Mystics & Statistics

U.S. Defense Budget

By the way, the defense budget is supposed to be going up (maybe). Now, it has been in decline a while. We were told by a U.S. Army director back in 2009 not to expect continued support because of upcoming budget cuts. This was before sequestration. Sequestration basically shrunk the Army’s budget by 5% or so every year for three years running (2013-2015). It was “lifted” for 2016, but this only meant that the budget did not decline further. The U.S. Army went from a high of around 570,000 troops in 2010 to around 475,000 troops now. They were preparing to continue drawing down to around 450,000 troops.

Now, budget is supposed to be increasing. The Army is supposed to grow to 540,000 troops, the navy from a 275-ship navy to a 355-ship navy and our nuclear forces are supposed to be upgraded. So far the only thing slated for reduction is the F-35 (maybe). The U.S. is still running a deficit and certainly tax increases are not on the horizon; in fact they are talking about tax cuts. Hard to know how this is going to all balance out.

The defense budget authorized for FY2017 is 618.7 billion. We are already four months into that fiscal year. It was 604.2 authorized in 2016.

The nominated head of OMB (Office of Management and Budget) is a tea-party fiscal conservative: mulvaney-defense-budget

…

P.S. The defense budget basically increased every year from 1996 to 2008, going from 266 billion (16.8% of the total government budget) to 696 billion (20.9% of total government budget). In was 698 in 2009, 721 in 2010, 717 in 2001, 681 in 2012, 610 in 2013, 614 in 2014 and 637 in 2015 (16.0% of total government budget). This is not inflation adjust dollars: Military_budget_of_the_United_States

P.P.S.: According to one source the size of the United States Army in 2010 was 566,045 in 2010: us-military-personnel-1954-2014

 

South China Sea

The South China Sea has moved front-and-center as a major issue (along with the one China policy): prevent-china-taking-over-territory

Just a few notes:

  1. Tillerson’s statement on Jan. 11 during confirmation hearings was “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.”
  2. Presidential spokesman Sean Spicer said yesterday “The U.S. is going to make sure that we protect our interests there.”
  3. And from the article: “Aides have said that Trump plans a major naval build-up in East Asia to counter China’s rise.”

Not sure what the “clear signal” is and how confrontational this will be. Right now, it is just talk. But, does this mean that the Trump administration is intending to expand the navy?

East Mosul Taken

By the way, amid all the discussion in the news on crowd sizes, Eastern Mosul fell, sort of. Article here: Iraqi-forces-complete-control-eastern-mosul

Highlights:

  1. “The deputy parliament speaker [of Iraq] announced the capture of the east of the city.”
  2. “Mopping-up operations were still under way on Monday….”
  3. “The west side of Mosul could prove more complicated to take than the east as it is crisscrossed by streets too narrow for armored vehicles.”
  4. “Iraq forces estimated the number of militants inside the city at 5,000 to 6,000 at the start of operations three months ago, and says 3,300 have been killed in the fighting since.”
  5. Took 100 days from the start of the campaign. Two weeks to get there and twelve weeks to clear the east side of the city.

An Additional Comment on the Link Between Operations, Strategy, and Policy In Russian Hybrid Warfare

A conclusion that Fox alluded to in his article, but did not state explicitly, is that in a sense, the Russians “held back” in the design of their operations against the Ukrainians. It appears quite clear that the force multipliers derived from the battalion tactical groups, drone-enabled recon-strike model, and cyber and information operations capabilities generated more than enough combat power for the Russians to decisively defeat the Ukrainian Army in a larger “blitzkrieg”-style invasion and occupy most, if not all, of the country, if they had chosen to do so.

This clearly is not the desired political goal of the Russian government, however. Instead, the Russian General Staff carefully crafted a military strategy to fulfill more limited political goals, and creatively designed their operations to make full use of their tactical capabilities in support of that strategy.

