Mystics & Statistics

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – day 1 (ground actions)

Well, I did not think that Russia would actually take a step this far, but they did. I may discuss all the implications of that later. Right now my focus is on what ground actions they are taking. Is this a limited and defined operation or are they looking for large scale occupation of Ukrainian territory? As I see it there are six major areas of operations right now.

1. Kiev

2. Odessa

3. Kharkov

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces.
5. Mariupol.
6. Crimean border

 

Here Is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180) There is a column driving down the road from Belarus. Don’t know the size or whether it is Russian or mixed Russian-Belarussian. Needless to say, it is a big step from crossing a border to driving all the way down to the capital city. Taking Kiev is even a bigger challenge. I assume that Ukraine has some forces covering that route. I am guessing any column will get stopped or delayed. Not sure if this is anything more than a feint. I kind of doubt that they are looking at taking Kiev (especially as I gather they only have around 30,000 troops in Belarus).

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826) : I have heard reports that there is a landing there. Have no idea of the size or location of the landing., Again, I wonder if this is anything more than a distraction. Are they really looking at occupying Odessa? Cannot rule out that this is a special operations head-hunting expedition to try to capture/kill some of the people involved in the violence in Odessa in 2013, something that Putin has talked about.  

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): This may be the real objective/prize of this war. It is the second largest city in Ukraine and the largest Russian speaking city in Ukraine. It is part of the former Soviet rust-belt cities (which include Lugansk and Donetsk). It has had a declining population since 1989, although I gather this has now stabilized. I gather it has developed a big IT business though, and almost all of its business is with overseas customers. A Russian occupation would probably destroy a lot of that business. 

Geographically, it is a city in the middle of a large open plain. It changed hands three times in 1943. It was larger (population wise) than Stalingrad, which is why we examined the operations there for our urban warfare studies. I have never been there, but drove by it on the way to Belgorod. I do see lots of pictures of Russian forces near Belgorod and at the border between Belgorod and Kharkov. I have been to Belgorod a couple of times, which is part of the Kursk battlefield. 

So my question is, is Russia going to conduct serious ground operations for the sake of surrounding and isolating Kharkov?

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces: Of course, Russia has recognized these “people’s republics.” They only control half of their provinces. The rest of the provinces under control of Ukraine and defended by the Ukrainian army. I gather their desire is to expand their control and take the rest of both provinces, but these are well defended. Not sure how serious will be their attempts here.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): This city of part of the Donetsk Oblast (province/county) and is on the route to Crimea. Are Russian going to try to drive through there to create a land connection to Crimea? Maybe, but it is well defended. Not sure this will be a high priority. In the next reports I saw last night, while there was lots of stuff exploding around Kiev and Kharkov, there was not much happening around Mariupol.

6. Crimea: One of the problems with Crimea is that they get their water from Ukraine. Is Russia going to try to expand their control of the area north of Crimea so as to secure water resources? Maybe. Such an operation also complicates the defense of Mariupol. I have heard that they have crossed the borders there, but I do wonder how serious of an effort they will make.

It is hard to say what Russian final objectives are, but obviously they are going to bomb all major military facilities and airfields. As cities are where many reporters are located this is what is first reported on. But the question for me, it what do they intended to occupy? Are they going to conquer all of Ukraine (I doubt it, it is a very big piece to swallow)? Are they going to just occupy all of Lugansk and Donetsk oblasts? Maybe, but this is a hard fight over terrain of limited economic value? All they going to isolate and then try to take Kharkov? This I think is a distinct possibility and I am looking for any reports of ground operations there with great interest.

While I assume the Ukrainian Army has some defensive capabilities, their biggest problem is that Russia has complete air superiority. 

