to reach the Belgorod highway, 18th TC unexpectedly ran into the enemy’s well-organized resistance, which featured buried tanks and assault guns along the line ht. 217.9–ht. 241.6….

I have ordered the corps’ units to go over to the defensive along the following lines:….

From Fifth Guards Tank Army Operational Report #1, 1900, July 12, 1943.

18th TC, with 80th Gds Mortor Rgt [Katyushas], advancing from the line Prelestnoye-Prokhroovka, by 1400 captured Mikhalovka.

At 1400 the corps repulsed an enemy counterattack by 50 tanks from the Bogoroditskoye area, and by 13 “Tigers” from the area of ht. 226.6.

The corps’ further advance was contained by the enemy’s powerful artillery and mortar fire from the Greznoye area, and by tank fire from the Bogoroditskoye area.

Note that this counterattack by 50 tanks seems to be missing in most primarily German-based accounts. Not sure if it occurred. On the other hand, these last two paragraphs do put German tanks in Vasilyevka.

From Fifth Guards Tank Army Operational Report #2, 1700, July 13, 1943.

18th TC, with the 80th Gds Mortar Rgt, by the end of July 12 had taken the eastern outskirts of Vasilyevka, but its further advance was halted by the enemy’s artillery and tank fire from the area of the western outskirts of Vasilevka. The corps is on the line Petrovka-Mikhailovka and has consolidated and is regrouping.

From Fifth Guard Army Report from July 7-24, 1943 (prepared 30 September 1943):

170th and 181st Tank Brigades were to attack….and by 1430, after fierce fighting, had taken the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz and had reached Andreyevka and Vasilyevka, an advance of 6-7 kilometers.

At 1330 the first-echelon brigades were fired on by 13 “Tiger” tanks from the area of ht. 226.6, which were moving in the direction of the northwestern outskirts of Mikhailovka.

At 1800 on July 12 the corps’ brigades finally took Vasilevka and reached Kozlovka.

The corps, on the line ht. 219.9–3 km southwest of Kozlovka–ht. 241.6, encountered heavy enemy fire resistance from assault guns, tanks buried in the ground, and fierce aerial bombardment, which made any further advance impossible.

The corps commander orders his units to consolidate along the line achieved and organize an all-around defense; 32nd MotRBde and 170th TBade, with the remains of 36th Gds TBde, in the center of Vasilyevka–Mikhailovka–Prelestnoye area; 181st TBde in Petrovka; 110th TBde in the (excl.) Petrovka–Beregovoye area.

 

181st Tank Brigade:

From XVIII Tank Corps Account covering 12-24 July (post-battle account):

…by 1200 were fighting along the line: 181st TBde Andreyevka-ht. 241.6

From Combat Report #37, 1400, July 12, 1943

181st TBde: Occupied Okyabrskii Sovkhoz and is fighting along the line Andreyevka-ht. 241.6.

From Combat Report #38, 0300, July 13, 1943

…181st Tank Brigade: Petrovka area

From Fifth Guard Army Report from July 7-24, 1943 (prepared 30 September 1943):

In Andreyevka 181st TBde met a large column of enemy tanks. As a result of the battle that followed, the Germans suffered heavy casualties and were thrown back on Kozlovka.

Note that this puts the 181st Tank Brigade at the front of the Corps and in Andreyevka.

170th Tank Brigade:

From XVIII Tank Corps Account covering 12-24 July (post-battle account):

The 170th Tank Brigade, attacking on the left flank, by 1200 had lost 60% of its equipment.

….by 1200 were fighting along the line:….170th TBde the ravine southeast of Mikhalilovka

From Combat Report #37, 1400, July 12, 1943

170th TBde: fighting along the line of the ravine southeast of Mikhailovka.

32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade:

….by 1200 were fighting along the line:…..32nd MotRBde was fighting for Andreyevka.

From Combat Report #38, 0300, July 13, 1943

….32nd MotRBde, with the 110th TBde and 36th Gds TRgt,: the area of the center of Vasilyevka–Mikhailovka–Prelestnoye

Other units:

From Combat Report #37, 1400, July 12, 1943

110th TBde: 500 meters east of Mikhailovka.

Headquarters is on the northern outskirts of Petrovka.

From Combat Report #38, 0300, July 13, 1943

…110th TkBde: the (excl.) Petrovka-Bergovoye area.

….1694th AA ArtRgt is to cover the defensive area from enemy air attacks, having its main firing positions in the Beregovoye area.

From Fifth Guard Army Report form July 7-24, 1943 (prepared 30 September 1943):

36th Gds TRgt encountered heavy fire from “Tigers” and AT guns from the ravines 2 km south of Mikhalovka, where it suffered heavy casualties.

This last account may be a reference to this LSSAH Tiger tanks.

