Mystics & Statistics

Shaping the Russo-Ukrainian Peace Negotiations

It appears that the United States had begun shaping the Russo-Ukrainian Peace Negotiations. Not sure why they would choose to do so now, but their two main points are:

  1. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on Wednesday called Ukraine’s desire to recover all of the territory it has lost to Russia since 2014 an “unrealistic objective,” 
  2. Any peace deal, Hegseth added, must come with “robust security guarantees,” international oversight of the boundary between Russian and Ukrainian forces, and no NATO membership for Ukraine

Source: Hegseth calls Ukraine’s peace goals ‘unrealistic’ in meeting with allies

 

The Hunting Falcon to be released in the UK on Friday, 14 February

The Hunting Falcon is being released in the UK the Friday, 14 February.

According to Amazon.com it will be released in the U.S. March 31, 2025.


The Hunting Falcon covers the story of the third German ace to be awarded the Blue Max, after Immelmann and Boelcke. Hans-Joachim Buddecke was the fighter pilot and squadron leader who established German air dominance over Gallipoli in late 1915 – early 1916. A book of his story was published in German in 1918 but was never translated until recently. We (meaning Jay Karamales) translated it, and then we researched the background behind some of his stories. So the book alternates between several translated chapters from his book then a chapter explaining in more depth the people and events behind his story. For example, it includes a detailed description of the air operations around Gallipoli.

Hans-Joachim Buddecke story starts in Indianapolis before the Great War. He talks about his American cousin and uncle who had recently encouraged him to move from Germany to the United States. We have been able to research and identify that uncle as Albert Lieber, a very successful brewer and businessman in Indianapolis, who he went into the airplane business with. His cousin was Edith Lieber Vonnegut, the tall and attractive socialite mother of the famous atmospheric scientist Dr. Bernand Vonnegut (1914-1997) and the even more famous writer Kurt Vonnegut Jr. (1922-2007).

Leaving his airplane at the infield of Indianapolis Motor Speedway, Hans Buddecke snuck past the British blockade into Germany and became third ace in the German air force. This book details for the first time his complete story, including the unsavory aspects of it.

Ukrainian Corps

MilitaryLand.net on Twitter (X) stated last week that “The Ukrainian Army is reportedly planning to establish up to 20 Army Corps, including the 3rd and Azov Corps, with each corps consisting of at least five brigades.”

Now, this would imply that there are 100 Ukrainian brigades. At the start of war in February 24, 2022 Ukraine had mobilized around 25 maneuver brigades. They also had 9 artillery brigades and 2 in reserve (see pages 66 – 76 in The Battle for Kyiv for a listing of them). The does not count National Guard, Territorial Defense or Foreign Volunteers. By the end of May they had mobilized at least 13 more maneuver brigades. So by the summer of 2022 they had at least 49 brigades (including artillery). 

If I look at Militaryland.net now I can count 103 units labelled as brigades: 3 tank brigades, 46 mechanized brigades, 3 heavy mechanized brigades, 3 assault brigades, 2 mountain assault brigades, 3 motorized brigades, 2 jaeger brigades, 1 presidential brigade, 10 artillery brigades, 1 artillery recon brigade, 1 missile brigade, 2 rocket artillery brigades, 4 territorial defense brigades, 1 unmanned strike aviation brigade, 4 army aviation brigades, 4 marine brigades, 2 marine artillery brigades, 1 airborne brigade, 3 airmobile brigades, 5 air assault brigades, 1 air assault jaeger brigade, 1 air assault artillery brigade). This does count air defense and coastal defense missile and artillery units.

There are four operational commands (east, north, south and west)

Now, the structure of battalions reporting to regiments/brigades reporting to divisions reporting to corps reporting to armies date back to the Napoleonic Wars. This is kind of been the structure of most militaries over the last 200 years. There has been a push in recent time to eliminate the division and to go straight from brigades to corps. Not exactly sure what is gained by this, but for smaller armies it makes some sense. Ukraine does not have a small army.

