This text is pulled from pages 744-745 of my Kursk book.
A look at the German and Soviet tank losses since the start of the battle against the SS Panzer corps shows:
SS Panzer Corps Opposing Soviet Exchange
Date Tank Losses Tank Losses Ratio
5th 54 tanks 30 tanks 1:0.56
6th 79 149 1:1.89
7th 55 86 1:1.56
8th 47 164 1:3.49
9th 34 135 1:3.97
10th 3 55 1:18.33
11th 16 9 1:0.56
—— ——-
288 tanks 628 tanks 1:2.18
This comparison is a case where one should not place too much reliance in the day-to-day statistics. While the German losses, calculated as a decline in ready-for-action, are reasonably accurate during this period for each day and for each division; the Soviet records are not. Overall, the Soviets lost as many or more tanks during this period, as indicated here, but there is some question how many were lost on exactly which day.
For the record, 118 tanks were lost by the Adolf Hitler SS Division while they may have been responsible for 255 Soviet tank losses (a 1-to-2.16 exchange ratio), the Das Reich SS Division lost 104 tanks, while they may have been responsible for 274 Soviet tanks (a 1-to-2.63 exchange ratio). The Totenkopf SS Division did not get as much credit, for although it lost only 66 tanks, it is only credited with 99 tanks (a 1-to-1.50 exchange ratio). One much keep in mind that these formations were supported by air, artillery, and elements of the 167th Infantry Division and they certainly played a role in causing Soviet tank losses. Furthermore, the assignment of which Soviet units faces which German units is sometime questionable as the unit boundaries overlapped and sometimes the German units were operating in close coordination with each other.
The reverse comparison can also be made, although it is less clear as there were often two different tank corps facing the same German divisions and sometimes elements of the same tank corps facing two different German divisions,. Still, one can estimate that the XXXI Tank Corps lost 93 tanks while they may have been responsible for 15 German tanks (a 6.20-to-1 exchange ratio). The V Guards Tank Corps lost 166 while they may have been responsible for 62 German tanks (a 2.68-to-1 exchange ratio). The II Tank Corps lost 136 tanks while they may have been responsible for 34 German tanks (a 4.00-to-1 exchange ratio). Note that there is considerable overlap between these three formations and their opponents. Adding them together produces 395 Soviet tanks lost while they may have been responsible for 111 German tanks lost. this is a 3.56-to-1 exchange ratio. Finally, the carefully husbanded II Guards Tank Corps lost 48 tanks while they may have been responsible for taking out 32 German tanks (a 1.50-to-1 exchange ratio).
Tank losses for 1st Battalion, 26th Panzer Regiment January 1944
The 1st Battalion of the German 26th Panzer Regiment (I./Pz.Rgt. 26) did not fight with its parent division (the 26th Panzer Division), which was engaged in Italy. Instead, the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 was waiting for its Panthers to arrive. The first shipments were sent in August and Panthers continued to trickle in during the autumn, allowing the battalion to start training.
Instead of joining its parent division, the battalion was sent to the Ukraine, where its first action would take place in January 1944.
At first the battalion was attached to the Grossdeutschland Division, but when Soviet forces broke through northeast of Slatopol, as part of the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky operation, the battalion was sent to counterattack. The inexperienced battalion would be committed to action without infantry or artillery support, to fight a very confused battle on 28-29 January.
During its 75 kilometer march to the Slatopol area, the battalion lost a number of tanks due to mechanical problems. One Panther caught fire in the engine room and was completely destroyed. This is reminiscent of the Panthers at Kursk and as the first Panthers had been shipped to the battalion in August 1943, it may well have had several Panthers of the model D, which took part in Operation Zitadelle. Also, one of the two Bergepanthers caught fire, but it could be extinguished by the crew. The vehicle would however be out of action and sorely missed the following days.
Five other Panthers were damaged during the march, with the following problems: final drive leak, idler wheel bearing, radiator, fuel pump and also one drove off a bridge and was difficult to recover.
During the fighting 28-29 January, five Panthers were complete losses due to AT round hits that caused the tanks to catch fire. Another five had been hit by AT rounds that caused damage to the tracks or other components that rendered the tanks immobile. It was decided to blow them up, as they were in positions where they could not be recovered quickly. Finally, one Panther fallen down a steep slope during the night and could also not be recovered. It was attempted to blow it up, but that failed.
In addition, there were 24 Panthers that suffered serious mechanical breakdowns and which were put on trains to be repaired. In many cases, the engine main connecting rod bearings had been damaged. These 24 Panthers were put on train and sent away for repairs. Interestingly, even three Panthers written off as complete losses were put on trains. I can only speculate why, but perhaps the Germans wanted to make use of the raw materials.
The repair and recovery services had worked hard and carried out 118 repairs during the five last days of January.
On 31 January, the battalion had 30 combat ready Panthers, while 8 remained in the workshops. 24 had been sent away by train and 13 had been written off (in addition to the twelve mentioned above, one Panther had caught fire when loading on train in France).
The I./Pz.Rgt. 26 was sent into action with many vehicles that suffered from mechanical shortcomings. In addition, it was established that most of them had been replenished with fuel that was substandard and this may have been the cause of many of the defect engines that were sent away on train. To make matters worse, the battalion was sent into action without infantry and artillery support and without any proper reconnaissance of the battlefield.
All of this shows up in the outcome. It is also clear that the inability to recover tanks was a major factor causing complete write-offs. Five Panthers were direct losses due to enemy fire. Another five were damaged by enemy fire, but not recovered and thus became complete write-offs. Also, one Panther was completely lost due to an accident on the battlefield, but it seems that it would have been returned to service, had it been possible to recover it. Again, it is clear that command of the battlefield (or lack of it) played a significant role for irrevocable losses.
All data is taken from Anlage 25, Kriegstagebuch 2, I./Pz.Rgt. 26, BA-MA RH 39/599). The report is very detailed and shows all losses, with the individual turret numbers given.
