Mystics & Statistics

Economics of Warfare 4

Examining the fourth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

This one is on “opportunity costs,” linear regression, comparing unemployment rates to violence, and the effectiveness of some civil action problems in Iraq to violence. This discussion does get into the weeds, so to say. It is not casual reading.  The link to the lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%204.pdf

To summarize:

  1. On slide 9 there are links to two papers by Dr. Eli Berman and others: 1) Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines? (2011) and 2) Modest, Secure and Informed: Successful Development in Conflict Zones (2013).
  2. Conclusion on Berman’s first paper: It is a little more complicated than a simple trade-off between violence in an insurgency and unemployment (slides 11-13). In fact the relationship is “negative.” As Dr. Spagat notes (slide 26): “In summary, I would say that the relationship between unemployment and violence in Iraq is not tiny, but it is not big either.”
  3. Conclusions on Berman’s second paper: This one look at levels of funding versus insurgent attacks. There are of course problems with trying to determine cause and effect here (see slides 29-30). As Dr. Spagat notes (slide 41): “Again, we wind up with a statistically significant effect that does not have enormous practical significance.”

Now, I did discuss civil works briefly in Chapter 14 of America’s Modern Wars. It is a grab bag chapter called “Other Issues” that looked at 1) Duration of Insurgencies by Type of Insurgency, 2) Outcome of Insurgency by Type of Insurgency, 3) Winning Hearts and Minds, 4) Decapitating Insurgencies, 5) Early Suppression of Insurgencies, 6) Wounded to Killed Ratios, 7) Exchange Rates, 8) Bleeding an Insurgency to Death, and 9) Focus on Population.

In the section on “Winning Hearts and Minds” we ended up noting (on page 151) that:

As much as people talk about winning hearts and minds (a Vietnam-era phrase, which of course, was not entirely successful), there is no program, theory, agenda or list that tells the counterinsurgent what he must do to achieve this….

In the long run, there needs to be a focused analytical effort that looks at what efforts in other insurgencies have actually worked in the long run to gain support from the population, and what efforts in other insurgencies have not made that much of an impact. Considering the large amount of money being spent on these efforts, it is surprising that nothing systematic has been developed on this.

I do start the Chapter (page 147) with a great quote written by Bernard Fall in 1967:

Civic action is not the construction of privies or the distribution of anti-malaria sprays. One can’t fight an ideology; one can’t fight a militant doctrine with better privies. Yet this is done constantly. One side says, “Land Reform,” and the other side say, “Better culverts.” One side says “We are going to kill all of those nasty village chiefs and landlords.” The other side says, “Yes, but look, we want to give you prize pigs to improve your strain.” These arguments just do not match. Simple but adequate appeals will have to be found sooner or later.

Anyhow, it does not look like this has all been resolved yet. The line to remember is: “One can’t fight an ideology, one can’t fight a militant doctrine with better privies.”

Economics of Warfare 3

Examining the third lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

The link to the lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%203.pdf

This one starts with the war in Kosovo (1998-1999), which was actually a successful invention although very poorly done. It does pick on a constant theme of Dr. Spagat’s, which is how to get the correct counts of actual people killed in the conflicts, including civilians. For those of us who actually try to do things like quantitative analysis of insurgencies (for example America’s Modern Wars)….this is very useful. A lot of other people don’t particularly care, sometimes because a particularly high or low number serves their political agenda (or cosmology).

Starting on slide 11, Dr. Spagat discusses Iraq casualty estimates. This, along with Colombia, were the two areas we discussed with him when we were working on our Iraq and insurgency material (2004-2010). He was one of the few people out there doing work similar to ours. He points out that there were two estimates of deaths in Iraq, one of 150,000 and one of 600,000. Needless to say, the lower one was closer to correct. The higher number got heavily broadcast. This whole section is worth reviewing and remembering for any future conflicts. I like the picture on slide 14.

Sorry about this abstract look at some very sad and gruesome statistics.

P.S. Merry Christmas

Economics of Warfare 2

Examining the second lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

The link to the lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%202.pdf

It is all good stuff, but we don’t do a lot of work on terrorism, so don’t have any insights to add. We actually don’t have a category for “terrorism” so this is filed under “insurgencies.”