In comparison, the U.S. had thirteen divisions (10 Army and 3 Marine). The U.S. Army has four active corps (I, III, V and XVIII Airborne). It has six armes (1st, Central. North, South, Europe and Africa, and 8th (Korea)). Only one is an actual field army. This Army structure had never made a lot of sense to me. The Marines also have two corps headquarters (I and II MEFs)

 

P.S. Just to clarify, the U.S. Army has had a total of 260 four-star generals in its history. In wartime, we had one during the Revolutionary War (1775-1783), three during the Civil War (1861-1865), three during WWI (1917-1918), 16 during WWII (but 11 were created in 1945, so only 5 for most of the war). We currently have 11 four-star general in the U.S. Army.

For the record, over the decades I have met 11 of them, starting with William C. Westmorland. 

The U.S. Marine Corps has had 75 four-star generals in its history. The first in March 1945 during WWII. There are currently three serving.

Basically, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps has one four-star general for each division. 

 

P.P.S. I did send this out for comment before posting it, and Ivan Torres (Jomini of the West) added: 

“The “corps” are actually divisions, even though they will be labeled “corps.” The test bed was the Voron Group, which has been operating in the Lyman area since last year. The Voron Group is a National Guard “division” comprising three brigades (including Azov). I’m unsure what “division” enablers were assigned to them, if any, since enablers are more dispersed than maneuver units. The command relationships and battlefield management functioned well enough for the General Staff to replicate it across the ground forces. However, it likely succeeded because the National Guard has a better leadership caliber than the regular army (this observation comes from sources on the ground; take it as you will). “

Situation in Ukraine, 3 February 2025

I have not blogged for a while. Been focused on books recently (and they do require some focus).

Anyhow, nothing earthshaking has been going on in Ukraine and it does not appear that we are on the verge of achieving “peace for our time,” so the war does continue. Wanted to tag for a moment where the front lines are, tapping into War Mapper’s efforts:

Oskil River:

West of Pokrovsk:

Andriivka:

“Kursk salient”

West of Terny:

East of Siversk:

Around Toretsk:

Velyka Novosilka:

Overview map for 3 February 2025:

 

We do like War Mapper. War Mapper Links:

War Mapper on X: “Ukraine updates: In Kharkiv, Russia has significantly expanded its positions on the western bank of the Oskil River. They have taken positions both north and south of the previous area of control in Dvorichna. https://t.co/a4qUzciCNL” / X

War Mapper on X: “The advance wrapping around the west of Pokrovsk has continued to develop with Russian forces taking Solone and entering Udachne. https://t.co/T29GdEWwb0” / X

War Mapper on X: “Further south, they have advanced into Andriivka after taking a series of fortifications east of the Town. https://t.co/L9DkVLNGaX” / X

War Mapper on X: “Russian forces in the south of the Kursk salient have pushed up to the southern outskirts of Sudzha. https://t.co/5Qp8ETnDbv” / X

War Mapper on X: “Russia has reached and potentially already secured positions in the first Ukrainian defensive line west of Terny after previously crossing and taking Ivanivka in January. https://t.co/rr2Wp8Obac” / X

War Mapper on X: “East of Sivers’k, Russia has entered the eastern outskirts of the settlement of Verkhnokamianske. https://t.co/TTskiMSphi” / X

War Mapper on X: “Russia continues to consolidate its positions around Toretsk after recently taking control of the city. https://t.co/DKoiw3HN1J” / X

War Mapper on X: “Last week, Velyka Novosilka was fully occupied by Russian forces. https://t.co/qoqRWnRcqk” / X

War Mapper on X: “An overview map of the situation in Ukraine as of 03 March 2025. https://t.co/h3LHd4Zxzz” / X

 

The quote from Neville Chamberlain is:

“My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honor. I believe it is peace for our time… Go home and get a nice quiet sleep.”

September 30, 1938

 

 

The Current Ukrainian Offensive – resolved?