Helmets from dead Iranian soldiers. [Conflict Iran]
[This post is based on “Iranian Casualties in the Iran-Iraq War: A Reappraisal,” by H. W. Beuttel, originally published in the December 1997 edition of the International TNDM Newsletter.]
It is the opinion of this author that, aside from the 400 expatriates Iraq admitted, that the “5,000” Iranian PoW and “20,000 PoW/MIA” still unaccounted for [as of December 1997] will be shown to be KIA (dead on the battlefield or died in captivity) as recovery operations proceed (20 more were delivered to Iran in June 1997 and another 15 in August). The alternate possibility is that some or most of these personnel now serve in the NLA or other Iraqi supported resistance groups and their identities and existence are concealed for this reason. There is no real evidence that such a large number of living Iranian PoWs are still being held by Iraq. Another chilling possibility recently raised is that some Iranian POWs may have disappeared into the Iraqi biological weapons programs as human guinea pigs.”[73]
[Authors note: As this article went to press I uncovered a small piece of information from 1988. In reference to some of the Iranian MIAs being defectors to the Iraqi-sponsored NLA, the Iranians estimated that as many as 3,000 of their troops may have defected while PoWs in Iraq. They have never mentioned this since. Also 136 Iranian soldiers were arrested and shot for desertion.]
The continued Iranian insistence on 5,000 possible remaining PoWs may also be related to the 6,000 missing declared dead at family request without recovery of a body. In an interesting turn to usual practice, the families seem to have given up hope before the government has lost interest.
Further complicating the matter, Iran seems to have lost control of its accounting procedures. Originally listing 60,711 “missing” in 1988, this increased to 72,753 estimated MIA by 1995. If we combine the 39,048 released PoWs with 72,753 estimated MIA, Iran actually had some 111,801 PoW/MIA during the war or 84% more than they first thought. If there are 5,000 Iranian PoWs still held by Iraq then the total would be 116,801 or 92% higher than estimated.
The answer to this poor accounting probably lies in the overall organization for combat employed by Iranian forces during the war. In addition to the regular army and Pasdaran, Iran employed a third component called the Baseej. The Baseej al Mostafazim (Mobilization of the Oppressed) was founded as a wartime expedient to augment the IRGC and formally placed under their control in January 1981. Baseej formations comprised 300-man battalions divided into 100-man companies with 22-man platoons armed with light weapons.[74] Their functions were IRGC reinforcement in the war. Baseej units fought extensively in the War of Sacred Defense (1980-88). However, their availability was only episodic as their tour of duty was normally only three months, usually from January to March. At this time most Baseej were rural peasants, often very young (some only 10) or very old and illiterate, who had to return for spring planting and fall harvests. As a result their training was rudimentary, often as little as two weeks of small arms and hand grenade practice. It was the Baseej who were given plastic keys to hang around their necks with the promise these would unlock the gates of paradise if they were killed in action.[75] As many as two million Baseej forces saw combat in the imposed war with Iraq.[76]
When the Iranian government offered its original tally of dead and missing in 1988 the Baseej losses were not mentioned separately and assumed to fall under the category of Pasdaran. It was only after the war when most (if not all) Iranian PoWs had been released and the magnitude of the MIA issue became evident that Iran realized it had suffered far more losses than originally thought. It is likely the degree of Baseej unit administration and accountability was far below regular army or established Pasdaran formations. Given the episodic nature of their participation, widespread personnel illiteracy and their poor level of training (and the fact they were used as temporary human “fill” for Pasdaran formations), it is unlikely that unit returns were maintained in anything like a proper or organized manner.
This author believes that the bulk of the additional true MIAs claimed since the end of the war are represented by primarily Baseej fallen who were simply not originally accounted for in established Pasdaran or regular army unit returns. Baseej units made up to 40% of Iranian force strength during the war. The 73,000 now-claimed missing (and presumed dead) of the war represent 38% of the total known and presumed combat dead (circa 188,000—see below). This is too close to be accidental.
Mr Beuttel, a former U.S. Army intelligence officer, was employed as a military analyst by Boeing Research & Development at the time of original publication. The views and opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Boeing Company.
NOTES
[73] “The World’s Deadliest Woman?” MSNBC News, November 1997.
In my book, page 814, I have Franz Staudegger’s birth date as 12 February 1923. Several other internet sources have that date, as does Agte on page 120. Some Wikipedia-type sites and several other internet sources have his birth date as 1921.
I have the date he passed away as 16 March 1991, as does several internet sources. Some Wikipedia-type sites and several other internet sources have his date of death as 16 May 1995.
Does anyone have documentation, a grave stone picture or an obituary so I can confirm these dates?
Anyhow, I think this is my last post on Wittmann and Staudegger until someone comes up with more information. My posts on the subject have been:
[This post is based on “Iranian Casualties in the Iran-Iraq War: A Reappraisal,” by H. W. Beuttel, originally published in the December 1997 edition of the International TNDM Newsletter.]