The point that got my attention was on slide 13 where he states: “Mueller and Stewart estimate that the US is spending about $75 billion per year more on terrorism after 9/11 happened than it was spending before 9/11. The real number is almost certainly bigger than this and, possibly, a lot bigger.”

Hmmm…..16 years since 9/11 times $75 = $1.2 trillion. Is this really the whole cost for the Global War on Terror?

Slide 12 gives economic “losses per incident.” The financial losses from 9/11 is estimated at $200 billion. Of course, there was considerable human life lost. Not sure how that is “costed.”

Anyhow, it is always interesting to see what the economists are looking at. It is worth flipping through the entire lecture. It is pretty interesting material.

Economics of Warfare 1

If you look at our “Interesting Links” down towards the bottom of the right side of the page, you will see a link to a blog called Wars, Numbers and Human Losses with the byline “The Truth Counts”: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

This is the blog of Professor of Economics Michael Spagat of England’s Royal Holloway University. He is American. We think highly of Dr. Spagat’s work. In particular, there a series of blog posts that publish the lectures of his course “Economics of Warfare.” A look at the first lecture is worthwhile: economics-of-warfare-lecture-1

The link to the lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%201.pdf

A couple of highlights:

  1. Slides 13 & 14 on the causes of casualties among civilians in Iraq.
  2. Slide 20 is damn interesting. More on civilian casualties over the first years of the Iraq War.

For those few who have read my book America’s Modern Wars, I do address civilian casualties, primarily in Chapter 9 “Rules of Engagement and Measurements of Brutality.”

Vincent Viola

We have a new nominated Secretary of the Army and I will try to avoid any obviously way too cute headlines or puns.

He is another New York billionaire from outside of the DC establishment: Vincent Viola and vincent-viola

Not much on him. Military experience is:

  1. Graduated from West Point 1977.
  2. I gather he served a full five years in the Army (bio doesn’t state, but that was the standard at the time).
  3. Is a reserve major.
  4. Has been involved in founding and funding the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and several other projects.

Anyhow, I gather the real challenge with the Army over the last few years has been the budget. With DOD taking 50% of the sequestration cuts (which were really a big deal), it does appear that the Army took about half of those defense cuts. The nature of things is that the Army does not have a lot of big ticket production items, like F-35s and Littoral Combat Ships, that are difficult to cancel and hard to cut. Instead their costs are in personnel, which are easier to cut (except for the people who get cut). In the last 5-6 years the Army has dropped from around 570,000 to around 480,000 people and was slated to drop to 450,000. Trump has said he is bringing the Army back up to 540,000. Not sure where that figure comes from and have my doubts that it will actually occur.

See: us-military-personnel-1954-2014 and end-strength

Anyhow, the budget for the Army is not going to be determined by Mr. Viola, although it may be influenced by him. There are lots of players involved in determining the budget and balancing the budget. The Trump’s administration’s first real budget will be next year, FY2018.

So, is it 25,000?

I hate to keep harping on this…..but I do believe in reasonable estimates of opposing forces strength and losses. I am not sure we are doing that.

  1. The U.S. claimed in August that there were 19,000 – 25,000 ISIL:Islamic State strength estimates
    1. I don’t believe I have seen strength estimates from before this time that is more than 25,000: Global Security
    2. About half were in Iraq.
  2. The U.S. now claims there are 12,000 to 15,000 ISIL: white-house-isis-down-to-12000-15000-battle-ready-fighters
    1. This includes 3,000 to 5,000 in Mosul: War updates
  3. The U.S. claims were have killed 50,000 in the last two years: Over 50000 killed
    1. Including 25,000 in the last 11 months: pentagon-counts-isil-dead-refuses-discuss-them
    2. 25,000 – 50,000 = 15,000…meaning they recruited 40,000 new fighters in the last two years?
  4. The U.S. claims were have attrited 75% of ISIL: US-Officials-Say-ISIS-Has-12-000
    1. 15,00 times 4 = 60,000…meaning working backwards this was the ISIL strength….or this includes the 40,000 new recruits added to a strength originally equal to 25,000? This math actually works, if you accept the figure of 40,000 new recruits.
    2. Of course, this is exterminating and replacing the entire ISIL force each year for two years in a row. Can’t really recall the historical president for this.
  5. The UK estimates we have killed 25,000 ISIL: uk-us-number-isis-fighters-killed
    1. This seems more reasonable.

