Mystics & Statistics

The First Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 in Tysons Corner, VA

Announcing the first Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September, 2022 in Tysons Corner, VA, USA. It is being hosted by The Dupuy Institute but is an open conference and we are looking for interested presenters and attendees from all corners of the historical analysis, operations research, and historical research communities.

Purpose:

To explore and promote the use of historical analysis in understanding military affairs.

It is built in part upon the work done by the HERO (Historical Evaluation Research Organization), TNDA (Trevor N. Dupuy and Associates), DMSI (Data Memory Systems Inc.), TMCI (The Military Conflict Institute), TDI (The Dupuy Institute) and elements of the Cornwallis Group. Similar in concept to the TMCI conferences.

First Conference:

Will be held 27-29 September 2022 at Tysons Corner, Virginia, near Washington, DC. It is in honor of the 60th anniversary of the Trevor N. Dupuy founded organizations and the 30th anniversary of The Dupuy Institute.

It is expected that the conference will include a wide range of attendees and presenters from private industry, academia, the U.S. government, the UK operational research and historical analysis community, and other interested parties.

The first day (Tuesday) of the conference with be focused on Analysis of Conventional Warfare, the second day (Wednesday) on Analysis of Unconventional Warfare and the third day (Thursday) with include Other Analysis of Warfare. Each presentation will be a maximum of 45 minutes with at least 15 minutes set aside for questions and discussion.

If demand is high enough, the conference will be broken into working groups as required.

Historical Analysis:

There is no clear definition as to what historical analysis consists of. For the purposes of this conference, it is that analysis of history that is focused on military affairs and is usually quantitative in approach and based upon a large number of cases (as opposed to being a case study). Historical Analysis is considered a proper subdiscipline of UK Operational Research. It is not considered part of Operations Research in the United States.

The UK Dstl defines historical analysis as “The use of mathematical, statistical, qualitative and other forms of analysis to understand historical engagements, operations, campaigns and conflicts for the purpose of providing impartial analysis and sensitive decision support to policy makers.”

The key elements of what The Dupuy Institute looks for in historical analysis is that it is 1) based upon history, with a strong bias towards primary sources (i.e. unit records), 2) it is a based upon a representative sample of cases, not just a case study of one or two cases, 3) it is analytical in approach, 4) it is using past real-world experience for analyzing and addressing a problem of today. Historical analysis is simply the analysis of real-world experiences.

There are people who are doing surveys of historical operations, basically doing multiple case studies to examine trends and patterns. While these are not based upon the large databases that The Dupuy Institute favors, these are efforts worth examining and such efforts will also be explored at our conferences.

Costs:

Cost of attendance will be $150 for the entire conference. Dining and hotels are at the expense of the attendees. There will be facilities for virtual attendees and virtual presenters, but the focus of the conference will be in-person presentations and attendees.

Call for Presentations:

We are making a call for papers and presentations at that time. We have already set up a preliminary list of presenters.

Long-term Goal:

The long-term goal is a create a series of periodic conferences for the purposes of presenting, examining and encouraging historical analysis of military affairs across a wide-range of issues.

For questions, suggestions, comments, or to volunteer for presentations, please contact:

Christopher A. Lawrence

The Dupuy Institute

(703) 289-0007

LawrenceTDI@aol.com

 

P.S. In subsequent posts I will be posting the rates for the conference, the list of nearby hotels, and a preliminary list of presenters.

More on the revived ISIL

I have still not seen anything on the U.S. news about the resurgent ISIL, but it is on the French news.

Heavy fighting continues for 3rd day to stop ISIS prison break attempt in Syria (yahoo.com)

A few points that get my attention:

  1. It appears that ISIL was executing prison guards.
  2. The U.S. is conducting airstrikes to support the SDF (Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces).
  3. U.S. forces in Bradley fighting vehicles were seen about 300 meters from the fighting location.
  4. The SDF say that 22 of their fighters have died and 17 injured. This is a lop-sided wounded-to-killed ratio, but note point one above (executed guards).
  5. The SDF claims that 45 ISIL members were killed and 110 escaped detainees were captured. How many escaped detainees were not captured? There were nearly 3,500 people held in the prison.
  6. Why is ISIL continued to fight after three days? Why not attack and withdraw? What are they gaining by continuing the fight?

 

P.S. I still don’t know why people call it ISIS? Even google translate gives the translation as “The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.” Try it: الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام

So Is Russia going to actually attack Ukraine?

Based upon on the buzz lately in the news and comments by some Western politicians, it appears that is only a question of when, not if, that Russia is going to attack Ukraine. Yet, Russia is saying they are not going to attack. So… who is right?

