Excellence in Historical Research and Analysis
Excellence in Historical Research and Analysis
This is a link to a long article by Dr. Ben Wheatley called ‘Surviving Prokhorovka: German Armoured Longevity on the Eastern Front in 1943-1944.”: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16161262.2020.1750841
I have not read it yet and probably will not for a while. I have some other deadlines I am working to. This is a subject we have discussed before on this blog.
In June 1943 Otto Dessloch took over command of the Fourth Air Fleet from Wolfram von Richthofen. Richthofen went off to command the Second Air Fleet in Italy. Although it was supposed to be temporary command, Dessloch remained in command of the Fourth Air Fleet until the middle of 1944.
Dessloch later became infamous for having conducted a retaliatory bombing of Paris in September 1944, after the allies had taken it over. He passed away in Munich in 1977.
Now, I have two dates as to when he took command of the Fourth Air Fleet, either 11 June or 13 June. Right now, I don’t have any solid confirmation for either date, although Wikipedia uses the 11 June date. Does anyone has some clear documentation that establishes what date he took command?
A few years ago I wrote an article on the History News Network on my decision to quote from David Irving’s work in my book on Kursk. The article is here: https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/163814
This primarily concerned the conference on 4 May 1943 preceding the Battle of Kursk. This conference is described in some depth by Guderian in his book. Guderian’s account has often been accepted uncritically by some writers. The account provided by David Irving, quoted from Wolfram von Richthofen (the cousin of the famous Red Baron), gives a very different picture of the conference. I do not know which account is more correct, but decided to present them both in my book.
Nine months ago, Dr. Andrew Arthy in Australia commented on that article that he had copies of the notes make by Wolfram von Richthofen. I noticed the comment last week, so looked him up, emailed him and he willingly provided a copy of the memo. It came from Freiburg: BA-MA N 671/10. The image above is the copy he sent me.
Jay Karamales (who is not a native German speaker) provided me with the following translation of it:
1.) Operation Citadel: General Model said he wasn’t strong enough and would likely get stuck or would need a lot of time. The Führer was of the opinion that the attack must smash through in the shortest possible time under all circumstances. Colonel General Guderian held out the prospect that within six weeks he would be able to supply sufficient armored forces that this would be guaranteed. The Führer therefore decided to postpone it for six weeks. To confirm this decision from all directions, discussion with FM von Kluge and FM von Manstein. Initially, they agreed to a postponement; however, when they heard that the Führer had already made the decision along these lines, they promoted [preached, publicized] an immediate start to the attack, apparently so as not to be burdened [encumbered? In legalese “belasten” means incriminated] by the postponement themselves.
Chief of the General Staff has doubts as to whether Guderian’s promises can be kept, above all because a larger number of Tiger deliveries are expected, but it appears that their chassis construction is not in order.
The Chief of Luftflotte 4 takes the position that postponement was wrong under all circumstances. The Russians can (and do) deploy more defense systems in six weeks than we can attack weapons. The attack will go slowly if we wait to start it in mid-June. [If we launch it] At the beginning of May we might not get to Kursk in the scheduled time of 48 hours, but certainly within 4 days. The Russian had defensive structures only on the fronts and not as deep as now. The Russian forces were still in the process of freshening up and realigning, while the Russian is now strong and ready. Our own troops (army corps and divisions) had total confidence and absolute success. This has definitely been undermined by all the back and forth and the waiting [delays]. The postponement gives the Russian the opportunity to take the initiative, even if this is not likely. In any case, it is impossible to predict how the postponement of the operation and its probably much slower progress will affect the plan [intentions] in the northern part of the Eastern Front.
