Category Russia

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 2 (ground actions)

I changed the title of my previous post to “Day 1.” Again, my focus here is on the ground actions. What I am interested in is what ground are they going to take and what ground are they going to hold. Right now, this attack looks pretty unrestrained, but who knows what are Putin actual objectives or at what point he will decide he has done enough. I gather the degree of resistance by the Ukrainian Army may influence these decisions.

We are looking six major areas of operations right now.

1. Kiev

2. Odessa

3. Kharkov

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces.
5. Mariupol.
6. Crimean border

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): The Russian Army is reported to have reached the northern outskirts of Kiev (the Obolon district). They have also occupied the defunct nuclear power plant at Chernobyl (I wouldn’t want to be those troops). Vladimir Zelensky vowed last night to stay in Kiev. So, it does look like they intend to hold and fight for the city (see picture above). Very different than what we saw in Afghanistan. 

The Antonov/Hostomel airport has become a real right. Apparently, Russia did an airmobile operation to put troops within 15 miles of the capitol. This is the group of Matthew Chance ran across, and they were so nice as to let him film them. Ukraine counterattacked against what would have been an isolated “forward detachment” (the head of our Kursk research team, Col. Sverdlov, wrote the influential book “Forward Detachments in Battle”). They have retaken it according to some accounts. By the end of today, I gather it was back under Russian control.

There are lots of twitter feeds on this fight. Recommend you check @RALee85 and @TrentTelenko.

This is a decent news report from AP: https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/sorting-fact-disinformation-russian-attack-ukraine-83106752

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): There were reports of a landing there yesterday. I still have no idea of the size or location of the landing. I see not yet seen any clear reports on the subject for today. Was this a raid or a permanent landing?

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): How serious are Russian ground operations? Are they trying to surround and isolate Kharkov? It appears the Ukraine army in this area are putting up a fight. It does appear that most of the videos of captured Russians and destroyed Russian vehicles are coming from there.

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces: Of course, Russia has recognized these “people’s republics.” They only control half of their provinces. The rest of the provinces under control of Ukraine and defended by the Ukrainian army. I gather their desire is to expand their control and take the rest of both provinces, but these are well defended. Not sure how serious will be their attempts here. So far, we have not heard much from this area.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): This city of part of the Donetsk Oblast (province/county) and is on the route to Crimea. Are Russian going to try to drive through there to create a land connection to Crimea? Maybe, but it is well defended. Not sure this will be a high priority. The mayor is reporting fighting in the area, but I gather none at or near Mariupol.

Afternoon update: There are reports of an amphibious landing of several thousand troops in or near Mariupol.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): It appears that they are fairly serious about their operations in the area north of Crimea. It looks like they entered Kherson yesterday and raised the Russian flag over the administrative building in the middle of the city. So it does appear that Russia controls the area from the Crimea to Kherson. Such an operation complicates the defense of Mariupol.

Afternoon Update: Twitter accounts report over 100 Ukranian vehicles in convoys in this area were destroyed, but that Ukraine has re-occupied the area between Crimea and Kherson. I assume this is because Russia does not have manpower deployed to hold all the areas they have moved through.

Later Update: It looks like Kherson is back under control of Ukraine. This video is worth watching in its entirety: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSCYjnwJtfk

In general, the news is lagging, as it is in the middle of the afternoon there. Will update this post as I find more information. 

The Home Front: There were a number of decent sized protests against the war in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Ekaterinburg that I saw videos off. According to reports, Russia arrested more than 1,700 protesters. There are videos on-line of protesters and protesters being arrested.

Casualties:

Russian Losses include:

4 soldiers captured in three separate incidences (video evidence)

1 Su-25 (attack jet) crashed (Russian claim)

1 An-26 (transport plane) crashed, crew killed (Russan claim)

1 Ka-52 (assault helicopter) destroyed (video evidence) 

1 T-80 (tank) destroyed (video evidence)

1 BMP destroyed (video evidence)

450+ casualties (UK estimate) – note probably 25% or less of casualties are killed, so maybe less than 113 killed.