It still doesn’t look to me like they are going to attack. This opinion is not based upon any inside knowledge or deep understanding of the situation. I only know what I read in the news. But a few things get my attention:

Force Ratios: First of all, Russia has amassed a 100K+ troops along the border, plus some forces are in a training exercise in Belarus. I gather the actual figure is on the low side of 100,000, vice being near 200,000. On the other hand, the Ukrainian Army, before mobilization is almost 200,000. So, is Russia really massing so it can attack while outnumbered?

Now, there are a few other factors in what is not that simple of a comparison. First of all, Russia can move more troops into the area(s) of interest on short notice. So that buildup of 100K+ could quickly turn into 300K+. If Russia had more than 300K troops in the area, I would become very concerned. But right now, they do not.

Weather: People are making noise like something will happen in February. It is freakin’ cold at that time of year. There is snow on the ground. Do they really want to attack then? I would wait until after the spring thaw, like the Germans did in 1941, 1942 and 1943, when you have a nice long summer for your campaign.

Warning: Surprise is a nice force multiplier. I have a chapter on the subject in my book War by Numbers. It is now no surprise if an attack comes. Furthermore, they even lack strategic surprise, so Ukraine has been able to lobby for more aid and has received more weapons. Why would Russia help their potential adversary get prepared, which is what has happened over the last couple of months? Ukraine is receiving weaponry and support that is probably would not have otherwise received. So, did Russia really choose to give Ukraine 2-3 months of warning to prepare before they attack them? This seems counter-intuitive.

Again, I go back to my original post, which is here:

Russian Invasions | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

I may be proven wrong come February and Russia suddenly comes swarming across the border to take the rest of “New Russia,” to take Kharkov (the second largest city in Ukraine) and to cross the Pripet marshes and Chernobyl/Pripyat area to threaten Kiev, but right now, I am not sure this is the real scenario.

I still think the threats are part of a larger negotiation strategy (although I don’t rule out that the Russia government has simply made a mistake).

In Case We Forget

This AP news report caught my attention: Islamic State gunmen mount deadly attacks in Syria, Iraq: dozens killed

The points that stand out to me:

1. “In Iraq, IS gunmen attacked an army barracks [at 3 a.m.] in a mountainous area north of Badhdad early Friday, killing 11 soldiers as they slept…”

 

2. “In Syria, more than 100 IS fighters using heavy machine guns and vehicles rigged with explosives attacked the Gweiran Prison in the northeastern city of Hassakeh…”

     a. “…seven U.S. backed Kurdish fighters were killed and several others were wounded. At least 23 IS attackers were also among the dead…”

     b. This is a company-sized attack by an insurgency “defeated” “in March 2019” !!!

     c. “The complex attack was mounted on Thursday evening…prisoners inside the facility rioted simultaneously…”

     d. “…more than 100 militants who escaped were arrested…” So, how many escaped ???

     e. “…at least 23 Kurdish security forces and prison guards were killed in the clashes, alongside 39 militants and five civilians…” (unconfirmed and unofficial)

    f. “…the inmates are mostly in control of the prison, while Kurdish forces attempt to wrestle it back…” (unconfirmed and unofficial).

 

Another recent article adds: https://news.yahoo.com/syria-kurds-hunt-down-jihadists-083912455.html?fr=sycsrp_catchall

  1. “….killed at least 23 Kurdish secuirty forces and set ‘dozens of IS fighters’ free… (unconfirmed and unofficial)

And this is worth watching (VOA). It is only three and half minutes long: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V3P8iuKUT5g

  1. They note that there are more than10,000 Islamic State prisoners being held in Syria (at 2:45 see. “One of the most worrisome problems…”)

Some comments on Kazakhstan

As I am sure a lot of people have noticed, Kazakhstan has been in the news this week. The protests there have been large and violent. They are now saying that at least 164 people have died, including 18 police. It has put an end to the influence of the longest serving FSU (Former Soviet Union) dictator, Nursultan Nazarbayev. He had been in office since 1990 (when the Soviet Union still existed). Good riddance, although I am not sure he is going to be replaced by anyone any better. It does not look like this is going to turn into a budding enlightened democracy any time soon. With Russia troops in the country, who knows exactly what path this will take.

The intervening force is CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), which had been around since 1992/1994. It has six members, Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kygyzstan and Tajikistan. Russia has the largest military of the six, with 900,000 active troops. The next largest military is 45,000. I gather most all of the members have sent troops to Kazakhstan, but clearly Russia is the dominate player. The current secretary general of CSTO is from Belarus.

