Mystics & Statistics

M-1 versus Russia’s T-90 and China’s Type 99 Tank

Another interesting comparative article from The National Interest: China’s Deadly Type 99 Tank vs Russia’s T-90 and America’s M-1 Abrams: Who Wins?

A few points they make:

  1. The U.S. has the better gun.
  2. The U.S. has the better armor.
  3. The U.S. tank has more crew (this is a good thing).
  4. The U.S. tank is heavier (this is not a good thing).
  5. They do claim the Chinese Type 99 may be better protected due to its multi-layered defensive systems.
  6. The U.S. tank does not have a Laser Warning Receiver.
  7. The U.S. tank does not have Active Protection Systems.
  8. The U.S. tank does not have Explosive Reactive Armor.
  9. The U.S. tank does not have a “dazzler” laser to blind other gunners.

A few points for further comment:

  1. They state: “Moscow currently maintains good relations with Beijing, with which it shares a border, but the two powers are not close allies, having nearly come to war during the late 1960s.”
    1. They did have multiple engagements in 1969, including two actions that were at least company sized. We were not able to find anything of more significance. See our report SS-1: An Analysis of the 1969 Sino-Soviet Conflict. Link to our report listing: TDI Reports 1992-present
    2. I am not sure they had “nearly come to war” during that time.
  2. They state: “The Abrams, of course, is the classic American design which devastated Soviet-made Iraqi armor in the 1991 Gulf War without losing a single tank to enemy fire.”
    1. We were facing Soviet-built T-72s
    2. Not sure what has been publically released on this, but according to the rumors I have heard, it was truly one-sided. The M-1 was notably superior in firepower and sensors and T-72’s armor protection was deficient.
    3. The T-90 is a descendent of the T-72.

Quantum Radar: Should We Be Putting All Our Eggs In The Technology Basket?

Corporal Walter "Radar" O'Reilly (Gary Burghoff) | M*A*S*H
Corporal Walter “Radar” O’Reilly (Gary Burghoff) | M*A*S*H

As reported in Popular Mechanics last week, Chinese state media recently announced that a Chinese defense contractor has developed the world’s first quantum radar system. Derived from the principles of quantum mechanics, quantum radar would be capable of detecting vehicles equipped with so-called “stealth” technology for defeating conventional radio-wave based radar systems.

The Chinese claim should be taken with a large grain of salt. It is not clear that a functional quantum radar can be made to work outside a laboratory, much less adapted into a functional surveillance system. Lockheed Martin patented a quantum radar design in 2008, but nothing more has been heard about it publicly.

However, the history of military innovation has demonstrated that every technological advance has eventually resulted in a counter, either through competing weapons development or by the adoption of strategies or tactics to minimize the impact of the new capabilities. The United States has invested hundreds of billions of dollars in air and naval stealth capabilities and built its current and future strategies and tactics around its effectiveness. Much of the value of this investment could be wiped out with a single technological breakthrough by its potential adversaries.

The basic assumption behind the Third Offset Strategy is that the U.S. can innovate and adopt technological capabilities fast enough to maintain or even expand its current military superiority. Does the U.S. really have enough of a scientific and technological development advantage over its rivals to validate this assumption?

Russian Duma Elections

state_duma_election_2016_svg

As the vote counts are being finalized for this election held 18 September, we have the following results for the Russia legislative elections (the Duma):

  1. United Russia (Putin’s party) = 54% of popular vote
    • 343 seats, up from 238 in 2011.
  2. Communist Party (yes, those dinosaurs) = 13%
    • 42 seats, down from 92 in 2011.
  3. Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (mad Vladimir Zhirinovskii’s party) = 13%
    • 39 seats, down from 56 in 2011.
  4. A Just Russia (a moderate, well-behaved reformist party) = 6%
    • 23 seats, down from 64 seats in 2011.

Two other seats are held by two other parties. Fourteen parties participated in the election. Duma members serve for 5 years (next Duma election is in 2021).

A significant part of the story though is voter turn-out. In the bad old days of the Soviet Union, voter turn-out used to be very high. Even in 1990 (under Gorbachev) it was 77%. It was 60.1% in 2011. It was 47.88% in this election (and there is some question about this figure). It is the lowest turn-out figure to date. In the two major cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg turn-out was low. For Moscow it was less than 35%, down from 66% in 2011. This is worth noting. There were no major post-election protests, unlike in 2011. Crimea did vote in the Russian election.

