Mystics & Statistics

Economics of Warfare 12

Examining the twelfth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

This paper continues with discussion of the studies done by Fearon and Laitin (lecture 11, slide 5) and Collier and Hoeffler (lecture 11, slide 15) on civil wars. The lecture basically goes through and tests or challenges their papers in two areas: 1) ability to predict, and 2) causality.

Warning: This lecture may cause you to lose confidence in multi-variant regression models.

I already had. If you go to my book America’s Modern Wars, in Chapter 6 (pages 63-69) I propose a two-variable model of insurgency success or failure. I then tested the model back to the cases I used to make up the model and the model predicted the correct result in 53 out of 68 cases used (77.9%). The model predicted incorrectly in 15 cases, or over 20% of the time. Now, if I was at a blackjack table in Vegas, I would be pretty damn happy to predict the outcome of game almost 80% of the time. The problem I had is that I could not find a clear third variable. I could easily explain away why 7 of the 15 cases were incorrectly predicted, although they were for a variety of reasons; but I could not easily explain why the other 8 cases were incorrectly predicted. In three of the cases the model predicted a red win (insurgents won) when the blue side won (the counterinsurgents); and in four of the cases the model predicted a blue win when the red side won (page 67). There was clearly a third, fourth or fifth variable in play here, but I could never figure out exactly what it was, and it was probably multiple variables. This was the next step and would have been pursued further if we could have obtained further funding.

Of course, we could have just added three or more additional variables to the model and this would have certainly improved the fit….but what are we really doing? This is the point where I begin to loose confidence in adding more variables, so I choose not to.

Getting back to Dr. Spagat’s lecture, one person analyzed the two papers by Fearon and Laitin (called FL) and Collier and Hoeffler (called CH) as to their predictive value. They were not very good at prediction, and sometimes gave false predictions (slide 6). Note that the “false positives” outnumbered the correct predictions for the Collier and Hoeffler model.

On slide 10, Dr. Spagat shows the variables used in each model and how much each variable impacts the results. You will note that one to three variables in each model provide far more explanatory value than the rest of the variables. GDP sort of stands out in both models, although one uses GDP while the other uses GDP growth, which are very different values. There are also some odd variables in there (for example using “squared commodity dependence” in addition to using “commodity dependence” in one model).

Dr. Spagat then goes into the issue of causality, ending up with a discussion on rainfall. Unfortunately, the real world is more complex than the models. A regression model assumes that the inputs are “independent” variables and the output is a “dependent” variable. Yet, in the real world, there can be another variable out there that is influencing both the “independent” and the “dependent” variable. Also, the alleged “dependent” variable can sometimes influence the independent variables. This he discusses in slide 12 (“This is, while it is true that low or negative growth might cause conflict is also true that conflict might cause low or negative growth.”).

Note that Dr. Spagat does address using different measurements of variables in slide 22 (rainfall levels vice growth rates in rainfall). This is an issue. Does one use an independent variable with an clear value (like a GDP figure) or does one use the change in the value of the variable over time as the measure (like percent change in GDP)?

The link to the lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%2012.pdf

 

Logistics In War

“Amateurs study tactics, armchair generals study strategy, but professionals study logistics,” as the old saw goes. While the veracity of this statement is debatable, there can be little doubt that the study and appreciation of the role of sustainment in warfare lags behind that of the sexier topics of strategy and tactics.  A new blog, Logistics in War, [also on Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/logisticsinwar/) and Twitter (@logisticsinwar)] is seeking to change that.

The anonymous and somewhat mysterious purveyor of the blog bills it as “a public, unofficial, ‘Professional Military Education’ site,” the purpose of which is “to instigate and inspire, continue and create, a discussion on military logistics that is so often sorely lacking (or if it does occur, does so behind closed doors).”

It seems safe to conclude that the blog’s owner is an Australian Army loggie, however: “Although the blog currently reflects an Australian and Army orientation, its vision is to become broadly applicable; to reflect the many different approaches to logistics as practiced by different military Services, the Joint domain, and militaries of all persuasions.”

