We are back to posting up videos of the first two HAAC conferences. What we have already posted from the first conference was copies of the slides for 31 presentations and videos of the first day of presentations.
The Battle of Kursk (1943) was the largest battle of World War II. I have three books out on the subject (the big book, The Battle of Prokhorovka and Aces at Kursk). There are two more planned (The Battle of Tolstoye Woods and The Tank Fields of Prokhorovka). I also have one book out in the war in Ukraine (The Battle for Kyiv), one that we are about to submit another to the publisher (The Siege of Mariupol) and several more planned. I have also done a couple of hundred blog posts on the Russo-Ukrainian War. So, I guess as measured by page count, I am kind of an expert. Still, this doesn’t mean that I have any unique knowledge or understanding as to what is going on right now in Ukraine; but let me take a shot at it.
Now, this Second Battle of Kursk is nowhere near the size of the first one, but like the first one, it is also really not at Kursk. In fact, this seems to be a fairly small affair, involving elements of two Ukrainian brigades and so far no significant Russian forces. The area involved is the size of Fairfax County. Ukraine has taken around 1,000 square kilometers. This is not particularly significant, making up less than 0.002% of Russia. It is not a region of any particular economic value. The population of the main village in the occupied area, Sudzha, is last reported as 5,127. The whole Sudzha district (which is 996 sq. kilometers) is 26,964 (2010 census and is now probably less).
courtesy @War_Mapper
This operation is just a classic case of hitting them where they ain’t. There was a reason Russia was not defending this border area. Ukraine also does not directly defend large parts of its border areas. What I assume both sides do (and this is an assumption) is to hold a couple of regiments or brigades back in central locations, ready to move towards the border if need be. So far, it does not appear that Russia is doing even that. I suspect Ukraine is, and it may have been some of those forces around Sumy that were used to conduct this operation. So a large extended masking operation probably was not needed, the forces used were already nearby. But, neither side has a continued fortified border to the northwest of Kharkiv, so these little land grabs are possible by either of them. They are relatively meaningless militarily.
But, it could result in an expansion of the front. Right now, the front has been effectively 700 kilometers in length (see: The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – rev. 1 – The Dupuy Institute). This excludes all that area to the northwest of Kharkiv, including Sumy to Chernihiv. It also excludes the Kakhovka Reservoir and the part of the Dnipro River going down from there to Kherson. So, it is possible, by expanding the front to include the entire border between Ukraine and Russia, that we could end up with a 1,200 kilometer front line. Who benefits from that?
Right now Russian has about 450,000 troops located in Ukraine (Ukrainian estimate, Putin says 617,000). I am guessing that Ukraine has 300,000 to 400,000 opposite them and engaged with them. Ukraine supposedly has more than 700,000 mobilized, but I gather many are still training and holding down inactive or rear areas (like, for example Sumy and Chernihiv). The Russian Army, according to Wikipedia (IISS estimate for 2024 is the source) consists of the “Ground Forces” of 500,000 (including 100,000 conscripts) and the airborne forces of 45,000 (2023, source TASS). Their naval infantry are 12,000. So, 557,000 ground troops. There are also air force, navy and rocket forces for a total armed forces strength of 1,320,000 (December 2023, AP). Also see: Density of Deployment in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute. Theoretically, if Ukraine has 700,000 mobilized (as the president was claiming in 2023), then Ukraine could gain an advantage by stretching out the front line. I really don’t think that is the case.
So what is the Ukrainian objectives? Are they going to set up a Kursk Peoples Republic or hold the territory? I doubt it. I assume over the next week or two, Russia will build up its force in the area, and I suspect the most likely answer is that Ukraine will declare victory and go home, withdrawing from the area as the pressure increases.
The problem is that if you hold this Fairfax County-size piece of property inside of Russia, you not only have to commit one or two or three brigades to holding the area, but you have to also secure the left and right flanks of this area with ground troops. This is at least a brigade on each flank. So now, we are talking about 3 to 5 or more brigades committed to this effort. The Ukrainian army is only around 40 to 60 or so brigades active (I have not attempted to do a count in over a year). Are they really going to commit 10% of their ground forces to hold this little area. I doubt it.
So, I suspect Ukraine will withdraw. Still, the operation does three things for them:
Propaganda value.