Several opinion polls from September shows United Russia with 39.3 to 43% of the vote and two exit polls show it with 44.5 and 48.4% of the votes. There were some voting irregularities reported. United Russia won 54.2% of the popular vote in an election of with a turn-out of 47.88%.

United Russia now has 343 out of 450 seats in the Duma. This is 76% of the seats. Half the seats were elected based upon proportional voting based upon party lists and half were elected based upon single-member constituencies. This was a change from the 2011 elections. United Russia does have a “supermajority” which now allows them to unilaterally change the constitution. This is probably a very important point. For all practical purposes, Russia is now a “single-party democracy.”

From 1999 to 2013 the Russian economy boomed at unprecedented levels. From 2014 to the present, it has been in decline. Next election is the presidential election of March 2018.

SU-35 Flanker vs F-15 Eagle

Another comparative analysis article from The National Interest: America’s F-15 Eagle vs Russia’s Su-35 fighter: Who Wins?

This article lacks the depth of the nicely done article in the Armata Tank vs the M-1 Abrams Tank and the TOW missile. A few points:

  1. F-15C Eagle is now nearly 40 years old.
  2. It may be in service for another 20 years.
  3. The Flanker-E clearly has the advantage at low speeds.
  4. The F-15C and F-15E have the advantage at long ranges.
  5. I gather the author considers them overall roughly equal.

But the lines that catch my attention are:

“More likely to happen is that a F-15 would run into a Su-35 operated by some Third World despot. The pilots are not likely to have the training, tactics or experience to fight against an American aviator with a realistic chance of winning.”

I am not sure which “Third World despots” he is considering for his analysis. Indonesia is a democracy. Indonesia is not on bad terms with the U.S. I gather only Russia has the SU-35 with China and Indonesia having ordered them. Indonesia is using them to replace their aging fleet of U.S. F-5E Tiger IIs. The initial buy is something like 8 planes. Perhaps Algeria, Egypt, India, Pakistan, or Vietnam may purchase them at some point, but these are also not countries we are likely to conflict with. It does not appear that places like North Korea, Venezuela, and what remains of the government of Syria is going to obtain them (although Russia deployed at least 4 Su-35s in Syria). I think the author of the article probably needs to re-examine who is actually going to have and use these aircraft. So far, it seems to be only Russia, China (24 of them) and Indonesia (8 of them).

What does A2/AD look like?

r2d2

A2/AD stands for anti-access/aerial denial. There is a recently published article from The National Interest that laid out a potential scenario concerning such an effort in the Baltic Sea. It is only 4-pages and makes for a good read: Entering the Bear’s Lair: Russia’s A2/D2 Bubble in the Baltic Sea

There are a number of NATO members on the Baltic Sea: Denmark, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Non-NATO members are Sweden, Finland and Russia.

Kaliningrad is part of Russia. It is the old German city of Konigsberg and surrounding former Prussian territory. It was given to the Soviet Union at the end of World War II and they attached it to Russian SFSR (which became the independent country of Russia in 1991). The Kaliningrad Oblast had a population of 941,873 in 2010. It is named after the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mikhail Kalinin (1975-1946), one of the original Bolsheviks.

baltic

This keys off of the previous post by Shawn about the “Third Offset Strategy,” of which A2/AD is a part of.

Betting On The Future: The Third Offset Strategy

Image by Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA).
Image by Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA).

In several recent posts, I have alluded to something called the Third Offset Strategy without going into any detail as to what it is. Fortunately for us all, Timothy A. Walton, a Fellow in the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, wrote an excellent summary and primer on what it as all about in the current edition of Joint Forces Quarterly.

The Third Offset Strategy emerged from Defense Strategic Guidance issued by the President and Secretary of Defense in 2012 and from the results of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. As Walton outlined,

The Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) articulated 10 missions the [U.S.] joint force must accomplish in the future. These missions include the ability to:

– deter and defeat aggression

– project power despite antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) challenges

– operate effectively in cyberspace and space.

The follow-on 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review confirmed the importance of these missions and called for the joint force to “project power and win decisively” in spite of “increasingly sophisticated adversaries who could employ advanced warfighting capabilities.”

In these documents, U.S. policy-makers identified that the primary strategic challenge to securing the goals is that “capable adversaries are adopting potent A2/AD strategies that are challenging U.S. ability to ensure operational access.” These adversaries include China, Russia, and Iran.

