Mystics & Statistics

Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War

I noticed that our blog was being pinged by a site I was not familiar with, so I took a look at it….and I don’t read Chinese Korean  (see: https://m.blog.naver.com/alsrb19/221127427656).

But the site had a link to a paper written by Dr. Phillip A. Karber of the Potomac Foundation. This is worth looking at:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwsSGlkg0LM2aVhrNXExQ2FVTngxbzhWYVFCSFpvNWNCdVFB/view

This was done as part of the “Historical Lessons Learned Workshop.” I gather Dr. Phillip Karber and retired Gen. Wesley Clark wandered around Ukraine a lot during 2014 and 2015. Mr. Karber was wounded in June 2015 in a MLRS strike at Bebedynsky during the process. While I have never met him, Phil Karber has been around for a while, having worked for Andy Marshall (OSD Net Assessment). A few highlights:

  1. “…the struggle in Ukraine has involved the largest scale battles in Europe since the end of the Second World War.” (page 2)
  2. “The Russo-Ukrainian War has been full of surprises. First, it was totally unexpected.” (page 2)
  3. “A third surprise is the relative lack of Western attention given to the military aspects of the Russo-Ukrainian War; particularly given the unexpected scale and duration of the conflict….” (page 3)
  4. Artillery: “In the Ukraine conflict the author has witnessed units firing 300-400 rounds per tube per day. This increased intensity of fire is both outgoing and incoming.” (page 16)
  5. “Data from the Ukraine conflict show that artillery is producing approximately 85% of all casualties on both sides.” (page 17)
  6. “In July 2014….In the space of six weeks, the Russians launched 53 fire strikes at 40 different locations, which decimated Ukrainian forces. For example, at Zelenopillya, in a combined MLRS fire strike that lasted no more than three minutes, two Ukrainian mechanized battalions were virtually wiped out with the combined effects of top-attack munitions and thermobaric warheads.” (page 18)
  7. “Since the end of the Cold War, armies around the world have given increased emphasis to light Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV), which prioritizes mobility and fire-power over survivability. The evidence coming in from the Ukrainian conflict seriously questions the validity of that emphasis.” (page 26)

There are probably a few other significant points that I passed on.

So did Kozhedub shoot down 62, 64 or 66 planes?

Ivan Kozhedub was the highest scoring allied ace of World War II, having been credited with 62 or 64 victories. Hard to nail down the exact number. Most sources say 62, including Wikipedia. Many sources also credit him with also shooting down two U.S. P-51s. The Wikipedia article then lists his victories based upon the book Stalin’s Falcons by Mikhail Bykov. That listing records 64 planes, but no P-52s. The Wikipedia article also has a section of the “Alleged shooting down of two USAAF P-51 fighters.” That write up does not appear to accept the story.

A number of other sources also credit him with 64 claimed kills, or 64 claimed kills and two P-51s. Sort of mystified why this is an issue. I assume there are records of his claims somewhere.

So….what do we have out there:

……………………….Claimed Kills

Source…………….62…….62+2……..64……..64+2………63…….and 29 group kills
Wikipedia………….Y……….?…………..Y………..?
Seidl…………………………..Y
Polak……………….Y
Bykov……………………………………….Y………..?
Hardesty……………………………………Y

Red Falcons……….Y…………………….Y……….Y…………Y………..Y

 

Seidl is Stalin’s Eagles by Hans D. Seidl’s, Polak is Stalin’s Falcons by Tomas Polak with Christopher Shores, Bykov is Soviet Aces 1941-1945: The Victories of Stalin’s Falcons by Mikhail Bykov, Hardesty is Red Phoenix Rising by Von Hardesty and Ilya Grinberg, and Red Falcons is the Red Falcons website here: http://airaces.narod.ru/all1/kojedub.htm. Maybe the title of this post should have been “bird droppings.”

It is, of course, a different issue than the validity of those 62+ claims, which can be justifiably challenged. I will post about that later.

What is the Level of U.S. Commitment to NATO?

