Mystics & Statistics

Coronavirus Mortality Rates in the U.S. ?

I have not posted for a while on the Coronavirus. I noticed on my twitter that people have posted the following stats on COVID from the CDC (Center for Disease Control):

Mortality Rates:

Unvaccinated: 6.1 deaths per 100K
Vaccinated: 0.5 deaths per 100K
Boosted: 0.1 deaths per 100K


I went to their websites and tried to find the stats from the original source, but couldn’t find the magic button that led me to the magic stats, so I will just go with what I saw on twitter. After all, that is the data that is being transmitted through the aether.

Now I gather around 62% of Americans are partially or wholly vaccinated. 38% have taken no vaccines.

Now, there are a mere 331,893,745 people in the U.S. (2021 estimate).

So, 62% of 331,893,745/100K x 0.1 = 206 deaths

In this case, I am assuming that those vaccinated will be boosted. 

And, 38% of 331,893,745/100K x 6.1 = 7,693.

In this case, I am assuming these 38% will not get vaccinated. I would not be surprised if up to half of them do.

Does this really mean we are at the point that the total additional cost of the Coronavirus in the United States is less than 10,000 more lives? I find that hard to believe. In the last 28 days we have lost 35,492. Last week we lost 8,442 people.

To date, we have lost 812,283. This is out of a reported 51,564,141 cases. This calculates at a mortality rate of 1.575% or 1,575 deaths per 100K. This is much higher than 6.1 per 100K. There seems to be a disconnect here.

1. Are the CDC statistics as transmitted by twitter incorrect (I first saw them on Anthony Scaramucci’s feed, but have seen the statistics repeated on other feeds. It was labeled “Latest CDC statistic on deaths from known COVID cases”)?

2. Is the mortality rate of the Delta and Omicron variants much lower than the original virus?

3. Is this just the statistical anomaly created by the most vulnerable people having been vaccinated (or worse) and the unvaccinated are mostly younger and healthier, with a much lower mortality rate?

4. Did I make a math error here somewhere?

 

Russian Invasions

My son was texting me today about the threat Russia appears to be posing towards Ukraine. Glad he is paying attention. According to an article he read, the Russians have gathered 175,000 troops on the border and 10 days of supply.

Now, according to Wikipedia (which is usually drawn from IISS) the Ukrainian Armed Forces has 255,000 active personnel and 900,000 in reserve as of 2021. In 2016 there were 169,000 personnel in the ground forces: with two armored brigades, 13 mechanized brigades, eight air assault brigades, two mountain warfare brigades, five airmobile brigades and seven rocket and artillery brigades. In 2016 the Air Force had 36,300 personnel, the Navy had 6,500 personnel and the Special Forces had 4,000. I gather these forces have expanded since 2016.

So, it does not look like Russia is planning on marching to Kiev, especially with 10 days of supply. They are probably not even considering creating a land bridge to Crimea.

So what might they be considering:

1. Help the local governments in rebellion take the rest of Donetsk and Lugansk.
2. Replace the local governments in Donetsk and Lugansk with their own governance (possibly in anticipation of formally annexing these two areas).
3. Make violent border demonstrations.
4. Or the build up may be the message (most likely option).

I gather Russia really does not want Ukraine to join NATO. I am not sure that build ups at the border make that point. In fact, it may reinforce Ukraine’s desire to join NATO. On the other hand, invading Donetsk or Lugansk or the rest of Ukraine certainly works against that goal.

Of course the real question is not whether Ukraine wants to join NATO, I gather that is a given. The real question is NATO willing to take on the responsibility of defending Ukraine, especially with two provinces in open revolt and two entities (Crimea and Sevastopol) annexed by Russia. So far, I gather no one significant has made a clear statement on that subject one way or the other. Ukrainian’s NATO membership appears to be in permanent limbo, which I gather that is what Russia prefers. The build up may be for the sake of signaling that it should stay that way. 

