“…last Thursday, Acting Defense secretary Patrick Shanahan presented an updated military plan that envisions sending as many as 120,000 troops to the Middle East….
“…should Iran attack American forces or accelerate work on nuclear weapons, administration officials said.”
“They do not call for a land invasion of Iran, which would require vastly more troops, officials said.”
“More than a half-dozen American national security officers….agreed to discuss them with the The New York Times….”
Now, this really cannot be an invasion force for Iran. Iran is a country of 82 million people with an armed force of over 500,000. Of that force, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps makes up 120,000 (about 100,000 in their ground forces) while the Iranian Army consist of 350,000. They also have a 37,000 person air force, 18,000 person navy and 15,000 air defense force. Their army budget is 2 trillion, which is about 0.3 percent of what we spend. All this data is from Wikipedia.
We occupied Iraq in 2003 with an initial invasion force of 75,000 U. S. ground troops, and that ended up not going too well. Iraq had a population of 24 million at the time. Also, Tehran is a long way from the Persian Gulf. Assuming we have learned something in the interim, this probably means we would be looking for an invasion force of several hundred thousand. So, this is probably not an invasion force.
I assume a significant portion of this force is air and naval.
We did previously intervene in the Persian Gulf during the “Tanker War” between Iran and Iraq. These two nations had been at war since 1980. It is estimated that during their “Tanker War” (1984-1988) 430 civilian sailors were killed. The U.S. became involved on 23 July 1987 with Operation Earnest Will. This operation, which including escorting tankers in the Persian Gulf, led to a U.S. build up of over 30 warships. The biggest loss of American life was an incident that occurred before the tanker escort operation was declared when on 17 May 1987 an Iraqi (not Iranian) F-1 Mirage plane accidently fired two Exocet missiles at the USS Stark, with 37 sailors killed and 21 wounded. The U.S. also lost 2 U.S. Marines killed during Operation Praying Mantis on 18 April 1988 and 10 U.S. Navy wounded on 14 April 1988 (from the USS Samuel B. Roberts hitting a mine). U.S. ships were fired upon, struck mines or took other military actions on July 24 1987, September 22-26, October 10, October 15, October 18, April 14, April 18, July 3 and July 14 1988. There were at least 18 U.S. civilian seamen injured by (Iranian) mines.
During Operation Praying Mantis Iran lost the frigate Sahand (45 crew killed), a gunboat (11 crew killed) and 3 speedboats. They also lost 5 killed in a U.S. raid on Iran Ajr on 22 September 1987 and three other Iranian boats were sunk shortly afterwards. There were some other losses, but I have not tracked them all.
Then there was the USS Vincennes which on 3 July 1988 sunk two Iranian gunboats and then accidently shot down Iran Air Flight 655 for the loss of 290 civilians.
A couple of our posts on Breakpoints (forced changes in posture) are getting a lot of hits lately. Not sure why or by who. Let me list all of our posts addressing the issue of breakpoints:
A U.S. 11th Marines 75mm pack howitzer and crew on Guadalcanal, September or October, 1942. The lean condition of the crewmembers indicate that they haven’t been getting enough nutrition during this period. [Wikipedia]
Military history demonstrates that whenever an outnumbered force was successful, its combat power was greater than that of the loser. All other things being equal, God has always been on the side of the heaviest battalions and always will be.
In recent years two or three surveys of modern historical experience have led to the finding that relative strength is not a conclusive factor in battle outcome. As we have seen, a superficial analysis of historical combat could support this conclusion. There are a number of examples of battles won by the side with inferior numbers. In many battles, outnumbered attackers were successful.
These examples are not meaningful, however, until the comparison includes the circumstances of the battles and opposing forces. If one take into consideration surprise (when present), relative combat effectiveness of the opponents, terrain features, and the advantage of defensive posture, the result may be different. When all of the circumstances are quantified and applied to the numbers of troops and weapons, the side with the greater combat power on the battlefield is always seen to prevail.