The United States spends 3.2% of its GDP on defense (SIPRI 2019) or 3.57% in 2017 according the Secretary General’s Annual Report (2017). All the other 28 countries in NATO spend less than that. Only three or four NATO members spend more than 2% (Greece at 2.36%, UK at 2.12%, Estonia at 2.08%). There is a little confusion in these figures, for NATO records France at 1.79% for 2017 while SIPRI in 2019 has France at 2.3%). Germany spends 1.24% (1.2% according to SIPRI). Canada, which has a GDP almost as large as Russia spends 0.9% (SIPRI) or 1.29% (NATO). Russia spends 4.3% (SIPRI).

But the United States had multiple commitments around the world, and many of these have nothing to do with NATO (which is…the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). In fact, there is a geographic definition in their charter. Of course, the notable exception here is Afghanistan, where most nations sent troops as part of a NATO force there.

Not all of the U.S. forces are in Europe. For example, we have two maneuver brigades in NATO (Germany and Italy). We have 13 divisions in the U.S. Army and USMC (usually three maneuver brigades per division). Therefore, is U.S. ground commitment to NATO roughly 2/42nds of our ground forces? Or should we include all those units in Texas and Colorado and elsewhere who can be moved to Europe on short notice (I hope they can move…haven’t checked on that recently)?

So, for example, the U.S. forces in Korea are not a NATO asset. The Second Infantry Division has its division headquarters, its Combat Aviation Brigade, its sustainment Brigade, and an independent Field Artillery Brigade based in Korea, but its two maneuver brigades (both Stryker Brigades) are in Washington state. In 2015 we deactivated the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team and instead rotate a brigade from other divisions to Korea for nine month tours (3rd ABCT, 1st Armored Division is there now). The 3rd Marine Division HQ is in Okinawa. It is almost certainly not a NATO asset. Also, it is effectively only two brigades (the Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade of only one MEU and the 3rd and 4th Marine Regiments). So are we really looking at 37/42nds of our ground forces committed to NATO?

The same goes with the Air Force which only has the Third Air Force in Europe with three fighter wings and three other flying wings. The U.S. Air Force as of 2015 had 57 active duty flying wings. So, is only 6/57th of the Air Force in Europe? Planes are quick to move. A lot could be moved there quickly, and we maintain multiple airfields.

The navy has only one fleet (the Sixth Fleet) that regularly operates in the north Atlantic with one carrier and one carrier that regularly operates in the Mediterranean. We have six numbered fleets (one is a cyber command), 11 carriers and 9 Marine amphibious assault ships (which are about the size of most other peoples’ carriers). Usually about two of those carriers and Marine amphibious assault ships are operating in and around Europe, although it is easy to move ships about. Still, between Korea, the Pacific, the Persian Gulf, not everything is available for Europe.

So clearly we are not spending 3.2% of our GDP on NATO. We do have some other commitments in the world (Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Niger, etc.). As certainly more than 2/3rds of our army, air force and navy can be committed to Europe on short-notice then we can argue we are above 2% of GDP.

Dupuy’s Verities: The Complexities of Combat

“The Battle of Leipzig, 16-19 October 1813” by A.I. Zauerweid (1783-1844) [Wikimedia]
The thirteenth and last of Trevor Dupuy’s Timeless Verities of Combat is:

Combat is too complex to be described in a single, simple aphorism.

From Understanding War (1987):

This is amply demonstrated by the preceding [verities]. All writers on military affairs (including this one) need periodically to remind themselves of this. In military analysis it is often necessary to focus on some particular aspect of combat. However, the results of such closely focused analyses must the be evaluated in the context of the brutal, multifarious, overlapping realities of war.

Trevor Dupuy was sometimes accused of attempting to reduce war to a mathematical equation. A casual reading of his writings might give that impression, but anyone who honestly engages with his ideas quickly finds this to be an erroneous conclusion. Yet, Dupuy believed the temptation to simplify and abstract combat and warfare to be common enough that he he embedded a warning against doing so into his basic theory on the subject. He firmly believed that human behavior comprises the most important aspect of combat, yet it is all too easy to miss the human experience of war figuring who lost or won and why, and counts of weapons, people, and casualties. As a military historian, he was keenly aware that the human stories behind the numbers—however imperfectly recorded and told—tell us more about the reality of war than mere numbers on their own ever will.