 

Ukrainian Losses include:

137 soldiers killed, including 10 officers (Zelensky)

14 Soldiers surrendered (Russian claim)

25 Civilians killed (U.N. High Commisiooner)

Updates: Ukrainian Su-27 shot down over Kiev (video evidence)

 

Also, there is one video on youtube called “fight between Russian Sukhoi Su35 v Ukrainian Mig29 over Kyiv.” If true, it shows that at least some of Ukrainian air force has survived the initial attack. AhirTech has posted many other interesting videos.

There are people doing a better job of this on Twitter, including @RALee85 and @Oryxspioenkop, neither who are known to me. I have not taken the time to exhaustively search their material. I am still working on my first cup of coffee this morning. Maybe later.

 

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – day 1 (ground actions)

Well, I did not think that Russia would actually take a step this far, but they did. I may discuss all the implications of that later. Right now my focus is on what ground actions they are taking. Is this a limited and defined operation or are they looking for large scale occupation of Ukrainian territory? As I see it there are six major areas of operations right now.

1. Kiev

2. Odessa

3. Kharkov

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces.
5. Mariupol.
6. Crimean border

 

Here Is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180) There is a column driving down the road from Belarus. Don’t know the size or whether it is Russian or mixed Russian-Belarussian. Needless to say, it is a big step from crossing a border to driving all the way down to the capital city. Taking Kiev is even a bigger challenge. I assume that Ukraine has some forces covering that route. I am guessing any column will get stopped or delayed. Not sure if this is anything more than a feint. I kind of doubt that they are looking at taking Kiev (especially as I gather they only have around 30,000 troops in Belarus).

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826) : I have heard reports that there is a landing there. Have no idea of the size or location of the landing., Again, I wonder if this is anything more than a distraction. Are they really looking at occupying Odessa? Cannot rule out that this is a special operations head-hunting expedition to try to capture/kill some of the people involved in the violence in Odessa in 2013, something that Putin has talked about.  

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): This may be the real objective/prize of this war. It is the second largest city in Ukraine and the largest Russian speaking city in Ukraine. It is part of the former Soviet rust-belt cities (which include Lugansk and Donetsk). It has had a declining population since 1989, although I gather this has now stabilized. I gather it has developed a big IT business though, and almost all of its business is with overseas customers. A Russian occupation would probably destroy a lot of that business. 

Geographically, it is a city in the middle of a large open plain. It changed hands three times in 1943. It was larger (population wise) than Stalingrad, which is why we examined the operations there for our urban warfare studies. I have never been there, but drove by it on the way to Belgorod. I do see lots of pictures of Russian forces near Belgorod and at the border between Belgorod and Kharkov. I have been to Belgorod a couple of times, which is part of the Kursk battlefield. 

So my question is, is Russia going to conduct serious ground operations for the sake of surrounding and isolating Kharkov?

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces: Of course, Russia has recognized these “people’s republics.” They only control half of their provinces. The rest of the provinces under control of Ukraine and defended by the Ukrainian army. I gather their desire is to expand their control and take the rest of both provinces, but these are well defended. Not sure how serious will be their attempts here.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): This city of part of the Donetsk Oblast (province/county) and is on the route to Crimea. Are Russian going to try to drive through there to create a land connection to Crimea? Maybe, but it is well defended. Not sure this will be a high priority. In the next reports I saw last night, while there was lots of stuff exploding around Kiev and Kharkov, there was not much happening around Mariupol.

6. Crimea: One of the problems with Crimea is that they get their water from Ukraine. Is Russia going to try to expand their control of the area north of Crimea so as to secure water resources? Maybe. Such an operation also complicates the defense of Mariupol. I have heard that they have crossed the borders there, but I do wonder how serious of an effort they will make.

It is hard to say what Russian final objectives are, but obviously they are going to bomb all major military facilities and airfields. As cities are where many reporters are located this is what is first reported on. But the question for me, it what do they intended to occupy? Are they going to conquer all of Ukraine (I doubt it, it is a very big piece to swallow)? Are they going to just occupy all of Lugansk and Donetsk oblasts? Maybe, but this is a hard fight over terrain of limited economic value? All they going to isolate and then try to take Kharkov? This I think is a distinct possibility and I am looking for any reports of ground operations there with great interest.