Well, so far it doesn’t look like the current Ukrainian offense, that started on Sunday 5 January, was not all that much. They took the town of Berdin and I gather 20 or so square kilometers of territory. To put that in perspective, Washington DC is 177 sq km.

Anyhow, it appeared the Ukrainian attack went on for two days (Sunday and Monday), at then stopped. Meanwhile other actions continued around Pokrovsk where Russia took some more territory in the slowest moving offensive since 1917 (this is probably not entirely correct… but you get the point). 

What did get my attention was the claim that “Ukrainian officials have indicated this is part of a larger operation.” We will see if that is true. We will see if Ukraine has anything more in hand.

The Current Ukrainian Offensive

Ukrainian offensives do get my attention because I believe that to negotiate a peace settlement that does not permanently surrender 20% of their country Ukraine will probably need to start retaking some of that ground. They really have not reclaimed any more of their own territory since November 2022.

But they are on the offensive again. Curiously, just before the Trump inauguration. To quote twitter account @timkmak from yesterday (bolding is mine): (1) Tim Mak on X: “Here’s what we are reading today: Ukraine has launched a new offensive in Kursk region, the Russian Defence Ministry said. Ukrainian officials have indicated this is part of a larger operation. This follows territorial setbacks for Ukraine in the Kursk region in recent months. https://t.co/CEMHisnLqv” / X

“Ukraine has launched a new offensive in Kursk region, the Russian Defence Ministry said. 

Ukrainian officials have indicated this is part of a larger operation.

The follows territorial setbacks in Ukraine in the Kursk region in recent months.”

Other people are reporting that Ukraine has taken Berdin and has gone 2.7 kilometers past the Russian zero line (Def Mon on X: “Ukrainian forces likely went about 2.7km past the Russian zero line. https://t.co/WDFs2bGxZU” / X and Def Mon on X: “The developments in Kursk oblast looks something like this. We do not know if Ukraine managed to consolidate positions. We think we have geolocated UA units inside Berdin and Novosotnitskii. Geos: https://t.co/RNty0eKLQL https://t.co/ouerMmm9y4” / X).

Reports that this is a significant attack (“AT LEAST a 6 brigade attack): david D. on X: “im tracking about 10 “attacks” by ukr forces around kursk and north Belgorod. keep in mind that some will be real attacks, and some will be feints to draw in russian forces. russians are saying this is AT LEAST a 6 brigade attack… things will be clear later today expect” / X

There are reports of significant Russian losses (which must always be taken with a grain of salt): Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | on X: “BURN RATE: In the last 48 hours in Kursk Oblast, the Russian army lost up a battalion of North Korean infantry and VDV paratroopers. Since AUG, Moscow has deployed 50K troops to Kursk Oblast: approximately 38K are assessed as killed, wounded, missing or surrendered.” / X

Some maps of the area:  Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | on X: “UKRAINE’S KURSK OFFENSIVE: Latest from the BBC. https://t.co/QLSOk09HmP https://t.co/8xx9goK4kl” / X and Aurora Borealis 🤫 on X: “katsaps report the loss of the village of #Berdin, #Kursk region. https://t.co/QBeVLm9C81” / X and david D. (@secretsqrl123) / X and MAKS 24 🇺🇦👀 on X: “🔼🇺🇦 AFU managed to advance 8 km in the Kursk region, according to Russian voenkors. Map from ISW 🗺️👇👀 https://t.co/ebSfskuV9p” / X.

Anyhow, more to come, but all these reports must be taken with a grain of salt.

The Kursk offensive in August of 2024 was an interesting exercise but fundamentally did not retake any of their own territory and did not take enough of Kursk province to give them a lot they could trade off. It did not fundamentally change the situation on the ground, which is what was needed to give them advantage at the negotiation table. Unconditional surrender is very rare. Most wars end in a negotiated settlement.