Of course, part of the problem is that ISIL and every other insurgency movement out there does not consists only of full-time fighters. For example (see America’s Modern Wars: Chapter 11: “Estimating Insurgent Force Size”), looking at some the insurgent strength estimates from Vietnam, Cabanas (Mexico) and Shining Path (Peru), we came up with some rules of thumb for determining the mix of insurgents (see page 120):

  1. Full-time insurgents make up 10 to 20% of the force.
  2. Full-time and part-time insurgents are 20 to 50% of the force.
  3. Casual insurgents are 40 to 80% of the force.

This was based on a very limited selection of marginal data and of course, may not be relevant to ISIL, as they have developed a more conventional-like force structure. But, it does bring up the issue that most insurgencies are not only full-time committed fighters, but lots of people that only sometimes active (often regional), and a large collection of people that are only occasionally active (and may become inactive if things are not going well). Also, many of the insurgents are “support personnel” vice fighters. It is an issue that I don’t believe I have seen anyone else attempt to deal with analytically. Our efforts were only preliminary.

Syria After Aleppo

Reports of the collapse of resistance by forces fighting the regime of Bashar Al Assad in Aleppo, Syria have overshadowed news of the recent recapture of Palmyra by Daesh fighters. While the conquest of Aleppo is a significant victory for Assad, the loss of Plamyra – which had been recaptured by the Syrian Army earlier in the year – clearly indicates that success will not be decisive in bringing the five-year old civil war to an end.

Despite major assistance from Russia and Iran, the Syrian Army lacks the combat power to defeat the various domestic and foreign rebel forces arrayed against it. The army, estimated to number over 300,000 before the conflict began, is now believed to total less than half of that as a result of casualties, desertions, and fatigue. It has become particularly weak in infantry. In an attempt to remedy this, the Syrians have raised religiously and politically indoctrinated National Defense Forces (NDF) militias with the help of Iranian advisors, although they are of uncertain quality. The Iranians Qods Force and Lebanese Hizbollah have contributed advisor and fighters, respectively, and the Russians have also contributed advisors and heavy artillery and air support.

Reliable estimates of force strengths for the various factions are hard to come by, and figures for the Syrian Army are particularly variable. The Syrian Kurds are currently aligned against Daesh and Jubhat Fateh al-Sham (the current name for al Qaeda fighters in Syria). They seek independence from the Assad regime but are not fighting against it at this time.

Even the most optimistic estimates based on back-of-the-envelope counts of the raw numbers do not credit the Assad regime and its patrons with enough of a force ratio advantage to overwhelm their opponents in the sort-term. If the pessimistic estimates are more accurate, despite local successes, the Syrian government may struggle simply to maintain the status quo.

During the presidential campaign, Donald Trump promised to intensify U.S. efforts effort to defeat Daesh and to work with Russia to that end. Analysts believe, however, that Russia supports Assad’s calculated strategy to defeat Syrian Sunni rebels first to eliminate the political threat they pose to his regime, before seeking to defeat Daesh and al Qaeda. Precisely what the incoming Trump administration will do differently than currently and the extent of actual military cooperation with Assad and Russia remains to be seen.

Pivot to Russia?

This is an interesting article on the U.S. deliberately pivoting from China to Russia: 45-years-ago-kissinger-envisioned-a-pivot-to-russia-will-trump-make-it-happen?

I am not sure I buy into any of it !!!…..but it got my attention.

The argument:
  1. 45 years ago Kissinger told Nixon that the next president would have to pivot towards Russia in 20 years.
  2. In effect, he envisioned the United States playing a balance of power role between China and Russia, moving back and forth between the two.
  3. Is this what Trump is doing with his recent negative comments on China and positive comments on Russia?
Factiods that got my attention:
  1. “As a means to block the spread of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia, Carter administration officials approved of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, which occurred shortly after Deng Xiaoping concluded the first trip of a Chinese leader to the United States in January 1979.” …..Really?
  2. “China’s economy was once a fraction of the Soviet economy; now it’s about five times larger.” …….it is always useful to look at GDP.

What is missing?