By January 1982 Iran held some 28,423 Iraqi PoWs to Iraq’s 5,285 Iranian captives.[29] In early 1984 Iran held 50,000 Iraqis to Iraq’s 7,300 Iranian PoWs.[30] In August 1986 Iran claimed to hold some 52,000 Iraqi PoWs.[31] Just before the cease-fire in 1988 the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated 49,285 Iraqi PoWs in fifteen Iranian camps and 12,747 Iranians in ten Iraqi camps.[32]
On 9 August 1988 the ICRC count was 50,182 Iraqi PoWs held in Iran to 13,526 Iranians in Iraqi captivity.[33] Iran had at least 8,500 captured in the final Iraqi offensives oi July 1988 and another 700 on 23 August 1988 immediately after the cease-fire went into effect.[34] PoW release had begun long before the war ended. In August 1986 Iran had released 200 Iraqi PoWs and had unilaterally released some 620-650 previously.[35] By 18 October 1988 Iran and Iraq had agreed to begin PoW exchanges. Beginning 30 October 1988 each side exchanged 25 PoWs. Eight of the 25 Iranians were civilian internees captured early in the war.[36]
On 10 November Iran and Iraq agreed again to the exchange of 1,118 Iraqi and 411 Iranian PoWs who were badly wounded or ill.[37] However, after 156 Iraqis and only 57 Iranians had been released the exchange broke down by 27 November over 63 Iraqis who refused repatriation.[38] In January 1989 Iran released 131 sick and wounded Iraqis and Iraq reciprocated by releasing 124 Iranians.[39] In February Iran offered to release another 260 ill Iraqi PoWs. One hundred fifty-eight were released, but 27 refused to return.[40] In March 1989 the more or less official count of PoWs was 50,000 Iraqi to 18,902 Iranians.[41] Iran, on 10 April, released 70 disabled and sick Iraqi PoWs and on 23 May a further 49 plus 15 other PoWs of varied nationalities who fought for Iraq.[42] No further activity occurred until December when Iran proposed more sick and disabled PoWs be exchanged and suggested that a substantial number of Egyptian nationals were among the PoWs it held.[43] Eventually on 14 March 1990 Iran released twenty Egyptians captured fighting for Iraq.[44]
Post-Desert Storm PoW Exchanges
It was not until after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait that the PoW issue came alive again. On 15 August 1990 Saddam Hussein offered to release all Iranian PoWs. He further allowed 17,000 Iranian nationals in Kuwait to return home. By 23 August PoW exchanges were running at 6,000 a day and some 21,000 Iraqi and Iranian PoWs had been repatriated.[45] By 4 September 23,798 Iranian and 24,250 Iraqis had been released.[46] On 16 November the two countries agreed to another exchange of 100 PoWs a day and a group of200 Iraqis was released on 4 December, another group of 200 on 10 December 1990.[47] There is no record of Iranian PoW releases by Iraq in this time period. However, a total of 39,043 Iranian PoWs were eventually released.[48]
On 1 June 1991 Iran claimed Iraq was still holding at least 5,000 Iranian PoWs, an assertion Iraq denied. When Iran repeated the claim in October, Iraq admitted it had 400 who refused repatriation.[49] During the 1991-92 time frame another 64 Iranian soldiers became PoWs during fighting with the NLA [National Liberation Army of Iran] and Kurdish groups supported by Iraq.[50]
Then in early 1991 some 5,000 Iraqi soldiers crossed into Iran to evade coalition forces in the Desert Storm War. Beginning in November 1992 Iran released 400, followed by releases of 1,000 (April 1993), 400 (May 1993), 450 (June 1993) and 459 (July 1993). Eventually 4,115 were released in fourteen intervals with the last known release bringing the total to 4,574.[51] At the same time Iran released 100 Iraqi PoWs from the War of Sacred Defense in May 1993.[52]
At that time the ICRC claimed to have had overseen the repatriation of over 80,000 PoWs held by both Iran and Iraq.[53] This figure is not borne out by the published numbers. At this time the maximum number of Iranian and Iraqi PoWs released from both the Iran-Iraq and Desert Storm wars stood at about 92,267, a discrepancy of 12,000. Some of the 17,000 repatriated civilian internees of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait may have been counted. The ICRC still had some 19,000 Iraqis and 4,000 Iranians on its books as active PoWs.[54]
By July 1992 the only exchanges were those of 101 MIA bodies.[55] In December 1993 Iran complained Iraq was still holding 8,000 Iranian PoWs. The proof was that 26 Iranian civilian internees from the war had escaped and made it back to Iran that same month.[56]
In January 1994 Iran conceded that many of the personnel it listed as PoWs may have been KIA/MIA.[57] Then in July 1994 Iran accused Iraq of holding 16,000 Iranian PoWs.[58] According to the Red Cross Iran continued to hold as many as 19,000 Iraqi PoWs as of 1994.[59] In 1994 the ICRC calculated 4,168 confirmed Iranian PoWs still in Iraq and some 475 other unaccounted for Iranian PoWs.[60]
In August 1995 the Iraqis complained Iran still held 7,000 of their PoWs.[61] That same month Iran released 100 PoWs. The ICRC claimed at that time it had overseen the repatriation of 82,000 of 100,000 known PoWs of the war.[62] MIA exchanges continued with Iraq returning 144 dead and Iran 200 in June 1996.[63] Since then Iran released 150 of Iraqi PoWs as late as 28 October and 724 on 27 December 1996 making a total of 974 that year.[64] Iraq insisted there were still 20,000 Iraqis captive in Iran.[65]
“Not even a single Iranian PoW has been released by the Iraqi regime in the past five years.”
In January 1997 the two nations exchanged 60 Iranian and 70 Iraqi MIA remains, but Iraq again insisted Iran held 17,000 of its PoWs.[66] In August 1997 Saddam Hussein claimed Iran still held 20,000 (1997 ICRC figures about 13,000) Iraqi PoWs. He also claimed that all 39,000 Iranian PoWs held by Iraq had been freed except for a pilot downed during the early part of the war who was still being held as proof Iran started the whole thing.[67] The Iranians countered that 5,000 Iraqi PoWs had requested and been granted asylum in Iran which more or less agrees with 1994 ICRC figures for total remaining Iraqi PoWs (19,000-5,000 = 14,000).[68] In September 1997 47 more Iraqi PoWs were released.[69] In total Iran has released some 48,650 Iraqi PoWs.[70] In November 1997 Iran approved release of another 500 Iraqi PoWs.[71]
Speaking in September 1997 Brigadier General Abdullah Najafi, chairman of the Iranian PoW commission, stated that “not even a single Iranian PoW has been released by the Iraqi regime in the past five years.”[72] This suggests that some may have been released as late as 1992, but this author can find no record of this. The cold fact remains that since 1990 (or 1992 at the latest), no known living Iranian PoW has been recovered. 27,000 remains of MIAs have with another 39,000 estimated. A chronology of this confusing and somewhat contradictory chain of events is given below.
