Category Russia

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – part 1

My opinion of this potential conflict is summarized in these two posts.  

So Is Russia going to actually attack Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Russian Invasions | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The first post “Russian Invasions” was made on 5 December 2021. The next one was done on 22 January 2022. Over the last two months, nothing that has happened has changed my opinion. 

If I was going to invade Ukraine, I would use surprise, overwhelming force and hit them during good weather. This is not what is happening right now. So, I still have a hard time believing we are about to see a major conventional war starting this month. 

On the other hand, a lot of people are saying something very different. Let me address a few of their points:

Time:

Apparently, the current U.S. administration is saying that the attack may happen in the second half of this month. To quote from the New York Times article by Helen Cooper and David E. Sanger that I found here: U.S. Warns of Grim Toll if Putin Pursues Full Invasion of Ukraine

“Should Mr. Putin decide to invade, American officials believe he is not likely to move until the second half of February.”

So, maybe a five-week campaign season? Two weeks in February and maybe three weeks in March. In 1943, the German offensive past Belgorod was called off around 24 March 1943 because of mud. Don’t know if “mud season” arrives sooner now and have not done any analysis of the currently mobility of the modern Russian army in poor weather conditions, but I am guessing it will still be a problem. The “American officials” quote in the NYT article are apparently aware of this with their next sentence “By that point, more ground will have frozen, making it easier to move heavy vehicles and equipment….”

So… five, maybe six, weeks campaign season, then mud. 

As they note in the NYT article “…the officials warned that if Mr. Putin chose the most aggressive of his options, he could quickly surround or capture Kyiv…” 

Maybe. Back in 1943, the Russians during the Battle of Kursk started their offensive north of Belgorod on 3 August 1943 and took Kiev on 6 November 1943. I am assuming that the 170,000+ Ukrainian Army will have some ability to slow the Russians down (unlike the Afghani army in August of last year). 

Force Levels:

I gather Russia currently has around 110,000 troops and according to NYT “…the Russian military had assembled 70 percent of the forces it would need to mount a full invasion of Ukraine…who assessed that Mr. Putin had concluded that he would need some 150,000 troops from 110 battalion tactical groups to conquer Ukraine….”

So, they will have 150,000 troops “…to conquer Ukraine…”. I gather this includes the “Thirty thousand troops…now in Belarus.”

The Ukrainian Army is 170,000+. Now, I do not know how good the Ukrainian Army is relative to the Russian Army. Suspect the Russian communications, recon, spotting and artillery are pretty good (see: The Russian Artillery Strike That Spooked The U.S. Army | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)). They will certainly have air superiority (unless NATO decides to directly support Ukraine). So, they will have the advantage. The range of casualty estimates (see below) seem to give credit the Russians with a 1.7-to-1 to 2.5-to-1 advantage in casualty effectiveness.

Still, I do expect the Ukrainian army, on the defensive, in prepared positions, fully warned, recently supplemented, and maybe somewhat motivated to defend their homeland, is something more than just speed bumps. I don’t really see how Russia is going to take Kiev in a five-week campaign.

Casualties:

This one gives me real heartburn. My suspicion is that the officials briefed “casualties” and it ended up in the NYT as killed. Keep in mind “casualties” include killed, wounded, wounded and later died of wounds, missing and captured (and deserters). The number of wounded usually outnumbers the number killed by 3- or 4-to-1 and sometimes as high as 10-to-1. I do have a full chapter on the subject in my book War by Numbers. 

The NYT says “…potential deaths…of 5,000 to 25,000 members of the Ukrainian military…”

25,000 deaths times three wounded per person killed is 100,000 casualties. 100,000 casualties from a force of 170,000 is almost 60% losses. Are they really talking about an army-level force taking 60% losses in a five-week campaign? That has not happened a lot. Do those losses include the various reserves and militias that Ukraine can call up? If so, the numbers mesh together better.