At the moment, I don’t have much to say beyond what is being reported. Life has become uncomfortable for certain leaders in the FSU. The democratically elected but Russian aligned leader of Ukraine, Yanukovich, was thrown out of power in 2014 in the Euromaiden protests; the leader of Armenia, Sargsyan, was removed from office in 2018 (the Velvet Revolution); the leader of Belarus, Lukashenko, came pretty close to being thrown out of power in 2020/21 (the Slipper Revolution); and now the longest serving dictator in Kazakhstan has been thrown out of power in 2022. One does wonder who is next.

Update (1/13/22):

  1. CSTO sent around 2,500 troops.
  2. They are supposed to pull out by 19 January.
  3. Update 1/19/22: At least 225 people were killed, according to the Kazakhstan prosecutor general’s office. 
  4. Update 1/19/22: Russian and CSTO have stated they have withdrawn their over 2,000 troops deployed to Kazakhstan.

Award Dates for the Blue Max (1916)


Still sidetracked somewhat on the Great War air research. Sorry if this does not hold the interest of many of you. I have been examining the list of the first German aviators who received the Pour le Merite, commonly called the Blue Max, named after its first recipient, Max Immelmann. A total of 13 pilots were awarded the Blue Max in 1916. These first recipients are (name, number of victories, dates, date of death, age, and any notes):


1. Max Immelmann (8): 12 January 1916, KIA 18 June 1916 (25)


2. Oswald Boelcke (8): 12 January 1916, KIA (mid-air collision) 28 October 1916 (25)


3. Hans-Joachim Buddecke (7): 14 April 1916, KIA 10 March 1918 (27)


4. Kurt Wintgens (8): 1 July 1916, KIA 25 September 1916 (22)


5. Max Ritter von Mulzer (8): 8 July 1916, died in testing crash 26 September 1916 (23)


6. Otto Parschau (8): 10 July 1916, KIA 21 July 1916 (25)


7. Walter Hoehndorf (8), 20 July 1916, Crashed 5 September 1917 (24)


8. Ernst Freiherr von Althaus (8): 21 July 1916, died 1946 (56)


9. Wilhelm Frankl (6 or 9): 16 July 1916 or 12 August 1916, KIA (wing failure) 8 April 1917 (23) – Jewish, converted to Christianity in 1917.


10. Rudolf Berthold (8): 12 October 1916, killed in Kapp Putsch 15 May 1920 (28)


11. Gustav Leffers (8): 5 November 1916, KIA 27 December 1916 (21)


12. Albert Dossenbach (9): 11 November 1916, KIA 3 July 1917 (26) – two-seater pilot at time of award


13. Hans Berr (10): 4 December 1916, KIA (mid-air collision) 6 April 1917 (26)


 


I believe that these are all the airmen that had been awarded the Blue Max in 1916. Of those, 11 died during the war, one died violently shortly after the war, and only one died of natural causes.


According to website The Aerodrome, 81 German military aviators were awarded the Blue Max. 76 army aviators and 5 naval aviators. They also provide a listing of the 62 German aces who won it. A total of 687 Pour le Merite were awarded during the Great War.


Let me know if there is anything I have missed in this listing. Note that I have two different dates given for when Wilhelm Frankl was awarded the Blue Max.


 

U.S. Defense Budget for 2022

The U.S. Defense budget was signed into law on Monday. A few things that caught my attention:

  1. Increase of 5% (I guess we have to replace all that equipment left behind in Afghanistan).
  2. 2.7% pay raise (which I gather makes up around 2% or so of that 5% increase).
  3. Seems to be focused on keeping “pace militarily with China and Russia.”
  4. “The bill includes $7.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and a statement of congressional support for the defense of Taiwan, measures intended to counteract China’s influence in the region.”
  5. “It also includes $300 million for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, a show of support in the face of Russian aggression, as well as $4 billion for the European Defense Initiative.”

Let’s look at what keeping “pace militarily with China and Russia” looks like in dollars and sense:

U.S. Budget: $768.2 billion (2022) or 3.42% of GDP in 2019.

Chinese (PRC) Defense Budget: $209.4 billion (2021) or 1.3% of GDP (2021)

Russian Defense Budget: 61.7 billion (2020-21) or 4.3% of GDP (2019).

 

See: https://www.marketwatch.com/story/biden-signs-bill-authorizing-768-2-billion-in-2022-defense-spending-including-a-2-7-pay-raise-for-service-members-into-law-01640648957?siteid=yhoof2&yptr=yahoo

Russian Invasions – update 1

Well, it appears that the U.S. and Russia will hold “security talks” on Jan. 10, 12 and 13. See: https://news.yahoo.com/1-u-russian-officials-set-035411514.html

I noted in my original post post four possibilities. The last one listed was “4. Or the build up may be the message (most likely option).”

