Mystics & Statistics

Turkish Army Tanks Proving Vulnerable In Syria

Turkish Army Leopard 2A3 main battle tank struck by suspected Daesh Kornet anti-tank missile. [Photo: YouTube / Turkish Military Portal Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri]

The Turkish Army, conducting Operation EUPHRATES SHIELD in northern Syria since 24 August 2016, has reportedly lost at least 15 German-made, Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks (MBTs) to man-portable anti-tank systems (MANPATs) in combat with Daesh fighters. Five were lost in December 2016 after the Turks deployed several of its 354 Leopard 2A4’s to buttress its offensive, which initially employed mainly older, upgraded American-made M60A3 MBTs. 10 more Leopard 2’s were knocked out in subsequent fighting in urban terrain around the town of al-Bab in northern Syria, 15 miles south of the Turkish-Syrian border.

Daesh fighters have used a variety of anti-tank missiles against the Turkish Army vehicles, including U.S.-made BGM 71 TOW-2s, and Soviet/Russian-produced 9K111 Fagots (“Basoon”) and 9M133 Kornets, all reportedly captured from Syrian and Iraqi Army stocks. The 60-ton Leopard 2, a mainstay of NATO armored forces, earned a reputation for invulnerability after surviving Taliban improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Afghanistan. However, the A3 version used by the Turks does not have explosive reactive armor or active protection systems, which are used by the many modern MBTs to defeat the new generation of MANPATs.

There is also some evidence that Turkish tank losses are at least partly due to faulty tactical employment. Some of the M60s destroyed in the initial fighting were observed firing from open positions when hit, rather then from less vulnerable hull down locations. The Leopard 2A3’s, with heavy frontal armor, but thinner protection on the sides and rear, were designed for long-range tank v. tank fighting, and are notably unsuited for combat in urban terrain. Successful urban combat places a premium on combined arms tactics, particularly the use of dismounted infantry to clear out potential enemy MANPAT flanking fire positions.

Economics of Warfare 9

Examining the ninth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

This lecture opens with a discussion on government bond markets and World War II. As a military historian, this is not an approach I ever considered. Slide 3 is interesting. There is a noticeable decline in French government bond prices in the months leading up to May 1940 (the month the Germans actually invaded France). There is then a rather abrupt break in the graph.

Starting with slide 5 Dr. Spagat goes into a discussion of Angola and Jonas Savimbi (just to refresh your memory: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonas_Savimbi). The interesting result is that (slide 19), the end of the Savimbi rebellion (as determined by the date of his death) “…was bad for the diamond companies operating in Angola”….and interestingly enough (slide 23): “An important conclusion from the study is that it might be wrong to assume that businesses operating in war-torn countries and the government officials in these countries are all automatically in favor of pace. Influential actors may actually benefit economically from the continuation of a war.”

Dr. Spagat these switches to the ETA and the Basque Independence Movement in Spain (slide 24). This was a very small movement (see slide 25). The conclusion (slide 33) is that “…terrorism has been costly for the Basque region of Spain.”

Then Dr. Spagat switches gears to comparing European economic growth to Chinese economic growth (slide 34) over the course of around 1800 years. This is using Angus Maddison’s figures, which was an effort to measure the world economy by country over the course of history. I just happen to have a copy of his book, The World Economy, sitting on my desk. Strongly recommend everyone own a copy. Anyhow, the discussion from slide 35-38 addresses a hypothesis by Voightlander and Voth (their paper is linked on slide 35) that “They claim that Europe had a lot more wars than China did and that this actually explains why Europe grew more than China.” I am not sure I buy into this suggestion, and am I not sure that Dr. Spagat does either, but it is an interesting viewpoint.

Anyhow, not sure what the main takeaway is from all this, but it is damn interesting.

The link to the lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%209.pdf

 

Frickin’ Laser Beams

This is a fascinating short advertising video from British Aerospace Engineering Systems (BAE Systems) teasing the potential of laser beam weapons. It addresses the concept of using airborne lasers to create atmospheric lenses by temporarily heating and ionizing the atmosphere to enable long-range aerial surveillance and targeting. The same concept can also be used to counter anti-aircraft laser fire from ground platforms.

BAE Systems has been working on the military applications of lasers for a while, from laser tracking systems, aerial laser-guided rockets, and high energy lasers for shipborne point defense. The U.S. Army is working with General Dynamic to add lasers to its vehicles for point defense as well. Lasers have been used for military purposes for a long time and there is great anticipation for their potential. While the current state of laser technology may have its limitations, the future of warfare may well go pew-pew.

‘Your Lyin’ Eyes’: Visualizing the A2/AD Environment in Europe

The Russia – NATO A2AD Environment. [CSIS]

Over, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Ian Williams, Kathleen Weinberger, and Colonel John O’Grady have assembled data on NATO and Russian anti-access/area denial (known as A2/AD, love it or hate it) capabilities, which has been turned into a fascinating interactive graphic. The capabilities depicted include “air defenses, counter-maritime forces, and theater offensive strike weapons, such as short- or medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and other precision guided munitions.”