The armed forces of Ukraine are 215,000 active (2022). Their reserves are 250,000 (2022). Available for military service is 11,139,646, ages 16-49 (2015). Fit for military service is 6,979,035 (2015). Reaching military age annually is 470,406 (2021). So, how big of a Ukrainian military are we talking about here? 170K in ground forces, or half-million or more counting reserves, militia and new call-ups? If Ukraine calls up its reserves and draft militia, is Russia really going to take (and hold) a lot of Ukraine with an army of 150,000? Anyhow, a lot of things don’t match up here. Perhaps that is because the NYT did not properly quote the “officials,” perhaps because of the details of some of the scenarios they drafted (which may be improbable), or perhaps because they have garbled their calculations (this has happened before, remember Afghanistan in August 2021).

Anyhow, it is hard for me to evaluate the data in the NYT article. In the meantime, I will stick to my opinions given in my first two blog posts on the subject.

So, what is everyone about to go to war over?

With all the talk of war over Ukraine, it is always useful to look at the area they are actually talking about. I am sure there are more sophisticated analyses of the subject, but I particularly like the videos on www.youtube.com done by “bald and bankrupt.”

This first one is of the areas near Donetsk, on the Ukrainian side. It is a 35-minute video posted on March 8, 2021. Note the weather.:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2bNzjBJF_G0

Also worthwhile are these 16-minute videos from Moldovia and 18-minute videos from Transnistia posted in 2019:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wnDxHTaeNX0

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5kVnrqBb6y4

While these are hardly scholarly works, I do find them both educational and entertaining. He has a lot more videos on his channel.

So Is Russia going to actually attack Ukraine?

Based upon on the buzz lately in the news and comments by some Western politicians, it appears that is only a question of when, not if, that Russia is going to attack Ukraine. Yet, Russia is saying they are not going to attack. So… who is right?

It still doesn’t look to me like they are going to attack. This opinion is not based upon any inside knowledge or deep understanding of the situation. I only know what I read in the news. But a few things get my attention:

Force Ratios: First of all, Russia has amassed a 100K+ troops along the border, plus some forces are in a training exercise in Belarus. I gather the actual figure is on the low side of 100,000, vice being near 200,000. On the other hand, the Ukrainian Army, before mobilization is almost 200,000. So, is Russia really massing so it can attack while outnumbered?

Now, there are a few other factors in what is not that simple of a comparison. First of all, Russia can move more troops into the area(s) of interest on short notice. So that buildup of 100K+ could quickly turn into 300K+. If Russia had more than 300K troops in the area, I would become very concerned. But right now, they do not.

Weather: People are making noise like something will happen in February. It is freakin’ cold at that time of year. There is snow on the ground. Do they really want to attack then? I would wait until after the spring thaw, like the Germans did in 1941, 1942 and 1943, when you have a nice long summer for your campaign.

Warning: Surprise is a nice force multiplier. I have a chapter on the subject in my book War by Numbers. It is now no surprise if an attack comes. Furthermore, they even lack strategic surprise, so Ukraine has been able to lobby for more aid and has received more weapons. Why would Russia help their potential adversary get prepared, which is what has happened over the last couple of months? Ukraine is receiving weaponry and support that is probably would not have otherwise received. So, did Russia really choose to give Ukraine 2-3 months of warning to prepare before they attack them? This seems counter-intuitive.

Again, I go back to my original post, which is here:

Russian Invasions | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

I may be proven wrong come February and Russia suddenly comes swarming across the border to take the rest of “New Russia,” to take Kharkov (the second largest city in Ukraine) and to cross the Pripet marshes and Chernobyl/Pripyat area to threaten Kiev, but right now, I am not sure this is the real scenario.

I still think the threats are part of a larger negotiation strategy (although I don’t rule out that the Russia government has simply made a mistake).