One last note: the price of oil is below $70 a barrel (Brent Crude was at 69.92). Last I checked (it was a couple of years ago), Russia needed the price of oil to be at $80 or higher to balance their budget. It was there a month ago, now it is not. Running significant deficits may limit their willingness to explore military options. Perhaps the easiest way to constrain Russian adventurism is to keep the price of oil down.

Rickenbacker at Narragansett Park Speedway – 1915

On September 18, 1915 Eddie Rickenbacker (America’s top ace in the Great War) won the 100 mile race at Narragansett Park Speedway in Providence, Rhode Island. It was his third win that year.

One internet lap board has his lap leader breakdown as (100 one-mile laps):

Eddie Rickenbacker in a Maxwell: leads laps 1-36
Ralph DePalma in a Stutz: leads laps 37-44
Bob Burman in a Peugeot: leads laps 45-63
Ralph DePalma: leads laps 64-76
Eddie Rickenbacker: leads laps 77-100

See: https://www.racing-reference.info/race-results/1915_Providence_Race/UO/

On the other hand, The Boston Sunday Globe dated September 19, 1915, page 15, has a slightly different account. It says:

“He {Rickenbacker] shot into the lead on the first lap, but was crowded back into third place before the second mile ended. There he held his place watching the speed of the others and always within 50 feet of the leader.

But he had to stop in the 15th lap. He had some carburetor trouble, it was stated. Before he got going the leaders had passed around three laps. So it seemed if it was all over for him…

Rickenbacker cut loose, however, and very soon it was apparent that the little car with 1 on its radiator was coming around very frequently. First it was noticed that it had regained the laps lost to the end of the field. Then when 33 miles had been covered he had won back a lap, the leaders being 33 and Rickenbacker 31….

De Palma had the lead in the 37th mile and from that to the 57th, or a distance of 30 miles, he kept in the van. But every time he and Burman made a mile in 54 or 55 seconds Rickenbacker did it about 50 or under. So he continued to cut down the lead. Before 50 miles had been reached he had circled all the other again and so they were then but one mile ahead of him.

Burman then began to show signs of speed and to tear away from De Palma, having passed into first place on the 58th mile. And each mile, while he was leaving De Palma behind, Rickenbacker was gaining on him. The spectators then began to sit up and shout. And the shouting encouraged Rickenbacker, for he smiles and let his motor car roar its way a little faster.

When 60 miles had been reached, he was swinging around the upper curve with an abandon that seemed reckless, for he appeared to handling the car like a toy. It would whirl around and the rear wheels would start for the sky or the upper edge of the track only to get yanked back like an unruly horse that shied at a street car.

Then it would roar down the track with the driver laughing and nodding to his pit attendants, who help up blackboards telling him how fast he was going, his position, etc. Having evened up matter, it was then his plan to get the lead. De Palma was the first he went after, and when he had swung over the line on the 72nd mile and the cars tore around the first quarter, Rickenbacker went into second place.

It was now Burman only that separated him from first place. Then the real race began. One hardly realized that the Maxwell had passed when it was around again. It came so fast that people mistook it for some other car, and they asked where it was, no knowing it passed. A few times Rickenbacker was pocketed by some of the others, and to see the way he wiggled through without slower up was amazing. 

When the cars came swinging down for the 73rd mile it was seen that Rickenbacher was closing up on Burgamn. The passed over the line five seconds ahead. There was no question then of the outcome, it seemed. On the next lap they tor down side by side and it seemed was if Rickenbacker was playing with Burman.

They crossed the line with Burman four feet in the lead. For two more laps they swung around side by side and then, entering the 77th miles, Rickenbacker seemed to infuse new life into the his car, and he got into the lead. When he went over the line on that mile he was nine seconds ahead of Burman…

So as it neared the 100 mile every one was resigned to Rickenbacker’s win. And he crossed the line amid a great ovation, with 1 minute and 1 second to spare. Burman finished second, Haupt third, De Palma fourth.”

So, the  “race results” internet site only agrees with the newspaper report given at that time on lap 1, laps 37-44, laps 58-63, and laps 77-100. For the majority of the laps, they differ as to who was leading.

 

Note: The paper refers to him as Rickenbacker, although at this time he spelled his name Rickenbacher. 