 

P.S.: Captured around Kharkov: First Prisoners of War as Ukraine Captures Russian Soldiers

P.P.S.: Useful map: Map shows locations of explosions and potential attacks in Ukraine

P.P.P.S: More fighting around Kharkov. This one includes a video of a destroyed Russian tank: Russian Tank Convoy Blown Up in Videos as Ukraine Fights Back Invasion

P.P.P.P.S: Matthew Chance from CNN is at Antonov airbase 15 miles north of Kiev. It looks like Russian airborne and airmobile troops have already taken it. See: Cnn reporter: This shows just how close Russian forces are to Ukraine capital

P.P.P.P.P.S. It does appear that Russia is making a play for Kherson: 

https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/801461.html

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/24/7325476/

 

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – part 6 (Russian deployment)

The following are reported deployed near Ukraine (according to U.S. statements). See: Roughly 75% of Russian conventional forces deployed against Ukraine:

This includes:

1. 120 Battalion Tactical Groups

2. 35 air defense battalions

3. 500 fighter and fighter-bombers

 

So, 500 Russian fighter and fighter-bombers versus Ukraine’s 100. They will clearly have air superiority. Makes me wonder what the 35 air defense battalions are going to do?

 

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – part 5 (airpower)

There is a big mismatch in airpower between Russia and Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force can field about 100 modern aircraft, Russia can field over 1,300. Actual count according to Wikipedia is:

Ukraine
MiG-29 – 37 (multirole)

Su-24 – 12 (attack)

Su-25 – 17 (attack/CAS)

Su-27 – 32 (multirole)

Total Modern Combat Airplanes: 98

Total multirole or fighters: 69

 

Russia (in service)

MiG-35 – 8 (multirole)

MiG-31 – 113 (fighter)

MiG-29 – 259 (fighter)

Su-24 – 274

Su-25 – 193

Su-27 – 172 (fighter)

Su-30 – 119 (multirole)

Su-34 – 131 (multirole)

Su-35 – 103 (multirole)

Su-57 – 5 (multirole)

Total Modern Combat Airplanes: 1,377 (they also have 124 bombers)

Total multirole or fighters: 910

 

This does not include Russian Naval aircraft: 22 MiG-29s, 42 MiG-31s, 22 Su-24s, 4 Su-25UTG, 6 Su-27s, 26 Su-30ss, and 18 Su-33s for a total of 140.

It is clear that Russia will dominate the air. For Ukraine to have a fighting chance, it would need significant air support from the U.S. or NATO. The U.S. providing such air support is not an option I have heard discussed anywhere. Such a promise would have deterrence value.

 

Not discussed: Helicopters and drones.

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – part 4 (Russian strengths)

Reporting I saw a couple of hours ago (courtesy of Kaitlan Collins’ twitter feed): U.S. ambassador Michael Carpenter: “We assess that Russia probably has massed between 169,000-190,000 personnel in and near Ukraine as compared with about 100,000 on January 30. This estimate includes military troops along the border, in Belarus, and in occupied Crimea; Russian National Guard and other internal security units deployed to these areas; and Russian-led forces in eastern Ukraine.”

So, this estimate includes Russian-backed separatists, which I gather were not part of the previous estimates of 150,000. It also includes “Russian National Guard and other internal security units” which are usually not offensive forces.

The Ukrainian Army has 170,000+ mobilized. Don’t know how many they have recently mobilized but would not be surprised to find their mobilized strength currently exceeds 200,000.

The real difference in strength is in airpower, which I will post about soon.

Vincent B. Hawkins has passed away

I just heard that Vincent Hawkins, former HERO and DMSI employee, passed away yesterday. Born in August 1955 he was 66 years old.

He came to work for Trevor Dupuy’s HERO/DMSI around 1986 and was there when I arrived. Always outgoing and welcoming, he had a master’s degree in history, was fluent in German and led the German research team for the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base (ACSDB). He was the co-author of one chapter in Trevor Dupuy’s Understanding Defeat.

He continued at DMSI until around 1991, when it closed down. He was the editor for weekly defense newsletter they were doing, which I thought was a worthwhile effort. He then did some historical research for George Kuhn’s casualty estimation efforts at LMI.

Always outgoing and humorous, Vince was a good friend at DMSI. His office was always one of my stops when I took a break for coffee.