Information on the map is divided into six categories:

Russia – Air Defense: Includes deployments of long-range Russian anti-air missile systems. Specific systems represented are the S-300 and S-400. Not included in map are Russia’s shorter ranged, highly mobile air defense assets, such as the Buk family of surface to air missile systems. These “shoot and scoot” launchers are embedded with Russian ground forces, and thus do not have fixed locations.

Russia – Land-based Strike: Includes deployments of short-range offensive ballistic missile systems, such as the SS-26 or Iskander short-range ballistic missiles, as well as deployments of Russian Oniks anti-ship missiles to Kaliningrad.

Russia – Naval strike: This category reflects the range (from notional locations) of Russia’s sea-based SS-N-30A Kalibr-type cruise missiles, and its SS-N-27 Sizzler anti-ship missiles.

NATO – Air Defense: Shows the estimated coverage areas and home-base disposition of NATO PATRIOT missile units, separately showing ballistic missile and air defense coverage areas. Although not reflected in this map, NATO is heavily reliant on fighter aircraft for air defense.

NATO – Naval Strike: Reflects the estimated range of U.S. Tomahawk Block IV (TLAM-E) sea-based cruise missiles.

NATO – Ports of Debarkation/Embarkations (PODs): These points show key logistical infrastructure, such as airports and seaports (APODs / SPODs), that could be used by NATO forces.

Figuring out how to fight effectively in this environment is what is keeping American and Western national security thinkers and planners up at night these days. The Third Offset Strategy was the first crack at doing so. Whether it will survive into the incoming Trump administration remains to be seen, though some signs indicate that it will. Stay tuned, folks.

Lives Of The Russian (And Ex-Russian) Aircraft Carriers

Goofus and Gallant at Sea, or the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov (l) and the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning (r). [The Telegraph and China Stringer Network, via Reuters]

When we left the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov last autumn, it was steaming (and by steaming, we mean smoking) through the English Channel with its screen toward the Mediterranean Sea to support combined Syrian-Russian military operations against rebel forces in the city of Aleppo. After being denied permission en route to refuel in Spain and Malta, the Kuznetsov arrived on station off Syria in early November.

The Kuznetsov began military operations on 8 November, but just six days later one of it’s brand-new MiG-29KR multi-role fighters crashed. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the accident was the result of an unspecified fault in one of the Kuznetsov‘s four landing arrestor cables, but the Russian newspaper Gazeta claimed the aircraft crashed when it’s engines failed while waiting to land. IHS Jane’s has speculated that the aircraft likely ran out of fuel. The MoD called attention to airstrikes launched from the Kuznetsov against Syrian targets the next day, 15 November. MoD video showed Su-33 fighter-bombers loaded with unguided bombs but no MiG-29KR’s, leading some to conclude that the latter had been grounded due to the crash.

Satellite photographs subsequently taken on 20 November of Humaymim Air Base in Syria’s Latakia province showed eight Russian Navy Su-33 and one MiG-29KR jets alongside Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) aircraft, suggesting that the Kuznetsov‘s air wing had been temporarily transferred to land to continue flight operations.

On 5 December, the MoD announced that “while landing after completing a combat task over Syria, an Su-33 fighter jet skidded off the [Kuznetsov‘s] deck because the arresting cable gear broke.” The announcement did not specify a date for the crash, but it was believed to have occurred on 3 December, less than three weeks after the first incident.

Last week, Russia announced that it would begin withdrawing its combat forces in Syria, beginning with the Kuznetsov task force. The Russian military commander in Syria, Colonel General Andrei Kartapolov, asserted that in two months, the Kuznetsov had launched 420 air combat sorties against 1,252 “terrorist targets.” No announcement has yet been made for when the long return voyage to the Kuznetsov‘s Barents Sea home port of Severomorsk, Russia, will begin, nor whether any country along the route will allow the flotilla to refuel.

Meanwhile, in early January 2017, the Chinese Defense Ministry announced that it’s only (current) aircraft carrier, the Liaoning (the Kuznetsov‘s sister ship, née Riga, then Varyag) and five escorts would conduct a “‘cross-sea area’ training exercise, involved J-15 fighter jets, as well as several ship-borne helicopters” in the South China Sea. The Chinese then proceeded to rattle cages in the region by unexpectedly sailing the Liaoning carrier group through the volatile Taiwan Straits yesterday, prompting Taiwan to scramble F-16 fighters and to divert a frigate in response. Just two days earlier, Japan and South Korea had launched fighter jets in response to an incursion by Chinese aircraft into the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan. This follows the seizure of a U.S. Navy underwater drone by a Chinese warship off the coast of the Philippines last month.

While the actual military capabilities of the Kuznetsov and Liaoning may be modest in comparison with U.S. aircraft carriers, the political and military reactions they have elicited indicate the value of sea-going air power. The diplomatic utility of power projection should not be underestimated. Imagine the results if the Russians or Chinese possessed aircraft carriers comparable to the U.S.S. Nimitz, which conducted its own politically-charged transit of the Taiwan Strait in 1996.