The initial posts range in subject from a list of suggested readings about logistics, to the impact of sustainment in battle in recent history, to the challenges of supplying combat forces in the multi-domain battle construct. The writing is crisp, clear, and professional, and the questions and topics addressed are of undeniable importance. Logistics in War is a welcome addition to the online conversation about warfare, and is well worth the time to peruse. It will be very interesting to watch it progress and grow.

U.S. Army Record Keeping

The Dupuy Institute was involved in three record keeping contracts done for the U.S. Army from 1998-2000. This effort generated six reports. They are:

R-1: U.S. Army Records Survey (March 1999)

R-2: Records Management Survey Meeting (Oct. 20 1998)

R-3: War Records Workshop (March 23, 1999)

R-4: U.S. Army Force XXI Records Analysis (March 2000)

R-5: Analysis of U.S. Army Force XXI Record Keeping (May 2000)

R-6: Final Report of the Test Record Redesign Matrix (June 15, 2000)

The list of TDI publications is here: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tdipub3.htm

This work came about because I was working in the Vietnam records in 1968-1970 for the I Corps area and saw how poorly they were kept. They were the worst U.S. Army records I had ever seen. The U.S. Army World War II combat records were much better kept, and they were at least as busy at the time. In fact, U.S. Army records during Red Cloud’s War (1866-1868) were much better. Hundred year later, the U.S. Army records were incomplete, majors potions of the records had been thrown away, there were significant gaps in the daily operational reports, basic statistical data was missing, etc.

We ended up flagging this issue up to senior leadership in the Army, and were pleasantly surprised when they gave us a contract to look further into it. We ended up doing a survey of U.S. Army record keeping at that time (the peacekeeping effort in Bosnia was the major operation going on).

Several years later, well after we had completed our work, we did go back to the Army to recommend that we do a second survey. This time “the suits” showed up at the meeting (senior SES government managers) and assured the command that everything was fine, they had it under control and another survey was not needed. I am not sure the general we were talking to believed them, but this was the end of the discussion. We went back to analyzing warfare instead of record keeping.

Spotted this article today in the Military Times. It is worth reading in its entirety: http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/airstrikes-unreported-syria-iraq-afghanistan-islamic-state-al-qaeda-taliban

The problem may be as simple as the Army was not sharing its record keeping of helicopter sorties and drone strikes with the Air Force. If that is the problem, then it can be simply corrected. I kind of doubt it is that simple.

Anyhow, record keeping is not as exciting as tanks, but it is part of the nuts-and-bolts issues of running an army.

No Secretary of the Army

So, we don’t have a Secretary of the Army. Not entirely surprised if one or more of the various nominees has to withdraw. It is the nature of pulling from the outside and the nomination of successful business people; that a few can’t clear the nomination process.

Article here: trumps-nominee-army-secretary-withdraws-name

Will it be another 2-3 months before we have a Secretary of the Army? What is the status of the other politically appointed positions in the Army (assistant secretaries and under secretaries)?

 

Ukraine (Avdiivka)

Kind of mystified why things are suddenly being stirred up in Ukraine. To me, this does not seem to work to Russia’s advantage, as they are trying to convince the new U.S. administration to remove some sanctions. Anyhow a couple of relevant articles:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/global-alarm-over-ukraine-fighting-death-toll-hits-104743721.html

https://www.strategypage.com/on_point/20170131225224.aspx

Main points:

  1. Death toll up to 19 in recent fighting centered around a town called Avdiivka.
  2. This has been going on for 4 days.
  3. Ukraine lost 3 soldiers.
  4. At least one shell was a dud.
  5. Conflict has killed nearly 10,000 people since it started in April 2014
    1. More than half of them civilians
    2. We have not confirmed the accuracy of these figures

Anyhow, from my perspective, the timing of this looks odd.

Army And Marine Corps Join Forces To Define Multi-Domain Battle Concept

U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley and U.S. Marine General Robert Neller recently signed a joint white paper to be sent for review by Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford Jr.,outlining the collective views of their services on what has been termed “multi-domain battle.” The Army and Marine Corps have also established a joint task force to develop tactics applicable to the concept.

Multi-domain battle is a concept that has evolved as a response to challenges posed by anti-access/area-denial capabilities fielded by potential U.S. military rivals, such as Russia, China, and Iran. Its proponents argue that in it’s broadest application, the concept seeks to expand the principles of combined arms tactics beyond the traditional air/sea/land service boundaries and apply them to joint operations and newly emerging domains such as cyber warfare and information operations. Trevor Dupuy postulated that the employment of combined arms on the battlefield was one solution armies have historically adopted to adapt to increases in weapon lethality over time.

