Category Eastern Front

Aces at Kursk

Oh, and by the way, I have a new book coming out next month: Aces at Kursk: The Battle of Aerial Supremacy on the Eastern Front 1943. It is with Pen & Sword in the UK. The release date in the UK is 30 August. We have the UK Amazon link here: Buy from Amazon (UK). The release date for the U.S. is 30 October. The U.S. Amazon link is here: Buy from Amazon. Both of these links are on the right side of the blog. If you click on the image, it goes to the Pen & Sword site. You can pre-order the book direct from the publisher or Amazon or other sites. I have not yet seen a final copy. Not sure if I will have copies available at our conference: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 8 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It is discounted if pre-ordered. It is cheapest if pre-ordered directly from Pen & Sword. They have a nice pre-order discount.

It is not a small book, 392 pages. This book took a while to publish. I could not find an American publisher that wanted to publish it. Oddly enough, when I contacted Pen & Sword, they mentioned that they had been publishing a lot of American authors recently.

I did have three chapters on the air war in my big Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka book. This book was built from those three chapters, the associated air war appendix, and a lot of other material that has been assembled since I first wrote this around 2002. I also added some chapters on air war on the north side of Kursk (this was at the request of the publisher) and I did have some Soviet air regiment records that I had collected that was not part of the original big book. I also spend more time than I would like disputing accounts and figures from other books. There have been other works published since 2002 when I first wrote the manuscript for my big Kursk book. Unfortunately, some of these added to the confusion over the history. Maybe the best thing is to ignore other works and just tell your account, but in this case, I did roll up my sleeves and debate the details of what they said. Mostly this was done in footnotes, but I did also put in a few “sidebars” in the text. Kind of hated to do that as some of these people I know virtually, and they have always been decent supportive people. But facts are facts, and I really do think the story needs to be told correctly.

I will probably be working on another Kursk related book this fall called The Battle of Tolstoye Woods. This time with an American publisher. I do have a master plan to do up to a dozen books covering all the fighting in the south of Russia and Ukraine in 1943. May yet get around to covering the entire Battle of Kursk and the three battles of Kharkov in 1943.

A couple of related posts:

Aces at Kursk – Summation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Is this my last Kursk book? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Density of Deployment in Ukraine

One thing that stands out on this battlefield is that there is not a lot of troops covering a lot of area. As far as I can tell, for this war in Ukraine, each side has about 200,000 or so regular troops, after all new recruits and old losses are counted for. I actually have never seen any strength figures since the war has started. On the other hand, the Ukrainian Army has said that they have a front width of 2,450 kilometers (1,522 miles) of which 1,105 (687 miles) are active fighting. By active fighting, I assume that means the area from Kharkov to Severodonetsk to Kherson. The border with Belarus is 891 kilometers (554 miles), which I assume is part of the “inactive area.” The Ukrainian border with Russia is 1,974 kilometers (1,227 miles). Anyhow, not sure exactly how this active front is calculated, but I will use the Ukrainian Army figures for now (until I get the energy to pull out a ruler and painstakingly measure it myself).

So, 200,000 troops divided by 1,105 kilometers is 181 men per kilometer, except: I suspect that some of those people are protecting Kiev and other such places away from the active front, and some are in reserve and rear positions. So, it might be two-thirds of that figure (121 men per kilometer). This is less than a tenth of World War II standards for this area.

During the Battle of Kursk before 5 July 1943, in the south around Belgorod, the frontage from the German 332nd Infantry Division through Totenkopf (the main two-corps German attack) covered 54 kilometers. This was covered by 146,443 troops, for a density of 2,712 troops per kilometer. In contrast, the part of the Soviet Sixth Guards Army’s first echelon that was facing them consisted of only 46,412 troops or 859 troops per kilometer (see page 148 of my big Kursk book). This Sixth Guards Army defense, considering both echelons, came in at 1,301 men per kilometer covering 66 kilometers of front, while the neighboring Seventh Guards Army had 1,568 men per kilometer of front covering 55 kilometers (see page 210).