Economics of Warfare 8

Examining the eighth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

This lecture is focused on estimating deaths in a conflict, which is a subject that has produced some unusually high figures through faulty analysis. For example, he starts with a figure of 6.9 million killed in the Congo (slide 2). This leads Dr. Spagat into a discussion of “excess death rate,” which is basically estimating how many additional deaths occur if there is a war going on vice if there is peace (starting slide 4). From slide 4-12 he questions the Congo estimate. He does not offer an alternative figure, but it is clear that the real figure might be considerably lower, in particular as the IRC (International Refugee Committee) used an estimated baseline rate of deaths figure that was probably too low for Congo.

On slide 13 he starts discussing Iraq, where he has done such an estimate (provided on slide 14). His figure is 160,000 excess deaths for Iraq in 2003-2011, which is a lot lower than some of other estimates out there (I think I have seen them as high as 600,000). He then discusses the problems with his estimate (slide 15). From slides 16-30 he discusses further aspects of estimating excess deaths, including looking at regional variation and the impact of war on health (child height) . This may be getting a little bit to much into the weeds for most of our readers.

Anyhow, the main takeaway from all this is to be wary of over-estimates of total losses in wars. Sometimes they can be way too high.

The link to the lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%208.pdf

 

 

DOD Successfully Tests Micro-Drones

The Defense Department announced yesterday a successful test of the world’s largest micro-drone swarm. Conducted at China Lake, California in October 2016 by the DOD’s Strategic Capabilities Office, in partnership with Naval Air Systems Command, three F/A-18 Super Hornets launched 103 Perdix micro-drones. According to the DOD press release, “the micro-drones demonstrated advanced swarm behaviors such as collective decision-making, adaptive formation flying, and self-healing.”

The micro-drone swarm comprises an autonomous system.

“Due to the complex nature of combat, Perdix are not pre-programmed synchronized individuals, they are a collective organism, sharing one distributed brain for decision-making and adapting to each other like swarms in nature,” said [Strategic Capabilities Office] Director William Roper. “Because every Perdix communicates and collaborates with every other Perdix, the swarm has no leader and can gracefully adapt to drones entering or exiting the team.”

The Perdix micro-drones were originally designed by Massachusetts Institute of Technology engineering students, and modified for military use by the MIT Lincoln Laboratory in 2013.

To get an idea of the military potential of this technology, watch the demo video tracking the simulated mission.

In related news, the U.S. Army Research Laboratory and Georgia Technical Institute is developing the capability for soldiers in the field to 3D-print swarms of mini-drones to specific specifications within 24 hours. As reported by Defense One,

“A soldier with a mission need uses a computer terminal to rapidly design a suitable [drone],” says a poster by project chief engineer Zacarhy Fisher. “That design is then manufactured using automated processes such as laser cutting and 3D printing. The solution is sent back to the soldier and is deployed.”

Inspired by the modular adaptability of Legos, Fisher says the each drone could be fabricated in less than a day, with total turnaround time of less than three days.

Trump Administration Considering Keeping Robert Work On During Transition

Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work [DOD]

In a somewhat surprising move, The Washington Post is reporting that the transition team for the incoming administration of Donald J. Trump is considering keeping the current Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work in office for three to six months. Work would help maintain continuity for the incoming Secretary of Defense-designate James Mattis and assist in preparing the Trump administration’s first defense budget proposal. He also quietly rallied support for Mattis’s selection as Defense Secretary, vouching for bipartisan confidence in the former USCENTCOM commander.

Holding Work over could be seen as a sign that Mattis and the administration may intend to keep elements of the Third Offset Strategy, which Work developed under current Defense Secretary Ashton Carter.

A few days ago, The Post reported that Mattis had clashed with senior Trump transition team officials over Defense Department appointments. Mattis allegedly first learned of the appointment of Vincent Viola as Secretary of the Army from the media, leaving him “furious.” Several senior Defense Department office remain to be staffed and Mattis has been said to have rejected several individuals proposed by Trump’s transition staff.

CTS Reaches Tigris In Mosul

Mosul districts liberated by Iraqi Security Forces (in green), as of 7 January 2016 [Ninevah Media Center]

A spokesman for the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS) announced that CTS units reached the eastern bank of the Tigris River in central Mosul today, securing a damaged bridge over the river. The Tigris runs north-south through the center of the city. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have made steady progress against stiff Daesh opposition since renewing offensive operations on 27 December 2016.

Though the battle is far from over, recent gains suggest that ISF might be winning the battle of attrition with the vastly outnumbered defenders. However, it likely will still be some time before ISF fully occupies and secures the city.

Entering Mosul from the North

The collation as now moved to the northern outskirts of Mosul. Probably something they should have done a while back: entering-mosul-north

Article does report U.S. strength in Iraq now at 5,260.

The Habda district mentioned in the article is shown on this map. It is in the upper right corner of the map (NE part of Mosul).