Category National Security Policy

The Principle Of Mass On The Future Battlefield

Men of the U.S. Army 369th Infantry Regiment “Harlem’s Hellfighters,”in action at Séchault on September 29, 1918 during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. [Wikimedia]

Given the historical trend toward battlefield dispersion as a result of the increasing lethality of weapons, how will the principle of mass apply in future warfare? I have been wondering about this for a while in the context of the two principle missions the U.S. Army must plan and prepare for, combined arms maneuver and wide area security. As multi-domain battle advocates contend, future combat will place a premium on smaller, faster, combat formations capable of massing large amounts of firepower. However, wide area security missions, such as stabilization and counterinsurgency, will continue to demand significant numbers of “boots on the ground,” the traditional definition of mass on the battlefield. These seemingly contradictory requirements are contributing to the Army’s ongoing “identity crisis” over future doctrine, training, and force structure in an era of budget austerity and unchanging global security responsibilities.

Over at the Australian Army Land Power Forum, Lieutenant Colonel James Davis addresses the question generating mass in combat in the context of the strategic challenges that army faces. He cites traditional responses by Western armies to this problem, “Regular and Reserve Force partnering through a standing force generation cycle, indigenous force partnering through deployed training teams and Reserve mobilisation to reconstitute and regenerate deployed units.”

Davis also mentions AirLand Battle and “blitzkrieg” as examples of tactical and operational approaches to limiting the ability of enemy forces to mass on the battlefield. To this he adds “more recent operational concepts, New Generation Warfare and Multi Domain Battle, [that] operate in the air, electromagnetic spectrum and cyber domain and to deny adversary close combat forces access to the battle zone.” These newer concepts use Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA), Information Operations, long range Joint Fires, and Robotic and Autonomous systems (RAS) to attack enemy efforts to mass.

The U.S. Army is moving rapidly to develop, integrate and deploy these capabilities. Yet, however effectively new doctrine and technology may influence mass in combined arms maneuver combat, it is harder to see how they can mitigate the need for manpower in wide area security missions. Some countries may have the strategic latitude to emphasize combined arms maneuver over wide area security, but the U.S. Army cannot afford to do so in the current security environment. Although conflicts emphasizing combined arms maneuver may present the most dangerous security challenge to the U.S., contingencies involving wide area security are far more likely.

How this may be resolved is an open question at this point in time. It is also a demonstration as to how tactical and operational considerations influence strategic options.

Did The Patriot BMD Miss Again In Saudi Arabia?

Apparent trajectory of Houthi Burqan ballistic missile fired at Saudi Arabia on 4 November 2017 [New York Times]

On 4 November 2017, Houthi rebels fired a Burqan 2H (a variant of the SCUD) ballistic missile from Yemeni territory aimed at Riyadh International Airport in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis claimed to have intercepted the missile before it hit using a U.S.-made Patriot PAC-2 ballistic missile defense (BMD) system.

A team of independent analysts have challenged that claim, however. Led by Jeffery Lewis, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middleberry Institute of International Studies at Monterey, the team analyzed video of an impact near the Riyadh Airport and scattered missile debris. Based on this evidence, they concluded that five Saudi Patriot BMD missiles failed to intercept the incoming missile and that its warhead detonated on the ground just a kilometer away from a busy airport terminal.

The apparent failure of the Patriot BMD continues a string of operational disappointments that extends back to the 1991 Gulf War. Intended for terminal BMD against short and medium range ballistic missile threats, the Patriot forms part of the layered U.S. BMD system, and has also been sold to 14 other countries, including South Korea and Japan.

The credibility of U.S. and regional military defenses against North Korea rests significantly on perceptions of the effectiveness of U.S-made BMD. As President Donald Trump boasted the day after the alleged Saudi missile intercept, “Our [Patriot] system knocked the missile out of the air… That’s how good we are. Nobody makes what we make, and now we’re selling it all over the world.”

North Korean Missile Likely Broke Up on Re-Entry

It looks like the latest North Korea missile that was fired broke up on re-entry: http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/02/asia/north-korea-missile-re-entry/index.html

This is not a minor point.

The article also notes the need for the North Koreas to “master missile guidance and targeting” and the two-stage missile was at least partially liquid fueled, which takes time and can provide U.S. intelligence with a warning before it is launched.

Anyhow, it is still a developing program, although they have surprised people with how fast they have developed.