David Irving’s translation (and he does his own translation), from his book Hitler’s War, reads:
[On 27 April] General Model declared he was not strong enough and would probably get bogged down or take too long. The Fuehrer took the view that the attack must be punched through without fail in shortest time possible. [Early in May.] General Guderian offered to furnish enough tank units within six weeks to guarantee this. The Fuehrer thus decided on a postponement of six weeks. To get the blessing of all sides on this decision, he called a conference [on 4 May] with Field Marshals von Kluge and von Manstein. At first they agreed on a postponement; but when they heard that the Fuehrer had already made his mind up to that effect, they spoke out for an immediate opening of the attack—apparently in order to avoid the odium of being blamed for the postponement themselves.
Annoying Disclaimer (that I probably should not need to make): The fact that I have referenced David Irving’s work in an area where he correctly quoted someone does not mean that I agree with or in any way support other claims or work that he has done.
P.S. Dr. Andrew Arthy is currently working on: https://airwarpublications.com/air-war-courland-writing-begun/
P.P.S. Another translation of the same passage is provided in Christer Bergstrom’s newly released Black Cross, Red Star, Volume 5 book, page 181. It reads:
They initially agreed to a postponement; however, when they heard that the Fuhrer had already made a decision in this sense, they propagated an immediate commencement of the attack, apparently so as not to be burdened by the shift themselves.”
The Aces at Kursk book may be my last Kursk book I will do for a while, depending on demand. From my original mega-book I have prepared two books, The Battle of Prokhorovka and Aces at Kursk. From the original book I can prepare two more books: The Battle of Tolstoye Woods and The Belgorod Offensive. These four books would effectively complete the serialization of my original book. I could also create one additional book, which would be a 300-page book for a more general audience addressing the entire battle in the south.
Also in my files are the German and Soviet research materials and draft texts to produce two or three others books covering the Soviet offensive to take Kharkov in February 1943, the German counteroffensive to retake Kharkov in March 1943 and the Soviet offensive to take Kharkov in August 1943. As part of our urban warfare work, we pulled up the unit records for both sides for the three battles in and around Kharkov in 1943. The fighting in February and March of 1943 was the fighting that immediately preceded the Battle of Kursk. They are probably best covered in a single book. The fighting in August 1943 is a continuation of the Battle of Kursk and is considered part of the Battle of Kursk by Soviet historians.
This would potentially allow for a series of six to eight books covering most of the fighting on the Russian Front in the south from February to August 1943. But I am not sure whether I should do that or move onto other projects. Right now, leaning towards moving onto other projects.
I do have a completed book of around 400 pages called Aces at Kursk: The Belgorod Offensive Air War. It is a book about the actual air battles, as opposed to yet another picture book. The air battles at Kursk were larger than the Battle of Britain, yet there is not a single comprehensive book addressing it.
I have contacted a number of publishers and am still waiting for a response from some of them. A couple of them made a counter offer than I do picture book. But, it is probably time to go out and look for other publishers. If someone knows a publisher that this book is a particularly good fit for please let me know. If a publisher has a strong interest in this book, please contact me directly.
Thanks
Now, some of the data provided in the previous posts were muddied by the fact that there were serious differences in the performances of the opposing armies. This is true for the German Army versus the Soviet Army in 1943, the Israeli Army versus the Arab armies in 1956-1973, and for the U.S. Army, USMC and allied armies versus the Iraqi Army in 1991. To a much lesser extent, it is also true for the German Army versus the U.S and UK armies up through the middle of 1944. This is discussed in some depth in my book War by Numbers.
As such, this seems like also a good time to again briefly address this issue. We need to break down the force ratio tables by which nationality is attacking. First let us look at the Eastern Front World War II data:
World War II, Kharkov and Kursk 1943 (180 cases)
German Army attacking the Soviet Army – culled data set (100 cases)
In these hundred battles, when the Germans are on the offensive, they win 96% of the time. That is a pretty impressive result. The full data set with another 28 cases that include “limited action” and “limited attack” are listed below.