This author’s figures (admittedly incomplete) indicate the release of 92,267 PoWs (plus 547 more Iraqis as of November 1997) by both sides resulting from the Iran-Iraq and Desert Storm conflicts. If ICRC figures for “PoWs” (which seems to include PoWs and CIs from both conflicts) are correct 18,000 are still unreleased. Their own figures list 13,000 Iraqis and 5,000 Iranians still unreleased which makes up the difference.
Mr Beuttel, a former U.S. Army intelligence officer, was employed as a military analyst by Boeing Research & Development at the time of original publication. The views and opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Boeing Company.
NOTES
[29] Edgar O’Ballance, The Gulf War, London: Brassey’s, 1988, p. 104,
[42] “Persian Gulf War Aftermath,” FYEO, NO. 211, 17 April 1989, p. 211-3; “Persian Gulf War, FYEO, NO. 214, 29 May 1989, p. 214-5; “Persian Gulf War Aftermath,” FYEO, NO. 215, 12 June 1989, p. 215-9.
[43] “Persian Gulf“, FYEO, NO. 229, 25 December 1989, p. 229-4. The reports indicated 13,000-20,000 Egyptians held, but this figure seems incredible.
[44] “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, N0. 236, 2 April 1990, p. 236-4,
[45] “Persian Gulf Crisis,” FYEO, No. 246, 20 August 1990, p. 246-3; “Persian Gulf Crisis,” FYEO, N0. 247, 3 September 1990, p. 247-1.
[46] “Persian Gulf Crisis,” FYEO, No. 248, 17 September 1990, p. 248-1.
[47] “Persian Gulf Crisis,” FYEO, No. 253, 26 November 1990, p. 253-2; “Persian Gulf Crisis,” FYEO, N0. 254, 10 December 1990, p. 254-1, 254-2; “Persian Gulf Crisis,” FYEO, No. 255, 24 December 1990, p. 255-1.
[48] “Iran Calls on Iraq to Release Prisoners of War,” Iran News, 18 August 1997.
[49] “War in the Gulf: Chronology of Events,” FYEO, No, 267, 10 June 1991, p. 267-2; “War in the Gulf: Chronology of Events,” FYEO, No. 277, 28 October 1991, p. 277-4.
[50] “Iran and Iraq,” International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) Annual Report 1996, 1 June 1997.
[51] “1,000 Iraqi Military Men to Return to Iraq,” 1, 17 February 1993; “Iran Releases More Iraqi PoWs,” IRNA, 22 April 1993; “Iran Frees Another Group of Iraqi Army Personnel,” IRNA, 19 May 1993; “450 Iraqi Military Men to Return Home Tomorrow,” IRNA, 22 June 1993; “Iran to Set Free 459 Iraqis Tomorrow,” IRNA, 13 July 1993.
[52] “Iran to Release More Iraqi PoWs,” IRNA, 26 May 1993.
[53] “Iran-Iraq Conflict: Repatriation Process May Resume,” ICRC Press Release, 96/40, 28 December 1996,
[54] “Aftermath of the Iran/Iraq War,” ICRCAnnual Report 1994, 30 May 1995
[55] “Gulf War Aftermath: Chronology of Events,” FYEO, No. 297, 3 August 1992, p. 297-3.
[56] “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, No, 333, 20 December 1993, p. 333-3: “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, No. 324, 10 January 1994, p. 324-3.
[57] “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, No. 335, 24 January 1994, p. 335-3.
[58] “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, No. 348, 25 July 1994, p. 348-21
[59] “Aftermath of the Iran/Iraq War,” ICRCAnnual Report 1994, 30 May 1995
[60] “Aftermath of the Iran/Iraq War,” ICRCAnnual Report 1994, 30 May 1995
[61] “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, No. 376, 21 August 1995, p. 376-41
[62] “Iran: 100 Iraqi Prisoners of War Set Free,” ICRC News 34, 23 August 1995.
[63] “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, No. 399, 8 July 1996, p. 399-4.
[64] “Iran Releases 150 Iraqi PoWs,” Compass Middle East News Wire, 28 October 1996; “General Najafi: Iran Continues to Release Remaining PoWs,” Tehran Times, 13 March 1997; “724 Iraqi Prisoners of War Freed Unilaterally,” Iran Review, No 2 (January 1997).
[65] “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, No. 412, 6 January 1997, p. 412-4.
[66] “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, No. 413, 20 January 1997, p. 413-3.
[67] “Iraq – Saddam Hits at Iran Over Jets, PoWs,” USNI Daily Defense News Capsules, 8 August 1997.
[68] “Issue of Iranian PoWs Should Be Publicized More,” IRNA, 18 August 1997.
[69] “Iran Releases More Iraqi PoWs Unilaterally,” IRNA, 25 September 1997.
[70] “Iran Calls on Iraq to Release Prisoners of War,” Iran News, 18 August 1997.
[71] “Iran to Unilaterally Release 500 Iraqi PoWs,” IRNA, 26 November 1997; “Leader Approves Release of Iraqi PoWs,” IRNA, 26 November 1997.
[72] “Iran Releases More Iraqi PoWs Unilaterally,” IRNA, 25 September 1997.
I do maintain a detailed and regularly updated errata sheets for all my books. In case it is not obvious, I am currently working on yet another (smaller) Kursk book. My proposed revised footnote on Staudegger (drawn from page 814 of my original book) now reads:
Probably the most detailed account of this action is in Patrick Agte’s book, Michael Wittman and the Waffen SS Tiger Commanders of the Leibstandarte in WWII (Stackpole Press, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2006), pages 103-105 and pages 119-121. The claim of facing 50-60 tanks comes from his Knight’s Cross award citation and Nazi-era press (propaganda) releases. The event could not have occurred near 252.2 as it occurred on the 8th of July (or 7 July in some sources). A number of internet sources (but not Agte) mention it occurring at the village of Psyolknee. We have not located a village called Psyolknee on any maps we have. While we do not doubt that some event like this occurred, the details are not support by anything in either side’s unit records.