Some comments on Kazakhstan

As I am sure a lot of people have noticed, Kazakhstan has been in the news this week. The protests there have been large and violent. They are now saying that at least 164 people have died, including 18 police. It has put an end to the influence of the longest serving FSU (Former Soviet Union) dictator, Nursultan Nazarbayev. He had been in office since 1990 (when the Soviet Union still existed). Good riddance, although I am not sure he is going to be replaced by anyone any better. It does not look like this is going to turn into a budding enlightened democracy any time soon. With Russia troops in the country, who knows exactly what path this will take.

The intervening force is CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), which had been around since 1992/1994. It has six members, Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kygyzstan and Tajikistan. Russia has the largest military of the six, with 900,000 active troops. The next largest military is 45,000. I gather most all of the members have sent troops to Kazakhstan, but clearly Russia is the dominate player. The current secretary general of CSTO is from Belarus.

At the moment, I don’t have much to say beyond what is being reported. Life has become uncomfortable for certain leaders in the FSU. The democratically elected but Russian aligned leader of Ukraine, Yanukovich, was thrown out of power in 2014 in the Euromaiden protests; the leader of Armenia, Sargsyan, was removed from office in 2018 (the Velvet Revolution); the leader of Belarus, Lukashenko, came pretty close to being thrown out of power in 2020/21 (the Slipper Revolution); and now the longest serving dictator in Kazakhstan has been thrown out of power in 2022. One does wonder who is next.

Update (1/13/22):

  1. CSTO sent around 2,500 troops.
  2. They are supposed to pull out by 19 January.
  3. Update 1/19/22: At least 225 people were killed, according to the Kazakhstan prosecutor general’s office. 
  4. Update 1/19/22: Russian and CSTO have stated they have withdrawn their over 2,000 troops deployed to Kazakhstan.

U.S. Defense Budget for 2022

The U.S. Defense budget was signed into law on Monday. A few things that caught my attention:

  1. Increase of 5% (I guess we have to replace all that equipment left behind in Afghanistan).
  2. 2.7% pay raise (which I gather makes up around 2% or so of that 5% increase).
  3. Seems to be focused on keeping “pace militarily with China and Russia.”
  4. “The bill includes $7.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and a statement of congressional support for the defense of Taiwan, measures intended to counteract China’s influence in the region.”
  5. “It also includes $300 million for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, a show of support in the face of Russian aggression, as well as $4 billion for the European Defense Initiative.”

Let’s look at what keeping “pace militarily with China and Russia” looks like in dollars and sense:

U.S. Budget: $768.2 billion (2022) or 3.42% of GDP in 2019.

Chinese (PRC) Defense Budget: $209.4 billion (2021) or 1.3% of GDP (2021)

Russian Defense Budget: 61.7 billion (2020-21) or 4.3% of GDP (2019).

 

See: https://www.marketwatch.com/story/biden-signs-bill-authorizing-768-2-billion-in-2022-defense-spending-including-a-2-7-pay-raise-for-service-members-into-law-01640648957?siteid=yhoof2&yptr=yahoo

Russian Invasions – update 1

Well, it appears that the U.S. and Russia will hold “security talks” on Jan. 10, 12 and 13. See: https://news.yahoo.com/1-u-russian-officials-set-035411514.html

I noted in my original post post four possibilities. The last one listed was “4. Or the build up may be the message (most likely option).”

Russian Invasions | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

It does appear that the build up got Russia the attention they wanted. We shall see what comes out of these talks. Suspect they will be more symbolic than substantive.

 

Russian Invasions

My son was texting me today about the threat Russia appears to be posing towards Ukraine. Glad he is paying attention. According to an article he read, the Russians have gathered 175,000 troops on the border and 10 days of supply.

Now, according to Wikipedia (which is usually drawn from IISS) the Ukrainian Armed Forces has 255,000 active personnel and 900,000 in reserve as of 2021. In 2016 there were 169,000 personnel in the ground forces: with two armored brigades, 13 mechanized brigades, eight air assault brigades, two mountain warfare brigades, five airmobile brigades and seven rocket and artillery brigades. In 2016 the Air Force had 36,300 personnel, the Navy had 6,500 personnel and the Special Forces had 4,000. I gather these forces have expanded since 2016.