German Army attacking the Soviet Army – complete data set (128 cases)
Out of these 128 battles, when the Germans attack they win 79% of the time. This is still impressive by any standard. Because of the additional cases being “limited action” and “limited attack” there are a lot of drawn engagements in this data set. The “culled” data set has three defender victories and one draw (and 96 attacker wins). This one has five defender victories and 22 drawn engagements. Now, let us look at how the Soviets do in response. These are the opposing forces on the same battlefield, similar terrain, similar weather, and often on the same day
Soviet Army attacking the German Army – culled data set (41 cases)
This is a very different result than what we see for the Germans. Out of the 41 attacks, the Soviets win 13 times or 32%. If I compare the German results of their attacks at odds below three-to-one, I have the Soviets succeeding 32% of the time while the Germans are succeeding 96% of the time (70 out of 73 attacks). Hard to argue that there is not a performance difference as the two armies in 1943 were roughly equivalent in armament and the mix of armaments. Each of the engagements from Kursk are presented in considerable detail in my books on the battle.[1]
The same data, but including “limited action” and “limited attack” is shown below:
Soviet Army attacking the German Army – complete data set (52 cases)
With this data set, out of 52 engagements the attacker still only won 13 times, or 25%.
[1] See Lawrence. Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (2015) and The Battle of Prokhorovka (2019). The first book lays out all 192 engagements from the offensive in the south while the second book provided the detailed data for 76 of the engagements. Each engagement has a separate engagement sheet that lays out the forces involved, their strength and their losses. There is a detail narrative of their operations in the text of the books. If anyone has any questions over the accuracy or interpretation of this data, it is presented in these books, developed primarily from the unit records of both sides (primary sources).
Various Three-to-one rules of thumbs have existed in the U.S. Army and in writings possibly as early as the American Civil War (1861-1865). These are fine as “rules of thumb” as long as one does not take them seriously and understands what they really mean. But, unfortunately, we have now seen something that is a loose rule of thumb turned into a codified and quantified rule. This is annoyingly overstating its importance and as given in U.S. Army manuals, is patently false.
The U.S. Army has apparently codified the “three-to-one rule” in its documentation and has given it a value. In the 2014 edition of FM 6-0, paragraph 9-103, it states that “For example, historically, defenders have over a 50 percent probability of defeating an attacking force approximately three times their equivalent strength.” This statement, on the surface, simply is incorrect. For example, the following table from my book War by Numbers is drawn from a series of 116 division-level engagements in France in 1944 against the Germans (see War by Numbers, page 10) They show the following relationship between force ratio and outcome:
Now these engagements are from fighting between the U.S., UK and Germany in France and Germany in 1944. These are engagements between forces of roughly equal competence. As can be seen, based upon 42 division-level engagements, in all cases of attacks at three-to-one (more specifically 2.71-to-1 and greater), the attacker advanced. Meaning in all cases of attacks at three-to-one, the attacker won. This directly contradicts the statement in FM 6-0, and contradicts it based upon historical data.
This is supplemented by the following two tables on the next page of War by Numbers. The first table shows the German performance when attacking Soviet units in 1943.
The next table shows the Soviet performance when attacking German units in 1943:
These charts are from the fighting around Kharkov in February, March and August of 1943 and the fighting during the Battle of Kursk in July 1943. It is 73 engagements between the German and Soviet armies.
Now, there is a clear performance difference between the German and the Soviet armies at this time. This is discussed in considerable depth in War by Numbers and will not be addressed here. But, what it amounts to is that the German Army has an advantage in the casualty exchange and that advantage also shows up in the outcomes of the battles, as show above. If they attacked at two-to-one odds are greater, they would win. The Soviets attacking at the same odds would win only 56 percent of the time. Clearly, at the division-level, in a unit to unit comparison, the Germans were two or three times better than their Soviet opponents.
Still, even in the worse case, which is the Soviets attacking the Germans, we do not get to the claim made in FM 6-0, which is the defender won 50% of the time when attacked at three-to-one. In fact, the Soviets managed to win 50% of the time when attacking at 1.20 to 1.65-to-1. Something is clearly wrong with the statement in FM 6-0.