We have examined the unit records of all Soviet tank corps in the area. The three closest Soviet armor units in the area were the V Guards Tank Corps, the X Tank Corps and the II Tank Corps.
Certainly the V Guards Tank Corps lost of lot of tanks this day with reported losses of 28 T-34s and 9 T-70s: 14 T-34s and 7 T-70s from the 20th Gds Tank Bde and 14 T-34s and 2 T-70s from the 21st Gds Tank Bde. The 22nd Gds Tank Bde reports it has no losses for this day. See Fond: 3403, Opis: 1, Delo: 18a, pages 143-156. Of course, if the claims for Staudegger are correct, then this would mean that he was responsible for 22 out of 28 T-34s lost by the V Guards Tank Corps on the 8th. As it were, it appears the tank corps was to the east of the Das Reich SS Division and at 1030 has reached the line of Sobachevskii-Kalinin-Belenikhino. In combat report #0112, 2200 July 8, 1943 they place the 20th Guards Tank Brigade two kilometers south of Sobachevskii and the 22nd Guards Tank Brigade in Belenikhino (Fond: 3403, Opis: 1, Delo: 18).
The X Tank Corps is another candidate except it reports that it only lost two tanks between 7 and 11 July (Fond 3410, Opis: 1, Delo: 17, page 10 and Fond: 3410, Opis: 1, Delo: 14, page 5). Unit strength reports for this unit do not contradict these reports. The nearest of its tanks brigades to the northeast of Teterevino on 8 July was the 178th Tank Brigade. The other two tank brigades were to the west of it and moving further west.
The II Tank Corps is the most likely candidate. It attacked in the afternoon and lost at least 31 tanks on the 9th of July. The 26th Tank Brigade did take Teterevino. They do report losses of 6 T-34s knocked out and 3 broken down, and 3 T-70s knocked out and 3 broken down. The I Battalion of the 99th Tank Brigade did loose its way during the fight and ended up attacking towards Teterevino (see Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, page 146). There it encountered “two Panzer VI” tanks (Tigers) which brought the battalion under fire. After “suffering tank losses,” it retreated. The other battalion of the tank brigade was involved in the attacks to the south with the 169th Tank Brigade. The 99th Tank Brigade does report their losses as of 0700 on 10 July as 12 T-34s knocked out and 4 undergoing report, and 4 T-70s knocked out and 4 broken down. The 169th Tank Brigade report losses of 3 T-34s knocked out and 5 broken down and 1 T-70 knocked out. The 15th Guard Heavy Tank Regiment reports 2 Churchills knocked out and 2 broken down. These reports probably account for the actions of both 8 and 9 July (see Fond: 3407, Opis: 1, Delo: 108, pages 195-216).
The most likely candidate is the I Battalion of the 99th Tank Brigade. Its composition is not known, but may have been 10 T-34s and 10 T-70s. The 26th Tank Brigade also had 6 T-34s knocked out. One is left with the conclusion from an examination of the Soviet unit records that the claims of 22 T-34s killed by Staudegger on 8 July 1943, along with the 2 T-34s killed by Deutschland SS Infantry Regiment, are probably overstated. The claim that he stopped a panzer regiment is clearly incorrect, as Teterevino was taken and Das Reich reported that they later attacked out of Teterevino with 40 tanks.
Now granted, this is a very long footnote, but I have no way of otherwise addressing this issue. As it were, the claims of 22 T-34s by Staudegger are mentioned and quoted in my book from an interview done of retired Bundeswehr Brigadier General Guenther Baer (who was a tank commander with the II Battalion, Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Panzer Regiment in July 1943). He was interviewed in 1999.
Shalmjah border, February 2010. An operation to repatriate the mortal remains of Iranian soldiers killed during the Iran-Iraq War is carried out under the aegis of the ICRC. [CC BY-NC-ND / ICRC / M. Greub]
[This post is based on “Iranian Casualties in the Iran-Iraq War: A Reappraisal,” by H. W. Beuttel, originally published in the December 1997 edition of the International TNDM Newsletter.]