Just do a spot check of several division-level engagements (yes, I do have all this data for the southern Kursk and the Kharkov battles in 1943 in our database, the Division-Level Engagement Data Base or DLEDB): 1) the linear density of the LSSAH Panzer Grenadier Division on 12 July 1943 at the tank fields of Prokhorovka was 1,922.64 men per kilometer of front. The attacking Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps came in at 3,151.27 men per kilometer of front, 2) The linear density of men for the GD Panzer Division, 332nd ID and 3rd PzD attack on 5 July 1943 was 2,204.88 men per kilometer of front. It was 612.89 for the defending Soviet 71st Guards Rifle Division. Going to the battles around Kharkov, 3) the linear density of the Soviet 40th Army at Prudyanka-Dergachi on 12 February 1943 was 203.65 while the defending German GD ID was 510.38. 4) The linear density of the LSSAH assault on Kharkov on 12 March 1943 was 753.04 while the defending Soviet 19th Rifle Division, 17th NKVD Brigade and 86th Tank Brigade was 472.65. By the 14th, this had increased to 2,436.43 for the Germans and 1,739.29 for the defending Soviets, 5) The most sparsely deployed unit I have in my database for the fighting in and around Kharkov in February to August 1943 was 280.00 men per kilometer for the attacker and 169.75 for the defender at Merafa III engagement on 13 March 1943. 6) the densest is the 106th ID Defense III on 20 August 1943 with the attacking Soviet 48th Guards Rifle Corps and 375th RD deployed at 3,457.80 men per kilometer of front while the defending 106th ID was at 1,766.00 men per kilometer of front (I do have 3,649.13 for the attacker South of Kharkov on 15 March, but the defender only has 424.38). 7) The most sparsely deployed engagement I have for the Kursk fighting is nominally Soldatskoye VIII on 18 July 1943, where the attacking Soviet elements held a front of 392.25 men per kilometer and the defending German 255th ID held the front at 319.33 men per kilometer (there are a number of other engagements where one side had less density than these) 8) the densest engagement is LSSAH Division’s clash with the 31st Tank Corps on 7 July 1943, where the Germans had a density of 8.,475.00 men per kilometer and the Soviets were at 4,328.85 men per kilometer. This is mostly driven by the LSSAH frontage being temporarily reduced to 2.6 kilometers. This is all drawn from 256 division-level battles on the Eastern Front in February-August 1943 (192 from Kursk and 64 from Kharkov), with all the data drawn from the unit records of both sides. The average for the front now in Ukraine may be 121 men per kilometer, and they are not evenly distributed.

So, what does this all mean?

Well, from a theoretical point of view, it is showing the changes in linear density over time. As firepower increases, density of troop deployments decrease. This has been occurring for hundreds of years. See Dispersion versus Lethality | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and TDI Friday Read: Lethality, Dispersion, And Mass On Future Battlefields | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and The Effects Of Dispersion On Combat | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Also see my book War by Numbers.

From a more practical point of view, that means that there are many places that are holding their lines with less than 121 men per kilometer. Does this mean that any concentrated offensive force can push through these areas “if they achieve surprise.” So, should we be seeing more fluid lines?

But, in fact, we are not seeing more fluid lines. This looks less fluid than I expected. So why? Is it because U.S. intel assistance is so good that any concentration of force is immediately fired upon? Is it because any concentration of force is immediately spotted and responded to, by either firepower or movement of reserves?

I don’t really know for sure, just looking at linear densities.

The Prokhorovka! game maps – comments?

I have done four posts on the game maps for the upcoming Advanced Squad Leader (ASL) module Prokhorovka!. I have not been involved in the developing the game, but found the effort worthwhile and interesting. What I was hoping to get back from those posts were comments on the game maps themselves, what was done right and well, and more importantly, what was not done right or needed to be corrected. So far, I have not gotten any comments on the game maps. I have provided some of my own to the designers, and in the case of the Storozhevoye map, it was re-worked before I posted it.

So anyhow, for the sake of our game designers, could we get some comments please.

Andreyevka Map for the game Prokhorovka! | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Stalinskii Map for the game Prokhorovka! | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Oktyabrskii Map for the game Prokhorovka! | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Storozhevoye Map for the game Prokhorovka! | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Other references:

Advancing Fire

PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com)

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Andreyevka Map for the game Prokhorovka!

As I have mentioned before, I am preparing a little write-up for the Italian wargame company Advancing Fire for their game Prokhorovka! (PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com). They are designing a set of scenarios for use in the game Advanced Squad Leader (ASL). They have been providing me with some of their advance material, although I am not involved in the design of the game. This is the fourth game map they have provided me.

They are drawing their ASL maps from German aerial photographs of the battlefield. This game map covers the area around Andreyevka and Vasilyevka. I do use different transliteration conventions than them (and many other people). For example, they spell Andreevka with an ee in the middle. An American, seeing the ee will invariably pronounce it like geek as opposed to ge-yek with two syllables. The two e’s are separately pronounced in Russian. Some transliteration conventions use an apostrophe instead of a y. I don’t think most Americans know what to do with a word spelled ge’ek or Andre’evka. The apostrophe is part of the Library of Congress transliteration system (which I think sucks). Some people use that system but take out the apostrophes, which gets us back to geek or Andreevka. I think it should be Andreyevka, which is closer to the Russian pronunciation.