Now, at the time I wrote War by Numbers, I was not aware of this sentence planted in FM 6-0 and so therefore did not feel a need to respond to the “three-to-one rule.” It is a rule of thumb, not completely without value, that had been discussed before (see Dupuy, Understanding War, pages 31-37). I thought this issue was properly understood in the U.S. analytical and defense community, therefore I did not feel a need to address it further. It turns out that I do. So, I will take a moment to tap into our databases and properly address this using all the resources at my disposal. This will be in subsequent blog posts.
Dr. Wheatley requested me to list out the losses for the 32nd and 31st Tank Brigades on 12 July 1943. They were the two attacking tank brigades on the right flank of the XXIX Tank Corps, with the 32nd Tank Brigade in the first echelon and the 31st in the second echelon. Next to the 32nd Tank Brigade was the 25th Tank Brigade and they were supported by the 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade. Here are their reports (the text in italics are the direct translations of the reports, done by Dr. Richard Harrison):
Operational Report #90, 0800 July 11, 1943. HQ 29th TC:
Corps material and supply situation:
25th TBde: 32 T-34s, 39 T-70s, 103 cars, 4 45mm guns, 3 37mm guns, 6 82mm mortars
31st TBde: 31 T-34s, 39 T-70s, 103 cars, 4 45mm guns, 2 37mm guns, 6 82mm mortars
32nd TBde: 63-T34s, 102 cars, 4 45mm guns, 2 25mm guns, and 6 82mm mortars
53rd MotRBde: 293 cars, 17 BA-64 armored cars, 12 76mm guns, 12 45mm guns, 30 82mm mortars and 6 120mm mortars.
271st Mortar Rgt: 69 cars and 36 120mm mortars
1446th Self-Propelled ArtRgt: 28 cars, 9 76mm SP guns, 12 122mm howitzers
108th ATArtRgt: 37 cars, 12 76mm guns and 8 45mm guns
75th Motorcycle Bn: 10 BA-64s, 13 cars, 72 motorcycles, and 4 82mm mortars
38th Armored Bn: 7 T-70s, 12 BA-10s, 10 BA-64s and 12 cars
363rd Ind Communications Bn: 74 cars, 10 BA-64s, and 3 T-34s.
193rd Sapper Bn: 31 cars
69th (?) Reconnaissance Bn: 15 cars
72nd (?) Reconnaissance Bn: 10 cars
1st (?) Co: 45 cars
7th (?): 6 cars
Combat Report #73, 1600, July 11, 1943, HQ: 29th TC:
Corps Strength 123 T-34s, 81 T-70s, 11 122mm SAUs, and 8 76mm SAU.
Note that this Corps Strength list does not match the list above in any category. In part because there were 7 T-70s with the 38th Armored Bn and 3 T-34s with the 363rd Ind Communications Bn.
Combat Report #75, 2400, July 12, 1943, HQ 29th TC:
25th Tank Brigade losses: 140 men killed, 180 wounded. 13 T-34s and 10 T-70s were irretrievably lost; 11 T-34s and 10 T-70s were knocked out or hit mines; 7 T-34s and 4 T-70s are out of action due to technical breakdowns.
32nd Tank Brigade losses: 100 men killed and 130 wounded. Overall, 54 T-34s were either burned, knocked out, or are in need of repair.
31st Tank Brigade losses: 20 T-34s and 18 T-70s knocked out and burned. Tanks in line: 3, with the location and condition of the remainder being investigated.
During the night 3 T-34s and 1 122mm SAU were repaired.
The evacuation of knocked-out tanks is being carried out by 3 turretless T-34s and a single M-3 “Grant”. Four brigades are working to restore damaged equipment, with one working to repair self-propelled guns; 2 brigades working to repair 32nd TBdes equipment, and 1 working for 31st TBde.
