Mystics & Statistics

Front Line Traces in Ukraine

With the help of some volunteer labor, we have produced a more precise set of front-line traces. I have done a couple of quick and dirty estimates before, but I never took the time to measuring it up right. Now we have done something a little more exacting. The google maps with the borders that we used is here: Google Earth. Clicking on the left hand menu will allow one to see how the border was measured. This was the work of Jack Flairty.

1. Length of the front line on 1 January 2014: This is land border with Russia.

  • 1,974 kilometers
  • 1,227 miles

2. Length of the front line 2016-2021: The border of the LPR and DPR and Ukraine.

  • 336 kilometers
  • 227 miles

3. Length of the front line 24 February 2022: This includes 1) part of the border with Belarus that is used by Russia, 2) part of the border with Russia from Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy to Kharkiv, 3) the border of the LPR and DPR, 4) the border with Crimea.

  • 1,706 kilometers
  • 1,060 miles

4. Length of the front line 1 March 2022: This includes 1) part of the border with Belarus that is used by Russia (they did expand it), 2) the front line trace from Kyiv to Chernihiv, to Sumy, to Kharkhiv down to Izyum, 3) the front line trace down to Mariupol. 4) the front line trace through Zaporizhzhia and Kherson province.

  • 3,011 kilometers
  • 1,871 miles

5. Length of the front line 1 April 2022.

  • 2,333 kilometers
  • 1,450 miles

6. Length of the front line 1 May 2022: This no longer includes Belarus.

  • 2,144 kilometers
  • 1,332 miles

7. Length of the front line 1 June 2022

  • 2,418 kilometers
  • 1,503 miles

8. Length of the front line 1 July 2022

  • 1,900 kilometers
  • 1,180 miles

9. Length of the front line 1 August 2022

  • 1,753 kilometers
  • 1,089 miles

10. Length of the front line on 1 June 2024.

  • 1,633 kilometers
  • 1,015 miles

 

Previous posts on the subject:

The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – rev. 1 – The Dupuy Institute

Length of Front Line Trace in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute

We have sold out of Attrition

Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War is no longer for sale by The Dupuy Institute. We sent out our last two copies last week. We still hold copies of everything else listed here: Books – The Dupuy Institute

If you want Attrition, it is available on Amazon.com, but at a hefty price of $180: Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War: Dupuy, Trevor N.: 9780963869234: Amazon.com: Books. We sold our copies for $19.95.

There is little chance we will publish it again. The rights are held by the Dupuy family, not us. We sold 54 copies over the course of 9 years. This hardly justifies a new print run.

You were warned: We our down to our last 16 copies of Attrition – The Dupuy Institute. We did sell those 16 copies in 9 months.

Aces at Kursk is for sale on Amazon.com (U.S.)

It looks like Aces at Kursk is for sale in the U.S. on Amazon.com. The link is here: Aces at Kursk: The Battle for Aerial Supremacy on the Eastern Front, 1943: Lawrence, Christopher A: 9781399081436: Amazon.com: Books

Yesterday they were reporting 19 in stock, this morning it was 16. So it does look like they were selling and shipping. Let me know when someone sees copies in the book stores.

 

I was in Liverpool

My grandfather was born in Rhyl Wales and grew up in Liverpool England. Here is a copy of his shipping record during the Great War. He did five voyages during the war. He did a voyage to Murmansk afterwards during the Russian Civil War (which I have blogged about twice: see Murmansk – The Dupuy Institute and  Mutiny in Murmansk – The Dupuy Institute).

The first two voyages were on the SS Adriatic. I think this is it: RMS Adriatic (1906) – Wikipedia. My grandfather had just turned 15 when he went on his first voyage. Both voyages were to New York and back.

Next voyage was in the SS Cedar Branch.  I think this is it: SS Aenos (1910) – Wikipedia. It is listed in the log book at 2222 tons and 404 HP. She is listed in Wikipedia as 3,554 GRT and 2,222 NRT. The voyage was to Gallao or Callao. Callao is the main port for Peru. 

His fourth voyage was with the Maria de Larrrinaga. Don’t have a Wikipedia link to that ship, but it was 2678 net tons and 429 HP. It is listed here:  Larrinaga Line (theshipslist.com). The destination is listed as OHMS (On His Majesty’s Service).

His fifth voyage was with the Dictator. I do not have a link to here. The number 3149 is written in the lower right corner of the ship listing. The voyage was to Gibraltar and the U.S.A.

The war ended on 11/11/18 (now Armistice Day). On 14/11/18 he went to sea on the Nigeria. This is the ship that brought him to Murmansk. The number 2590 is written in the lower right corner of the ship listing. The destination is listed as OHMS.