They have captured over 100 Russian prisoners which they can later exchange. Ukraine had thousands captured in 2022 and have never held enough Russian prisoners to exchange for all the people Russia holds. This helps.
They force the Russians to more seriously protect these border regions, which they obviously were not doing. This ties down more forces from a ground army of 557K that has 450K in Ukraine.
Anyhow, this was a clever move by Ukraine, but hardly a brilliant piece of operational art, as quite simply, no significant Russian forces were enveloped and destroyed. In the end, winning large extended conventional wars is usually done by destroying armies. This does not do that. Its impact has probably been overrated by many commentators.
Casemate Publishers (U.S. – Philadelphia/Haverford), who published my book America’s Modern Wars (hardcopies are here: Books – The Dupuy Institute), is advertising my book Aces at Kursk for sale. This is the email they sent me: New Releases! (mailchi.mp)
Just saw some great graphics from @War_Mapper that is worth repeating (dating goes from Feb. 2022 to July 2024).
His map as of 1 August is here:
Now, he is saying that for the month of July there was a net gain of around 177 square kilometers (68 square miles). This is kind of like taking an area the size of 17% of Fairfax County or almost all of Washington DC.
A numerical count is provided here:
This from November 2023 to July 2024 totals 776.59 square kilometers (300 square miles). This is almost 75% of the area of Fairfax County. Or, to match it up to a state, it is almost 0.2% of the state of California or 12% of the state of Delaware. Not earth shaking, but nibbling. As it is, Russian currently controls 17.72% of Ukraine.
For the record, @War_Mapper provided a number of maps that were used in my book The Battle for Kyiv and provided one map for our upcoming book The Siege of Mariupol.
The war is really not stalemated. The Russians continue to advance in Ukraine. This is causing some concern.
In the Pokrovsk area, the Russians are advancing at a rate of up to a kilometer a day. They have advanced 8 kilometers over the last two weeks (according to @J_Jhelin). They are threatening the village of Prohres (which is 26 kilometers northwest of Donets and 22 kilometers east of Prokrovsk).
Prokrovsk is a town of 60, 127 (2022 estimate). The Prokrovsk raion is one of the eight raions of Donetsk Oblast (province). This raion was not part of the Donetsk Peoples Republic (DPR). According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, it was 86.8% Ukrainian and 11.3% Russian.
Now, this is not an earthshaking offensive, but, repeated advances does put stress on the defenders. The real danger is if they could turn this advance into a breakthrough. Once units breakthrough, defender casualties go up significantly and the attacker’s rate of advance goes up. Let us look at some history (i.e. real combat examples) of casualties and advance rates.
In our various data bases, we ended up coding a number of our engagements by outcome. Outcome III is failed advance, outcome IV is attack advances, and outcome V is defender penetrated. So for example (from Table 8.6 in War by Numbers, page 65):
Summation (195 engagements):
Outcome Failed Advances Penetrated III IV V
Number of Engagements:
54 71 33
Attacker percent casualties per day:
2.98 1.20 0.83
Defender percent casualties per day:
2.62 2.96 6.40
Now, this is mostly division-level engagements but the pattern is clear. When the attack fails the attacker losses are more than the defender, especially as the attacker usually outnumbers the defender. When the attack advances, losses are roughly equal (1.20 vs 2.96%, except the attacker usually outnumbers the defender). When a penetration is achieved, the defender clearly losses more than the attacker, and a significant percent of those losses are captured in action (47.20%). The 195 engagements come from the Italian Campaign (75 engagements 1943-44), Ardennes Campaign (71 engagements 1944-45) and Kursk (49 engagements).
The same pattern exists for post-war engagements (see Table 8.7, War by Numbers, page 67).
Post-World War II (61 engagements):
Outcome Failed Advances Penetrated III IV V
Number of Engagements:
14 8 33
Attacker percent casualties per day:
3.20 1.60 1.36
Defender percent casualties per day:
2.80 4.83 15.10
Now, we recently put together a similar table using our Campaign Database (CaDB). These are army-level operations up to 60 days in length. This was presented at the 2nd HAAC, in Norway and at the latest HADSS conference. I have not written them up in a book yet (i.e. More War by Numbers). There are 94 cases coded:
Outcome III IV V
Cases 10 29 21
Force Ratios 1.80 2.69 2.75
Loss Ratios 1.66 1.51 0.64
Note the same loss pattern exists here.