Andreyevka and Vasilyevka is where the XVIII Tank Corps attacks into and through, getting as far as 200 meters east of the Bogoroditskoye church. Bogoroditskoye is often not marked on maps, but it is south of the Psel just west of Vasliyevka. Bogoroditskoye was defended by German armor (tanks or assault guns or Marders) and the Soviets claim at one point that they repulsed German counterattacks by 50 tanks from the Bogoroditskoye area (see page 318 of my Prokhorovka book or page 931 of my Kursk book). We have never clearly identified who that German armor unit was. I believe the Bogoroditskoye church is the church marked on Map M37-26C just west of the ravine west of Vasileyevka and is between Kozlovka and Vasilyeka. The Totenkopf SS two bridges were just west of Bogodoritskoye.

At 1600 (Moscow time) the XVIII Tank Corps’ II Battalion, 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade is claimed to be deployed from the Psel River to the center of Bogoroditskoye.

The eastern edge of the Andreyevka (assuming the gully marks the eastern edge) is some five kilometers almost due west of height 252.2. See 1:50000 scale Map M37-26C (there are copies of this map in both of my Kursk books). The village of Mikhailovka is just to the northeast of Andreyevka, along the Psel River (see story below). The XVIII Tank Corps moved through it during their attack.

Below is an aerial photograph of Andreyevka and Vasilyevka. The picture should be rotated 90 degree clockwise.:

The link to their game board is below. Just click on it and the game board should appear.

Andreevka

Now, I have looked their work, but I am hardly the right person to conduct photo analysis. Still, it looked pretty good to me. If anyone has any comments, criticisms, recommendations, corrections, edits, and so forth for this map, please let me know. I will forward the comments to them.

Thanks

Other references:

Advancing Fire

PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com)

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

P.S. In an email dated 12 April 2021, sent after this initial post, the game map designer informed me that “In the scenario, every hex North of the road A12-CCC10, on level 1 (the lower level), is Mud, so the vehicles and manhandled Guns may bog, the infantry goes slower and HE rounds effect is a bit “cushioned” (look at D8.23 and E3.6 in ASL Rulebook).”

P. P.S. My Mikhailovka story: In 1996, while leading a tour of mostly former German and American officers of the battlefield, we arrived at Mikhailovka while they were doing their presidential elections (back when Yelstin was running for re-election). Our American officers, led by a retired general, decided that this was a unique opportunity to see this new Russian democracy in action. So they decided to go into the town hall and watch the election unfolding. Needless to say, the local election officials were a little overwhelmed with the sudden arrival of rather large contingent of foreigners at their site. They initially said that we would have to leave, and then after conferring for a bit, they decided we could come in and observe the election in pairs. So we did. A rather informal observation of the 1996 Russian elections as conducted in the village of Mikhailovka by former German and American officers.

This trip is also discussed in a chapter in the book Becton: Autobiography of a Solider and Public Servant.

Stalinskii Map for the game Prokhorovka!

Christopher A. Lawrence
April 1, 2021

They are drawing their ASL maps from German aerial photographs of the battlefield. The game map covers the area around Stalinskii Sovkhoz (State Farm). Elements of the 25th Tank Brigade and 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade had pushed through to this small village. It was retaken by the Germans in the early afternoon., The village is in between Storozhevoye and height 252.2 (the previous two maps). It is some two kilometers north of Storozhevoye and a little over 1 and 1/2 kilometers south of height 252.2. See Map M37-26C.

Below are two aerial photographs of the Stalinskii State Farm.

The link to their game board is below. Just click on it and the game board should appear.

PROKHOROVKA! – SSF BOARD

Thanks.

Other references:

Advancing Fire

PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com)

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Eastern Front Kursk Modeling, Simulation & Wargaming World War II

Oktyabrskii Map for the game Prokhorovka!

They are drawing their ASL maps from German aerial photographs of the battlefield. The game map covers the area around Oktyabrskii State Farm and height 252.2, part of the tank fields of Prokhorovka. The road to Prokhorovka runs down the right edge of the map. One the previous map, Storozhevoye, is some 3 1/2 kilometers south of height 252.2. This is an aerial photograph of Oktyabrskii State Farm.

The link to their game board is below. Just click on it and the game board should appear.