The concept of combat power is foundational to Dupuy’s theory of combat. He did not originate it; the notion that battle encompasses something more than just “physics-based” aspects likely originated with British theorist J.F.C. Fuller during World War I and migrated into U.S. Army thinking via post-war doctrinal revision. Dupuy refined and sharpened the Army’s vague conceptualization of it in the first iterations of his Quantified Judgement Model (QJM) developed in the 1970s.
Dupuy initially defined his idea of combat power in formal terms, as an equation in the QJM:
P = (S x V x CEV)
When:
P = Combat Power
S = Force Strength
V = Environmental and Operational Variable Factors
CEV = Combat Effectiveness Value
Essentially, combat power is the product of:
force strength as measured in his models through the Theoretical/Operational Lethality Index (TLI/OLI), a firepower scoring method for comparing the lethality of weapons relative to each other;
the intangible environmental and operational variables that affect each circumstance of combat; and
the intangible human behavioral (or moral) factors that determine the fighting quality of a combat force.
Dupuy’s theory of combat power and its functional realization in his models have two virtues. First, unlike most existing combat models, it incorporates the effects of those intangible factors unique to each engagement or battle that influence combat outcomes, but are not readily measured in physical terms. As Dupuy argued, combat consists of more than duels between weapons systems. A list of those factors can be found below.
Second, the analytical research in real-world combat data done by him and his colleagues allowed him to begin establishing the specific nature combat processes and their interaction that are only abstracted in other combat theories and models. Those factors and processes for which he had developed a quantification hypothesis are denoted by an asterisk below.
By the way, if you pre-order The Battle of Prokhorovka through amazon.com it is selling for $28.43: Buy from Amazon The list price on the hardcover is $44.95. I do not know what price it will be listed at on 1 June 2019 (nor do I have any involvement or say in these matters).
When I realized how large the book was, I contacted the publisher and discussed the issue with him. I suggested that we go ahead and complete the large book I was writing and then go back and do an abridged version. He graciously agreed, but unfortunately I was unable to complete the original book in 2003/2004 (although it was mostly done) due to my work at The Dupuy Institute, magnified by a war or two going on.
So, when I was finally able to get back to this book (thanks to government budget cuts and sequestration), I was left with an original book of 1,662 pages. Clearly there was a need for a smaller book.
This is not that book. This book is the updated chapters of the original book that focus on the fighting by the SS Panzer Corps, III Panzer Corps, parts of the Sixth Guards Army, Sixty-Ninth Army, Fifth Guards Army, Fifth Guard Tank Army and parts of the Seventh Guards Army from 9 to 17 July 1943. As such, it is 40% of the original book sectioned off as a separate stand alone book.
I could do four such books from my original book. This is the first of these books. I am currently finishing up a second such book (Aces at Kursk: The Belgorod Offensive Air War). I could do two more books along that line (Battle of Tolstoye Woods and The Belgorod Offensive), although I am not sure that I ever will. It depends on demand, sales, the publisher’s interest, my time, and my mood.
I may also get around to writing a single 300-page book summarizing the offensive in the south. We shall see. There are a lot of other projects I am also considering.
In case you are not reading the comments to our blog post, wanted to make sure this was brought to your attention. The article is worth taking a look at just for the pictures. A few highlights:
“In my lifetime, computer-based simulation have largely taken over analytical gaming, sometimes bringing new levels of investigative power, but often just providing the illusion of it as the details of the models and their simplifying assumptions become invisible to players and to the policymakers whose decisions the games are supposed to inform.”
However, it gradually became clear [with the Baltic states wargame] — rather disconcertingly–that we were out in front of most of the official planning, not following in its wake.”
“The resulting game….resolves combat using 12-hour turns and 10-km hexes; units are battalions of ground forces, SAM batteries, and half-squadrons of aircraft (12 fighters or six bombers).”
Just for the record, my original mega-book consisted of 192 engagement sheets. So one could make the argument that this book covers 40% of the Belgorod offensive (at least compared to the original book).