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – part 3

There is a big difference between 72 hours and never.

See: Russia ‘will not capture’ any of Ukraine’s cities, Ukranian defense minister says

Now, I have no inside knowledge or deep understanding of Ukrainian defensive capabilities, so cannot comment on who is right. But U.S. General Miley did suggest that Kiev could fall within 72 hours. That seems like a pretty bizarre statement to me; as I don’t think that even if Russia starts a conventional warfare operation next week, Kiev will be the objective.

On the other hand, I am concerned about Kharkov (second largest city in Ukraine) and Mariupol (which connects to Crimea). 

Anyhow, the Ukrainian defense minister says the Russians “…will not capture either Kyiv, Odessa, Kharkiv, or any other city.” That may be true, as I still suspect we are not going to see any major conventional warfare in Eastern Europe this month. If there was, I do not have the knowledge to say that this would be the case. As Russian will have air superiority, hard to imagine they won’t be able to make some progress.

 

Old posts on the subject:

So Is Russia going to actually attack Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Russian Invasions | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The first post “Russian Invasions” was made on 5 December 2021. The next one was done on 22 January 2022. Over the last two months, nothing that has happened has changed my opinion. 

Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 1

Below is the provisional schedule for the first Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC). We currently have set up two conference rooms for use and are issuing out a call for presentations. We do have 23 presentations scheduled by 14 speakers. We have slots available for at least another dozen presentations. Each slot is an hour long, so planning for a 45-minute presentation and 15 minutes of discussion.

If we get more requests than that, my bias is to either rent a third conference room at the facility or to reduce some presentations to 20 minutes with 10 minutes of discussion. This would allow us to do two presentations in an hour slot. We are probably not going to turn away any quality presentations.

Call for presentations is here: Call for Presentations for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The current schedule is:

Schedule: Pike and Gallows Conference Center

Updated: 13 February 2022

 

 

Day 1: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 0930    Introductory remarks (new)                Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

0930 – 1030    Studying Combat (old)                       Dr. Shawn Woodford (TDI)

1030 – 1130    Data for Wargames (recent version) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1130 – 1230    How Lanchester modelling fits the historical data

                                                                                    Dr. Paul R. Syms (Dstl)

1230 – 1400    Lunch

1400 – 1500    Research fitting Lanchester Models to Battle Data

                                                                                    Dr. Tom Lucas (NPS)

1500 – 1600    How Important are Superior Numbers?                     

Dr. David Kirkpatrick (University College London) – virtual?

1600 – 1700    Killing Captain Hindsight: Quantifying Chance in Military History

Dr. Niall MacKay (University of York)        

 

Evening (1900):          Group Dinner – Rangos

 

 

Day 2: Analysis of Unconventional Warfare

0900 – 1000    Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (old)

Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1000 – 1100    Estimating War Deaths (in Iraq)

Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University of London)

1100 – 1200    Infantry Support Weapon                   Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.) – ?

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400   

1400 – 1500   

1500 – 1600

1600 – 1700    The Silent Killers: A Quick Historical Review of Biological Threats.

                                                                 Dr. Douglas A. Samuelson (InfoLogix, Inc.) 

 

 

Evening (1900):          Group Dinner – BJs

 

 

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000    The Application of the Scientific Method to Military History

Clinton Reilly (Computer Strategies. Australia)

1000 – 1100    The Decline of War Since 1950        

Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University of London)

1100 – 1200    Quantitative Risk Assessment in Military Decisions

                                                                    Dr. Douglas A. Samuelson (InfoLogix, Inc.)

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    HA support for our Directorate of Land Warfare

Dr. Paul L. Syms (Dstl)

1400 – 1500    Quantitative Analysis of History of Direct Fire Weapons

                                                                                    Dr. Alexander Kott (ARL)

1500 – 1600    The Criticality of Resurrecting TDI & TNDM

                                                                                    Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)

1600 – 1700    The Future of TDI and work of the conference (new)

Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

 

Evening:          Happy hour  – Rangos and/or Hawk and Griffin 

 

 

Schedule: Einstein Conference Room

 

Day 1: Poster and Book Room

Opened at 0800

 

Afternoon Day 1: Other Analysis of Warfare

1400 – 1500   

1500 – 1600   

1600 – 1700

 

Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 1000    A Statistical Analysis of Land Battles: What is Associated with Winning?