How Do You Solve A Problem Like North Korea?

Flight trajectories of North Korean missile tests, May-November 2017. [The Washington Post]

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted another ballistic missile test yesterday. Following a nearly vertical “lofted trajectory,” the test missile reached a height of 2,800 miles and impacted 620 miles downrange in the Sea of Japan. This performance would give the missile, which the North Koreans have designated the Hwasong-15, a strike range of 8,100 miles, which would include all of the United States.

Appended here is a roundup of TDI posts that address the political and military challenges posed by North Korea. It should be noted that the DPRK nuclear program has been underway for decades and has defied easy resolution thus far. There are no clear options at this stage and each potential solution carries a mix of risk and reward. The DPRK is highly militarized and the danger of catastrophic conflict looms large, with the potential to inflict military and civilian casualties running into the hundreds of thousands or more.

The first set of posts address a potential war on the Korean peninsula.

Chronology of North Korean Missile Development

Insurgency In The DPRK?

U.S. And China: Deterrence And Resolve Over North Korea

Casualty Estimates for a War with North Korea

The CRS Casualty Estimates

The second set of posts look at the DPRK ballistic missile threat and possible counters.

So, What Would Happen If The Norks Did Fire An ICBM At The U.S.?

Aegis, THAAD, Patriots and GBI

Defending Guam From North Korean Ballistic Missiles

The Pros And Cons Of Shooting Down North Korean Ballistic Missile Tests

 

 

Will Tax Reform Throttle A U.S. Defense Budget Increase?

John Conger recently reported in Defense One that the tax reform initiative championed by the Trump administration and Republican congressional leaders may torpedo an increase in the U.S. defense budget for 2018. Both the House and Senate have passed authorizations approving the Trump administration’s budget request for $574.5 billion in defense spending, which is $52 billion higher than the limit established by the Budget Control Act (BCA). However, the House and Senate also recently passed a concurrent 2018 budget resolution to facilitate passage of a tax reform bill that caps the defense budget at $522 billion as mandated by the BCA.

The House and Senate armed services committees continue to hammer out the terms of the 2018 defense authorization, which includes increases in troop strength and pay. These priorities could crowd out other spending requested by the services to meet strategic and modernization requirements if the budget remains capped. Congress also continues to resist the call by Secretary of Defense James Mattis to close unneeded bases and facilities, which could free spending for other needs. There is also little interest in reforming Defense Department business practices that allegedly waste $125 billion annually.

Congressional Republicans and Democrats were already headed toward a showdown over 2018 BCA limits on defense spending. Even before the tax reform push, several legislators predicted yet another year-long continuing resolution limiting government spending to the previous year’s levels. A bipartisan consensus existed among some armed services committee members that this would constitute “borderline legislative malpractice, particularly for the Department of Defense.”

Despite the ambitious timeline set by President Trump to pass a tax reform bill, the chances of a continuing resolution remain high. It also seems likely that any agreement to increase defense spending will be through the Overseas Contingency Operations budget, which is not subject to the BCA. Many in Congress agree with Democratic Representative Adam Smith that resorting to this approach is “a fiscal sleight of hand [that] would be bad governance and ‘hypocritical.’”

Are tax reform and increased defense spending incompatible? Stay tuned.

Size of U.S. Defense Budget

If you have kids, the conversations sometime wander into strange areas. I was told yesterday that the U.S. Defense budget was 54% of the U.S. budget. I said that not right, even though Siri was telling him otherwise.

It turns out that in 2015 that the U.S. Defense budget was 54% of U.S. discretionary spending, according to Wikipedia. This is a significant distinction. In 2015 the U.S. defense budget was $598 billion. In 2015 the U.S. Federal budget was $3.688 trillion actual (compared to 3.9 Trillion requested). This is 16% of the U.S. budget. As always, have to read carefully.

Just to complete the math, the U.S. GDP in 2015 was 18.037 Trillion (United Nations figures). So, federal budget is  20% of GDP (or 22% is the requested budget figure is used) and defense budget is 3.3% of GDP.

Latest figures are 583 billion for U.S. Defense budget (requested for 2017), 3.854 estimated expenditures for the U.S. Federal Budget for 2016 and 4.2 trillion requested for 2017, and 18.56 trillion for U.S. GDP (2016) and 19.3 trillion (preliminary for 2017).

