A couple of our posts on Breakpoints (forced changes in posture) are getting a lot of hits lately. Not sure why or by who. Let me list all of our posts addressing the issue of breakpoints:
A U.S. 11th Marines 75mm pack howitzer and crew on Guadalcanal, September or October, 1942. The lean condition of the crewmembers indicate that they haven’t been getting enough nutrition during this period. [Wikipedia]
Military history demonstrates that whenever an outnumbered force was successful, its combat power was greater than that of the loser. All other things being equal, God has always been on the side of the heaviest battalions and always will be.
In recent years two or three surveys of modern historical experience have led to the finding that relative strength is not a conclusive factor in battle outcome. As we have seen, a superficial analysis of historical combat could support this conclusion. There are a number of examples of battles won by the side with inferior numbers. In many battles, outnumbered attackers were successful.
These examples are not meaningful, however, until the comparison includes the circumstances of the battles and opposing forces. If one take into consideration surprise (when present), relative combat effectiveness of the opponents, terrain features, and the advantage of defensive posture, the result may be different. When all of the circumstances are quantified and applied to the numbers of troops and weapons, the side with the greater combat power on the battlefield is always seen to prevail.
The concept of combat power is foundational to Dupuy’s theory of combat. He did not originate it; the notion that battle encompasses something more than just “physics-based” aspects likely originated with British theorist J.F.C. Fuller during World War I and migrated into U.S. Army thinking via post-war doctrinal revision. Dupuy refined and sharpened the Army’s vague conceptualization of it in the first iterations of his Quantified Judgement Model (QJM) developed in the 1970s.
Dupuy initially defined his idea of combat power in formal terms, as an equation in the QJM:
P = (S x V x CEV)
When:
P = Combat Power
S = Force Strength
V = Environmental and Operational Variable Factors
CEV = Combat Effectiveness Value
Essentially, combat power is the product of:
force strength as measured in his models through the Theoretical/Operational Lethality Index (TLI/OLI), a firepower scoring method for comparing the lethality of weapons relative to each other;
the intangible environmental and operational variables that affect each circumstance of combat; and
the intangible human behavioral (or moral) factors that determine the fighting quality of a combat force.
Dupuy’s theory of combat power and its functional realization in his models have two virtues. First, unlike most existing combat models, it incorporates the effects of those intangible factors unique to each engagement or battle that influence combat outcomes, but are not readily measured in physical terms. As Dupuy argued, combat consists of more than duels between weapons systems. A list of those factors can be found below.
Second, the analytical research in real-world combat data done by him and his colleagues allowed him to begin establishing the specific nature combat processes and their interaction that are only abstracted in other combat theories and models. Those factors and processes for which he had developed a quantification hypothesis are denoted by an asterisk below.
By the way, if you pre-order The Battle of Prokhorovka through amazon.com it is selling for $28.43: Buy from Amazon The list price on the hardcover is $44.95. I do not know what price it will be listed at on 1 June 2019 (nor do I have any involvement or say in these matters).
When I realized how large the book was, I contacted the publisher and discussed the issue with him. I suggested that we go ahead and complete the large book I was writing and then go back and do an abridged version. He graciously agreed, but unfortunately I was unable to complete the original book in 2003/2004 (although it was mostly done) due to my work at The Dupuy Institute, magnified by a war or two going on.
So, when I was finally able to get back to this book (thanks to government budget cuts and sequestration), I was left with an original book of 1,662 pages. Clearly there was a need for a smaller book.
This is not that book. This book is the updated chapters of the original book that focus on the fighting by the SS Panzer Corps, III Panzer Corps, parts of the Sixth Guards Army, Sixty-Ninth Army, Fifth Guards Army, Fifth Guard Tank Army and parts of the Seventh Guards Army from 9 to 17 July 1943. As such, it is 40% of the original book sectioned off as a separate stand alone book.
I could do four such books from my original book. This is the first of these books. I am currently finishing up a second such book (Aces at Kursk: The Belgorod Offensive Air War). I could do two more books along that line (Battle of Tolstoye Woods and The Belgorod Offensive), although I am not sure that I ever will. It depends on demand, sales, the publisher’s interest, my time, and my mood.
I may also get around to writing a single 300-page book summarizing the offensive in the south. We shall see. There are a lot of other projects I am also considering.
In case you are not reading the comments to our blog post, wanted to make sure this was brought to your attention. The article is worth taking a look at just for the pictures. A few highlights:
“In my lifetime, computer-based simulation have largely taken over analytical gaming, sometimes bringing new levels of investigative power, but often just providing the illusion of it as the details of the models and their simplifying assumptions become invisible to players and to the policymakers whose decisions the games are supposed to inform.”
However, it gradually became clear [with the Baltic states wargame] — rather disconcertingly–that we were out in front of most of the official planning, not following in its wake.”
“The resulting game….resolves combat using 12-hour turns and 10-km hexes; units are battalions of ground forces, SAM batteries, and half-squadrons of aircraft (12 fighters or six bombers).”
Just for the record, my original mega-book consisted of 192 engagement sheets. So one could make the argument that this book covers 40% of the Belgorod offensive (at least compared to the original book).
The book was edited by the same editor of the original book, Ariane Smith of Capital A: http://www.capitala.net/. Therefore, it is of a very similar format and style.