What is missing from the list of Trump’s foreign and national security policy team is an established foreign policy expert or established foreign policy professional. There is no one like a Kissinger or Brzezinski. Of the seven people nominated (the list is below) two are businessmen with no prior government or foreign policy experience, three are retired generals, one has no real experience, and there is only one who has spent a significant part her career in foreign policy (McFarland). McFarland is not a major name, although she was on the board of Jamestown Foundation, effectively headed by Brzezinski. She does not report directly to the president.

Their degrees are interesting:
Haley = BS in Accounting,
Tillerson = BS in Civil Engineering,
Ross = MBA.

 

The three generals are better educated:
Mattis = BA in History. Graduate of National War College…does he have an MA or MS or only a BA?
Flynn = An MBA Telecommunications, MA in National Security and Strategic Studies.
Kelly = MS from National Defense University.

 

McFarland has a MA in Politics, Philosophy and Economics and studied for a PhD but never completed her dissertation.

The real senior foreign policy experts appear to be the retired generals. Keep in mind, that many retired generals are not foreign policy experts. They often spend the first 15-20 years in service with their branch, then as a general in various commands. Depending on how this adds up, some may have considerable foreign policy experience, but many do not.

Flynn during his career deployed in Grenada and Haiti, and starting around 2001 has been involved in intelligence commands, often deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Certainly no broad foreign policy experience but around two decades of very real experience in our last two wars.

Mattis’s international career also appears to have started around 2003 with the invasion of Iraq as the 1st Marine Division commander. He then went to the Combat Development Command and in 2006 to the Joint Forces Command and then U.S. Central Command. So, more than a decade of foreign policy experience.

Kelly is similar as he with the 1st Marine Division in Iraq. Again, maybe a decade.

On the other hand, McFarland is an old hand, having first worked on the National Security Council in the 1970s (when Kissinger was there).

Anyhow, degrees and experience does not produce a successful foreign policy and a lack of degrees and lack of experience does not mean they will not produce a successful foreign policy. But, with three defense experts, three business people (including Haley) and only one foreign policy expert (who does not directly report to the president), the foreign policy expertise is a little thin. The real concern is that among the six people that report directly to the president, there really is not an expert on foreign policy. Added to that, the president-elect is not considered a foreign policy expert either (BS in Economics).

It does raise the issue as to who is doing the bigger picture long-term strategic thinking for our foreign and national security policy or is this going to one of these administrations that jump from issue to issue with no real plan or overall strategy (like most administrations have…to be honest).

List of nominees:
Secretary of State: Rex Tillerson (head of Exxon)
Secretary of Defense: James Mattis (retired Marine Corps general)
National Security Advisor: Michael T. Flynn (retired Army Lt. General)
    Deputy National Security Advisor: K.T. McFarland (Fox News commentator)
Ambassador to the United Nations: Nikki Haley (Governor of South Carolina).
    This is apparently a cabinet-level position.
Secretary of Commerce: Wilbur Ross (businessman)
Homeland Security: John F. Kelly (retired Marine Corps General)

 

Questions II

Back on November 9 I made a long post about what our foreign and defense policies might be in the new administration. At the time, I really did not know, so I threw out a range of options on 14 different issues. That post is here: Questions

We now have a team nominated, although there are more positions to fill. It consists of:

Secretary of State: Rex Tillerson (head of Exxon)
Secretary of Defense: James Mattis (retired Marine Corps general)
National Security Advisor: Michael T. Flynn (retired Army Lt. General)
    Deputy National Security Advisor: K.T. McFarland (Fox News commentator)
Ambassador to the United Nations: Nikki Haley (Governor of South Carolina).
    This is apparently a cabinet-level position.
Secretary of Commerce: Wilbur Ross (businessman)
Homeland Security: John F. Kelly (retired Marine Corps General)

 

All these require confirmation by the senate except for the National Security Advisor (Flynn) and his Deputy (McFarland).

Anyhow, I am not sure I have answers to any of the 14 questions I posed. In fact, the only one that has been publicly discussed (#12) I whiffed on and provided no options. It simply read: “12. And then there is East Asia (China, the two Koreas, Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, etc.).”

I gather China is going to be a central issue in the Trump administration from the start. Not sure how much impact this will have on national security. Will it primarily be an argument over trade?