By 1995 Iran had conducted seventeen dedicated MIA [missing in action] retrieval operations from wartime battlefields. Approximately 80% of the MIAs are believed to lie in Iraqi territory. In that year Iran proposed a joint Iranian-Iraqi accord to retrieve the missing of both sides.[18] Brigadier General Mir Feisel Baqerzadeh and IRGC Brigadier General Behahim Safaie head the Special Commission for MIA Retrieval. Iran claimed to have recovered or settled some 21,000 cases by early 1995. In that time 2,505 MIAs had been retrieved by joint search operations in Iraq and another 12,638 in Iranian territory, the latter representing 85% of those estimated missing in Iranian held ground. Back calculating these figures indicates total Iranian missing was now regarded as 72,753, up 20% from the original figure of 60,711. By October 1996 the count was 24,000 retrieved.[19] By June of 1997 the number of MIA cases resolved had risen to 33,000 including 6,000 death certificates issued at family request for individuals of whom no trace had ever been found.[20] As of September 1997 the total number of MIA bodies recovered stood at over 37,000 according to Brigadier General Baqerzadeh.[21] “Martyr” (i.e. killed in action) status entitles the family to a $24,000 lump sum death benefit as well as a $280 monthly pension with provision for $56 a month for each dependent child from the Foundation for the Martyrs,[22]
The rate of actual forensic identification of the remains is unknown. One source mentions a positive identification of some 900. The standard practice seems to be determination of the operation in which they were martyred and the provincial origins of units in that engagement. Wartime operations which have yielded large numbers of MIA remains are Beit al-Moqqadas-4, Kheiber, Karbala-4, Karbala-5, Karbala-6, Karbala-8, Karbala-10, Ramazan, Badr, Kheiber, Muslim Ibn-e Aqil, Wal Fajir Preliminary Operation, Wal Fajir-1, Wal Fajir-2, Wal Fajir-6, Wal Fajir-8, Fath-5, and the Iraqi attacks on Majnoon and Shalamech, The retrieval operations are often dangerous and occur in former minefields. As of 1995 eleven IRGC personnel had been killed and fourteen seriously wounded in MIA retrieval operations. Individual military units often recover their own MIAs. In a speech at Gurgan, Ali Mirtaheri, head of the committee in charge of search teams for MIAs of the 27th Huzrat-e Rasul Pasdaran Infantry Division, stated in November 1997 that divisional teams had recovered 1,610 MIA bodies. Forty-two team members from the division have been killed and another eighty maimed in the operations (probably from leftover mines).[23]
Due to the number of cases and the vigorous retrieval operations MIA funerals tend to be mass affairs. Burials in Tehran alone tell the story. In October 1993 208 were buried in Tehran and 360 in other locations. In October 1994 1,000 martyrs were buried in Tehran; in April 1995 another 600 of 3,000 just recovered MIAs and the following month 405 more in Mashad; in October 1995 600 were interred; 750 in October 1996; 1,000 more in January 1997; in July 1997 another 2,000 including 400 from Tehran Province were interred nationwide; in September 1997 200 of 1,233 interred nationwide, including 47 in Qazvin, 34 in Khuzistan, 5 in Shustar and 5 in Sistan-Baluchistan. Of these only 118 were unknowns.[24] Unrecovered Iranian MIAs are carried as active soldiers on their unit personnel rolls with their current status listed simply as “still at the front.” Iran has also recovered Iraqi MIAs, returning up to 400 bodies at a time in a mutual exchange program usually accomplished at the Khosrawi border station in Kermanshah Province.[25] A total of 31,000 Iraqi bodies have been so returned compared to 2,500 Iranian dead returned by Iraq as of January 1997.[26] In January 1997, in conjunction with the Iraqi return of the remains of sixty Iranian MIAs of the Wal Fajir Preliminary Operation, Brigadier General Mir Feisel Baqerzadeh stated that Iran was willing to assume all search responsibilities and associated costs for both Iraqi and Iranian MIAs on Iraqi territory should Iraq not wish to continue recovery operations.[27] In May 1997 Brigadier General Mohammed Balar, spokesman for the Commission for Iranian PoWs, called on international organizations to pressure Iraq to clarify the status of 20,000 Iranian MIAs.[28]
Mr Beuttel, a former U.S. Army intelligence officer, was employed as a military analyst by Boeing Research & Development at the time of original publication. The views and opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Boeing Company.
NOTES
[18] “Iran Proposes Joint Committee to Decide Fate of PoWs,” Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), 18 October 1993.
[19] “The Remains of 750 Iranian Soldiers…” Al Akhbar Muslim World News, 15 October 1996.
[20] “Remains of Twenty Martyrs of Imposed War Handed Over to Iran,” IRNA, 1 June 1997.
[21] “Funeral Service to be Held Nationwide for 1,233 War Martyrs,” IRNA, 1 October 1997.
[23] “37,000 Bodies of Martyrs Discovered in Seven Years,” IRNA, 10 November 1997.
[24] “Funeral Procession War Martyrs,” IRNA, 7 July 1997; “The Remains of 750 Iranian Soldiers…”, Al Akhbar Muslim World News, 15 October 1996; “Funeral Service to be Held Nationwide for 1,233 War Martyrs,” IRNA, 1 October 1997; “Funeral Service for War Martyrs,” Iran Daily, 7 October 1997.
[25] “3,000 Bodies of Martyrs Found on Former Iran-Iraq Battlefields,” IRNA, 15 February 1995; “Funeral Service Held for 405 Martyrs in Mashad,” IRNA, 6 March 1995; “Cases of Over 21,000 MIA’s Settled So Far, IRNA, 19 February 1995; “568 More Bodies of Iran’s MIAs Uncovered,” IRNA, 17 October 1993; “Paper on PoW Issues,” IRNA, 31 May 1993; “IRGC Official: Investigations Continue to Find Our Martyrs’ Bodies,” IRNA, 20 February 1995; “Bodies of 65 Martyrs of Iraq-Imposed War Delivered to Iran,” IRNA, 13 August 1993; “Leader Attends Funeral for 600 Martys,” Iran News, 28 October 1995; “Leader Attends Funeral Service for 1,000 Martyrs,” Iran News, 20 October 1997; “War: MIAs Search Operation for MIAs Extended Another Year,” IRNA, 23 October 1995.
[26] “Funeral Ceremony for 1,000 Soldiers Killed in War Against Iraq,” Iran Weekly Press Digest, 21-31 January 1997.
[27] “Bodies of Sixty Martyrs Handed Over to Iran,” IRNA, 7 January 1997.
[28] “Iran Calls in International Clout to Find 20,000 PoWs,” Iran News, 20 May 1997.
At the end of July, mounting enemy pressure would push the battalion back and from then Jagdpanthers would start to become complete losses. The first took place on July 31, when the final drives of Lt. Scheiber’s Jagdpanther was damaged. The vehicle could not be recovered due to strong enemy artillery fire and lack of towing vehicles. It was blown up by the crew on Aug 2. On July 31, another 11 Jagdpanthers were damaged, but all of them were short time damage.
On Aug 1, the number of Jagdpanthers in long term repair increased from 1 to 3 and that number remained constant August 13. From July 31 to Aug 2, the number of tanks in short repair shrunk by 4, suggesting at least that many were repaired. On Aug 5, the number in short repair was 17, but it shrunk to 13 on July 6, again suggesting that 4 were repaired. Indeed, one of the Kampfgruppen was notified that it could expect to receive three Jagdpanthers from the workshops in the night or on Aug 6.