While I assume the Ukrainian Army has some defensive capabilities, their biggest problem is that Russia has complete air superiority. 

 

P.S.: Captured around Kharkov: First Prisoners of War as Ukraine Captures Russian Soldiers

P.P.S.: Useful map: Map shows locations of explosions and potential attacks in Ukraine

P.P.P.S: More fighting around Kharkov. This one includes a video of a destroyed Russian tank: Russian Tank Convoy Blown Up in Videos as Ukraine Fights Back Invasion

P.P.P.P.S: Matthew Chance from CNN is at Antonov airbase 15 miles north of Kiev. It looks like Russian airborne and airmobile troops have already taken it. See: Cnn reporter: This shows just how close Russian forces are to Ukraine capital

P.P.P.P.P.S. It does appear that Russia is making a play for Kherson: 

https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/801461.html

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/24/7325476/

 

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – part 6 (Russian deployment)

The following are reported deployed near Ukraine (according to U.S. statements). See: Roughly 75% of Russian conventional forces deployed against Ukraine:

This includes:

1. 120 Battalion Tactical Groups

2. 35 air defense battalions

3. 500 fighter and fighter-bombers

 

So, 500 Russian fighter and fighter-bombers versus Ukraine’s 100. They will clearly have air superiority. Makes me wonder what the 35 air defense battalions are going to do?

 

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – part 5 (airpower)

There is a big mismatch in airpower between Russia and Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force can field about 100 modern aircraft, Russia can field over 1,300. Actual count according to Wikipedia is:

Ukraine
MiG-29 – 37 (multirole)

Su-24 – 12 (attack)

Su-25 – 17 (attack/CAS)

Su-27 – 32 (multirole)

Total Modern Combat Airplanes: 98

Total multirole or fighters: 69

 

Russia (in service)

MiG-35 – 8 (multirole)

MiG-31 – 113 (fighter)

MiG-29 – 259 (fighter)

Su-24 – 274

Su-25 – 193

Su-27 – 172 (fighter)

Su-30 – 119 (multirole)

Su-34 – 131 (multirole)

Su-35 – 103 (multirole)

Su-57 – 5 (multirole)

Total Modern Combat Airplanes: 1,377 (they also have 124 bombers)

Total multirole or fighters: 910

 

This does not include Russian Naval aircraft: 22 MiG-29s, 42 MiG-31s, 22 Su-24s, 4 Su-25UTG, 6 Su-27s, 26 Su-30ss, and 18 Su-33s for a total of 140.

It is clear that Russia will dominate the air. For Ukraine to have a fighting chance, it would need significant air support from the U.S. or NATO. The U.S. providing such air support is not an option I have heard discussed anywhere. Such a promise would have deterrence value.

 

Not discussed: Helicopters and drones.

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – part 4 (Russian strengths)

Reporting I saw a couple of hours ago (courtesy of Kaitlan Collins’ twitter feed): U.S. ambassador Michael Carpenter: “We assess that Russia probably has massed between 169,000-190,000 personnel in and near Ukraine as compared with about 100,000 on January 30. This estimate includes military troops along the border, in Belarus, and in occupied Crimea; Russian National Guard and other internal security units deployed to these areas; and Russian-led forces in eastern Ukraine.”

So, this estimate includes Russian-backed separatists, which I gather were not part of the previous estimates of 150,000. It also includes “Russian National Guard and other internal security units” which are usually not offensive forces.

The Ukrainian Army has 170,000+ mobilized. Don’t know how many they have recently mobilized but would not be surprised to find their mobilized strength currently exceeds 200,000.

The real difference in strength is in airpower, which I will post about soon.

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – part 3

There is a big difference between 72 hours and never.

See: Russia ‘will not capture’ any of Ukraine’s cities, Ukranian defense minister says

Now, I have no inside knowledge or deep understanding of Ukrainian defensive capabilities, so cannot comment on who is right. But U.S. General Miley did suggest that Kiev could fall within 72 hours. That seems like a pretty bizarre statement to me; as I don’t think that even if Russia starts a conventional warfare operation next week, Kiev will be the objective.

On the other hand, I am concerned about Kharkov (second largest city in Ukraine) and Mariupol (which connects to Crimea). 