Needless to say, these accounts do not support a narrative that the 181st and 170th Tank Brigade were primarily engaged with 4 Tigers at height 241.6. In fact, they don’t support the narrative that they penetrated the German positions, then the German reconnaissance battalion, and then engaged the German artillery. Because of (one?) German post-war interview(s) and the German intelligence map created at the time, we do believe there was such a penetration. This penetration may well have been only a part of one brigade.

It is also not certain if the 170th Tank Brigade ever got beyond the ravine southeast of Mikhailovka.

Basis of the LSSAH Tiger Story on 12 July 1943

The story of the actions of the four LSSAH Tiger’s on this day are also not based upon any documentation I am aware of. As far as I know (and I admit that I have not exhaustively researched this aspect of the battle), the only source of its operations is a post-war account by Georg Loetzsch, who was in command of the one of the four Tigers on the 12 July. The account as provided by Karl-Heinz Frieser (page 127). It simply states that:

‘In the morning, the company was on the left wing of the II Armoured Battalion when about 50 enemy tanks, from the cover of copses and hedges, came storming towards us in broad wedge formation….I shot two T-34s, one of which drove towards me in flames. At the last moment I managed to avoid the burning bomb.’

Frieser footnotes Wendt, Tiger, pages 29-20. There may be more to the account than that, but I have not pursued it.

The German intelligence map for 12 July (see page 950 in my Kursk book or page 343 in my Prokhorovka book) does show a breakthrough that is turned back. It does not show what forces were engaged or turned them back. This whole fight, and who might of been involved has already been discussed in more depth in an earlier post:

Who all was facing the XVIII Tank Corps?

I did not include the Georg Loetzsch account in my book, as I was not familiar with its source. Perhaps I should have. I do tend to be suspicious of personal accounts that I cannot otherwise confirm.

Basis of the Tank Ditch Story of 12 July 1943

Figure 12 showing the tank ditch on 16 July 1943

The story of the Soviet tank ditch disrupting the operations of one or more attacking Soviet tank brigades at Prokhorovka is not based upon any documented records. It is entirely based upon post-war interviews and post-war accounts. This is always an uncomfortable basis from which to build an account from.

The primary source for this story of Captain Rudolf Ribbentrop’s account, who was the company commander of the 6th Panzer Company and was in the midst of the fight. As he was the eldest son of the German foreign minister, there is reason to be concerned that he may not have given an unbiased or unvarnished account. I still moved forward and accepted his account, but only after Major General Brand (Bundeswehr, ret) had discussed it with him and Ribbentrop had again discussed it with one or more crew members that were with him at the time. So there was reason to believe that this account is valid, even though it was originally published in a publication that was raising funds for SS veterans (see page 933, footnote 36 in my Kursk book; or page 320, footnote 60 in my Prokhorovka book).

The only other source for the tank ditch story is an account from Wilhelm Roes of the 7th Panzer Company. In this case, I drew his account from Zamulin’s writing, and his source is footnoted that the story came from the “author’s personal archive” (see page 328, footnote 64 in my Prokhorovka book). There may a more detailed Wilhelm Roes’ account in German sources, but I have not taken the time to chase them down. As it is, Zamulin’s used Roes account in Zamulin’s claim the tank ditch was encountered in the early afternoon.

Was the Tank Ditch encountered in the morning, the afternoon, or both?

It appears that these are the only two accounts for the tank ditch story. There may be others, but I have not located them. Now, there is not much question that the tank ditch existed. But, the basis of the story that Soviet tanks drove into and/or were stopped by the tank ditch is primarily (or only) based upon two post-war German accounts.

The interesting aspects of Dr. Wheatley’s research (which I do think is worthwhile, even if I disagree with him over a number of interpretations) is that his photo reconnaissance research could help confirm these stories. In particular in his article Visual Examination…. there are figures 12, 14, 15, 19 and 20 which actually show the tank ditch on 16 July 1943 and 7 August 1943. Figure 12 is displayed at the head of this blog post. Now, I don’t see any Soviet tanks in the ditch, but if there was, this would be very useful confirmation for an otherwise poorly documented action. Does anyone see any tanks in and around the tank ditch in these five pictures?

Now, Dr. Wheatley does note:

By closely comparing the photographs of 16 July and 7 August we can see the location of the destroyed tanks in the anti-tank ditch in the later, though by no means as clearly as on 16 July. The track in front of anti-tank ditch is less worn on 7 August which only goes to highlight (given its clear marking on 16 July) how many tanks on 12 July must have traversed the route whilst looking for a crossing.

I’ll be honest. I don’t see anything identifiable. They may be there and others may see them, but I do not. I see lots of black splotches in the pictures, but I cannot tell what they are. Are they tanks, are they shell holes? I can clearly see planes on airfields on the pictures I copied (see pages 575-576 of my Kursk book) and I can clearly see shell holes in the pictures I copied (see pages 573 and 600 of my Kursk book). There may be a resolution problem with the pictures attached to his article. They may be clear on his copies.

What probably should be done is to make a map and plot all the tanks that can be observed in these pictures on that map. Not sure who, if anyone, is going to take this on.