Category World War II

Four books on Kursk

I have three books published on the Battle of Kursk and one coming out next year (The Batte of Tolstoye Woods).

The Battle of Kusk was the largest battle of World War II. You would not get that sense from the military history section of most bookstores. Anyhow, there were four parts to the battle. The German offensive in the south from 4 to 24 July 1943, the German offensive in the north for 5 – 12 July 1943, the Soviet counteroffensive around Orel from 12 July to 23 August and the Soviet counteroffensive around Kharkov from 3 August to 23 August. My books are mostly about the German offensive in the south. I have consider doing one or two about the Battle(s) of Kharkov, but I have been distracted by the war that started in that same area in 2022.

I do have a fourth book coming out next year called The Battle of Tolstoye Woods. This one actually covers the Soviet counterattack that actually worked and stopped a German panzer corps. Everyone tends to focus on the Battle of Prokhorovka, but there were three German armored corps attacking in the south, and they all had to be stopped. This book is about the Red Army halting the 48th Panzer Corps, which was as large as the SS Panzer Corps.

Anyhow, not sure if I will get around to a fifth Kursk book. Might.



P.S. I do think my original book is the largest history book ever written: Did I Just Write the Largest History Book Ever? — History News Network

I have not submitted it to the Guinness World Records.

P.P.S. Here is the link to the “Other Battle of Kursk” which has been posted to Amazon.com (UK). It will be The Battle of Tolstoye Woods: The Other Battle of Kursk: Lawrence, Christopher A.: 9780811773737: Amazon.com: Books   and   The Other Battle of Kursk: Amazon.co.uk: Lawrence, Christopher A.: 9780811773737: Books

Four Books

Just got my author copies for a few of my books. Decided to post them all up.



1. Hunting Falcon – available U.S. April 3, 2025

2. Aces at Kursk – available U.S. September 30, 2024

3. Battle for Kyiv (paperback) – Hardback available U.S. January 18, 2024 – paperback available UK 4 December 2025. Will be available U.S. February 28, 2026.

4. Siege of Mariupol – Available UK 27 November 2025. Available U.S. January 30, 2026.

Can order directly from the publisher: Pen and Sword Books: The Siege of Mariupol – Hardback

Can order from UK Amazon.com: The Siege of Mariupol: The Azovstal Steel Plant and Ukraine’s Battle for Survival : Christopher A Lawrence, Stefan Korshak: Amazon.co.uk: Books


The piano in the background is an August Foerster. Made in Loebau, Germany since 1859. This one is from East Germany (1949-1990). Country dissolved, but the piano is just fine.

A Friendly Fire Discussion

I have decided to turn one of my email discussions I was having with several people into a blog post. As they got into a discussion of friendly fire (I gather based upon one addressee’s personal experience), I ended up making the following statement:

Friendly fire (FF):

1. The original figure that came out of WWII was 2% of the casualties were due to friendly fire (Beebe and Debakey?).

2. This was probably low.

3. Since WWII there has been no definitive studies on FF casualties that I am aware of.

4. It was much higher than 2% in the 1991 Gulf War.

5. In the 1990s Chuck Hawkins (Vietnam company commander) and Gene Visco (DUSA OR) did some preliminary work looking at FF casualties. They were attempting to get a contract to do an actual proper survey of the subject. That did not happen.

6. By default, the preliminary work by Hawkins and Visco (both deceased) is the only significant work on FF casualties that has been done since WWII. I may have a copy somewhere in my files. Not sure anything has been published or is on the internet. I think they presented their findings at ISMOR.

Dermot, you are welcome to discuss what the UK has done.


Dermot Rooney, the author of Slog or Swan (see: Slog or Swan – The Dupuy Institute) came back with the following response:

Here’s the Slog or Swan quote:

Meanwhile, fragile radio communications separated infantry and artillery, contributing to a high rate of fratricide. A Canadian study conducted during Veritable put the number of Allied casualties to friendly artillery at between seven and 21 percent of the total. The actions examined for the current assessment support splitting the difference at around 15 percent.11 This figure is alarmingly close to the 19 percent attributed to German small arms, and considerably greater than the six percent benchmark for friendly fire casualties in a First World War barrage. Artillery fratricide was also a major factor in five of the failed attacks in the current assessment and, considering the tendency to underreport such events, was likely a factor in as many more. The high chance of fratricide very probably undermined the essential trust between infantryman and gunner, the coordination of fire and assault, and therefore the value of suppression.12

 

[11] This is another of those tantalising glimpses mentioned earlier. The figures are the extremes presented in Brigadier E. C. Plow’s study of munition fragments removed from casualties and could only be found in Appendix L of Copp’s Cinderella Army. Copp and Buckley opt for ‘as high as 19 percent’. Copp, Cinderella Army, pp.291, 338–340; Buckley, Monty’s Men, p.272.