When the Army officially introduced the concept last year, General Milley said “This is pretty much the beginning of a new way of thinking.” General Neller echoed Milley’s comments. “We’ve been shoulder-and-shoulder on multi-domain battle and land concepts. We can’t afford to waste any resources on duplication when it’s not necessary. We see the problem the same way; we have the same conclusions.” U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) commander, U.S. Navy Admiral Harry B. Harris commented last fall that

We need a degree of jointness, in my opinion, in which no one military service dominates and no domain has a fixed boundary. A combatant commander must be able to create effects from any single domain to target in every domain in order to fight tonight and win. [I need] a true land-based cross-domain capability [that] offers us an integrated joint force capable of deterring rising powers by denying them the domains in which they seek to operate.

U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPC) is currently working with USPACOM to finalize exercises scheduled for this spring to test multi-domain battle warfighting concepts. Similar exercises are being planned for Europe in 2018.

There is a sense of urgency regarding multi-domain battle in the Pacific, given ongoing tensions with North Korea and recent comments by Trump Administration officials regarding the South China Sea. USARPC commander General Robert Brown recently stated “This isn’t something 10 years from now. If Kim Jong-un goes south tomorrow, I will need some of this tomorrow.'”

Even as the Army and Marine Corps move forward with integrating multi-domain battle into their combat doctrines, the concept is not without its discontents. Aside from Admiral Harris, the Navy has had little to say about multi-domain battle. The U.S. Air Force has also expressed skepticism that U.S. land combat forces will reduce their dependence on air power anytime soon. When the Army raised concerns last year about capabilities Russian forces had demonstrated in the Ukraine, some in its sisters services and the national security community accused it of alarmism in support of its lobbying for an increased share of the defense budget.

Whether mutli-domain battle survives as an organic concept, it seems to be spurring useful thinking about warfare in the near future. In addition to stimulating new technological research and development (Third Offset Strategy), it is leading to new ways at looking at command and control, planning, and notions of “jointness.”

The Yemen Raid

Hard to ignore this one. According to White House reports 14 members of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) were killed. We lost one person, three  four injured and a $70 million Osprey. There were 10, 15, or 16 civilians killed. According to one report there were a total of 30 people killed (14 + 16 = 30?).

A few news reports:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/civilians-likely-killed-us-raid-yemen-pentagon-014654537.html

This article provides the figures of 16 civilians killed (8 women and 8 children)

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/us-military-probing-more-possible-civilian-deaths-in-yemen-raid_us_5892bf5de4b0af07cb6b8930?

This article provides the estimate of 30 people killed at the site, including 10 civilians. It also say at least 15 civilians killed, according to U.S. military officials. “The military officials who spoke to Reuters on condition of anonymity said “a brutal firefight” killed Owens and at least 15 Yemeni women and children.” It also notes that “Some of the women were firing at the U.S. force, Pentagon spokesman Captain Jeff Davis told reporters.”

Also:

U.S. military officials….said, the attacking SEAL team found itself dropping onto a reinforced Al Qaeda base defended by landmines, snipers, and a larger than expected contingent of heavily armed Islamist extremists.

One of the three U.S. officials said on-the-ground surveillance of the compound was “minimal, at best.”

“The decision was made—to leave it to the incoming administration, partly in the hope that more and better intelligence could be collected,” that official said.

There were two Osprey’s used in the raid. One suffered engine failure (remember Operation Eagle Claw: Operation_Eagle_Claw).

The UK Guardian is more direct: http://theweek.com/speedreads/677442/trumps-disastrous-first-military-strike-previously-been-rejected-by-Obama

[Colonel John] Thomas said he did not know why the prior administration did not authorize the operation, but said the Obama administration had effectively exercised a “pocket veto” over it.

A former official said the operation had been reviewed several times, but the underlying intelligence was not judged strong enough to justify the risks, and the case was left to the incoming Trump administration to make it own judgment.”