The strength and loss figures being reported represent some fraction of reality. I do not know what that is (is it 1/10th or is it 9/10s?). I seriously doubt that the people posting these figures know that either, although some may indicate otherwise.

I was very disappointed in the failed Ukrainian offensive in early June 2023. For the sake of negotiating a positive resolution to the conflict, they really needed to take ground. I thought the Kursk offensive was a good stunt, but only that. Still, they have turned it into an extended fight that may yet yield dividends. If this offensive in Kursk is the start of a series of offensive that extend to Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, then this could become very significant. We shall see.

A key element in warfare is surprise (I do have a chapter on that in my book War by Numbers). If I can predict what Ukraine is going to do, that is not a good sign, as so to can the Russians. Therefore, if the Ukraine General Staff is doing their job right, they should be taking both Russian and me by surprise. That they appear to be doing. 

An Old Book Review for War by Numbers

This link below is a book review of War by Numbers published in the Army University Press. It was published in 2017 (the same year the book came out): War by Numbers. It just got forwarded to me by an associate but I have been aware of this favorable review for a while.

Of course, in the real world I get lots of review, some are favorable, some are very unfavorable, and some are in between. I have never published or commented on them for obvious reasons. I have since met some of the reviewers. In this case, I have never met and am not familiar with this reviewer, Frederick A. Baillergeon. What got my attention was that he was out in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. That is the center of the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College (C&GS). This has also traditionally been the center of anti-Dupuy anti-QJM writings, with some senior people there having had an openly hostile relationship with Trevor Dupuy. A number of students there also took exception to the claims made by Trevor Dupuy that the German divisions in Italy in from late 1943 to mid-1944 were more competent (had a higher CEV) than the American and UK divisions. This actually led to a number of books trying dispute this, not that they really succeeded (Dupuy’s claims were based upon data… their refutations were not).

I did get an email a few months ago from a lady apologizing for a negative review of War by Numbers that her brother wrote. She felt it was wrong and written out of animus. Every now and then people do something that make you realize that the vast majority of people are really decent, even if a few “scholars” are not. 

Anyhow, this was a nice review by Mr. Baillergeon. It is clear that he knew his subject and had read the book carefully.

Top Twenty blog posts

What are our twenty most popular blog posts (based upon the most number of hits on the blog):

1. U.S. Tank Losses and Crew Casualties in World War II – The Dupuy Institute

2. The Russian Artillery Strike That Spooked The U.S. Army – The Dupuy Institute

3. Wounded-To-Killed Ratios – The Dupuy Institute

4. Population over Time (US vs USSR) – The Dupuy Institute

5. New WWII German Maps At The National Archives – The Dupuy Institute

6. How Does the U.S. Army Calculate Combat Power? ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ – The Dupuy Institute

7. A story about planning for Desert Storm (1991) – The Dupuy Institute

8. Tank Loss Rates in Combat: Then and Now – The Dupuy Institute

9. Wounded-to-killed ratios in Ukraine in 2022 – The Dupuy Institute

10. Panzer Aces Wittmann and Staudegger at Kursk – part 1 – The Dupuy Institute

11. Counting Holes in Tanks in Tunisia – The Dupuy Institute

12. What Is The Relationship Between Rate of Fire and Military Effectiveness? – The Dupuy Institute

13. German versus Soviet Artillery at Kursk – The Dupuy Institute

14. Artillery Effectiveness vs. Armor (Part 1) – The Dupuy Institute

15. Artillery Survivability In Modern Combat – The Dupuy Institute

16. Where Did Japan Go? – The Dupuy Institute

17. Was Kursk the Largest Tank Battle in History? – The Dupuy Institute

18. Assessing the 1990-1991 Gulf War Forecasts – The Dupuy Institute

19. Some initial observations on the Russian Army Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) concept – The Dupuy Institute

20. How many brigades did Ukraine start with war with? – The Dupuy Institute

 

You are welcome to list in the comments any other blog posts that you think are worthy. 