[12] Contrary to the mines and mud narrative, the Canadian wounds study also found 4 percent of casualties were caused by the combination of mines and grenades, way behind German artillery, German small arms, and Allied artillery. J. B. Coates and J. C. Beyer (eds), Wound Ballistics in World War II: Supplemented by experiences in the Korean War (Washington: Office of the Surgeon General, 1962) has mines accounting for 0 to 10 percent of total casualties depending on the sampling method. The battle descriptions for this assessment suggest the effect of mines on advance rates was marginal and appears no greater than in other operations.


If anyone has a copy of any presentations made or write-ups done by Charles Hawkins or Gene Visco on fratricide, please forward them to me (LawrenceTDI@aol.com).

I do note that the links to Cornwallis Group, founded in 1996 by Gene Visco, is no longer connected to the ISMOR site. It does seem like we are losing knowledge. The earliest ISMOR link I can find is ISMOR 39 (with the Eugene Visco prize): ISMOR – ISMOR 39 | ORS. There were links to earlier ISMOR conferences and papers, and links in ISMOR to the Cornwallis Group, but I cannot find these. 

Slog or Swan

Dr. Dermot Rooney was a presenter at the Third HAAC and will be presenting on Measuring Military Effectiveness at the Fourth HAAC. See: The Fourth HAAC is scheduled for 21 – 23 October 2025 – The Dupuy Institute

He has a new book out based upon his work: Slog and Swan: British Army Effectiveness in Operation Veritable: February and March 1945. See: Slog or Swan | Military History Book | Helion & Company

As he describes it:

The book is based on my Corvisier Award-winning PhD thesis so be warned, it’s a bit geeky. It’s got 43 maps, 300 sources, a good handful of graphs and photos, and loads of footnotes.

On the upside it’s about fighting. The maps are mainly those used by the units at the time and they’re marked up to show the detail of how British and a few Canadian troops fought in 1945. It tells the story of how those men defeated the last competent Wehrmacht formation in the west –1. Fallschirm-Armee– despite suffering from a bunch of force design problems that still matter today.

And the book is about a massive operation that’s not been seriously examined before. If you count the Germans, Op Veritable had half a million men fighting for a month in what is close to the biggest named op that Britain ever fought. It started with a (nearly) thousand-bomber raid and the biggest artillery barrage of the war, it’s got one of the few confirmed deployments of the Sturmtiger, dozens of battles where plucky Tommies took on fanatical Fallschirmjäger, and it ended with the German Dunkirk – an orderly withdrawal where they blew up the last bridge behind them.

Yet even hardened WW2 buffs are often unsure where Veritable was fought and hardly anybody knows what it was about.

So, Slog or Swan might not be for you, and it might be a little bit late for the 80th anniversary of Veritable, but it’s the perfect Christmas Easter gift for the war geek in your life.

Presentation on Aces at Kursk on Wednesday, 19 February, 800 PM

I will be making a presentation about my book Aces at Kursk on Wednesday, 19 February, 800 PM on Greg McNiff’s World War II Discussion Forum: World War II Discussion Forum | Home. There is a zoom link on that page for that presentation.

Also it is here: Launch Meeting – Zoom

Mr. McNiff’s program is quite good with authors presenting their books each week in a virtual setting. Definitely worth looking at.

The World War II Discussion Forum is supported by entirely by donations, so do what you can to help.

Aces at Kursk and Soviet Kill Claims

The following 2019 blog post is getting some attention lately on military history forums: So What Was Driving the Soviet Kill Claims? – The Dupuy Institute

This was drawn from my original 1,662 page Kursk book and was repeated in my new book Aces at Kursk: Aces at Kursk: The Battle for Aerial Supremacy on the Eastern Front, 1943: Lawrence, Christopher A: 9781399081436: Amazon.com: Books

It is fully discussed in those two books.