Recent Russo-Ukrainian War Blog Posts

See how it may be a bit before I start blogging again on Ukraine, let me list our most recent Russo-Ukrainian war blog posts:

Day 846 – So how goes the war? – The Dupuy Institute

This is over a month old.

The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – rev. 1 – The Dupuy Institute

Density of Deployment in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute

The Russo-Ukrainian War is still a limited war – The Dupuy Institute

 

Last Six Blog Posts

I was quiet last week because I was on travel. Here are my last six blog posts before I went silent:

The front is really not 1,200 kilometers long – rev. 1 – The Dupuy Institute

Density of Deployment in Ukraine – The Dupuy Institute

People keep referencing us on the 3-to-1 Rule – The Dupuy Institute

The Russo-Ukrainian War is still a limited war – The Dupuy Institute

Definition of Limited War – The Dupuy Institute

Aces at Kursk is available in the UK – The Dupuy Institute

The Aces at Kursk book is listed on Amazon.com (U.S.) as being available as of 25 July. Do not have confirmation of that yet. It was available in the UK as of 9 July.

 

July’s Revised Schedule for the Third Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 8 – 10 October 2024

Had an informative, interesting and enjoyable visit to York, UK to attend the Niall MacKay organized HADSS: Final Schedule for HADSS 2024 – The Dupuy Institute

Good stuff and a wonderful city. My understanding is that the next HADSS will be held there in 2026.

Meanwhile, the third HAAC is coming up in less than three months. The current schedule is:

Schedule: Pike and Gallows Conference Center

Updated: revised 23 July 2024

 

Day 1: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 0930   Introductory remarks – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

0930 – 1030   Studying Combat: The “Base of Sand” Problem – Dr. Shawn R. Woodford

1030 – 1130   Slouching Towards Wabash: The Withering of Historical Analysis in the American Profession of Arms – Ivan Torres (Major, U.S. Army, ret.)

1130 – 1230   Redux: Quantifying Warfare – Alexandru Filip (Canadian Center for Strategic Studies)

1230 – 1400   Lunch

1400 – 1500   Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII – Sasho Todorov, esquire  

1500 – 1600   Validation Challenges in Wargaming: What’s Real Here? – Dr. Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1600 – 1700   open

 

Evening (1900):   Group Dinner – Rangos

 

Day 2: Analysis of Unconventional Warfare

0900 – 1000   Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1000 – 1100   Haiti: The Risks of a Failed State in the Western Hemisphere – Dr. Christopher Davis

1100 – 1200   Native American Wars and Conflicts, 1500-1900 – Dr. David Cuberes

1200 – 1300   Lunch

1300 – 1400   The Islamic State of Khorasan: The Evolution of Terrorism – Dr. Christopher Davis

1400 – 1500   The Gaza Death Numbers – Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University)

1500 – 1600   Open

1600 – 1700   Group Discussion: The Next Middle East Wars

 

Evening (1900):   Group Dinner – BJs

 

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000   Close Combat Overmatch Weapons (SLAMMER) – Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)

1000 – 1100   The Debate over French Armored Warfare Doctrine 1935 to 1940 – Dr. James Slaughter

1100 – 1200   Ground Warfare in 2050: How it Looked in 2017 – Dr. Alexander Kott

1200 – 1300   Lunch

1300 – 1400   The Red Army’s Offensive Operations in Ukraine, 1943-44 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1400 – 1500   Critique of Western Wargames of NATO-WP Conflict – Walker Gargagliano

1500 – 1600   Capabilities of FPV drones in Ukraine: Revolution or Continuation of Historical Quantitative Trend? – Dr. Alexander Kott 

1600 – 1700   Group Discussion: Russo-Ukrainian War

 

Evening:   Happy hour – Rangos 

 

 

Schedule: Einstein Conference Room

 

Day 1: Poster and Book Room

Opened at 0800

 

Afternoon Day 1: Air Warfare Analysis

1400 – 1500   open

1500 – 1600   Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII (part 2 or overflow presentation) – Sasho Todorov, esquire 

1600 – 1700   open

 

Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat – mostly virtual

0900 – 1000   Designing Computer Based AI Wargaming Systems for Simulating and Investigating Historical Battles – Clinton Reilly (Computer Strategies, Australia) – virtual

1000 – 1100   Beaches by the Numbers – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill (Concordia University, Quebec) – virtual

1100 – 1200   Surveying and Quantifying Naval Warfare – Alexandru Filip

1200 – 1300   Lunch

1300 – 1400   Urban Warfare: Myths and Reality – Dr. James Storr (UK) – virtual

1400 – 1500   Urban Warfare (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1500 – 1600   New Findings on Artillery Suppression – Dr. Dermot Rooney (Wapentakes) – virtual