Colonel Thomas is the Central Command spokesman:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-acknowledges-civilian-deaths-in-trump-authorized-yemen-raid/2017/02/01/e1f56c3c-e8e0-11e6-80c2-30e57e57e05d_story.html?utm_campaign=pubexchange&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=huffingtonpost.com&utm_term=.76e64d7a6149

Anyhow, I think people will be talking about this one for a while.

 

Country Size

This is a continuation of my previous post: Economics of Warfare 11. It is based upon a review of Michael Spagat’s lecture: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%2011.pdf

The Fearon and Laitin study on the “Determinants of Civil War Onset” (link to paper on slide 5) had eight factors that influenced that chance of a new civil war (they are listed on slides 8 and 10). One of them is “population (positive effect)”. This is summarized by Michael Spagat as “more people, more chances for war.” The Collier and Hoeffler paper came to similar conclusions on this (link to paper on slide 15). As Michael Spagat summarizes it “Population size is still positive and significant” (slide 16). And then there is a third paper by Hegre and Sambanis (like to paper on slide 23) that states that “country size (population and territory) is positively associated with civil war onset” (slide 24).

Now when we did our insurgency studies we also saw the same thing as it related to winning or losing an insurgency. It show up in our Iraq Casualty Estimate (see America’s Modern Wars, Chapter 1) and in subsequent analysis. Quite simply, insurgencies in large countries were often successful. For example, when we looked at all 10 insurgencies with foreign intervention where the indigenous population was greater than 9 million, the insurgents won 80% of the time (see page 47). In our original Iraq estimate for the cases we had, we found the insurgencies won 71% of the time in large countries (290,079-2,381,740 square kilometers…14 cases); 100% of the time in populous countries (population of 9,529,000 or higher…7 cases); and 78% of time in countries with a large border (which is probably related to country size). This is on pages 17-18.

Apparently size matters when it comes to violence. I am not sure of the cause-and-effect here. Obviously, there are many other factors at play. The Symbonese Liberation Army (SLA)…the people who kidnapped Patty Hearst…were a small urban insurgency operating in a large populous country (the United States). It fizzled quickly. So, it certainly does not mean any insurgency in any large place is an issue. But, there does seem to be some correlation here that continues to haunt analysis of insurgencies and the onset of civil war (which are two different subjects, but somewhat related).

Economics of Warfare 11

Examining the eleventh lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

This lecture discusses analysis of cross-country datasets, correlations, and then discussed some problems with statistical testing in general. This is worth reading carefully in its entirety.

The datasets they are discussing in the first slides I assume are from the “correlates of war” (COW) dataset, a publically available data set that many in academia have used. We have never used it. When we created the MISS (Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets…now called DISS), we built them entirely from our own research.

He then looks at two different studies on the probability of conflict, one done by Fearon and Laitin (slide 5) and the other done by Collier and Hoeffler (slide 15). Even though they are based upon the same data, they produced somewhat different results (all, of course, to 90% or 95% confidence intervals). He summarizes the conclusions of the Fearon and Laitin study on slides 8 and 10 and the conclusions to the Collier and Hoeffler study on slides 16 and 18. It is worth comparing the differences.

Throughout this paper, he starts giving warnings about the problems with this analysis. First he discusses “story lines” on slides 12 – 14. This is important. One you have a correlation….then most people are clever enough to be able to explain why such a correlation exists, be it right or wrong.

But the part of the lecture that hit home with me starts with the statement that “These reported results may just have come out out that way by luck or chance.” (slide 20). The cartoon on slide 22 makes the point. Basically, if you test 20 different things, even if they are completely irrelevant, even to a 95% confidence interval; then with average luck you will get at least one correlation! Test enough things, and you will get a correlation. By the same token, add enough variables to your regression model and you will get a fit.

This is done all the time and I did discuss it in America’s Modern Wars, page 73-75 on a study done by CAA (Center for Army Analysis) in 2009 using our MISS. As I note in the book they identified 34 variables and then built a regression model based upon 11 of them and then boiled the final model down to four: 1) Number of Red Factions, 2) Counterinsurgent per Insurgent Ratio (Peak), 3) Counterinsurgent Developed Nation and 4) Political Concept. As their model was based on force ratio and political concept, it was similar to my regression model, except they added two more variables to the model. The problem is that one of those variables, “Number of Red Factions,” should not have been added. As I note in my book “In our original research we did not systematically and rigorously establish a count of factions for insurgency…. It should not have been used as a variable without further research.”