The book was edited by the same editor of the original book, Ariane Smith of Capital A: http://www.capitala.net/. Therefore, it is of a very similar format and style.
My new book The Battle of Prokhorovka consists of 16 chapters (the original mega-book had 27). The chapters are:
1. Preparing for the Showdown…..page 13
2. The Soviets Prepare…..page 35
3. The Belgorod Offensive: 4-8 July 1943…..page 51
4. The XLVIII Panzer Corps Heads West: 9 – 11 July 1943…..page 113
5. The Advance on Prokhorovka: 9-11 July…..page 133
6. The Advance on the Severnyii Donets: 9-11 July 1943…..page 203
7. The Situation as of 11 July 1943…..page 229
8. The Air War: 9-18 July 1943…..page 243
9. The Tank Fields of Prokhorovka, 12 July 1943…..page 291
10. SS Panzer Corps Attack Stalls, 13 July 1943…..page 359
11. Soviet Counterattacks against the III Panzer Corps: 12-13 July 1943…..page 375
12. Aftermath of Prokhorovka: 13 July 1943…..page 401
13. Cleaning Up the Donets Triangle: 14-15 July 1943…..page 475
14. The Battlefield is Quiet: 16-17 July 1943…..page 511
15. The German Withdrawal: 18-24 July 1943…..page 539
16. Post-Mortem…..page 559
There are only two short appendices in this book (the original book had 7 appendices totaling 342 pages):
Appendix I: German and Soviet Terminology…..page 615
Appendix II: The Engagements…..page 623
Caracas (Venezuela), 05 de Marzo del 2014. El Canciller del Ecuador, Ricardo Patiño, participó en los actos de conmemoración de la muerte del Comandante Hugo Chávez Frías. Foto: Xavier Granja Cedeño / Cancilleria Ecuador
Our government claims that all options are on the table in response to the situation developing in Venezuela. I gather this includes military options, which according to news reports, the U.S. had yet to actually mobilize for. So, if military options are a possibility, what does the Venezuelan military actually look like?
First, Venezuela is not a small country. It is over 32 million people and almost a million square kilometers in area. Population wise, this is more people than were in Vietnam in 1965, Afghanistan in 2001 or Iraq in 2003. Area wise, it is several hundred thousand square kilometers bigger than Afghanistan, Iraq or Vietnam.
The Venezuelan Army has 128,000 troops of six divisions. They have 192 T-72s, 84 AMX-30s, 78 Scorpion light tanks, and 111+ AMX-13s, several hundred armored personnel carriers and over 100 armored cars. They also have 48 Hind Mi-35 attack helicopters. The Venezuelan Air Force has 10+ F-16s and 23 Sukhoi Su-30s. The Venezuelan Navy is 60,000 personnel including 12,000 marines. It has 2 submarines, 3 missile frigates, 3 corvettes, 10 large patrol boats and gunboats, 19 smaller patrol boats and 4 LSTs (landing ship tank). Added to that is a National Guard with police functions of around 70,000 troops. They have up to at least 191 (and eventually up to 656) of the white Chinese-built APCs that were running over people a couple of days ago (see picture). There is also a National Militia and a Presidential Honor Guard brigade. So we are looking at 258,000+ people under arms. All data is from Wikipedia.
Added to that, the source of Chavez (Maduro’s predecessor) power and popular support was the military. He was a career military officer for 17 years, He was a captain when he attempted two violent coups in 1992. To date, the government of Maduro has maintained the support of the military. This is probably the key to his ability to hold onto power.
Now, retired General Jack Keene recently did discuss three military options 1) move forces to Colombia and threaten, 2) move a coalition of forces (Colombia and Brazil) into Venezuela to provide humanitarian aid and 3) invade with the purpose of conducting regime change. See: Keene Interview
I suspect that any form of direct intervention, like we did in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq is not being seriously considered. So, one wonders what other military options is the United States considering, if any.