This successful Clausewitizan calibration of policy, strategy, operations, and tactics by the Russians in Ukraine and Syria should give the U.S. real concern, since itself does not currently seem capable of a similar level of coordination or finesse. Now, the Russian achievements against the relatively hapless Ukrainians, or in Syria, where the ultimate outcome remains very much indeterminate, are no guarantee of future success against more capable and well-resourced opponents. However, it does demonstrate what can be achieved with a relatively weak strategic hand to play through a clear unity of political purpose and military means. This has not been the U.S.’s strong suit historically, and it is unclear at this juncture whether that will change under the incoming Trump administration.

Linking Operations, Strategy, and Policy In Russian Hybrid Warfare

Map depicting the encirclement and withdrawal of Ukrainian forces in the Debaltseve area, 14 January – 20 February 2015 [Map by Goran tek-en (Wikipedia)]

U.S. Army Major Amos Fox, who is quickly establishing himself as one of the brighter sparks analyzing the contemporary Russian way of land warfare, has a new article, “The Russian–Ukrainian War: Understanding the Dust Clouds on the Battlefield,” published by West Point’s Modern War Institute. In it he assesses the linkage between Russian land warfare operations, strategy, and policy.

In Fox’s analysis, despite the decisive advantages afforded to the Russian Army and their Ukrainian Separatist proxies through “the employment of the semi-autonomous battalion tactical group, and a reconnaissance-strike model that tightly couples drones to strike assets, hastening the speed at which overwhelming firepower is available to support tactical commanders,” the actual operations executed by these forces should be characterized as classic sieges, as opposed to decisive operational maneuver.

Fox details three operations employing this approach – tactical combat overmatch enabling envelopment and the subsequent application of steady pressure – that produced military success leading directly to political results advantageous to the Russian government.

According to Fox, the military strategy of siege operations effectively enabled the limited political goals of the Russian government.

What explains Russia’s evident preference for the siege? Would it not make more sense to quickly annihilate the Ukrainians? Perhaps. However, the siege’s benefit is its ability to transfer military power into political progress, while obfuscating the associated costs. A rapid, violent, decisive victory in which hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers are killed in a matter of days is counterproductive to Russia’s political goals, whereas the incremental use of violence over time accomplishes the same objectives with less disturbance to the international community.

Fox believes that this same operational concept was applied by the Syrian Army and its Russian enablers to capture the city of Aleppo last month, albeit with somewhat different tactics, such as substituting airstrikes for long-range artillery and rockets.

He advises that the U.S. would be prudent to plan for and prepare to face the new Russian land warfare capabilities.

These new features of Russian warfare—and an understanding of them in the context of that warfare’s very conventional character—should inform US planning. The contemporary Russian army is combat-experienced in combined arms maneuver at all echelons of command, a skill that the US Army is still working to recover after well over a decade of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This fact could prove troublesome if Russia elects to push further in Europe, infringing upon NATO partners, or if US and Russian interests continue to collide in areas like Syria. Preparing to combat Russian cyber threats or hybrid tactics is important. But the lesson from Ukraine is clear: It is equally vital to train and equip US forces to counter the type of conventional capabilities Russia has demonstrated in Ukraine.

UPDATE: An Additional Comment on the Link Between Operations, Strategy, and Policy In Russian Hybrid Warfare

Economics of Warfare 10

Examining the tenth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

This lecture starts with a discussion of coups and assassinations, specifically focusing on a study of “CIA-supported coups.” There are five of them: Iran (1953), Chile (1973), Guatemala (1954), Congo (DRC) (1960) and Cuba (1961). All of these are over 40 years ago.  The chart on page 4, listing some of our nefarious operations is worth a glance. I find it curious that “Project Camelot” is listed, which was simply a research project done being done by the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) that got bad press. A timeline for the five coups are provided on slide 6. Of course, being economists, they tie all these events to stock prices. Still, it is worth looking at slide 8, discussing some points related to the Guatemala coup, as is the following slide, listing expropriated companies. They then look at the effects of secret coup authorizations on stock returns (hey, I thought they were secret !!!). The kicker is slide 16 “The results suggest that US foreign policy was operating as a tool of a handful of private companies and the individuals involved were profiteering off their influence on the US government.” Having never really analyzed this issue myself, I am hesitant to comment on it.