1600 – 1700   Winfield Scott: Architect of American Joint Warfare (LtC. Nathan A. Jennings) – virtual 

 

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000   The Impact of Horses on Native Americans – Dr. David Cuberes

1000 – 1100   The Red Army’s Plans for a Preemptive Attack in 1941 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1100 – 1200   Mass Egress after an IED Explosion: Lessons Learned about Validation – Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1200 – 1300   Lunch    

1300 – 1400   Political Science Pedagogy in Strategic Studies (A Contrast in Quantified History) – Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill – virtual

1400 – 1500   open

1500 – 1600   open

1600 – 1700   open

 

Friday, October 11: Tour of a Civil War Battlefield – Antietam: bloodiest day of the U.S. Civil War (and in the Western Hemisphere?). –  we will arrange transport there and back ($20 charge for tour).

Definition of Limited War

Just for the record, here is the definition of a “limited war” from The Dictionary of Military Terms, by Trevor N. Dupuy, Curt Johnson and Grace P. Hayes (1986). page 137.

Limited war – 1) A war looked upon by one or more of its contestants as not involving its own sovereignty or most vital interests, and as being limited in at least one respect, as, for example, to a particular geographic area, to the employment of certain resources, or to the number of contestants. 2) A war considered by a detached observer as relatively limited in some key respect, especially with regard to political objectives. 
 

This is still the best dictionary of military terms out there. Vastly superior to what is published by the Pentagon.  

The Russo-Ukrainian War is still a limited war

It may not feel that way to a lot of the participants, but the Russo-Ukrainian War is still a limited war. It is not like WWI or WWII and is not likely the opening shots in WWIII. It is a limited war over limited territorial objectives. For Ukraine, it is nominally a war for national survival, but it is not for Russia.

The economic commitment of two sides is limited. In 2023, Russia committed only 4.1% of its economy to defense spending. I gather it is now about 7% for 2024. Ukraine in 2023 was committing a stated 37% to defense. In a full scale war you would expect to see 25% or more. For the Ukrainian allies, it is a lot less. In all cases, their percent of aid to Ukraine is less than 1% (Estonia provided 1.4% of its GDP in 2022). In most cases, it is well less than 1%. Their actual total defense spending of our NATO allies varies between 1.2 and 3%, with the U.S. spending 3.47% on defense in 2022. The latest U.S. aid package of $61 billion was 0.2 percent of our economy (our GDP is almost 29 Trillion). To put it in dollars and sense terms, if your income was $60,000 a year, it would be like contributing $127 to Ukraine.

And then there is mobilization. The Russian Armed Forces are 1,320,000 or 0.9% of their population of 146 million. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are 1,250,000+ or 3.7% of their population of 33 million. These are not particularly high mobilization figures for Russia and not maximized mobilization for Ukraine. For example, Ukraine is not drafting people under 25. I remember we were sending a lot of 18-year olds to Vietnam (and my older brother did get his draft number). For the record, the U.S. Armed Forces is 1,328,000 or 0.4% of our population of 334 million.

Now the actual size of the forces deployed forward are much smaller. We are estimating 450-617K for the Russians and 300-400K for the Ukrainians.

Although it was clear that the Russian objectives in 2022 were to eliminate Zelenskyy and occupy Kyiv, they have considerably reduced their objectives (thanks to failure of their operations in 2022 and the stiff defense put up by the Ukrainians). Now their objectives are four provinces (Lugansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson) in addition to continuing to hold onto Crimea and Sevastopol. Of those four provinces, Russian currently controls almost all of one and the majority of the territory in the other three. It does not control the capital city or the majority of the population in two of those three provinces. It claims all four and have officially annexed them. Russia has stated that turning over control of these four provinces are the conditions for peace. It will be a while before we see peace there.

Finally, losses are not at WWI and WWII levels. Ukrainian combat killed is at least 30,000 and probably at least twice that.  Russian killed is at least 60,000 and probably higher. Ukrainian civilian deaths are at least 10,000 and probably higher. Total military deaths in WWI were over 9 million. Total military deaths killed in WWII was over 24 million and civilian deaths maybe 49 million. Total killed in Korea was 2-3 million of which 33,686 were U.S. killed and 7,586 were U.S. missing (almost certainly all were killed). Total killed in the Vietnam War was 1 to 2 million, of which 58,281 were U.S. killed and 1,584 are still missing in action. These last two are considered limited wars. 

So yes, the Russo-Ukrainian War is a limited war. It is also a war of national survival for Ukraine, for if they negotiate at a loss (i.e. surrender Lugansk or Donetsk provinces, or conduct a cease fire in place), then there is a high probability that this will not be the last Russo-Ukrainian War.