PROKHOROVKA! – Tank Fields BOARD

The road running down the right edge of the board it the road to Prokhorovka, heading northeast. Also worth looking at is the 1:50000 scale map M 37-26C in my Kursk and Prokhorovka books. The area is mostly in between the grid lines 35 and 37 and 55 to 58 (six square kilometers).

Now, I never walked the ground right around Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz. It was still a working farm when I first toured the battlefield in 1995. But you could see it from height 252.2.

Thanks.

Other Photos:

OSF building (1)

And a photo from my books:

Other references:

Advancing Fire

PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com)

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

A List of Killed and Wounded SS Panzer Officers, July 1943

Christopher A. Lawrence
March 23, 2021

There are some daily medical reports in the files that I have (T354, R605, the II SS Pz Corps). Sometimes they provide a list of names and the units they are with. Sometimes this list is readable. Let me list the ones that are clearly reported with an SS panzer regiment up through 28 July 1943. An examination of the originals (which are in Freiburg) might add some more names.

Date Status Rank Name Unit

4.7-5.7 Wounded SS-Ustuf. Wittman Zugf. Pz. Rgt./LSSAH

7.7-8.7 Killed SS-Ostuf. Pense 9. Pz. Kp. S-DR

12.7-13.7 Wounded SS-Ustuf. v. Kleist 3./Pz.Rgt SS-T

12.7-13.7 Wounded SS-Ustuf. Schwieger 6./Pz.Rgt. SS-T

12.7-13.7 Wounded SS-Ustuf. Koerner NZ I/Pz.Rgt. SS-T

15.7-16.7 Killed SS-Ustuf. Weisenhelter II./Pz.Rgt. SS-DR

15.7-16.7 Killed SS-Ustuf. Envelka 5./Pz.Rgt. SS-DR

19.7-20.7 Killed SS-Ustuf. Koehler Pz.Regt. 3 SS-T

19.7-20.7 Killed SS-Ustuf. Schroeder Pz. Rgt. 3 SS-T

Because of the poor quality of my copies, please do not take the list as definitive or correct. It is illustrative of the data that is available. An examination of the personnel files in Berlin, as Nikals Zetterling has suggested, may be far more productive.

Translations:

SS-Ustuf: is Untersturmfuehrer or a “junior assault leader” or the equivalent to a second lieutenant.

SS-Ostuf is Obersturmfuehrer or a “senior assault leader” or the equivalent to a first lieutenant.

This post is done is response to Niklas Zetterling’s comments on this blog post: Summation of Argument on LSSAH PzRgt Organization in July 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Eastern Front Kursk World War II

Storozhevoye Map for the game Prokhorovka!

They are drawing their ASL maps from German aerial photographs of the battlefield. This is is one of the aerial photographs they are using. It is of the area Storozhevoye, some 3 1/2 kilometers south of height 252.2.

The link to their game board is below. Just click on it and the game board should appear.

PROKHOROVKA! – Storozhevoje BOARD – VERSION 23-1-21

It helps to spin the image 90 degrees to the right to match it up with the aerial photograph. Also worth looking at is the 1:50000 scale map M 37-38A in my Kursk and Prokhorovka books. The area is mostly in between the grid lines 35 and 36 and 51 to 53 (two square kilometers).

Thanks.

Other references:

Advancing Fire

PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com)

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Meanwhile back at the Tank Ditch

One other statement in the Lehmann account is that “These three [surviving tanks of the 6th panzer company] could fire at the Russians from a distance of ten to thirty meters and make every shell a direct hit because the Russians could not see through the dust and smoke that there were German tanks rolling along with them in the same direction. There were already nineteen Russian tanks standing burning on the battlefield when the Abteilung opened fire for the first time (footnote: “report from von Ribbentrop”).”

So, that account states that 19 Russian tanks were destroyed before the 5th and 7th company opened fire on them. Ribbentrop himself was credited with 14 tanks this day. Now, this could well be an exaggerated tally (and there are many examples of this), but let us take it seriously for a moment.

The attacking force was most of the 32nd Tank Brigade and the 25th Tank Brigade. The 25th Tank Brigade on 1600 11 July reported having 31 T-34s and 36 T-70s ready for action (they report 4 tanks in repair). The 32nd Tank Brigade on 1600 11 July reported having 60 T-34s and 4 T-70s. It is reported that at least 15 T-34s penetrated to the Komsomolets Sovkhoz in the original attack, where they were all destroyed. The 31st Tank Brigade (29 T-34s and 38 T-70s) was in the second echelon of the attack. So the total number of tanks in this initial attack force would have been 131 minus 15 detached = 116.