I will be presenting on Aces at Kursk at WWIIDF on Wednesday, 8 PM, 19 February.  See: World War II Discussion Forum | Home.

 

The Russians are continuing to advance in Ukraine

The war is really not stalemated. The Russians continue to advance in Ukraine. This is causing some concern.

In the Pokrovsk area, the Russians are advancing at a rate of up to a kilometer a day. They have advanced 8 kilometers over the last two weeks (according to @J_Jhelin). They are threatening the village of Prohres (which is 26 kilometers northwest of Donets and 22 kilometers east of Prokrovsk).

Prokrovsk is a town of 60, 127 (2022 estimate). The Prokrovsk raion is one of the eight raions of Donetsk Oblast (province). This raion was not part of the Donetsk Peoples Republic (DPR). According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, it was 86.8% Ukrainian and 11.3% Russian. 

Now, this is not an earthshaking offensive, but, repeated advances does put stress on the defenders. The real danger is if they could turn this advance into a breakthrough. Once units breakthrough, defender casualties go up significantly and the attacker’s rate of advance goes up. Let us look at some history (i.e. real combat examples) of casualties and advance rates.

In our various data bases, we ended up coding a number of our engagements by outcome. Outcome III is failed advance, outcome IV is attack advances, and outcome V is defender penetrated. So for example (from Table 8.6 in War by Numbers, page 65):  

Summation (195 engagements):

Outcome              Failed       Advances   Penetrated
                               III             IV                  V

Number of Engagements:

                              54                71                33

Attacker percent casualties per day:

                             2.98            1.20             0.83

Defender percent casualties per day:

                            2.62             2.96            6.40

Now, this is mostly division-level engagements but the pattern is clear. When the attack fails the attacker losses are more than the defender, especially as the attacker usually outnumbers the defender. When the attack advances, losses are roughly equal (1.20 vs 2.96%, except the attacker usually outnumbers the defender). When a penetration is achieved, the defender clearly losses more than the attacker, and a significant percent of those losses are captured in action (47.20%). The 195 engagements come from the Italian Campaign (75 engagements 1943-44), Ardennes Campaign (71 engagements 1944-45) and Kursk (49 engagements).

The same pattern exists for post-war engagements (see Table 8.7, War by Numbers, page 67).

Post-World War II (61 engagements):

Outcome              Failed      Advances    Penetrated
                               III            IV                  V

Number of Engagements:

                              14               8                 33

Attacker percent casualties per day:

                             3.20            1.60             1.36

Defender percent casualties per day:

                            2.80             4.83           15.10

Now, we recently put together a similar table using our Campaign Database (CaDB). These are army-level operations up to 60 days in length. This was presented at the 2nd HAAC, in Norway and at the latest HADSS conference. I have not written them up in a book yet (i.e. More War by Numbers). There are 94 cases coded:

Outcome            III      IV        V

  Cases                 10       29         21

  Force Ratios    1.80    2.69     2.75

  Loss Ratios      1.66    1.51      0.64

Note the same loss pattern exists here.

Now, I do have a chapter on Advance Rates in War by Numbers. Below is a repeat of part of Table 14.1, page 177. It is broken out by campaign. The numbers given are kilometers opposed advance per day for division-level engagements.

Outcome                    III        IV       V

Italian Campaign     0.74     1.76     2.53

Ardennes                   0.45     3.71     5.00

Kursk                         0.58      5.18   11.43 

So……

  1. The advance rates in Ukraine are pretty much in line with outcome III and IV engagements. 
  2. The advance rates are fairly low compared to the other cases we have.
  3. Will discuss casualties later.

This does not look like the next Brusilov Offensive (June – September 1916).

Aces at Kursk is for sale on Amazon.com (U.S.)

It looks like Aces at Kursk is for sale in the U.S. on Amazon.com. The link is here: Aces at Kursk: The Battle for Aerial Supremacy on the Eastern Front, 1943: Lawrence, Christopher A: 9781399081436: Amazon.com: Books

Yesterday they were reporting 19 in stock, this morning it was 16. So it does look like they were selling and shipping. Let me know when someone sees copies in the book stores.