Mystics & Statistics

Bleeding an Insurgency to Death

From Chapter 14 (Section H) of America’s Modern Wars:

H. Bleeding an Insurgency to Death

             Bleeding an insurgency to death is possible, but rare. Let’s just look at a graph from the Greek Civil War:

P145-Greek-Civil-War-Insurgent-Recruitment-and-Losses

This dramatic graph was created from a number of sources, all combined onto the same chart. The scale for monthly strength was divided by four fit them all together (meaning a figure of 25% for Monthly strength is actually 100% of strength). At the time, when I put the graph together, I intended it to illustrate the process where one could bleed an insurgency to death, by interrelating loss rates, exchange rates, recruitment, force strength, etc. When I presented this in a meeting in December 2004, I was then asked to look at tipping points.

It is difficult to bleed an insurgency to death. The problem is that only a small portion of the insurgents you are facing are active, full-time insurgents. So, mostly you are attriting the spearpoint. The part-time and casual insurgents tend to be active when they have a reason to, and tend to become inactive (and otherwise invisible) when the environment becomes too hot. As such, “search-and-destroy” missions and other such efforts tend to focus on the active people.

The problem is, as long as the rate of casualties among them is moderate, they can recruit and pull in new people. There is a base of support for insurgencies, and that base is a source of recruits. Unless one has shut down the recruiting source, then they can quickly replace the losses.

For example, let us say you have 10,000 insurgents, of which 2,000 are “full-time.” They are operating in a country with a population of one million. So we have the insurgency making up 1% of the population of the country. That is not out of line with historical cases. Let us say that 30% of the population favors the insurgency or are in areas under control of the insurgency.

Now, out of a population base of 300,000 civilians, one would expect to see about 3,000 new insurgents to come of age each year.[1] This means that the insurgents potentially have a new population of 3,000 coming-of-age boys each year to draw upon. Therefore, the counterinsurgents must grind through probably around 2,000 or more insurgents a year to actually be able to reduce insurgent strength from year to year. Otherwise, they get replaced as fast as they are being lost.

Expand this example to a country with 30,000 insurgents and 24 million population, like is potentially the case for Afghanistan and Iraq, and it is clear that bleeding the insurgency to death becomes almost an impossible proposition, no matter how long you stay.

Still, it was done in the case of the Greek Civil War. This was caused in part by a decision by the insurgents to increase the tempo of operations and go almost conventional. The result is that the insurgents conveniently choose to help the counterinsurgents bleed the insurgency to death. As can be seen, this quickly broke the back of the insurgency, and this occurred before Yugoslavia cut off support and bases for the insurgents. Basically, the insurgency was losing by fighting a traditional insurgency, so they changed their approach to increase the tempo of operations, and this simply sped up their eventual and inevitable defeat.

To some extent, the same thing happened in Vietnam with the Tet Offensive. Military, the offensive gutted the Viet Cong, and left them permanently weakened and less effective for the rest of the war. If the only force the U.S. was facing in Vietnam was the VC (Viet Cong), then this would have potentially led to a U.S. victory. The presence of a continued flow of forces from North Vietnam, including fully-armed combat regiments, compensated for the heavy losses the VC suffered.

Beyond those two cases, we do not have examples of insurgencies being bleed to death. The mathematics does not favor such an approach, although people invariably try it. One could describe General Westmoreland’s strategy in as Vietnam heavily oriented towards an attrition approach.

NOTES

[1] 300,000 divided by an average 50-year life span, divided by two to account for only males.