On slide 17 they switch to a study on assassinations. On slide 19 it is stated they came up with 298 assassination attempts since 1875 (to 2002) of which 59 were successful and 47 were not “serious attempts.” So, 23.5% of serious attempts succeed? How many times did they try to assassinate French president Charles De Gualle? Oh, and 55% of them were done by gun, 31% by explosive device (slide 20). Guns succeeded 31% of time, while explosive devices only succeeded 7% of the time. The “other category,” which apparently includes “stoning” succeeded 44% of the time! Slide 23 provides assassination attempts (and successes) over time, with World War II (1939-1945) being a particularly peaceful period of time (as far as assassinations go). The presentation then goes into a long discussion on the impact of assassinations on war, with their conclusions presented on slide 33. Basically it is 1) “There is some evidence that having a successful assassination attempt rather than a failed one increase the probability that an intense war will end.” and 2) “There is evidence that having a successful assassination attempt rather than a failed one increases the probability that a moderate war will turn into an intense war.” So….might work for you, might work against you?

In my book America’s Modern Wars, we do briefly discuss decapitating insurgencies (page 151-153). We also did not come up with a clear answer. We only had about dozen cases to look at, and of the four we examined in depth, in all cases the insurgency still won. Our conclusions were (page 153): “Now this is not to say we should not go after insurgent leadership when we have the chance. We obviously should. But, it is to stress that you should be careful about giving ‘decapitation’ too much importance as a strategic answer to your counterinsurgent problem.” and “Still, if you have the means to try decapitation, it is important to do so in such a way that you do not kill civilians or give them propaganda tools that they can use. In the end, if you are losing the propaganda war while you are trying to decapitate, then you are working against yourself.”  

The link to the lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%2010.pdf

Turkish Army Tanks Proving Vulnerable In Syria

Turkish Army Leopard 2A3 main battle tank struck by suspected Daesh Kornet anti-tank missile. [Photo: YouTube / Turkish Military Portal Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri]

The Turkish Army, conducting Operation EUPHRATES SHIELD in northern Syria since 24 August 2016, has reportedly lost at least 15 German-made, Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks (MBTs) to man-portable anti-tank systems (MANPATs) in combat with Daesh fighters. Five were lost in December 2016 after the Turks deployed several of its 354 Leopard 2A4’s to buttress its offensive, which initially employed mainly older, upgraded American-made M60A3 MBTs. 10 more Leopard 2’s were knocked out in subsequent fighting in urban terrain around the town of al-Bab in northern Syria, 15 miles south of the Turkish-Syrian border.

Daesh fighters have used a variety of anti-tank missiles against the Turkish Army vehicles, including U.S.-made BGM 71 TOW-2s, and Soviet/Russian-produced 9K111 Fagots (“Basoon”) and 9M133 Kornets, all reportedly captured from Syrian and Iraqi Army stocks. The 60-ton Leopard 2, a mainstay of NATO armored forces, earned a reputation for invulnerability after surviving Taliban improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Afghanistan. However, the A3 version used by the Turks does not have explosive reactive armor or active protection systems, which are used by the many modern MBTs to defeat the new generation of MANPATs.

There is also some evidence that Turkish tank losses are at least partly due to faulty tactical employment. Some of the M60s destroyed in the initial fighting were observed firing from open positions when hit, rather then from less vulnerable hull down locations. The Leopard 2A3’s, with heavy frontal armor, but thinner protection on the sides and rear, were designed for long-range tank v. tank fighting, and are notably unsuited for combat in urban terrain. Successful urban combat places a premium on combined arms tactics, particularly the use of dismounted infantry to clear out potential enemy MANPAT flanking fire positions.

Economics of Warfare 9

Examining the ninth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

This lecture opens with a discussion on government bond markets and World War II. As a military historian, this is not an approach I ever considered. Slide 3 is interesting. There is a noticeable decline in French government bond prices in the months leading up to May 1940 (the month the Germans actually invaded France). There is then a rather abrupt break in the graph.

Starting with slide 5 Dr. Spagat goes into a discussion of Angola and Jonas Savimbi (just to refresh your memory: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonas_Savimbi). The interesting result is that (slide 19), the end of the Savimbi rebellion (as determined by the date of his death) “…was bad for the diamond companies operating in Angola”….and interestingly enough (slide 23): “An important conclusion from the study is that it might be wrong to assume that businesses operating in war-torn countries and the government officials in these countries are all automatically in favor of pace. Influential actors may actually benefit economically from the continuation of a war.”