Two Different Accounts of the Same Air Battle – part 2 of 2

Fokker E.III at the airport in Jaroměř, Pterodactyl Flight, Radka Máchová, 2016 – photo taken by “Portwyn” (from Wikipedia)

And then Boelcke’s letter continues, clearly referring to events on the same day (from same paragraph that says “on the 9th…”):

“The French were very cross with us about that; when the pair of us arrived at the front in the evening for a peaceful bit of hunting, practically all the French aircraft in the neighbourhood went for us. And suddenly those fellows really got megalomania and attacked me; among the assailants was a new type of biplane (with a cockpit and very fast). They appeared to be very astonished that we calmly let them attack us — on the contrary we were very pleased to run up against someone who didn’t bolt at once. After several futile attacks they retired, but we–being far from lazy–went after them, and each of us forced an enemy machine down in a glide.

As it was fairy late, we were satisfied with this success and flew off, side by side, in the direction of Douai [their home airfield]. But when I happened to look round, I saw two other machines circling about behind their lines. As I did not want to give our people in the trenches the impression that we were bolting, I signalled to Immelmann that we would fly round a couple of times, just to show that we were cock of the walk. But Immelmann misunderstood me and attacked one of the Frenchmen (Farman type, without a cockpit), who was not going to be drawn into a fight and so sheered off. But while Immelmann was busy with the Farman, the other Frenchman (a Morane-Saulnier Biplane) swooped down on him from behind. So then I had to turn back to help Immelmann, who could not see the second French machine. When the Morane saw me coming up, he turned round to meet me, I peppered his nose a bit, so that he got in a funk and turned back. That was his greatest mistake. I sat on his neck, and as I hung on and came up fairly close–up to fifty metres–it was not long before I hit him. I must have mortally wounded the pilot–suddenly he threw up both his hands and the machine went down vertically. I watched it fall, and saw it turn over a couple of times and crash about four hundred metres in front of our trenches. Our people ascertained that it was smashed to bits and both inmates dead. 

Meanwhile it had grown fairly late and was high time for us to fly home, especially as our petrol was running out. Finally we had to land about eight hundred metres in front of our aerodrome; as the corn had already been cut, we succeeded in making good landings in spite of the growing darkness.

There was much joy in the section over my new victory. Our infantry had already rung up from the trenches to announce the crash…”

Now Immelmann’s letter of 11 September;

“The following day [which would be the 10th] I forced two enemy aircraft to land. Boelcke joined in the fight with the second one.

We signalled to each other to fly home, because it was already dusk. Suddenly I saw an enemy biplane attack Boelcke from behind. Boelcke did not seem to have seen him.

As if by agreement, we both turned round. First he came into Boelcke’s sights, then into mine, and finally we both went for him and closed up on him to within 50-80 metres. Boelcke’s gun appeared to have jammed, but I fired 300 rounds. Then I could hardly believe my eyes when I saw the enemy airman throw up both his arms. His crash helmet fell out and went down in wide circles, and a second later the machine plunged headlong into the depth from 2,200 metres. A pillar of dust showed where he hit the ground.

So then home. It was almost dark. Flares were burning when we reached our aerodrome, we could see nothing of the aerodrome itself. Suddenly my engine stopped–run out of petrol. So a forced landing. I made a smooth landing in the darkness, climbed out and looked round for Boelcke. He had been flying behind me. Nothing to be seen of him. Finally–he had he same bad luck. Ran out of petrol and made a forced landing. We were welcomed with congratulations on all sides, for everyone had watched the fight and the crash which ended it through their field-glasses.”

So:

From Immelmann’s account:

  1. Immelmann victory on the 9th?
  2. 2nd Immelmann victory on the 10th?

From Boelcke’s account:

  1. Just a single Boelcke victory on the 9th or 10th?
  2. If Immelmann did shoot down a plane on the 9th or the 10th, which one was it?

By the way, with modern text messaging, emails, and tweets, will we be able to preserve these type of accounts of what happened in combat like they did with letters?