Note the reference to evacuation of tanks, which does have some definite impact on the photo reconnaissance pictures taken on 16 July and 7 August 1943.
Operational Report #2, 0700, July 13, 1943. HQ 5th Gds Tank Army:
29th TC: Losses: 95 T-34s, 38 T-70s, 8 self-propelled platforms, 240 men killed and 610 wounded.
Combat Report #76, 1300, July 13, 1943, HQ 29th TC:
31st Tank Bde: Material Supply and condition: 8 T-34s and 20 T-70s in line; during the night 8 T-34s were evacuated from the field.
Losses for 12 July: 14 men killed, 27 wounded, and 15 missing. 1 45mm guns wrecked, 1 heavy MG, 2 SMGs and 1 rifle.
25th Tank Bde, consisting of 50th MotRBn, 11 T-70s and 2 guns from an antitank battalion, are defending 1 km east of Storzhevoye.
32nd Tk Bde: Tanks in line: 12 T-34s
1529th Self-Propelled Art Rgt is in Prokhorovka.
Operational Report #91, 0400 July 14, 1943. HQ 29th TC:
25th TBde losses: 40 men killed, 87 wounded, 2 T-70s burns, and 1 knocked out.
53rd MotRBde: Losses for July 12: 517 men killed and missing, and 572 wounded; 16 heavy MGS, 25 AT rifles, 2 45mm guns, 13 light MGs, and 2 cars.
1446th Self-Propelled ArtRgt turned over 2 guns to 25th TBde and 6 to 32nd TBde. Losses for July 12: 19 men killed, 14 wounded; 8 122mm SAUs and 3 76mm SAUs destroyed.
108th ATArtRgt is the corps commander’s reserve without losses
271st Mortar Rgt has been subordinated to 53rd MotRBde. Losses for July 12: 5 men killed and missing, with 4 wounded.
On July 12 1 man was killed and another wounded.
Operational Report #4, 0700, July 14, 1943. HQ 5th Gds Tank Army:
29th TC: Losses: 3 T-70s, of which 2 were irreplaceable; 40 men killed and 87 wounded. Tanks on hand: 31 T-34s, 40 T-70s.
Operational Report #92, 1600 July 14, 1943. HQ 29th TC:
25th TBde losses: 1 T-70 burns, 1 man killed and 5 wounded.
Combat Report #77, 1900, July 14, 1943. HQ 29th TC:
25th TBde: Losses 1 T-70 burned, 1 man killed and 5 wounded.
Operational Report #5, 1900, July 14, 1943. HQ 5th Gds Tank Army:
29th TC: Losses: 1 T-70 burned, 1 man killed and 5 wounded. Tanks on hand: 33 T-34s and 39 T-70s.
Operational Report #6, 0700, July 15, 1943. HQ 5th Gds Tank Army:
29th TC: Tanks in line: 35 T-34s and 40 T-70s
Operational Report #94, 1600 July 15, 1943. HQ 29th TC:
31st TBde: Tanks on hand: 15 T-34s and 20 T-70s. Losses: 1 man killed.
53rd MotRBde: Losses 1 man killed, 17 wounded.
25th TBde: Tanks on hand: 5 T-34s and 19 T-70s. Loses: 1 T-70 knocked out, 1 man killed.
32nd TBde: Tanks on hand: 15 T-34s.
Operational Report #7, 0400, July 16, 1943. HQ 5th Gds Tank Army:
29th TC: Losses: 1 T-70 knocked out, 1 man killed. Tanks in line: 40 T-34s and 45 T-70s.
Combat Report #80, 1900 July 16, 1943 HQ 29th TC:
25th TBde: Losses: none. Material Status: 5 T-34s and 17 T-70s in the line; 4 antitank guns; 5 82mm mortars; 3 37mm AA guns.