 

Sources:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_budget_of_the_United_States

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_federal_budget

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_United_States#21st_century

And other wikipedia links.

 

 

Secretary of the Army, take 3

On 19 July 2017 Mark Thomas Esper was nominated to be the new Secretary of the Army. This is the third nomination for this position, as the first two nominees, Vincent Viola and Mark E. Green, withdrew. Not sure when Congress will review and approve this nomination. I am guessing it won’t happen in September. The acting Secretary of the Army is Ryan McCarthy (approved as Undersecretary of the Army in August 2017).

Mr. Esper’s background:

  1. Graduate of USMA (West Point) in 1986 with a BS in Engineering.
  2. Masters degree from Harvard in 1995.
  3. PhD from GWU in 2008.
  4. Served as in infantry officer with the 101st Airborne Division during the Gulf War (1990-1991).
  5. Over ten years of active duty (1986-1996?). I gather still in the Army Reserve as a Lt. Colonel.
  6. Chief of Staff of the Heritage Foundation, 1996-1998.
  7. Senior staffer for Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 1998-2002.
  8. Policy Director House Armed Services Committee, 2001-2202.
  9. Deputy Assistance Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy, 2002-2004.
  10. Director of National Security Affairs for U.S. Senate, 2004-2006.
  11. Executive Vice President at Aerospace Industries Association, 2006-2007.
  12. National Policy Director for Senator Fred Thompson’s 2008 Presidential campaign, 2007-2008.
  13. Executive Vice President of the Global Intellectual Property Center, and Vice President for Europe and Eurasia at U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2008-2010.
  14. Vice President of Government Relations at Raytheon, 2010 to present.

Wikipedia article: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Esper

“So Fricking Stupid”: Muddling Through Strategic Insolvency

As I have mentioned before, the United States faces a crisis of “strategic insolvency” with regard to the imbalance between its foreign and military policy commitments and the resources it has allocated to meet them. Rather than addressing the problem directly, the nation’s political leadership appears to be opting to “muddle through” instead by maintaining the policy and budgetary status quo. A case in point is the 2017 Fiscal Year budget, which should have been approved last year. Instead Congress passed a series of continuing resolutions (CRs) that keeps funding at existing levels while its members try to come to an agreement.

That part is not working out so well. Representative Adam Smith, the ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), earlier this week warned that the congressional budget process is headed for “a complete meltdown” in December, Sidney J. Freedberg, Jr. reported in Defense One. The likely outcome, according to Smith, will be another year-long CR in place of a budget. Smith vented that this would constitute “borderline legislative malpractice, particularly for the Department of Defense.”

Smith finds himself in bipartisan agreement with HASC chairman Mac Thornberry and Senate Armed Services chairman John McCain that ongoing CRs and the restrictions of sequestration have contributed to training and maintenance shortfalls that resulted in multiple accidents—including two U.S. Navy ship collisions—that have killed 42 American servicemembers this summer.

As Freedberg explained,

What’s the budget train wreck, according to Smith? The strong Republican majority in the House has passed a defense bill that goes $72 billion over the maximum allowed by the 2011 Budget Control Act. That would trigger the automatic cuts called sequestration unless the BCA is amended, as it has been in the past. But the slim GOP majority in the Senate needs Democratic votes to amend the BCA, and the Dems won’t deal unless non-defense spending rises as much as defense – which is anathema to Republican hardliners in the House.

“Do you understand just how fricking stupid that is?” a clearly frustrated Smith asked rhetorically. A possible alternative would be to shift the extra defense spending into Overseas Contingency Operation funding, which is not subject to the BCA, as has been done before. Smith derided this option as “a fiscal sleight of hand [that] would be bad governance and ‘hypocritical.’”

Just as politics have gridlocked budget negotiations, so to it prevents flexibility in managing the existing defense budget. Smith believes a lot of money could be freed up by closing domestic military bases deemed unnecessary by the Defense Department and canceling some controversial nuclear weapons programs, but such choices would be politically contentious, to say the least.

The fundamental problem may be simpler: no one knows how much money is really needed to properly fund current strategic plans.

One briefer from the Pentagon’s influential and secretive Office of Net Assessment told Smith that “we do not have the money to fund the strategy that we put in place in 2012,” the congressman recalled. “And I said, ‘how much would you need?’…. He had no idea.”

And the muddling through continues.