From Aug 7 onwards, the number of Jagdpanther in short repair increased. On Aug 14, 17 Jagdpanther were in short repair, but it was noted that spare parts had to be brought up to repair them. At this point the German supply situation in general was desperate, which meant that the arrival of spare parts was not very likely. The battalion was ordered to pull out and bring its vehicles in workshops along. Thus far, seven tanks had been irretrievably lost (including one confiscated by an SS-units and whose fate was unknown).
During all of August, the following complete losses (including command tanks) were recorded, by cause (including Scheiber’s Jagdpanther mentioned above):
Mechanical damage, tank blown up by crew: 12
Destroyed AT fire: 2
Stuck in terrain, could not move, subsequently hit by enemy tank, burnt out: 1
Destroyed by HE or phosporus rounds: 2
Damaged by enemy fire and blown up by crew since it could not be recovered: 2
Confiscated by SS-unit, unknown fate: 1
Lack of fuel, blown up by crew: 1
Carpet bombing at Rouen: 1
Up to the point when the battalion we know of at least 32 cases when tanks in the battalion were repaired, which can be contrasted to 7 cases of complete losses. Obviously, this includes vehicles that suffered technical damage during the approach march, but is must also be noted that all cases of damage are not mentioned by the war diary. In august, there are a few cases noted:
4 Aug: Unspecified number of Jagdpanther damaged by artillery fire.
5 Aug: One Jagdpanther damaged during march, short term repair.
10 Aug: One Jagdpanther damaged during march, short term repair.
12 Aug: 1 gun barrel damaged by enemy artillery fire.
13 Aug: 1 case of final drive failure
14 Aug: 2 damaged by artillery fire.
Given the data available, exact percentage calculations are perhaps not so meaningful, but it is clear that before the battalion began to pull out, the damage received was usually of such character that it is to be expected that it will be repaired.
What is also interesting is that losses due to presence of enemy ground combat units, or in some cases artillery fire, caused the Germans to blow up many Jagdpanthers. In fact, more than half the losses occurred in this way, which highlights the importance of controlling the ground.
Few Jagdpanthers were penetrated by AT rounds and in two of the cases, the vehicles could be repaired. Furthermore, the effects of artillery fire should not be neglected. Although a HE round is not likely to destroy a heavy tank, it may well (as is evident from several instances mentioned in the war diary) case damage to the tank and if ground units are close enough, the enemy tank will not be recovered.
The 654th Jagdpanther battalion is of course not an average unit. Nevertheless, its detailed war diary can contribute to a better understanding of tank losses and repairs.
The 654th Jagdpanther battalion fought in Normandy, on the eastern part of the front. Unlike most German battalion level records, the war diary plus annexes has survived for this unit. At battalion level, the fate of many tanks can often be tracked and this unit is no exception. Included in the annexes is a list of the Jagpanthers lost by the battalion, by chassis number or turret number and which includes date (and often time as well), location, cause, list of items recovered, etc. All information is taken from the war diary and its annexes.
When it started marching from Rocquigny near the Belgian border towards Normandy, it had 25 Jagdpanthers, On 27th July, three command Panthers and one Jagdpanther arrived at the battalion. They first had to be checked by the workshops and on July 29 they were ready for action.
Marching to Normandy took its toll of the battalion. There were several air attacks, which caused losses in the battalion, but none of the Jagdpanthers were destroyed. However, many Jagdpanthers suffered mechanical breakdowns. During the march (approx. 300 km) the following cases of damage was recorded: 18 final drives (a well-known problem), two engines, 2 oil coolers, 3 cooling fans, 1 torsion bar, 4 road wheels, 1 drive shaft, 4 drive sprockets, 2 idler wheels and 109 track links.
The result was that on July 17, the battalion had 8 operational Jagdpanther, 16 in short repair and 1 in long repair. Efforts by the repair and recovery services raised the operational readiness to 23 Jagdpanther on 30 July, 2 in long repair and 1 long repair. This includes one additional Jagdpanther that arrived on this day. Until July 26, the following damage had been caused by enemy action: 1 gear box, 4 radiators, 1 oil cooler, 4 cooling fans, 6 drive sprockets, 2 final drives, 16 road wheels.
It is unclear how many vehicles that were damaged up to this point, as single vehicles could have suffered more than one kind of damage. For example, a hit on a tank could cause damage to more than one road wheel. Before July 31, no Jagdpanther was completely lost.
The 2nd Coy arrived ahead of the rest of the battalion at the front in Normandy and it reported 6 operational Jagdpanther on July 7, when attached to the Panzer-Lehr division. It was however attached to 276th ID when Pz-Lehr left its sector. When moving on July 8, four Jagdpanthers broke down. Two more broke down on July 9, but four were also repaired. On July 11, one Jagpanther was penetrated in the left side armour and three crew members were wounded, but no other damage was recorded. Also, another Jagpanther was penetrated (does not say from which direction). The loader was killed and the commander, driver and gunner were wounded. The crew still managed to drive the tank into safety.
At least one Jagpanther was repaired by the company between 12 and 17 July.
Given the increase in operational Jagpanthers from July 17 and 29 at least 14 must have been repaired. At least five were repaired by 2nd Coy before July 17. So far we have indications of 19 repairs. However, there were further Jagdpanthers damaged between July 18 and 29. On July 20, two were damaged by enemy artillery fire and classified as short repair. Two days later, a periscope on one Jagdpanther was destroyed by enemy artillery fire. On July 26 one Jagdpanther caught fire in the engine room, not by enemy action. Vehicle classified as short repair. Four days later, one Jagdpanther was damaged by artillery fire and classified as short repair.