 

The Ninth Anniversary of the Blog

The first post on this blog was made December 27, 2015. See: Welcome to Mystics & Statistics – The Dupuy Institute.

This was done at the instigation of Dr. Shawn Woodford. He came up with the idea, sold it to me, designed the blog and did most of the really popular posts on the blog in those first four years. The first five posts (and the only posts in 2015) were:

Welcome to Mystics & Statistics – The Dupuy Institute

President Obama’s Casualty Estimates – The Dupuy Institute

Iraq/Syria Intervention Scenarios – The Dupuy Institute

Defeating an Insurgency by Air – The Dupuy Institute

Is Your Washroom Breeding Bolsheviks? – The Dupuy Institute

As of 27 December, the blog has had 1,909 posts, or over 200 a year. We also have had at least 3,168 comments made to the blog. We did early on cross post the blog to Twitter, Facebook and LinkedIn. We are currently cross posting to Twitter (now known as X), Blue Sky and Threads. See: We are on Blue Sky and Threads – The Dupuy Institute

 

Before there was the blog we did have an active forum: The Dupuy Institute Forum – powered by Infopop. We started it in March 2001 and it was very active for a few years. It was fueled primarily with postings by Richard Anderson, Niklas Zetterling, me and others.  It was through the forum that we met Shawn Woodford. Over time it became less active, people moved on, and it was being spammed. As I was busy writing books and maintaining The Dupuy Institute, I no longer had the time to regularly patrol it and maintain it, so I locked out any new sign-ins (to stop the spamming). It has been inactive since then. We have considered re-establishing it, except there really needs to be someone to watch over and maintain a forum. That really cannot be me. 

Dupuy’s Verities vs the Russo-Ukrainian War

So, we have had almost three full years of conventional war in and around Ukraine. Back in the 1970s- 1980s Trevor Dupuy assembled a list of factors (or verities) that influence and describe conventional combat. They covered combat in three different areas. They were 1) The Timeless Verities of Combat (13 verities), 2) Combat Attrition Verities (29 verities), and 3) Combat Advance Rates (15 verities).

They are listed below in these three posts:

The Timeless Verities of Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Trevor N. Dupuy’s Combat Attrition Verities – The Dupuy Institute

Trevor Dupuy’s Combat Advance Rate Verities – The Dupuy Institute

They are listed in detail in my book War by Numbers, although I edited a few for brevity.

They are listed in detail in Trevor Dupuy’s 1987 book Understanding War. They are also listed in his 1980 book Evolution of Weapons and Warfare.

They have been around for a while. I think they are a significant list and of course have been coded into his combat models the QJM and TNDM, which actually have proven track record of making good predictions. I do think they have been underutilized and underappreciated by the wider defense community.

Anyhow, my questions for the community that reads our blog is:

1. Which of these verities have been re-confirmed by war in Ukraine?, and
2. Which of these verities have been called in doubt by the war in Ukraine?

Interested to see the responses.

 

 

 

P.S. Some related links:

TDI Friday Read: Principles Of War & Verities Of Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Offensive Action – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Power Of Defense – The Dupuy Institute

The Combat Value of Surprise – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Utility Of Defense – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Initiative – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Fortification – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Advantage Of The Offensive – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Requirements For Successful Defense – The Dupuy Institute

A Comment On The Importance Of Reserves In Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Surprise – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Effects of Firepower in Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Inefficiency of Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: Combat Power =/= Firepower – The Dupuy Institute

Dupuy’s Verities: The Complexities of Combat – The Dupuy Institute

Response to Question on Dupuy’s Combat Attrition Verities – The Dupuy Institute

Average Losses per Day in Division-level Engagements on the Eastern Front in 1943 – The Dupuy Institute

People keep referencing us on the 3-to-1 Rule – The Dupuy Institute

Last Six Blog Posts – The Dupuy Institute

Shout out to Echoes of Past – The Dupuy Institute

These are all the posts you get if you click on the category “Dupuy’ Verities”:  Dupuy’s Verities – The Dupuy Institute