Russian Invasions | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

It does appear that the build up got Russia the attention they wanted. We shall see what comes out of these talks. Suspect they will be more symbolic than substantive.

 

Coronavirus Mortality Rates in the U.S. ?

I have not posted for a while on the Coronavirus. I noticed on my twitter that people have posted the following stats on COVID from the CDC (Center for Disease Control):

Mortality Rates:

Unvaccinated: 6.1 deaths per 100K
Vaccinated: 0.5 deaths per 100K
Boosted: 0.1 deaths per 100K


I went to their websites and tried to find the stats from the original source, but couldn’t find the magic button that led me to the magic stats, so I will just go with what I saw on twitter. After all, that is the data that is being transmitted through the aether.

Now I gather around 62% of Americans are partially or wholly vaccinated. 38% have taken no vaccines.

Now, there are a mere 331,893,745 people in the U.S. (2021 estimate).

So, 62% of 331,893,745/100K x 0.1 = 206 deaths

In this case, I am assuming that those vaccinated will be boosted. 

And, 38% of 331,893,745/100K x 6.1 = 7,693.

In this case, I am assuming these 38% will not get vaccinated. I would not be surprised if up to half of them do.

Does this really mean we are at the point that the total additional cost of the Coronavirus in the United States is less than 10,000 more lives? I find that hard to believe. In the last 28 days we have lost 35,492. Last week we lost 8,442 people.

To date, we have lost 812,283. This is out of a reported 51,564,141 cases. This calculates at a mortality rate of 1.575% or 1,575 deaths per 100K. This is much higher than 6.1 per 100K. There seems to be a disconnect here.

1. Are the CDC statistics as transmitted by twitter incorrect (I first saw them on Anthony Scaramucci’s feed, but have seen the statistics repeated on other feeds. It was labeled “Latest CDC statistic on deaths from known COVID cases”)?

2. Is the mortality rate of the Delta and Omicron variants much lower than the original virus?

3. Is this just the statistical anomaly created by the most vulnerable people having been vaccinated (or worse) and the unvaccinated are mostly younger and healthier, with a much lower mortality rate?

4. Did I make a math error here somewhere?

 

Russian Invasions

My son was texting me today about the threat Russia appears to be posing towards Ukraine. Glad he is paying attention. According to an article he read, the Russians have gathered 175,000 troops on the border and 10 days of supply.

Now, according to Wikipedia (which is usually drawn from IISS) the Ukrainian Armed Forces has 255,000 active personnel and 900,000 in reserve as of 2021. In 2016 there were 169,000 personnel in the ground forces: with two armored brigades, 13 mechanized brigades, eight air assault brigades, two mountain warfare brigades, five airmobile brigades and seven rocket and artillery brigades. In 2016 the Air Force had 36,300 personnel, the Navy had 6,500 personnel and the Special Forces had 4,000. I gather these forces have expanded since 2016.

So, it does not look like Russia is planning on marching to Kiev, especially with 10 days of supply. They are probably not even considering creating a land bridge to Crimea.

So what might they be considering:

1. Help the local governments in rebellion take the rest of Donetsk and Lugansk.
2. Replace the local governments in Donetsk and Lugansk with their own governance (possibly in anticipation of formally annexing these two areas).
3. Make violent border demonstrations.
4. Or the build up may be the message (most likely option).

I gather Russia really does not want Ukraine to join NATO. I am not sure that build ups at the border make that point. In fact, it may reinforce Ukraine’s desire to join NATO. On the other hand, invading Donetsk or Lugansk or the rest of Ukraine certainly works against that goal.

Of course the real question is not whether Ukraine wants to join NATO, I gather that is a given. The real question is NATO willing to take on the responsibility of defending Ukraine, especially with two provinces in open revolt and two entities (Crimea and Sevastopol) annexed by Russia. So far, I gather no one significant has made a clear statement on that subject one way or the other. Ukrainian’s NATO membership appears to be in permanent limbo, which I gather that is what Russia prefers. The build up may be for the sake of signaling that it should stay that way. 

One last note: the price of oil is below $70 a barrel (Brent Crude was at 69.92). Last I checked (it was a couple of years ago), Russia needed the price of oil to be at $80 or higher to balance their budget. It was there a month ago, now it is not. Running significant deficits may limit their willingness to explore military options. Perhaps the easiest way to constrain Russian adventurism is to keep the price of oil down.