Anyhow, the Ukrainian defense minister says the Russians “…will not capture either Kyiv, Odessa, Kharkiv, or any other city.” That may be true, as I still suspect we are not going to see any major conventional warfare in Eastern Europe this month. If there was, I do not have the knowledge to say that this would be the case. As Russian will have air superiority, hard to imagine they won’t be able to make some progress.

 

Old posts on the subject:

So Is Russia going to actually attack Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Russian Invasions | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The first post “Russian Invasions” was made on 5 December 2021. The next one was done on 22 January 2022. Over the last two months, nothing that has happened has changed my opinion. 

So, what is everyone about to go to war over? – part 2

Saw this article from the Daily Beast this morning. Nothing new here, but reinforces my previous post on this subject: Putin’s Army Forces Ukraine’s Frontliners Into “Fight or Flight” Hell

The closest I have been to this area is the countryside around Belgorod (for obvious reasons). 

Previous post: So, what is everyone about to go to war over? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – part 2

And then there is this article: Troop-to-Task: A Russian Invasion of Ukraine

What catches my attention about this article is the discussion of whether “troop-to-task” ratios, also known as tie-down ratios, sometimes also known as force ratios; should be measured based upon population or based upon insurgent strength.

To quote from his article: “Throughout the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, American analysts and military officials referred to a 20:1,000 (2%) troop-to-population ratio for successful counterinsurgency.”

He also notes: “These troop-to-population security ratios are notoriously unreliable and have weak empirical basis for planning.” 

That is more polite than how I refer to them in private. I did discuss this subject on pages 70-71 of my book America’s Modern Wars.

He then states: “Another popular way to analyze troop requirements in through troop–to-insurgent ratios.”

Popular? I have not seen anyone do this in recent times. I do have a book published on the subject (America’s Modern Wars). Perhaps I am missing out on something that is going on in the basement of the Pentagon. 

He does note that “This approach falls apart at step one: Counting insurgents.”

I have a chapter on the subject (Chapter 11: Estimating Insurgent Force Size, pages 115-120). It is possible. It is not perfect or easy; but doing something vague and difficult is better than doing something that is conceptually flawed. To date, I have not seen anyone else do anything further on estimating insurgents. My work was a tentative first cut on the subject. My customers were completely uninterested in this analysis, and nothing further was done. Clearly something further needs to be done. I think that is better than doing something that is conceptually flawed.

I have discussed this before on this blog and in my book: America’s Modern Wars. My discussion of the previous RAND work on the subject is on pages 70-71. It includes the following table from our work:

If anyone can tell me from that table where a 2% figure could come from, have at it.

Listed below are a collection of four relevant blog posts on the subject (there are some 1,288 posts on this blog). We do have categories like “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” “Force Ratios” and “Estimating Insurgent Force Size” this blog. We have done a few posts on the subject.

Needless to say, I think that basing the “troop-to-task” ratios on population is at best marginally relevant. For example, the troop-to-task ratio for Vietnam was 88.4. We did not win that one. On the other hand, when the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) with its two dozen members, raised hell in San Francisco and Los Angeles in the early 1970s, doing a political assassination, kidnapping Patty Hearst, and robbing banks, we took care of it using the LA police. We did not need to deploy 2% of the population of the United States (estimated at 213 million in 1974) to deal with the SLA. We did not need to raise over 4 million troops to suppress this insurgency. 

I do think the size of the insurgency is relevant.

 

 

Related posts:

Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency II | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency III | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency IV | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

and many, many others….

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – part 1

My opinion of this potential conflict is summarized in these two posts.  

So Is Russia going to actually attack Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Russian Invasions | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The first post “Russian Invasions” was made on 5 December 2021. The next one was done on 22 January 2022. Over the last two months, nothing that has happened has changed my opinion. 

If I was going to invade Ukraine, I would use surprise, overwhelming force and hit them during good weather. This is not what is happening right now. So, I still have a hard time believing we are about to see a major conventional war starting this month. 