So, it does not look like Russia is planning on marching to Kiev, especially with 10 days of supply. They are probably not even considering creating a land bridge to Crimea.

So what might they be considering:

1. Help the local governments in rebellion take the rest of Donetsk and Lugansk.
2. Replace the local governments in Donetsk and Lugansk with their own governance (possibly in anticipation of formally annexing these two areas).
3. Make violent border demonstrations.
4. Or the build up may be the message (most likely option).

I gather Russia really does not want Ukraine to join NATO. I am not sure that build ups at the border make that point. In fact, it may reinforce Ukraine’s desire to join NATO. On the other hand, invading Donetsk or Lugansk or the rest of Ukraine certainly works against that goal.

Of course the real question is not whether Ukraine wants to join NATO, I gather that is a given. The real question is NATO willing to take on the responsibility of defending Ukraine, especially with two provinces in open revolt and two entities (Crimea and Sevastopol) annexed by Russia. So far, I gather no one significant has made a clear statement on that subject one way or the other. Ukrainian’s NATO membership appears to be in permanent limbo, which I gather that is what Russia prefers. The build up may be for the sake of signaling that it should stay that way. 

One last note: the price of oil is below $70 a barrel (Brent Crude was at 69.92). Last I checked (it was a couple of years ago), Russia needed the price of oil to be at $80 or higher to balance their budget. It was there a month ago, now it is not. Running significant deficits may limit their willingness to explore military options. Perhaps the easiest way to constrain Russian adventurism is to keep the price of oil down.

Coronavirus in Russia

I know some people who are in Moscow right now. Their observations are that:

1. No one is wearing masks.

2. They are still congregating like normal.

3. Even though the signs at the subway are saying they should wear masks, no one is wearing masks.

4. But don’t take my word for this: here is a video of downtown Moscow on 4 June 2021:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wjP4Vkf_V1w

5. Probably the reported number of cases for Russia (5,408,744 cases total) is low because most people don’t get tested.

Now this last point is always an issue. Part of the reason I focus on mortality rates is because I am guessing that the expected mortality rate should be around 0.5% or 1 death per 200 cases. In the case of the United States the mortality rate is 1.80%. This probably means that number of actual cases is up to four times higher than the number of reported cases. In the case of Russia, the mortality rate is 2.43%. This probably means that the number of actual cases is maybe five times higher than the number of reported cases.

But, the number of deaths in Russia is also grossly under-reported. This has been “known” for many months. The reported number of deaths is 131,671. On 1 May 2021, The Moscow Times reported that “excess deaths” estimates place the number of cases at 460,000. More to the point, 460,000 more people died in a twelve month period from April 2020 to March 2021 compared to the number that died during the same period the previous year. Certainly the vast majority of those excess deaths were due to Coronavirus. So 460,000 deaths versus 5,408,744 reported cases or a mortality rate of  8.5%. That would make the argument that the number infected is actually more like over 60% of the country (assuming the mortality rate is actually around 0.5%, less if it is higher). If there is 460,000 excess deaths from Coronavirus, then with a population of 146.2 million, we are looking at 3,146 deaths per million people. In contrast, the United States has 604,006 deaths in a population of 331.9 million or 1,820 deaths per million people. Just to compare to a more competent response, Canada has 26,188 deaths in a population of 38.3 million or 684 deaths per million people.

Copy of The Moscow Times article:

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/05/01/russias-pandemic-excess-death-toll-passes-460k-a73804

It is worth while looking at the chart of excess deaths in that article. I was not able to to add it to this blog post.

A lot of Russian have been vaccinated: 39.2 million doses administered out of a population of 146.2 million (including Crimea and Sevastopol) according to John’s Hopkins. Right now the number of cases in Russia is on the rise, about 20K cases a day as of last Friday compared to the United States at 7K cases last Friday and Canada at 606 cases last Friday.

Variable 4: Is there a problem with internal turmoil and unrest in China?