The 25th Tank Brigade on 2400 12 July reported that 13 T-34s and 10 T-70s were irretrievably lost, 11 T-34s and 10 T-70s were knocked out or hit mines and 7 T-34s and 4 T-70s were out of action due to technical breakdowns. So out of 67 tanks, 44 combat losses, 11 breakdowns and 12 or so remaining ready-for-action. The brigade was operating on the “other side” of the railroad track, and also probably also encountered the German self-propelled AT guns (Marders).

The 32nd Tank Brigade on 2400 12 July reported that 54 T-34s were either burned, knocked out, or are in need of repair. So at best 6 T-34s and 4 T-70s ready for action. Of those 54 combat losses, we gather at least 15 were lost at Komsomolets Sovkhoz, which is out of the area under discussion here.

If 11 of the 55 losses (20%) of the 25th Tank Brigade were mechanical, then it appears that there were also mechanical breakdowns among the remaining 54 – 15 lost T-34s. A straight line estimate would say 8. So total combat losses in these two tank brigades in an around the tank fields appear to be around 44 + 54 -15 – 8 = 75. Now, if Ribbentrop and company got 19 of them then we are looking at 56 other tanks put out action in combat by either 5th and 7th panzer company, artillery, antitank guns, aircraft, mines (they do specifically mention mines in the Soviet reports), German infantry on height 252.2 (which was also attacked by tanks), German Marders, Soviet aircraft (the 32nd Tank Brigade reports that it was attacked at 1300 by Soviet assault aircraft), or by operations later in the day, etc. So how many of these 56 other lost tanks actually drove into the tank ditch? I am guessing not a lot.

Added to that, the battle continued throughout the day, and clearly while many of these tanks were lost in the morning attack, some were lost later in the day.

Now, there are some accounts that seem to want to want to have lots of tanks rolling into tank ditches. But between the 6th Panzer Company, the rest of the II Panzer Battalion, the German artillery, German antitank guns, German air, Soviet air, mines, Marders and German infantry… then, who was left to roll into the tank ditch? Certainly not a lot.

Again, the tank ditch story is sometimes overstated. There is probably a reason why Captain Rudolf von Ribbentrop never mentions any Soviet tanks driving into the tank ditch in his account of the action.

Summation of Argument on LSSAH PzRgt Organization in July 1943

In the case of how the LSSAH Panzer Regiment was organized in July 1943 (as there is no clear documentation of this), there are three options:

1) The regiment consisted of only the II Panzer Battalion with 5th, 6th, and 7th panzer companies, and the 13th panzer company for the Tigers.

2) The II Panzer Battalion had the 8th panzer company active.

3) The regiment consisted of the II Panzer Battalion with the 5th, 6th, and 7th panzer companies, and the 143h panzer company for the Tigers, and an ersatz I Panzer Battalion of maybe three companies.

Let me briefly outline the strengths and weaknesses of these three arguments:

The three medium panzer company argument:
1. Strengths
  1. This is the traditional position.
  2. This is what all the post-war narratives say.
  3. There is nothing that solidly disproves this.
2. Weaknesses
  1. This makes little sense with 90 Pz III and IVs and 9 Panzer III Command tanks (in addition to the Pz I command tank).
  2. The companies would have had 31 tanks to start the battle with.
    1. But Ribbentrop says they started with 22.
  3. On 12 July, if Ribbentrop had 7 tanks, then the other two companies had at least 22 tanks each.
The four medium panzer company argument
1. Strengths
  1. You can almost fit the 90 tanks into four companies at 22 tanks a company.
  2. Compromise answer that avoids creating an ersatz Panzer battalion.
2. Weaknesses
  1. Not documented in any unit records I have seen.
  2. The one source mentioning the 8th company specifically states that it was not used for Citadel due to “lack of tanks”.
The two battalion argument
1. Strengths:
  1. Accounts for all the tanks on 4 July.
  2. Accounts for all the tanks on 11 July (based upon Lehmann’s claim that II Panzer Battalion had 33 tanks).
  3. This is what Das Reich did.
  4. The “I Panzer Battalion” is actually referenced twice on 8 July 1943 in German records.
2. Weaknesses
  1. Was never mentioned in any of the post-war accounts.

So readers…did the LSSAH Panzer Regiment in July 1943 have 1) only II Battalion of three medium companies, 2) only II Battalion of four medium companies, 3) or an ersatz I Battalion in addition to the II Battalion of three medium panzer companies?