Now, I do have a chapter on Advance Rates in War by Numbers. Below is a repeat of part of Table 14.1, page 177. It is broken out by campaign. The numbers given are kilometers opposed advance per day for division-level engagements.
Outcome III IV V
Italian Campaign 0.74 1.76 2.53
Ardennes 0.45 3.71 5.00
Kursk 0.58 5.18 11.43
So……
The advance rates in Ukraine are pretty much in line with outcome III and IV engagements.
The advance rates are fairly low compared to the other cases we have.
Will discuss casualties later.
This does not look like the next Brusilov Offensive (June – September 1916).
0900 – 1000 Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)
1000 – 1100 Haiti: The Risks of a Failed State in the Western Hemisphere – Dr. Christopher Davis
1100 – 1200 Native American Wars and Conflicts, 1500-1900 – Dr. David Cuberes
1200 – 1300 Lunch
1300 – 1400 Close Combat Overmatch Weapons (SLAMMER) – Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)
1400 – 1500 The Islamic State of Khorasan: The Evolution of Terrorism – Dr. Christopher Davis
1500 – 1600 The Gaza Death Numbers – Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University)
1600 – 1700 Group Discussion: The Next Middle East Wars
1700 – 1800 The Impact of Horses on Native Americans – Dr. David Cuberes
Evening (1900): Group Dinner – BJs
Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare
0900 – 1000 The Debate over French Armored Warfare Doctrine 1935 to 1940 – Dr. James Slaughter
1000 – 1100 Summoning the specter of “Beweglichkeit”: A critical analysis of the U.S. Army’s new FM 3-0 Operations and observed Ukrainian battlefield trends – Ivan Torres (Major, U.S. Army, ret.)
1100 – 1200 Ground Warfare in 2050: How it Looked in 2017 – Dr. Alexander Kott
1200 – 1300 Lunch
1300 – 1400 The Red Army’s Offensive Operations in Ukraine, 1943-44 – Dr. Richard Harrison
1400 – 1500 Critique of Western Wargames of NATO-WP Conflict – Walker Gargagliano
1500 – 1600 Capabilities of FPV drones in Ukraine: Revolution or Continuation of Historical Quantitative Trend? – Dr. Alexander Kott
1600 – 1700 Group Discussion: Russo-Ukrainian War
Evening: Happy hour – Rangos
Schedule: Einstein Conference Room
Morning Day 1: Naval Warfare Analysis
0930 – 1030 A Naval Power Index: The U.S. Navy vs three challengers – Imperial Japan, USSR and PRC China – Geoffrey Clark
1030 – 1130 U-boats in the Atlantic: The Unseen and Unheard – Dr. John Magill – virtual
1130 – 1230 The WW2 USAFF Strategic Bombing Campaign: Strategy and Operational Imperatives – Dr. Sorin Adam Matei (Purdue University)
Afternoon Day 1: Air Warfare Analysis
1400 – 1500 Dogfight: Were US pilots in Korea really better than those in Vietnam? – Chip Sayers
1500 – 1600 Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII (part 2 or overflow presentation) – Sasho Todorov, esquire
1600 – 1700 “VPAF Aces: As good as they claimed? – Chip Sayers
1700 – 1800 Reserved
Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat – mostly virtual
0900 – 1000 Designing Computer Based AI Wargaming Systems for Simulating and Investigating Historical Battles – Clinton Reilly (Computer Strategies, Australia) – virtual
1000 – 1100 Beaches by the Numbers – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill (Concordia University, Quebec) – virtual
1100 – 1200 Surveying and Quantifying Naval Warfare – Alexandru Filip
1200 – 1300 Lunch
1300 – 1400 Urban Warfare: Myths and Reality – Dr. James Storr (UK) – virtual
1400 – 1500 Urban Warfare (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)
1500 – 1600 Salvation only in arms: A critical historical analysis of operational maneuver during the 1814 campaign in France – Ivan Torres (Major, U.S. Army, ret.)