Depressions begat revolutions. Now it ain’t so simple as that, but there is a big enough correlation here that every time there is a economic downturn, a nation’s leaders should be looking over their shoulder in concern. If they are a democratic government, it probably means they will now have time to write their memoirs. If they are a dictatorship, they could end up dangling from a meat-hook.

The seminal quantitative work on this subject was two separate studies done in the 1960s by Ted Gurr and the couple Ivo and Rosilind Feierabend. Ted Gurr’s work was summarized in his book Why Men Revolt, while the Feierhabend’s never issued out a book (which is a shame as their work was as significant). There has not been much of significance done since then (which I think is fairly bizarre actually… it is not like revolutions are a dead subject).  We have blogged about this before.

So Variable 3 is “How is the economy of China doing?.” As long as the China economy is growing and thriving over the next 20 years, then this only increases the danger to Taiwan. On the other hand, there are lots of reasons to doubt that their economy will continue to thrive over the next 20 years. If the economy is not growing, then this fourth variable comes into play: Is there a problem with internal turmoil and unrest in China?  This affects the odds that China will decide the invade Taiwan in five ways:

  1. The reduced economic growth probably reduces their “defense” budget.
  2. If there is unrest or political turmoil, it probably distracts the government to worry about internal issues, vice invading their neighbors (although it some cases, it can actually do the reverse).
  3. It may result in a leadership change:
    1. This leadership could be even more internally absorbed.
    2. This leadership could be even more nationalistic.
    3. This government could be unstable.
  4. It may result in a change of the form of government:
    1. Communism collapses.
      1. It becomes a democracy
      2. It becomes a dictatorship.
      3. The new government could be unstable
      4. Central government may collapse entirely.
    2. Communism is reinforced (sort of another cultural revolution)
    3. Communism is de-stabilized, but returns back in control.
  5. It may result in no government at all (more on this later).

So, what are the odds that China will have a economic slow-down in the next 20 years? Is it 25%, is it 50%, is there no chance at all? 

If there is an economic slowdown, what is the chance of political turmoil, and then what is the extent, nature and virulence of this political turmoil? Is it a bunch children of “princelings” that can be run over with tanks, or is something more broadly based.

The problem with revolutions, is that once they start, they gets pretty hard to predict where they are going to go. For example, when the Shah of Iran abdicated in 1979, much his vocal opposition came from the left, often college students. The country ended up being taken over by Ayatollahs. The Russian revolution started in 1917 with the moderately liberal Cadet Party and Alexander Kerensky running the country in a somewhat democratic manner and ended up with Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin in charge. The Russian revolution of 1991 ended up with Boris Yeltsin in charge of a developing democracy and ended up with Vladimir Putin in charge. The Arab Spring of 2010-2012 resulted in demonstrations and revolts in 17 or so different countries. In four of those countries the governments were overthrown (Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen). Only one ended up with a democratic government in its aftermath. 

And then there is always the possibility that China could end up with no central controlling government at all. This is not all that far-fetched. China has spent almost of much of its history broken up into smaller states as it has spend unified as a single state. There is no strong reason to assume that over the next decades that China will remain unified. There is no history that suggests such a pattern.  

Modern countries do break up. Yugoslavia comes to mind. There are significant independence movements in Catalonia (Barcelona) and Scotland. So the image of China as a dominating unified state may not be the image moving forward.

Anyhow, I suspect we are looking at maybe a 50% chance of a major economic slowdown in the next 20 years (this is just a wild guess, I have no idea what the odds of such an event are). If there is an economic slowdown, then I am guessing maybe a 50% change of unrest and turmoil. So….there is no guarantee that China will be in a position or place to even consider invading Taiwan in the next 20 years. Maybe a 50% chance that this is the case.