My new book The Battle of Prokhorovka consists of 16 chapters (the original mega-book had 27). The chapters are:
1. Preparing for the Showdown…..page 13
2. The Soviets Prepare…..page 35
3. The Belgorod Offensive: 4-8 July 1943…..page 51
4. The XLVIII Panzer Corps Heads West: 9 – 11 July 1943…..page 113
5. The Advance on Prokhorovka: 9-11 July…..page 133
6. The Advance on the Severnyii Donets: 9-11 July 1943…..page 203
7. The Situation as of 11 July 1943…..page 229
8. The Air War: 9-18 July 1943…..page 243
9. The Tank Fields of Prokhorovka, 12 July 1943…..page 291
10. SS Panzer Corps Attack Stalls, 13 July 1943…..page 359
11. Soviet Counterattacks against the III Panzer Corps: 12-13 July 1943…..page 375
12. Aftermath of Prokhorovka: 13 July 1943…..page 401
13. Cleaning Up the Donets Triangle: 14-15 July 1943…..page 475
14. The Battlefield is Quiet: 16-17 July 1943…..page 511
15. The German Withdrawal: 18-24 July 1943…..page 539
16. Post-Mortem…..page 559
There are only two short appendices in this book (the original book had 7 appendices totaling 342 pages):
Appendix I: German and Soviet Terminology…..page 615
Appendix II: The Engagements…..page 623
Caracas (Venezuela), 05 de Marzo del 2014. El Canciller del Ecuador, Ricardo Patiño, participó en los actos de conmemoración de la muerte del Comandante Hugo Chávez Frías. Foto: Xavier Granja Cedeño / Cancilleria Ecuador
Our government claims that all options are on the table in response to the situation developing in Venezuela. I gather this includes military options, which according to news reports, the U.S. had yet to actually mobilize for. So, if military options are a possibility, what does the Venezuelan military actually look like?
First, Venezuela is not a small country. It is over 32 million people and almost a million square kilometers in area. Population wise, this is more people than were in Vietnam in 1965, Afghanistan in 2001 or Iraq in 2003. Area wise, it is several hundred thousand square kilometers bigger than Afghanistan, Iraq or Vietnam.
The Venezuelan Army has 128,000 troops of six divisions. They have 192 T-72s, 84 AMX-30s, 78 Scorpion light tanks, and 111+ AMX-13s, several hundred armored personnel carriers and over 100 armored cars. They also have 48 Hind Mi-35 attack helicopters. The Venezuelan Air Force has 10+ F-16s and 23 Sukhoi Su-30s. The Venezuelan Navy is 60,000 personnel including 12,000 marines. It has 2 submarines, 3 missile frigates, 3 corvettes, 10 large patrol boats and gunboats, 19 smaller patrol boats and 4 LSTs (landing ship tank). Added to that is a National Guard with police functions of around 70,000 troops. They have up to at least 191 (and eventually up to 656) of the white Chinese-built APCs that were running over people a couple of days ago (see picture). There is also a National Militia and a Presidential Honor Guard brigade. So we are looking at 258,000+ people under arms. All data is from Wikipedia.
Added to that, the source of Chavez (Maduro’s predecessor) power and popular support was the military. He was a career military officer for 17 years, He was a captain when he attempted two violent coups in 1992. To date, the government of Maduro has maintained the support of the military. This is probably the key to his ability to hold onto power.
Now, retired General Jack Keene recently did discuss three military options 1) move forces to Colombia and threaten, 2) move a coalition of forces (Colombia and Brazil) into Venezuela to provide humanitarian aid and 3) invade with the purpose of conducting regime change. See: Keene Interview
I suspect that any form of direct intervention, like we did in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq is not being seriously considered. So, one wonders what other military options is the United States considering, if any.
Arriving at my door today (this Monday) was my new book The Battle of Prokhorovka published by Stackpole Books. It is based upon my original mega-book but is primarily focused on the operations leading up to and including the Battle of Prokhorovka.
A memorial in the Polish city of Wroclaw of the Tiananmen Square protests
We are looking at a rather extended series of protests in Venezuela now. Sometimes the successful street protests or people power protests that overthrow governments are fairly brief and sudden. For example, the street protests that ended the attempted coup, saved Boris Yeltsin as president of Russia, and eventually resulted in the dissolution of the 74-year old Soviet Union lasted only 3 days and resulted in only 3 deaths. Many other of the people power protests in Eastern Europe in 1990/1991 were also brief and not very bloody.
But often these things last a little longer with a lot more blood shed. For example, the Romanian protests of 1991 lasted 12 days, and involved considerable violence, with snipers firing on the protesting crowds as foreign (Libyan) soldiers tried to protect the regime. When it was done 689 to 1,290 people were dead but the government was overthrown (and executed). The more recent “successful” street protests that overthrew the 29-year Egyptian government of Mubarak in 2011 lasted 17 days. Some 846 people died in the violence during the protests. One of the more extended efforts, conducted in the freezing winter of Ukraine, and also under sniper fire, was the Euromaiden Protests of 2013/2014 that lasted a little more than three months. When it was done, the government of Yanukovych was overthrown (for a second time), but at a cost of 104-780 people’s lives, and the loss of territory due to political protests and seizure by Russia. On the other hand, there is the Tiananmen Square protests on 1989, which went on for about a month and half before the government sent in the tanks. This failed protest cost at least 1,045 lives, and some claim thousands.
Now, we have never done a survey of people power protests and attempts to remove governments by protest. This would be useful. I do not know if longer protests have a higher or lower success rate than shorter protests. Right now we are looking at the most recent round of protests in Venezuela that started on 10 January 2019 and that have now gone on for four+ months. One could make the claim that the protests started in 2017 or 2014. They have also been bloody with at least 107 people killed in 2019.
The question is, as these protests extend, does this mean that Maduro has a greater chance of hanging on to power? This may be the lesson of Syria, which started as a series of protests in March 2011 that then morphed into a bloody civil war (over 200,000 dead) that is still going on today.
I would be sorely tempted to assemble a data base of people power protests since WWII (which is not a small effort) and then see if I could find some patterns there (like we did in our insurgency studies), including success rate, duration, size, and the reasons for successful versus unsuccessful protests.