The Prokhorovka book is still discounted

Even though The Battle of Prokhorovka book has been released, it is still available through Amazon.com for $28.43: Buy from Amazon. The list price on the hardcover is $44.95. I have no idea for how long Amazon.com will continue to sell it at this price.

The chapters for the book are listed in this post:

https://dupuyinstitute.org/2019/05/07/the-battle-of-prokhorovka-16-chapters/

What else is in the book (besides words) is listed in this post:

https://dupuyinstitute.org/2019/05/08/the-battle-of-prokhorovka-what-does-the-book-consist-of/

The reason why I wrote this book is discussed in this post:

https://dupuyinstitute.org/2019/05/09/the-battle-of-prokhorovka-book-why/

The book can obtained from Stackpole at: Stackpole Books

Or from Amazon.com at: Buy from Amazon

Dupuy on D-Day

A LCVP from the U.S. Coast Guard-manned USS Samuel Chase disembarks troops of Company E, 16th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division (the Big Red One) at the Fox Green section of Omaha Beach on the morning of 6 June 1944. American soldiers encountered the newly formed German 352nd Division. During the initial landing, two-thirds of Company E became casualties.

Today is the 75th Anniversary of D-Day, the invasion of Normandy by U.S., British, Canadian and other allied forces. The American who announced the D-Day invasion on Tuesday, 6 June 1944 was the journalist, soldier and historian, R. Ernest Dupuy (1887-1975) of New York. The announcement from SHAEF can be heard here (Dupuy’s announcements starts at 2:00): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K9xk9GaV0NE

Under the command of General Eisenhower, Allied naval forces, supported by strong air forces, began landing Allied armies this morning on the northern coast of France.

He was the father of Trevor N. Dupuy, the founder of The Dupuy Institute.

R. Ernest Dupuy’s obituary is here: https://www.nytimes.com/1975/04/26/archives/col-r-ernest-dupuy-88-dead-publicist-and-military-historian.html

 

P.S. https://tellersofweirdtales.blogspot.com/2011/05/r-ernest-dupuy-1887-1975.html

 

The Probable Characteristics of the Next War

Lt. Col. George S. Patton, Jr.: I Tank Battalion, Renault tank, summer 1918

Noted the following paper “The Probable Characteristics of the Next War and the Organizations, Tactics, and Equipment Necessary to Meet Them.” It was dated February 29, 1932 and done at the U.S. Army War College. The author was Major G. S. Patton, Jr. Cavalry: Patton Paper, 1932

A relevant article from The Strategy Bridge: Reviewing 21st Century Patton: Strategic Insights for the Modern Era

The Battles of the Donetsk Airport (May 2014 – Jan 2015)

Just published by The Institute of Land Warfare is a paper by Major Amos C. Fox, U.S. Army called “Cyborgs at Little Stalingrad”: A Brief History of the Battle of the Donetsk Airport. It is not long (16 pages) and definitely worth a read.

A few highlights:

  1. “Contrary to conventional narratives on the primacy and high-mindedness of maneuver warfare and the crippling effects of electronic and cyber warfare, positional warfare and sieges are the zeitgeist of contemporary war.” (page 12)
  2. “Positional battles and sieges have also commanded the counter-Islamic State campaigns in Iraq, Syria and the Philippines.” (page 12)
  3. “These battles are important because they remind students of war that rugged, land-centric combat arms warfare has not been thrown into the dustbin of history but is instead alive and well.” (page 16)
  4. He does document the downing of 10 Ukrainian aircraft in May – July 2014 (pages 11-12), but leaves out any reference to the downing of Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014 over Eastern Ukraine, killing 298 civilians.