 

Related blog posts:

Why Men Rebel? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Why Are We Still Wondering Why Men (And Women) Rebel? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Quote from America’s Modern Wars | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Ted Gurr Has Passed Away | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Proposed Defense Budget for 2022

The president has proposed his defense budget for 2022. The budget has not gone down, which may not have been what some people expected. The Department of Defense (DOD) budget is $715 billion. This is an increase in the budget of $10 billion from 2021, or about 1.6 percent. Inflation in 2020 is estimated to be 1.5 percent. The overall budget for “national defense” is $753 billion, with expenditures for the Department of Energy and other federal agencies included.

Don’t have details of the budget. It may be out there, but I have not chased them down yet. So, I don’t know what the Army’s share of the budget is. Budget for 2021 included supplemental spending bills and funding transfers and the expenses for combat operations were separately funded. For this proposed budget, these are included in this budget and are $18.4 billion. This is apparently a drop of 21 percent from last year.

There is a renewed focus on conventional war against near-parity opponents. We are now looking at a 296-ship fleet vice a 355-ship fleet envisioned by the previous administration. The 355-ship fleet was kind of a wasteful pipedream that was not easily achievable. It harkened back to the movement for a 600-ship fleet that was envisioned in the 1980s. This was briefly attained before it was cut back. They are also decommissioning two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), which always struck me as a bizarre expenditure of money. Then there is the controversial F-35 program, which has been reduce from 60 new planes this year to 48. They are retiring 42 A-10s, leaving the Air Force with 239. Artillery is back in fashion with $6.6 billion to develop and field long-range fires. Overall, they are spending a lot on R&D, the “largest-ever” R&D spending according to the SecDef (I have not tested statement against inflation). There was $107 billion R&D requested in 2021. For 2022 it is higher (but I did not see an exact figure).

By the way, the budget for the State Department and international programs is proposed as 63.6 billion.  

This is a proposed budget. It is a recommendation sent to congress and congress can choose to do whatever they wish with it. As it is a Democratic controlled House and a bare Democratic majority in the Senate, it may be passed close to as is, but probably will not be unscathed. Most likely, if it is significantly changed it will be to reduce it in general or to maintain or restore hardware (LCS and A-10s) that DOD is trying to reduce. I don’t expect the final figures to be much lower than what is proposed.

The total active and reserve component of the military is planned to be 2,145,900, which is a slight reduction (4,475 less) than last year. Chinese active personnel is 2,185,000 in 2021. Russia’s active personnel is 1,454,000.

In contrast the estimated defense budget for the Chinese armed forces for 2020 or 2021 is given as $193.3 (IISS-2020), $209.4 billion (Wikipedia-2021) or $252.0 (SIPRI-2020). This is between 1.3% to 1.7% of GDP. In contrast the U.S. defense budget is 3.4% to 3.7% of GDP. The Chinese budget in purchase parity (PPP) figures I gather would be some 1.6 times higher.

The defense budget for Russia is given as 61.7 billion in 2020. This is around 3.9% to 4.3% of GDP (as of 2019). The Russian budget in PPP figures is probably around 2.5 times higher.

 

See: https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/a-look-at-what-s-inside-biden-s-6-trillion-budget-request/ar-AAKuAdi?ocid=msedgntp

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/28/pentagon-asks-for-715-billion-in-2022-defense-budget.html

https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2639101/dod-budget-request-boosts-research-nuclear-modernization-and-includes-27-pay-ra/

https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2021/05/27/pentagon-budget-will-shake-up-legacy-systems-lawmakers-are-shaking-back/

https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/5/28/air-force-proposal-would-shift-funding-to-new-aircraft

https://breakingdefense.com/2021/05/secdef-rd-spending-to-skyrocket-in-22-budget/

Older related blog posts:

GAO: “We’re 26 ships into the contract and we still don’t know if the [Littoral Combat Ship] can do its job.” | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The Challenge of Getting to a 350-Ship Fleet | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The Saga of the F-35: Too Big To Fail? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

U.S. Army Invests In Revitalizing Long Range Precision Fires Capabilities | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Status Update On U.S. Long Range Fires Capabilities | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)