Some back-of-the-envelope calculations

Keying off Shawn’s previous post…if the DOD figures are accurate this means:

  1. In about two years, we have killed 45,000 insurgents from a force of around 25,000.
    1. This is around 100% losses a year
    2. This means the insurgents had to completely recruit an entire new force every year for the last two years
      1. Or maybe we just shot everyone twice.
    3. It is clear the claimed kills are way too high, or the claimed strength is too low, or a little bit of both
  2. We are getting three kills per sortie.
    1. Now, I have not done an analysis of kills per sorties in other insurgencies (and this would be useful to do), but I am pretty certain that this is unusually high.
  3. We are killing almost a 1,000 insurgents (not in uniform) for every civilian we are killing.
    1. Even if I use the Airwars figure of 1,568 civilians killed, this is 29 insurgents for every civilian killed.
    2. Again, I have not an analysis of insurgents killed per civilian killed in air operations (and this would be useful to do), but these rates seem unusually low.

It appears that there are some bad estimates being made here. Nothing wrong with doing an estimate, but something is very wrong if you are doing estimates that are significantly off. Some of these appear to be off.

This is, of course, a problem we encountered with Iraq and Afghanistan and is discussed to some extent in my book America’s Modern Wars. It was also a problem with the Soviet Army in World War II, and is something I discuss in some depth in my Kursk book.

It would be useful to develop a set of benchmarks from past wars looking at insurgents killed per sorties, insurgents killed per civilian killed in air operations (an other types of operations), insurgents killed compared to force strength, and so forth.

I Don’t Usually Do Body Counts, But When I Do…

(Photo: Dos Equis)
(Photo: Dos Equis)

Over at Foreign Policy, Michah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, has taken a critical look at the estimates of Daesh fighters the U.S. has killed provided by various Department of Defense sources since 2015. Despite several about-faces on a policy of releasing such figures, the lure to do so is powerful because of the impact they have on public opinion.

Zenko notes the inconsistent logic in the the numbers released, the lack of explanation of the methodology at how they were derived, and how denials about their validity undermine the public policy value of providing them in the first place. There is also the problem of acknowledging noncombatant deaths but asserting that only 55 civilians have been killed in over 15,000 confirmed airstrikes.

Here is the list Zenko compiled of Defense Department cumulative estimates of Daesh fighters killed in Iraq and Syria by U.S. airstrikes:

January 2015:                6,000
March 3, 2015:               8,500
June 1, 2015:             ~13,000
July 29, 2015:               15,000
October 12, 2015:        20,000
November 30, 2015:     23,000
January 6, 2016:           25,500
April 12, 2016:          25-26,000
August 10, 2016:           45,000

Chris cited an article two weeks ago in the New York Times, that provided an estimate by a Defense Department source that there are currently 19-25,000 Daesh fighters in Iraq and Syria.

Three Presentations

I will be giving two presentations at the October meeting of The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) and Shawn will be making one presentation there.

On Monday, 3 October, I will be doing a presentation on my book War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat, that is going to published in June/August 2017.  This presentation will describe the book. In addition, I will be discussing four or five other book projects that are on-going or I am considering.

The same day I will being making presentation called “Data for Wargames.” This was a course developed for a USMC White Team for a wargaming exercise.

On Tuesday Shawn Woodford will be presenting “Studying Combat: Where to Go from Here.” As he describes it:

Studying Combat: Where To Go From Here?

With Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Robert Work’s recent call for a revitalized war gaming effort to support development of a new national military strategy, it is worth taking stock of the present state of empirical research on combat. I propose to briefly survey work on the subject across relevant fields to get a sense of how much progress has been since TMCI published The Concise Theory of Combat in 1997. This is intended to frame a discussion of where the next steps should be taken and possibilities for promoting work on this subject in the defense and academic communities.

The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) Will Meet in October

TMCI logoThe Military Conflict Institute (the website has not been recently updated) will hold it’s 58th General Working Meeting from 3-5 October 2016, hosted by the Institute for Defense Analysis in Alexandria, Virginia. It will feature discussions and presentations focused on war termination in likely areas of conflict in the near future, such as Egypt, Turkey, North Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kurdistan, and Israel. There will also be presentations on related and general military topics as well.