                                                                                    Dr. Tom Lucas (NPS)

1000 – 1100    The Combat Assessment Technique               William Sayers

1100 – 1200    Machine Learning the Lessons of History      Dr. Robert Helmbold – virtual

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400   

1400 – 1500   

1500 – 1600    War by Numbers (old)                        Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI) – ?

1600 – 1700    Urban Warfare (old)                           Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI) – ?

 

 

 

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000    Midway and the Aleutians                  Dr. Michael Johnson (CNA)

1000 – 1100   

1100 – 1200   

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400   

 

 

Or Day 2 or 3: Combat Modeling Analysis

 

Or Day 2 or 3: Urban Warfare

 

Or Day 2 or 3: Air Combat Analysis

 

Or Day 2 or 3: Naval Combat Analysis

 

So, what is everyone about to go to war over? – part 2

Saw this article from the Daily Beast this morning. Nothing new here, but reinforces my previous post on this subject: Putin’s Army Forces Ukraine’s Frontliners Into “Fight or Flight” Hell

The closest I have been to this area is the countryside around Belgorod (for obvious reasons). 

Previous post: So, what is everyone about to go to war over? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – part 2

And then there is this article: Troop-to-Task: A Russian Invasion of Ukraine

What catches my attention about this article is the discussion of whether “troop-to-task” ratios, also known as tie-down ratios, sometimes also known as force ratios; should be measured based upon population or based upon insurgent strength.

To quote from his article: “Throughout the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, American analysts and military officials referred to a 20:1,000 (2%) troop-to-population ratio for successful counterinsurgency.”

He also notes: “These troop-to-population security ratios are notoriously unreliable and have weak empirical basis for planning.” 

That is more polite than how I refer to them in private. I did discuss this subject on pages 70-71 of my book America’s Modern Wars.

He then states: “Another popular way to analyze troop requirements in through troop–to-insurgent ratios.”

Popular? I have not seen anyone do this in recent times. I do have a book published on the subject (America’s Modern Wars). Perhaps I am missing out on something that is going on in the basement of the Pentagon. 

He does note that “This approach falls apart at step one: Counting insurgents.”

I have a chapter on the subject (Chapter 11: Estimating Insurgent Force Size, pages 115-120). It is possible. It is not perfect or easy; but doing something vague and difficult is better than doing something that is conceptually flawed. To date, I have not seen anyone else do anything further on estimating insurgents. My work was a tentative first cut on the subject. My customers were completely uninterested in this analysis, and nothing further was done. Clearly something further needs to be done. I think that is better than doing something that is conceptually flawed.

I have discussed this before on this blog and in my book: America’s Modern Wars. My discussion of the previous RAND work on the subject is on pages 70-71. It includes the following table from our work:

If anyone can tell me from that table where a 2% figure could come from, have at it.

Listed below are a collection of four relevant blog posts on the subject (there are some 1,288 posts on this blog). We do have categories like “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” “Force Ratios” and “Estimating Insurgent Force Size” this blog. We have done a few posts on the subject.

Needless to say, I think that basing the “troop-to-task” ratios on population is at best marginally relevant. For example, the troop-to-task ratio for Vietnam was 88.4. We did not win that one. On the other hand, when the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) with its two dozen members, raised hell in San Francisco and Los Angeles in the early 1970s, doing a political assassination, kidnapping Patty Hearst, and robbing banks, we took care of it using the LA police. We did not need to deploy 2% of the population of the United States (estimated at 213 million in 1974) to deal with the SLA. We did not need to raise over 4 million troops to suppress this insurgency. 

I do think the size of the insurgency is relevant.

 

 

Related posts:

Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency II | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency III | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency IV | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

and many, many others….