1600 – 1700 Theory of Victory: The Ideas, Doctrine and Education of the U.S. Army from 1814-1941 – Dr. Michael Bonura (CGSC) – virtual
1700 – 1800 Winfield Scott: Architect of American Joint Warfare – LtC. Nathan A. Jennings (CGSC) – virtual
Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare
0900 – 1000 Force Ratios – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)
1000 – 1100 The Red Army’s Plans for a Preemptive Attack in 1941 – Dr. Richard Harrison
1100 – 1200 Analyzing Barbarossa: By the Numbers – Dr. Robert Kirchubel (LtC, US Army, ret)
1200 – 1300 Lunch
1300 – 1400 Future of Maneuver Warfare – Dr. Amos Fox (Arizona State University) – virtual
1400 – 1500 Chernobyl compromised: The story of a Russian cyber attack – Joseph Weiss (Applied Control Solutions, LLC) – virtual
1500 – 1600 Mass Egress after an IED Explosion: Lessons Learned about Validation – Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)
1600 – 1700 Political Science Pedagogy in Strategic Studies (A Contrast in Quantified History) – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill – virtual
Friday, October 11: Tour of a Civil War Battlefield – Antietam: bloodiest day of the U.S. Civil War (and in the Western Hemisphere?). – we will arrange transport there and back ($20 charge for tour).
With the help of some volunteer labor, we have produced a more precise set of front-line traces. I have done a couple of quick and dirty estimates before, but I never took the time to measuring it up right. Now we have done something a little more exacting. The google maps with the borders that we used is here: Google Earth. Clicking on the left hand menu will allow one to see how the border was measured. This was the work of Jack Flairty.
1. Length of the front line on 1 January 2014: This is land border with Russia.
1,974 kilometers
1,227 miles
2. Length of the front line 2016-2021: The border of the LPR and DPR and Ukraine.
336 kilometers
227 miles
3. Length of the front line 24 February 2022: This includes 1) part of the border with Belarus that is used by Russia, 2) part of the border with Russia from Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy to Kharkiv, 3) the border of the LPR and DPR, 4) the border with Crimea.
1,706 kilometers
1,060 miles
4. Length of the front line 1 March 2022: This includes 1) part of the border with Belarus that is used by Russia (they did expand it), 2) the front line trace from Kyiv to Chernihiv, to Sumy, to Kharkhiv down to Izyum, 3) the front line trace down to Mariupol. 4) the front line trace through Zaporizhzhia and Kherson province.
3,011 kilometers
1,871 miles
5. Length of the front line 1 April 2022.
2,333 kilometers
1,450 miles
6. Length of the front line 1 May 2022: This no longer includes Belarus.
Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War is no longer for sale by The Dupuy Institute. We sent out our last two copies last week. We still hold copies of everything else listed here: Books – The Dupuy Institute
There is little chance we will publish it again. The rights are held by the Dupuy family, not us. We sold 54 copies over the course of 9 years. This hardly justifies a new print run.
Yesterday they were reporting 19 in stock, this morning it was 16. So it does look like they were selling and shipping. Let me know when someone sees copies in the book stores.
My grandfather was born in Rhyl Wales and grew up in Liverpool England. Here is a copy of his shipping record during the Great War. He did five voyages during the war. He did a voyage to Murmansk afterwards during the Russian Civil War (which I have blogged about twice: see Murmansk – The Dupuy Institute and Mutiny in Murmansk – The Dupuy Institute).
The first two voyages were on the SS Adriatic. I think this is it: RMS Adriatic (1906) – Wikipedia. My grandfather had just turned 15 when he went on his first voyage. Both voyages were to New York and back.
Next voyage was in the SS Cedar Branch. I think this is it: SS Aenos (1910) – Wikipedia. It is listed in the log book at 2222 tons and 404 HP. She is listed in Wikipedia as 3,554 GRT and 2,222 NRT. The voyage was to Gallao or Callao. Callao is the main port for Peru.
His fourth voyage was with the Maria de Larrrinaga. Don’t have a Wikipedia link to that ship, but it was 2678 net tons and 429 HP. It is listed here: Larrinaga Line (theshipslist.com). The destination is listed as OHMS (On His Majesty’s Service).
His fifth voyage was with the Dictator. I do not have a link to here. The number 3149 is written in the lower right corner of the ship listing. The voyage was to Gibraltar and the U.S.A.
The war ended on 11/11/18 (now Armistice Day). On 14/11/18 he went to sea on the Nigeria. This is the ship that brought him to Murmansk. The number 2590 is written in the lower right corner of the ship listing. The destination is listed as OHMS.