There were at least five vehicles damaged in this period when the operational readiness rose due to the efforts of the mechanics. We can conclude that at least 24 had been repaired before July 31. But this cannot possibly account for all vehicles damaged Also, it is clear that the kind of damage sustained thus far was of a kind that ought to be repaired and it can safely be assumed that more than 100 % of its Jagdpanthers had been in repair and not a single one had been lost.
The Martyrs Memorial to the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) in Imam Khomeini Square, Hamadan, Iran. [KiwiOutThere]
[This post is based on “Iranian Casualties in the Iran-Iraq War: A Reappraisal,” by H. W. Beuttel, originally published in the December 1997 edition of the International TNDM Newsletter.]
The Iran-Iraq War was the longest sustained conventional war of the 20th Century. Lasting from 22 September 1980 to 20 August 1988, the seven years, ten months, and twenty-nine days of this conflict are some of the least understood in modem military history. The War of Sacred Defense to the Iranians and War of Second Qadissiya to Iraqis is the true “forgotten war” of our times. Seemingly never ending combat on a scale not witnessed since World War I and World War II was the norm. Casualties were popularly held to be enormous and, coupled with the lack of battlefield resolution year after year, led to frequent comparisons with the Western Front of World War I. Despite the fact that Iran had been the victim of naked Iraqi aggression, it was the Iraqis who were viewed as the “good guys” and actively supported by most nations in the world as well as the world press.
Studying the Iran-Iraq War is beset with difficulties. Much of the reporting done on the war was conducted in a slipshod manner. Both Iraq and Iran tended to exaggerate each other’s losses. As oftentimes Iraqi claims were the only source, accounts of Iranian losses became exaggerated. The data is highly fragmentary, often contradictory, usually vague in particulars, and often suspect as a whole. It defies complete reconciliation or adjudication in a quantitative sense as will be evident below.
There are few stand-alone good sources for the Iran-Iraq War in English. One of the first, and best, is Edgar O’Ballance, The Gulf War (1988). O’Ballance was a dedicated and knowledgeable military reporter who had covered many conflicts throughout the world. Unfortunately his book ends with the Karbala-9 offensive of April 1987. Another good reference is Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (1990). Hiro too is a careful journalist who specializes in South Asian affairs. Finally, there is Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War Volume III: The Iran-Iraq War (1990). This is the most comprehensive treatment of the conflict from a military standpoint and tends to be the “standard” reference. Finally there are Iranian sources, most notably articles appearing since the war in the Tehran Times, Iran News, the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) and others.
This paper will approach the subject of losses in the conflict from the Iranian perspective. This is for two reasons. First, too often during the war Iraqi claims and figures were uncritically accepted out of prejudice against Iran. Secondly, since the War the Iranians have been more forthcoming about details of the conflict and though not providing direct figures, have released related quantified data that allows us to extrapolate better estimates. The first installment of this paper examines the evidence for total Iranian war casualties being far lower than popularly believed. It will also analyze this data to establish overall killed-to-wounded ratios, MIA and PoW issues, and the effectiveness of chemical warfare in the conflict. Later installments will analyze selected Iranian operations during the war to establish data such as average loss rate per day, mean length of engagements, advance rates, dispersion factors, casualty thresholds affecting breakpoint and other issues.
Casualties as Reported and Estimated
Too often incorrect formulae were applied to calculate casualties or the killed-to-wounded ratio. The standard belief was that Iran suffered two wounded for every killed—a ratio not seen since the ancient world. Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy established that the average distribution of killed-to-wounded in 20th Century warfare is on the order of 1:4 and in fact this relationship may be as old as the year 1700.[1] In Operation Peace for Galilee of 1982 the Israeli ratio of killed-to-wounded was on the order of 1:6.5 while the Syrian was 1:3.56.[2] At the same time in the Falklands, U.K. casualty ratio was 1:3. For Argentine ground forces it was 1:4.85.[3] Also it was assumed that Iran must have suffered 3-4 times the casualties of Iraqi forces in many given engagements on the basis of no good evidence this author can find.
Typical Western estimates of Iranian losses in the war are given below.[4]
The lowest estimate of Iranian KIA was from the Pentagon which estimated the killed (military and civilian) at 262,000.[5]
At the end of 1980 the Iraqis claimed 4,500 Iranian KIA and 11,500 WIA.[6] Iraqi claims as of 22 September 1981 were 41,779 Iranian KIA[7] By the end of August 1981 other estimates placed it as 14,000-18,000 KIA and some 26,000-30,000 WIA.[8] Alternate estimates placed this at 14,000 KIA and 28,000 WIA,[9] Still others claimed 38,000 KIA.[10] During the first half of 1982 estimate was 90,000 Iranians killed.[11] Iran’s casualties in its 1984 offensives resulted in 30,000-50,000 more KIA.[12] In mid-1984 Iran’s KIA were 180,000-500,000 and WIA 500,000-825,000.[13] By 23 March 1985, Iranian KIA may have been 650,000 with 490,000 “seriously” wounded.[14] In September 1986 the count of Iranian dead was 240,000.[15] By April 1987 Iran had 600,000-700,000 KIA and twice that number wounded.[16] Iraq claimed 800,000 total Iranian KIA at the time of the cease-fire.[17] Figure 1 graphically depicts this reporting.
Official Iranian statistics released on 19 September 1988 immediately after the cease fire listed the following casualty figures:
Mr Beuttel, a former U.S. Army intelligence officer, was employed as a military analyst by Boeing Research & Development at the time of original publication. The views and opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Boeing Company.
[3] Martin Middlebrook, Task Force: The Falklands War, 1982, Revised Edition; London: Penguin Books, 1987, pp. 382-385; Martin Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, London: Penguin Books, 1990, pp. 283-284. The low British ratio in the Falklands is a result of many ground forces being killed in mass while still aboard the Sir Galahad. This deflates the ratio vis a vis that actually experienced in ground combat. The shipborne dead should more properly be considered naval casualties.