On the other hand, a lot of people are saying something very different. Let me address a few of their points:

Time:

Apparently, the current U.S. administration is saying that the attack may happen in the second half of this month. To quote from the New York Times article by Helen Cooper and David E. Sanger that I found here: U.S. Warns of Grim Toll if Putin Pursues Full Invasion of Ukraine

“Should Mr. Putin decide to invade, American officials believe he is not likely to move until the second half of February.”

So, maybe a five-week campaign season? Two weeks in February and maybe three weeks in March. In 1943, the German offensive past Belgorod was called off around 24 March 1943 because of mud. Don’t know if “mud season” arrives sooner now and have not done any analysis of the currently mobility of the modern Russian army in poor weather conditions, but I am guessing it will still be a problem. The “American officials” quote in the NYT article are apparently aware of this with their next sentence “By that point, more ground will have frozen, making it easier to move heavy vehicles and equipment….”

So… five, maybe six, weeks campaign season, then mud. 

As they note in the NYT article “…the officials warned that if Mr. Putin chose the most aggressive of his options, he could quickly surround or capture Kyiv…” 

Maybe. Back in 1943, the Russians during the Battle of Kursk started their offensive north of Belgorod on 3 August 1943 and took Kiev on 6 November 1943. I am assuming that the 170,000+ Ukrainian Army will have some ability to slow the Russians down (unlike the Afghani army in August of last year). 

Force Levels:

I gather Russia currently has around 110,000 troops and according to NYT “…the Russian military had assembled 70 percent of the forces it would need to mount a full invasion of Ukraine…who assessed that Mr. Putin had concluded that he would need some 150,000 troops from 110 battalion tactical groups to conquer Ukraine….”

So, they will have 150,000 troops “…to conquer Ukraine…”. I gather this includes the “Thirty thousand troops…now in Belarus.”

The Ukrainian Army is 170,000+. Now, I do not know how good the Ukrainian Army is relative to the Russian Army. Suspect the Russian communications, recon, spotting and artillery are pretty good (see: The Russian Artillery Strike That Spooked The U.S. Army | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)). They will certainly have air superiority (unless NATO decides to directly support Ukraine). So, they will have the advantage. The range of casualty estimates (see below) seem to give credit the Russians with a 1.7-to-1 to 2.5-to-1 advantage in casualty effectiveness.

Still, I do expect the Ukrainian army, on the defensive, in prepared positions, fully warned, recently supplemented, and maybe somewhat motivated to defend their homeland, is something more than just speed bumps. I don’t really see how Russia is going to take Kiev in a five-week campaign.

Casualties:

This one gives me real heartburn. My suspicion is that the officials briefed “casualties” and it ended up in the NYT as killed. Keep in mind “casualties” include killed, wounded, wounded and later died of wounds, missing and captured (and deserters). The number of wounded usually outnumbers the number killed by 3- or 4-to-1 and sometimes as high as 10-to-1. I do have a full chapter on the subject in my book War by Numbers. 

The NYT says “…potential deaths…of 5,000 to 25,000 members of the Ukrainian military…”

25,000 deaths times three wounded per person killed is 100,000 casualties. 100,000 casualties from a force of 170,000 is almost 60% losses. Are they really talking about an army-level force taking 60% losses in a five-week campaign? That has not happened a lot. Do those losses include the various reserves and militias that Ukraine can call up? If so, the numbers mesh together better.

The armed forces of Ukraine are 215,000 active (2022). Their reserves are 250,000 (2022). Available for military service is 11,139,646, ages 16-49 (2015). Fit for military service is 6,979,035 (2015). Reaching military age annually is 470,406 (2021). So, how big of a Ukrainian military are we talking about here? 170K in ground forces, or half-million or more counting reserves, militia and new call-ups? If Ukraine calls up its reserves and draft militia, is Russia really going to take (and hold) a lot of Ukraine with an army of 150,000? Anyhow, a lot of things don’t match up here. Perhaps that is because the NYT did not properly quote the “officials,” perhaps because of the details of some of the scenarios they drafted (which may be improbable), or perhaps because they have garbled their calculations (this has happened before, remember Afghanistan in August 2021).

Anyhow, it is hard for me to evaluate the data in the NYT article. In the meantime, I will stick to my opinions given in my first two blog posts on the subject.