To continue from my book: “My fear it that this variable (“number of factions”) worked in their regression model because it was helping to shape the curve even though there is not a clear cause-and-effect relationship here. Also, because of the methodology they choose, which was establishing variables based upon statistical significance, as opposed to there being a solid theoretical basis for it, then I believe that statistically there should be around two ‘false’ correlations among those 11 variables.”

I end up concluding: “My natural tendency as a modeler was to make sure I had clearly identified cause-and-effect relationships before I moved forward. That is why my approach starts simply (two variables) and moves forward from there. It is also why I independently examined each possible variable in some depth. In addition, I reviewed and examined a range of theorists before proceeding (see Chapter Seventeen). I have had the experience of dumping lots of variables into a regression model, and lo-and-behold, something fits. It is important to make sure you have clearly established cause-and-effect.”

Anyhow, what Dr. Spagat warns of on slide 22 is what some people are actually doing. It is not a mistake made by grad students, but a mistake that a professional DOD analytical organization has done.

Enough preaching; the link to the lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%2011.pdf

 

Hybrid Warfare At Sea

“Who are you calling junk?”

During his Senate confirmation hearing on January 11th, Secretary of State-designate Rex Tillerson stated that the Trump administration is “going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building [in the South China Sea] stops and, second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.” Chinese state-run media outlets responded with vows to counter any attempts by the United States to block access to the artificial islands China is constructing in the South China Sea.

The possibility of a clash between the U.S. and China in the Western Pacific has been the subject of discussion and analysis for several years now. In the current issue of the U.S. Naval Institute’s journal, Proceedings, Admiral James Stavridis (ret.) takes a look at the potential challenges posed by maritime “hybrid warfare” capabilities. Noting that current assessments of hybrid war focus overwhelmingly on land warfare, he points out that both China and Iran have demonstrated the ability to apply asymmetrical approaches to sea warfare as well.

Stavridis outlines what a hybrid war at sea might look like.

Given its need to appear somewhat ambiguous to outside observers, maritime hybrid warfare generally will be conducted in the coastal waters of the littorals. Instead of using force directly from identifiable “gray hull” navy platforms, hybrid warfare will feature the use of both civilian vessels (tramp steamers, large fishing vessels, light coastal tankers, small fast craft, and even “low slow” skiffs with outboard engines). It also will be conducted and likely command-and-controlled from so-called white hulls assigned to the coast guards of given nations. Both the Chinese and the Iranians are using their coast guards (and revolutionary guards in the case of Iran) in this fashion in the South China Sea and Arabian Gulf, respectively.

Extrapolating from this, Stavridis argues that

The United States must start to consider its responses to hybrid warfare at sea, which may require developing new tactics and technologies, working closely with allies and partners, and building U.S. hybrid capability to counter its deployment by other nations and eventually transnational actors.

In addition, the United States should be considering the role of naval forces—Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and even Merchant Marine—in helping counter hybrid attacks ashore. Many of the capabilities developed to conduct and counter hybrid warfare at sea could be employed in the littoral, coastal regions, and eventually deep inland. This might be called “hybrid warfare from the sea,” and certainly is a potential part of maritime hybrid warfare.

He makes several specific recommendations:

  • “The most important thing we can do today is to study, analyze, and fully understand how the ideas of hybrid warfare as practiced today will both translate to the maritime sphere and develop there in lethal ways.”
  • Work with Coalition Partners and “encourage cross talk, exchange best practices, and share intelligence on this emerging concern.”
  • Train and exercise against maritime hybrid warfare. “The ambiguity of these scenarios will require education and training in rules of engagement, operating our conventional systems against unconventional forces at sea, and learning to act more like a network at sea in the littoral.”
  • Leverage the U.S. Coast Guard. “Involving it in a leadership role in combating maritime hybrid warfare is crucial. Many of its systems and platforms already contain the technologies to counter maritime hybrid warfare techniques, and its ethos and fighting spirit applied in this tactical arena would be powerful.”

The article goes into much more depth on these points. It is a good starting point for considering what a another potential area of future global competition may look like.