Two Different Accounts of the Same Air Battle – part 1 of 2

Fokker E.III at the airport in Jaroměř, Pterodactyl Flight, Radka Máchová, 2016 – photo taken by “Portwyn” (from Wikipedia)

On 9 September 1915, both Oswald Boelcke and Max Immelmann are credited with a kill, the 3rd kill for Boelcke and the 2nd for Immelmann. According to the Aerodrome website, Boelcke shot down a Morane two-seater in the P.M. at French lines. Immelmann shot down a biplane. We gather these claims are drawn from Norman Franks books.

See:

http://www.theaerodrome.com/aces/germany/boelcke.php

Max Immelmann (theaerodrome.com)

Now, I do have letters from both pilots that discuss these air battles. Unfortunately, they do not agree (bolding is mine).  

From Boelcke’s letter dated 18 September 1915:

“On the 9th, we succeeded in getting on either side of huge French fighting machine, so that it did not know what to do and only escaped us by a hasty dive.”

From Immelmann letter dated 11 September 1915:

“Only yesterday and the day before yesterday it was different. I forced an artillery flier down. At first there were three enemy fighters in the neighbourhood, but after a while only me. The machine was a huge thing, with two engines and two machine guns; it was 3,400 metres up and I was 3,200. I therefore screwed myself up a bit higher on our side of the lines, and crossed when I reached 3,400.”

“Suddenly I caught sight of Boelcke, who wanted to attack, but was much lower. He followed me. After I had fired 100 rounds, the enemy began to go down. Then Boelcke was able to attack him as well. The enemy as now between two fires; he went down in a series of very risky turns. He could not escape us.”

“After I had fired 250-300 round he made a hasty landing. Unfortunately he succeeded in reaching his own ground. Meanwhile we had come down to 1,900 metres, and it was pitch dark. So home! When we landed, we found they knew all about our success. Someone had telephoned that two Fokkers had shot down an enemy fighter.”

This story continues….

 

Justinianic Plague

I have always had a certain morbid fascination with plagues. For example:

Plagues and Peoples | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The London Plague of 1665 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

And of course:

Plague? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Coronavirus – One year later | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Anyhow, saw the following article yesterday and felt it was worth re-posting: We May Have Underestimated the First Known Outbreak of Bubonic Plague

Highlights:

  1. May have killed up to half the population of the Mediterranean region at the time.
  2. “Some historians remain deeply hostile to regarding external factors such as disease as having a major impact on the development of human society…”

Some Polling on Taiwan

This article showed up on my yahoo news feed that caught my attention: https://news.yahoo.com/poll-almost-9-10-taiwanese-184348279.html

Highlights:

  1. 86% of Taiwanese oppose “one country, two system” policy of Deng Xiaoping.
  2. 85% of Taiwanese support maintain the status quo, 7% say Taiwan should declare independence, and 1.6% expressed support for reunification.
  3. 69% of Americans support the recognition of Taiwan as an independent nations. 
  4. 53% of Americans support a formal alliance between the U.S. and Taiwan.

This last finding kind of surprised me so I pulled up that article: https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/public-opinion-survey/first-time-half-americans-favor-defending-taiwan-if-china-invades

The interesting aspect of that survey is: 60% of Republicans support sending U.S. troops to Taiwan’s defense, as do 50% of Democrats and 49% of Independents.

Casualty Effectiveness versus Combat Effectiveness

I have been involved in an off-line discussion related to combat modeling. This is a discussion relevant to that conversation. It is from page 56, Chapter 7: Measuring Human Factors in Combat, of War by Numbers.

 

Casualty Effectiveness versus Combat Effectiveness

            Much of the above analysis was based upon a measurement of casualty effectiveness. This is an outcome. The actual factor we are trying to measure is combat effectiveness. We have no means of directly measuring that. For his combat models, Trevor Dupuy was able to produce a Combat Effectiveness Value (CEV) based upon comparing the results of the model runs to the historical outcomes. The CEV served as a force multiplier for one side. As such, if a force with the CEV of two was attacking at even odds, it would be treated the same as if it was attacking at two-to-one odds. This would then result in better outcomes, more favorable casualty exchange ratios, and higher advance rates. While there was a not a direct linear relationship in the model between combat effectiveness and casualty effectiveness, a higher combat effectiveness value clearly improved casualty effectiveness. Casualty effectiveness was usually higher than the combat effectiveness value.