To quote from the last paragraph of my book, War by Numbers (page 328):

The post-Cold War world appears to be world of many small conflicts…the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 proved that the United States is not immune to attack and that we do have to remain engaged with the rest of the world to some degree. Certainly U.S. armed forces will be part of that engagement, and they will be called upon to fight a range of wars, from drone strikes and special operations to full-scale guerrilla wars and conventional campaigns. All must be addressed and planned for.

One Last Reminder (Today is the last day !!!)

One last reminder, if you pre-order The Battle of Prokhorovka through Amazon.com it is selling for $28.43: Buy from Amazon. The list price on the hardcover is $44.95. I do not know what price it will be listed at on Saturday, 1 June 2019 (nor do I have any involvement or say in these matters).

The chapters for the book are listed in this post:

https://dupuyinstitute.org/2019/05/07/the-battle-of-prokhorovka-16-chapters/

What else is in the book (besides words) is listed in this post:

https://dupuyinstitute.org/2019/05/08/the-battle-of-prokhorovka-what-does-the-book-consist-of/

The reason why I wrote this book is discussed in this post:

https://dupuyinstitute.org/2019/05/09/the-battle-of-prokhorovka-book-why/

The book can obtained from Stackpole at: Stackpole Books

Or from Amazon.com at: Buy from Amazon

145 or 10?

A German Henschel Hs-126 (1940 or earlier)

As some are aware, I am working on a book on the air battles during the Battle of Kursk. On 2 June 1943, the Germans organized a mass raid on the Kursk railway station using aircraft from the 1st Air Division of the Sixth Air Fleet and from the VIII Air Corps of the Fourth Air Fleet. The Sixth Air Fleet sent in 95 bomber sorties and 64 “destroyer” sorties (Me-110s) during the day, with heavy fighter cover. That night, they hit the Kursk area again with another 52 bomber sorties. The VIII Air Corps sent in 138 bomber missions during the day and 150 more during the night.

The German Air Force (Luftwaffe) burned its records towards the end of WWII, so in most cases there are not detailed records of their activity. In this case, there was. In the files of the Second Army, west of Kursk, are the records of the air liaison officer. It is in the National Archives, in the Captured German Records collection, file T312, roll R1234. The sortie counts given above are from those records. They also report their losses as 13 aircraft. The VIII Air Corps lost 1 Hs-126, 1 Ju-87, 3 He-111s and 1 Me-109 during the day and a Ju-88 at night. The Sixth Air Fleet lost 4 Ju-88s, 1 Me-110 and 1 Fw-190 during the day and nothing at night. I state in my book that “German losses connected with these raids were about 10 aircraft (2 percent losses)” as I am guessing that some of those 13 planes may have been lost in other operations (for example, the lost Hs-126 was probably doing reconnaissance). See Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka, page 303. E. R. Hooton in the book War Over the Steppes, page 200, states that the Germans lost 17 bombers. He does not footnote his sources. Bergstrom in Kursk: The Air Battle: July 1943, page 21, states that “Seventeen of these aircraft were shot down and destroyed and another eight sustained severe battle damage.” His source is the Luftwaffe Quartermaster reports. These claims from the Luftwaffe Quartermaster reports probably include losses from other causes (like mechanical, accidents and returned planes that were later scavenged for parts) and other missions.

On the other hand, another book written by two U.S. based authors state that “Certain Soviet sources list 145 German aircraft down (104 by VVS fighters and 41 by antiaircraft fire), with a modest loss of 27 Soviet fighters.”  They footnote the source as a Soviet-era book from 1977. I had found the same claim of 145 kills in a Soviet-era Progress Press publication from 1974.

I am not breaking new ground by pointing out that Soviet-era publications often exaggerated enemy casualties. As discussed in my Kursk book, the units involved often made these outrageous claims and this it what was in their unit records. Therefore these claims ended up in the Soviet historical accounts.

Needless to say, one needs to cross-check all Soviet-era claims before they are used in a book. It is not enough just to say “Certain Soviet sources…” and ignor the German records. It certainly does give the wrong impressions of the operations, especially to the casual reader. Yet this is done repeatedly in this book, even though it was updated and published in 2012.