The Third Offset Strategy was devised to address this primary strategic challenge.

In November 2014, then–Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced a new Defense Innovation Initiative, which included the Third Offset Strategy. The initiative seeks to maintain U.S. military superiority over capable adversaries through the development of novel capabilities and concepts. Secretary Hagel modeled his approach on the First Offset Strategy of the 1950s, in which President Dwight D. Eisenhower countered the Soviet Union’s conventional numerical superiority through the buildup of America’s nuclear deterrent, and on the Second Offset Strategy of the 1970s, in which Secretary of Defense Harold Brown shepherded the development of precision-guided munitions, stealth, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems to counter the numerical superiority and improving technical capability of Warsaw Pact forces along the Central Front in Europe.

Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has built on Hagel’s vision of the Third Offset Strategy, and the proposed fiscal year 2017 budget is the first major public manifestation of the strategy: approximately $3.6 billion in research and development funding dedicated to Third Offset Strategy pursuits. As explained by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, the budget seeks to conduct numerous small bets on advanced capability research and demonstrations, and to work with Congress and the Services to craft new operational concepts so that the next administration can determine “what are the key bets we’re going to make.”

As Walton puts it, “the next Secretary of Defense will have the opportunity to make those big bets.” The keys to making the correct bets will be selecting the most appropriate scenarios to plan around, accurately assessing the performance of the U.S. joint force that will be programmed and budgeted for, and identifying the right priorities for new investment.

It is in this context that Walton recommended reviving campaign-level combat modeling at the Defense Department level, as part an overall reform of analytical processes informing force planning decisions.

Walton concludes by identifying the major obstacles in carrying out the Third Offset Strategy, some of which will be institutional and political in nature. However, he quickly passes over what might perhaps be the biggest problem with the Third Offset strategy, which is that it might be based on the wrong premises.

Lastly, the next Secretary of Defense will face numerous other, important defense challenges that will threaten to engross his or her attention, ranging from leading U.S. forces in Afghanistan, to countering Chinese, Russian, and Islamic State aggression, to reforming Goldwater-Nichols, military compensation, and base structure.

The ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq show no sign of abating anytime soon, yet they constitute “lesser includeds” in the Third Offset Strategy. Are we sure enough to bet that the A2/AD threat is the most important strategic challenge the U.S. will face in the near future?

Walton’s piece is worth reading and thinking about.

 

Mosul Strength Estimates

A series of articles over the last week or so that seems to have bits and pieces as to what are the strength of forces around Mosul. They are:

http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/16/politics/us-troops-mosul-base/index.html

http://time.com/4485212/iraq-mosul-isis-baghdadi-united-nations/

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37353081

The estimates they provide include:

  1. Could began next month (October)
  2. There are 3,000 to 4,5000 ISIS fighters in Mosul.
  3. Their forces are estimated at between 3,000 and 9,000
  4. “…20,000 to 30,000 Iraqi troops expected to be used in the campaign….”
  5. “…could take another two months.”
  6. And there is the Pershmerga (Kurdish forces)
  7. “…but might not enter central districts to avoid aggravating political sensitivities.”
  8. And perhaps Shiite militias (the Hashid Shaabi)
  9. The Peshmerga general has 23,000 men under his command

So….40,000 to 60,000 or more Iraqi, Peshmerga and Hashid Shaabi versus 3,000 to 9,000 ISIL fighters.

Our previous posts on the subject, dating back to July, include the following estimates (check the category “Iraq”)

  1. The U.S. has 5,000 troops in Iraq.
  2. 5,000 or so fighters inside Mosul.
  3. There are also ISIL fighters outside of Mosul.
  4. The Islamic States has roughly 19,000 to 25,000 fighters, about half in Iraq and half in Syria.
  5. Most of the 10,000 to 12,000 in Iraq are concentrated around Mosul, in the Tal Afar area, and elsewhere in Nineveh Province.
  6. The Anbar Sunnis can contribute at most 10,000 soldiers to the Mosul effort.
  7. IS fighters in Mosul vary from a few thousand to not more than 10,000.
  8. Retaking Mosul would require 80,000 men, of whom 15,000 are expect to come from Shiite militias.
  9. Might happen in October
  10. Campaign needs 20,000 to 30,000 troops
  11. A few thousand police and 15,000 local fighters to hold land after assault.
  12. Up to 10,000 jihadists are in the city.

I guess that is the best we can do from open sources right now.