TMCI was founded in 1979 by Dr. Donald S. Marshall and Trevor Dupuy. They were concerned by the inability of existing Defense Department combat models to produce results that were consistent or rooted in historical experience. The organization is a non-profit, interdisciplinary, informal group that avoids government or institutional affiliation in order to maintain an independent perspective and voice. It’s objective is to advance public understanding of organized warfare in all its aspects. Most of the initial members were drawn from the ranks of operations analysts experienced in quantitative historical study and military operations research, but it has grown to include a diverse group of scholars, historians, students of war, soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and scientists. Member disciplines range from military science to diplomacy and philosophy.

For agenda information, contact Roger Mickelson TMCI6@aol.com. For joining instructions, contact Rosser Bobbitt rbobbitt@ida.org. Attendance is subject to approval.

Ambling

11tb-horse02-master675

This is not related to anything we are doing, although I found it interesting:  Vikings Possibly Spread Smooth-Riding Horses Around the World

  1. Apparently the ability of a horse to “amble” (as opposed to walk, trot, canter or gallop) is limited to certain breeds of horses and is tied to a single gene mutation.
  2. These “mutated horses” existed in the Danelaw area of England in the 9th century.
  3. Therefore (and this is the weak link in their argument), they may have been spread by Vikings across the world (or maybe they were transported by Vikings to England from another place in the world).

Anyhow, I have not figured out how this is relevant to modern combat, but I still find it interesting.

Kennedy and Vietnam

163480-wubefgwrg

No quantitative analysis here, but a decent and balanced look at Kennedy’s thinking on Vietnam in 1963, when we had more than 16,000 advisors committed but had not yet put in combat troops: Kennedy and Vietnam

A couple of salient points:

  1. His ruminations on a Congo intervention are particularly interesting: “I assume this probably won’t be successful. Nothing ever seems to be….”
  2. Concerning the Congo: “He also reiterated the need for an expert military assessment ‘of the chances of its [US military intervention] success'”
  3. Conclusion: “My view, rooted in the documents and tape recordings at the JFK Library, does not support the conclusions of either Kennedy advocates or critics.”

The U.S. at the end of 1960, under Eisenhower, the U.S had 685 troops in South Vietnam. Under Kennedy, at the end of 1961 it was 3,164, in 1962 it was 11,326 and in 1963 it was 16,263. Under Johnson, it continued to grow to 23,210 in 1964 and 184,314 at the end of 1965. At the end of 1968 it was at 536,040 (source: DISS — Dupuy Insurgency Spread Sheets).

War by Numbers Release Date

University of Nebraska Press (which owns Potomac Books) just posted the following announcement on War by Numbers: War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat

It is part of their spring/summer releases. The book may be in the warehouse and available for sale by mid-June.

According to U. of N. Press, the book is 498 pages, 231 tables, 2 charts and 49 graphs. Not sure that this is the final page count as my manuscript is only 342 pages and 121,094 words. I have not seen the final edited manuscript.

I have developed a course from this book called “Data for Wargames.” Will be giving presentations on the book and the course in early October at The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) meeting in Alexandria, VA (more on this later).

The Great Russian Recession

The Russian Recession has dragged on for 18 months now: Russian Recession

A few significant points:

  1. Economy shrunk 3.7% in 2015
  2. Expected to shrinking 1.2% this year.
  3. Expected to start growing again in 2017.
  4. Russian parliamentary elections are next month. Probably not going to be very earthshaking.
  5. Just for comparison, the “Great Recession” in the U.S. lasted 18 months, started in December 2007 and ended in June 2009.
    1. Or is that 12-months, from Q3 2008 to Q2 2009?
    2. In 2008 it was a 0.3% drop in GDP
    3. In 2009 it was a 2.8% drop in GDP.
    4. In 2010 GDP grew 2.5%
    5. Date source: Annual Growth Data

Not much more to say on this, just kind of waiting to see what happens.