31st TBde: Material Status: 16 T-34s and 21 T-70s in the line; 3 45mm guns, 2 37mm guns, 2 MBGs, and 3 82mm guns [probably mortars]
32nd TBde: Losses for July 16: 5 men killed, 5 wounded, 1 T-34. Enemy aircraft, in groups of up to 60 planes, bombed the brigade’s positions 4 times.
One notes that in most wargames, attacking a tank brigade with 120 or more Ju-87s and Fw-190s would probably result in more than 13 casualties (see below).
53rd MotRBde: Losses 2 men wounded. Material status: 11 76mm guns; 7 45mm guns; 51 AT rifles; 19 HMGs, 41 LMGs.
1446th Self-Propelled ArtRgt: Equipment on hand: 4 122mm SAUs and 6 76mm SAUs.
271st Mortar Rgt: Losses: 3 men wounded due to bombing and 3 cars damaged. Material condition: 33 120mm mortars.
108th ATArtRgt: Material status: 12 76mm and 8 45mm guns.
38th Armored Bn: Material status: 7 T-70s, 12 Ba-10s and 10 Ba-64s.
75th Motorcycle Bn: 9 BA-64s and 60 motorcycles.
Operational Report #95, 2400 July 16, 1943. HQ 29th TC:
Losses for July 16: 6 men killed and 19 wounded, 1 T-34, 3 cars knocked out and 3 damaged.’
Material Condition: 42 T-34s, 47 T-70s, 1 KV, 4 122mm SAUs, 6 76mm SAUs, 23 76mm guns, 26 45mm guns, 5 37mm guns, 3 25mm guns, 39 120mm mortars, 44 82mm mortars. By 0600 on July 17 5 T-34s and 3 T-70s will be restored.
Operational Report #96, 2400 July 16, 1943. HQ 29th TC:
Material Status: 42 T-34s, 50 T-70s, 1 KV, 4 122mm SAUs, 6 76mm SAUs, 23 76mm guns, 26 45mm guns, 5 47mm guns, 3 25mm guns, and 44 82mm mortars.
Operational Report #8, 0400, July 17, 1943. HQ 5th Gds Tank Army:
29th TC: Losses: 1 T-34, 5 men killed and 10 wounded. 6 cars smashed or knocked out. Tanks in line: 39 T-34s and 45 T-70s.
XXIX Tank Corps (Fond 332, Opis: 1943, Delo: 80, Pages 2-3):
Information on Equipment Loses and Strengths, July 12-16
Note that I had to retype all these entries, and I am ham-fisted, so there might be typo or two in them.
By the way, reviewing this just reinforces my opinion that the 31st Tank Brigade was in a second echelon position and used as such. May not have ever gotten past Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz.
In Valeri’s Zamulin’s book, the map on the page before page 385 shows the 170th Tank Brigade (XVIII Tank Corps) and the 1/32 Tank Brigade (XXIX Tank Corps) driving all the way to the village of Ivanovskii Vyiselok. I am not sure either of those units got that far. It shows their attack being halted by the 2nd SS Panzer Regiment, which is the Panzer Regiment of the neighboring Das Reich SS Division.
The records I have from the XVIII Tank Corps records has the 170th Tank Brigade by 1200 losing 60% of its equipment, taking Okyabrskii Sovkhoz “despite these losses” and 1200 are fighting along the line “the ravine southeast of Mikhailovka.” As of the Corps’ 1400 daily report the 170th Tank Brigade is still fighting along the line of the ravine southeast of Mikhailovka. ” The records then state that: “the corp’s units, continuing to carry out their mission, by the end of the day had reached the line 200 meters east of the Bororodiskoye church–southern outskirts of Vasilevka-Andreyevka-two windmills at Prelsstnoye–further along the northern slopes of the ravine southeast of Andreyevka–the Okyabrskii Sovkhoz.“
Some of the quotes from those records are in this post:
Where were the 181st and 170th Tank Brigades on 12 July 1943?