            There is a sense that one can determine “combat effectiveness” as the square root of casualty effectiveness. In this construct, a casualty effectiveness of four would mean a combat effectiveness value of two. In effect, being twice as good as your opponent results in a favorable casualty exchange being four times better. This has not been systematically tested.[1]

            Added to that there are some armies that are “casualty insensitive.” This certainly describes the Soviet Army in World War II, which was more than willing to take casualties for the sake of completing the mission or fulfilling their orders. The failure to encourage individual initiative at the lower levels and the insistence that orders must be followed regardless just amplified this tendency. It appears that the Soviet Army rather needlessly suffered additional casualties above and beyond that which other armies would suffer in the same scenario, and that this “casualty insensitive” regime also influenced the casualty effectiveness figures. This certainly also applies to the Japanese Army in World War II, especially with their “banzai charges” and tendency to fight until exterminated.

            Still, casualty effectiveness is an important metric and one that gets the analyst closer to combat effectiveness; it is just not a perfect measure.

 

[1] And we do not know how to test this outside of using a combat model structure.

Pratas Island

Noted an article yesterday:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/china-debated-attacking-taiwan-controlled-123900171.html

Basically, Taiwan is saying that China is considering invading Pratas island in 2024 or after (but not before 2024).

Now, Pratas Island is located 200 miles (310 kilometers) southeast of Hong Kong. It is 276 miles (444 kilometers) from Taiwan.

It is a circular atoll with a single island that is crescent-shaped (see picture).  It is that little piece of land in the western part of the atoll with a lagoon.

Map of Pratas Island (1969)

The island is about 430 acres (174 hectares) and measure 1.7 miles long (2.8 kilometers) and is only about a half-mile wide (0.537 miles or 0.865 kilometers). Not exactly a prize the size of Taiwan. There are “numerous” oil wells to the west of island. Not sure how much, if any, oil is being pumped there. 

The height of the island at the base of the “The Pratas Triangulation Point” is 2.4875 meters (8.16 feet). Sea levels are currently projected to rise 2-3 feet by the end of this century, so I gather this island is going to get smaller over time.

According to Wikipedia there are about 500 Taiwanese marines stationed there. The island has no permanent inhabitants. (see: Pratas Island – Wikipedia).

Pratas Island Lagoon

Now, I am not sure I am going to loose a lot of sleep over this one.

  1. It is a fairly insignificant piece of terrain.
  2. No one lives there.
  3. Is China really going to take the political and economic hit to take this?

If China grabbed the island, they were certainly take a political hit. They are not exactly the most popular country in the world right now, and this would have a negative impact to their world image and standing. I assume the local defense force would defend it, making it a bloody conquest. What would be the cost of this?

Militarily, it would serve to justify increases in the U.S., Taiwanese, South Korean and Japanese defense budgets.

Economically, it might have little impact, but two of China’s major trading partners are the United States and Taiwan. There might be limited or extensive economic sanctions.

Is this a hit that China is willing to take? 

Does this mean that we are four-for-four in our predictions?

Afghan village near Kunduz, 5 May 2008 (photo by William A. Lawrence II).

Well, I took the time over the last few weeks to post up most of my Chapter on Afghanistan from my book America’s Modern Wars. It was interesting to revisit what I had written. The 13 blog posts are summarized here:

Summation of Afghanistan Chapter | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Note that our fourth to last sentence on the subject is: If history is a guide, then this government will be replaced one way or the other several years after we withdraw. This was written in early 2015.

I then continue: What will replace it is hard to determine, but will probably include a return to some extent of the Taliban, or perhaps with them leading the new government. It is also distinctly possible that the country will return back into civil war. None of this fulfills our objectives.

So, does my chapter on Afghanistan in America’s Modern Wars make us four-for-four?