Dr. Spagat these switches to the ETA and the Basque Independence Movement in Spain (slide 24). This was a very small movement (see slide 25). The conclusion (slide 33) is that “…terrorism has been costly for the Basque region of Spain.”

Then Dr. Spagat switches gears to comparing European economic growth to Chinese economic growth (slide 34) over the course of around 1800 years. This is using Angus Maddison’s figures, which was an effort to measure the world economy by country over the course of history. I just happen to have a copy of his book, The World Economy, sitting on my desk. Strongly recommend everyone own a copy. Anyhow, the discussion from slide 35-38 addresses a hypothesis by Voightlander and Voth (their paper is linked on slide 35) that “They claim that Europe had a lot more wars than China did and that this actually explains why Europe grew more than China.” I am not sure I buy into this suggestion, and am I not sure that Dr. Spagat does either, but it is an interesting viewpoint.

Anyhow, not sure what the main takeaway is from all this, but it is damn interesting.

The link to the lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%209.pdf

 

Frickin’ Laser Beams

This is a fascinating short advertising video from British Aerospace Engineering Systems (BAE Systems) teasing the potential of laser beam weapons. It addresses the concept of using airborne lasers to create atmospheric lenses by temporarily heating and ionizing the atmosphere to enable long-range aerial surveillance and targeting. The same concept can also be used to counter anti-aircraft laser fire from ground platforms.

BAE Systems has been working on the military applications of lasers for a while, from laser tracking systems, aerial laser-guided rockets, and high energy lasers for shipborne point defense. The U.S. Army is working with General Dynamic to add lasers to its vehicles for point defense as well. Lasers have been used for military purposes for a long time and there is great anticipation for their potential. While the current state of laser technology may have its limitations, the future of warfare may well go pew-pew.

‘Your Lyin’ Eyes’: Visualizing the A2/AD Environment in Europe

The Russia – NATO A2AD Environment. [CSIS]

Over, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Ian Williams, Kathleen Weinberger, and Colonel John O’Grady have assembled data on NATO and Russian anti-access/area denial (known as A2/AD, love it or hate it) capabilities, which has been turned into a fascinating interactive graphic. The capabilities depicted include “air defenses, counter-maritime forces, and theater offensive strike weapons, such as short- or medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and other precision guided munitions.”

Information on the map is divided into six categories:

Russia – Air Defense: Includes deployments of long-range Russian anti-air missile systems. Specific systems represented are the S-300 and S-400. Not included in map are Russia’s shorter ranged, highly mobile air defense assets, such as the Buk family of surface to air missile systems. These “shoot and scoot” launchers are embedded with Russian ground forces, and thus do not have fixed locations.

Russia – Land-based Strike: Includes deployments of short-range offensive ballistic missile systems, such as the SS-26 or Iskander short-range ballistic missiles, as well as deployments of Russian Oniks anti-ship missiles to Kaliningrad.

Russia – Naval strike: This category reflects the range (from notional locations) of Russia’s sea-based SS-N-30A Kalibr-type cruise missiles, and its SS-N-27 Sizzler anti-ship missiles.

NATO – Air Defense: Shows the estimated coverage areas and home-base disposition of NATO PATRIOT missile units, separately showing ballistic missile and air defense coverage areas. Although not reflected in this map, NATO is heavily reliant on fighter aircraft for air defense.

NATO – Naval Strike: Reflects the estimated range of U.S. Tomahawk Block IV (TLAM-E) sea-based cruise missiles.

NATO – Ports of Debarkation/Embarkations (PODs): These points show key logistical infrastructure, such as airports and seaports (APODs / SPODs), that could be used by NATO forces.

Figuring out how to fight effectively in this environment is what is keeping American and Western national security thinkers and planners up at night these days. The Third Offset Strategy was the first crack at doing so. Whether it will survive into the incoming Trump administration remains to be seen, though some signs indicate that it will. Stay tuned, folks.