In the XXIX Tank Corps records I have, there is no mention of this either. For the 1900 report from the corps, they report that the 32nd Tank Brigade “…is attacking the enemy along the line Okyabrskii Sovkhoz, where it was halted by enemy artillery and tank fire, and by his aircraft.” and from the 2400 report they reported that “32nd Tank Brigade, having encountered stubborn enemy resistance, at 1300 forced to go over to the defensive along the line of the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz.”
The Fifth Guards Tank Army 1900 daily report shows a little more forward movement, with the XVIII Tank Corps reported to have captured Mikhailovka by 1400. It notes that “The Corps’ further advance was contained by the enemy’s powerful artillery and mortar fire from the Greznoye area, and by tank fire from the Bogoroditskoye area.” That same report has the XXIX TAnk Corps by 1400 taking the Komsomolets Sovkhoz and then notes: “…having encountered an enemy counterattack supported by 200 tanks from the Yar Zoslonnyi-Komsomolets Sokhoz, the corps abandoned the Sovkhoz. Units fell back to the line Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz–Storozhevoye, repelling enemy tank counterattacks.”
The Fifth Guards Tank Army’s 0700 13 July report has the XVIII Tank Corps taking the eastern outskirts of Vasilevka by the end of the 12 July, “…but its further advance was halted by the enemy’s artillery and tank fire from the area of the western outskirts of Vasilevka.” The report has the XXIX Tank Corps “…on the line Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz (excl.) Storozhevoye and is repelling enemy counterattacks by a large group of tanks from the Komsomolets Sovkhoz area.”
The Fifth Guards Tank Army’s summary report for 12-24 July has “the 170th and 181st Tank Brigade “…by 1430, after fierce fighting, had taken the Okyabrskii Sovkhoz and had reached Andreyevka and Vasilevka, an advance of 6-7 kilometers (which is putting a good face on a disastrous attack). This is also the report that states “In Andreyevka 181st Tank Brigade met a large column of enemy tanks.” For the XXIX Tank Corps they have “At 1300 32nd and 31st Tank Brigades, following a fiece meeting engagement with enemy tanks along the approaches to the road south of the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz, were halted by strong enemy tank and AT fire, as well as by aerial bombardment; the brigades went over to the defensive along this line and repulsed four strong tank counterattacks, which resulted in heavy enemy losses.”
So there is simply no mention of such an advance all the way to Ivanovskii Vyiselok in the XVIII Tank Corps records we have, nor in the XXIX Tank Corps records, nor in the Fifth Guards Tank Army records.
I don’t recall the SS records (which are very sparse this day) ever mentioning this.
The Germans have one intelligence map which shows two penetrations. One, probably by the 181st Tank Brigade, on the left flank of the LSSAH Division, and one, probably by the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade later in the day at the Storozhevoye woods. I don’t have a convenient version of this map that I can put at the top of this post, but it is on page 950 in my original Kursk book and page 343 in the Prokhorovka book.
I do have a contemporary II Guards Tank Corps map that shows Ivanokskii Vyiselok on 12 July. It shows no action there, although this is not particularly meaningful. As the attacking units were with the XVIII and XXIX Tank Corps, it is not surprising that their operations were not shown on the II Guards Tank Corps maps.
So, where does this claimed attack come from? Well, the only description I know of such an effort is in Zamulin’s book, page 351. He says:
At the same time [1430 or 1600 Moscow time], the forces of the left wing of Bakharov’s corps (the 170th Tank Brigade, part of the 181st Tank Brigade, several tanks from the 31st Tank Brigade mounting infantry from the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade) struck out along the gully leading from Andreevka to the southwest in the direction of Hill 241.6. The group attacked resolutely. Taking advantage of the terrain and the dense smoke of the battlefield, the tanks broke through the line of the Leibstandarte’s reconnaissance battalion and unexpectedly burst into the firing positions of the division’s artillery regiment….Within a short time, the 170th Tank Brigade was already fighting in the area of Ivanovskii Vyselok….Hausser immediately concentrated panzer elements from both SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte and SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich against both our tank groups at Komsomolets State Farm and Ivanovskii Vyselok.
So this does put elements of the 170th Tank Brigade at Ivanovskii Vyiselok sometime after 1430. There are a few problems here: First, there are no footnotes on this page. So not sure of the source of this account. Second, it not quite match his map. The map shows the 1/32 Tank Brigade also there, whereas the text on page 351 clearly leaves them stuck in Komsomolets Sovkhoz (“At this moment, the crews of Major Ivanov’s 1st Tank Battalion and the motorized riflemen of Lieutenant Colonel Lipichev’s 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade from the 29th Tank Corps were still fighting for their lives on the State Farm.”). Third this is a late afternoon attack and a late afternoon penetration of the LSSAH position. This does differ in time from other accounts (as does his putting the Soviet T-34s hitting the tank ditch story after 1300).
Not sure what to make of this account. I assume it is based upon some evidence, but I have no idea what that evidence is.
I am still trying to imagine the composition for a single four medium panzer company and one heavy company panzer battalion in LSSAH on 4 July 1943. The division had 173 tanks, more than the other two SS divisions in the corps. These other two divisions both had two panzer battalions, one created from an antitank battalion. Das Reich had its 166 tanks deployed in 7 medium and light companies and one heavy tank company; while Totenkopf had it 165 tanks in 6 medium and light companies and one heavy tank company. LSSAH may have only had four medium panzer companies (the heavy panzer companies with 12 Tigers and 5 Panzer IIIs are ignored for this discussion).
A German panzer company’s maximum authorized strength was 22 tanks. Rarely do you see overstrength panzer companies. Rarely did you actually see a panzer company at full strength. For example, the Das Reich SS Division with its 7 medium and light panzer companies would have averaged around 14 tanks per company at the start of the offensive. The Totenkopf SS Division with it 6 medium and light panzer companies would have averaged around 17 tanks per company at the start of the offensive. For the four panzer company construct to work the LSSAH, they pretty much have to be at authorized strength. So 4 tank companies = 88 tanks.
The LSSAH had on 4 July: 79 Pz IVs, 9 Pz III Command, 9 Pz III long, 2 Pz III short, 4 Pz IIs and 3 Pz Is.
So 66 Pz IVs in companies 5, 6 and 7 (22 each) and 13 Pz IVs, 3 Pz III Command, 4 Pz III longs and 2 Pz III short in company 8 (22 tanks). This leaves 3 Pz III Command for the battalion command and for the regiment headquarters 3 Pz III Command, 4 Pz IIs and 3 Pz I (and the other 5 Pz III longs are with the Tiger company).
It works. Not sure this is what was done. The problem is that come the evening of 11 July we have LSSAH with 47 Pz IVs, 7 Pz III Command, 4 Pz III long, 1 Pz III short, 4 Pz II and 2 Pz I. Ribbentrop says his 6th company had 7 Pz IVs. So:
I have two issues with this:
It is also possible that they had removed all the tanks from the 8th panzer company and put them in the 5th and 7th. I believe this is Ben Wheatley’s claim. This would leave these two companies with 21 tanks and the 6th panzer company with 7.
On the other hand, if the 6th panzer companies losses were in equal proportion to the division’s losses, then a company of 7 tanks started with 12 tanks (79/47 = 1.68 x 7 = 12). If LSSAH had two battalions of 3 panzer companies each with 12-13 tanks then this equal 72-78 tanks. The 9 command tanks are split equally between two battalions and the regiment HQ. This is an organizational arrangement more in line with other two SS divisions.
So, we are back to the construct that either LSSAH had one battalion of four medium panzer companies or two panzer battalions of around six medium panzer companies. But regardless, it does not appear that the LSSAH had just one battalion of three medium panzer companies. It is debatable that there were only three medium panzer companies at Prokhorovka on 12 July 1943.