[The] lack of strategic education has produced a United States military adrift. A cottage industry of shallow military thought attached itself to the Department of Defense like a parasite, selling “new” concepts that ranged from the specious (such as the RMA and effects-based operations), to the banal (like “hybrid” and “asymmetric” warfare), to the nonsensical (like 4th Generation Warfare and Gray Zone/Wars). An American officer corps, bereft of a solid understanding of strategic theory, seizes on concept after concept, seeking the next shiny silver bullet that it can fire to kill the specter of strategic disarray.
In general, and with only a few significant exceptions, until very recently American military theorists have shown little interest in the concept of a comprehensive theory or science of combat. While most Americans who think about such things are strong believers in the application of science to war, they seem not to believe, paradoxically, that waging war can be scientific, but that it is an art rather than a science. Even scientists concerned with and involved in military affairs, who perhaps overemphasize the role of science in war, also tend to believe that war is a random process conducted by unpredictable human beings, and thus not capable of being fitted into a scientific theoretical structure. [p. 51]
Like Friedman, Dupuy placed a good deal of the blame for this on the way U.S. military officers are instructed. He saw a distinct difference in the approach taken in the U.S. versus the way it was used by the (then) Soviet Union. In a 1989 conference paper, he contended that:
The United States Armed Forces pay lip service to the importance of military history. Officers are urged to read military history, but given little guidance on how military history can be really useful to them. The fundamental difference between the Soviet approach and the American approach, as I see it, is that the American officer is invited (but not really encouraged) to be a military history dilettante. The Soviets seriously study, and use military history. Figure 1 summarizes the differences in approaches of the U.S. and the Soviet armed forces to military history analysis.
Dupuy devoted an entire chapter of Understanding War to the Soviet scientific approach to the study and application of warfare. There was a time when the mention of Soviet/Russian military theory would have produced patronizing smirks from American commentators. In truth, Russian military theorizing has a long and robust tradition; much deeper than its American counterpart. Given the recent success Russia has had in leveraging its national security capabilities to influence favorable geopolitical outcomes, it might be that those theories are useful after all. One need not subscribe to the Soviet scientific approach to warfare to acknowledge the value of a scientific approach to studying warfare.
Continuing with the eighteenth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/
This lecture discussed the “costs of terrorism.” Now we have never done much work on terrorism, neither at The Dupuy Institute (TDI) or at any of Trevor Dupuy’s older organizations (TNDA/HERO/DMSI). At DMSI in the 1980s, they looked at doing work on terrorism, as part of the effort to “expand the business” but it was really not our core expertise and there was already a considerable number of people out there working the subject. We (HERO Books) did end up publishing a couple of books on terrorism. We no longer have them in stock: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/booksfs.htm
Now, terrorism is part of many insurgencies, and in some cases, may be a primary tool of an insurgency. This is especially true if it is an international political movement, like for example, the anarchists in the 1870s-1920s, which actually did assassinate one of our presidents (William McKinley in 1901) and bombed Wall Street in 1920 (38 killed and 400 wounded). International terrorism is not exactly new. If I was going to do anything on international terrorism, a comparative analysis to the anarchist movement, and other such movements, would be my starting point.
Slides 2 and 3 provide a list of causes of death for Americans in 2014. Of course, various diseases top the list (like cardio-vascular and cancer), and then there are 136,053 deaths in 2014 due to accidents, 47,055 due to drug overdoses, 42,773 due to “intentional self-harm,” 37,195 due to “transportation accidents,” 10,945 due to firearm assault, 6,721 due to HIV, 6,258 pedestrian deaths and of course…..19 due to terrorism in 2014 (and 44 in 2015…see slide 4).
I think this is a very valid point, if as a society we are concerned where to focus our time, resources and attention. As he points out on slide 4, even the 3,004 American deaths suffered in 2001 (9/11) is will below the number of pedestrian deaths in 2014.
He then references a book on slide 8 by Alan Krueger that makes an argument that the economic impact of terrorism is actually relatively low overall (slides 9-20), including making the argument that overreaction to terrorism is very costly (see slide 13).
He then addresses other papers on slides 21 and 37. These are interesting to look at as they attempt to measure the cost of terrorism, both microeconomic cost and macroeconomic costs. Probably best to read through it yourself.
Soldiers with Battery C, 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division maneuver their Paladins through Hohenfels Training Area, Oct. 26. Photo Credit: Capt. John Farmer, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cav
Last autumn, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley asserted that “we are on the cusp of a fundamental change in the character of warfare, and specifically ground warfare. It will be highly lethal, very highly lethal, unlike anything our Army has experienced, at least since World War II.” He made these comments while describing the Army’s evolving Multi-Domain Battle concept for waging future combat against peer or near-peer adversaries.
It is possible that ground combat attrition in the future between peer or near-peer combatants may be comparable to the U.S. experience in World War II (although there were considerable differences between the experiences of the various belligerents). Combat losses could be heavier. It certainly seems likely that they would be higher than those experienced by U.S. forces in recent counterinsurgency operations.
Dupuy documented a clear relationship over time between increasing weapon lethality, greater battlefield dispersion, and declining casualty rates in conventional combat. Even as weapons became more lethal, greater dispersal in frontage and depth among ground forces led daily personnel loss rates in battle to decrease.
The average daily battle casualty rate in combat has been declining since 1600 as a consequence. Since battlefield weapons continue to increase in lethality and troops continue to disperse in response, it seems logical to presume the trend in loss rates continues to decline, although this may not necessarily be the case. There were two instances in the 19th century where daily battle casualty rates increased—during the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War—before declining again. Dupuy noted that combat casualty rates in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War remained roughly the same as those in World War II (1939-45), almost thirty years earlier. Further research is needed to determine if average daily personnel loss rates have indeed continued to decrease into the 21st century.
Dupuy also discovered that, as with battle outcomes, casualty rates are influenced by the circumstantial variables of combat. Posture, weather, terrain, season, time of day, surprise, fatigue, level of fortification, and “all out” efforts affect loss rates. (The combat loss rates of armored vehicles, artillery, and other other weapons systems are directly related to personnel loss rates, and are affected by many of the same factors.) Consequently, yet counterintuitively, he could find no direct relationship between numerical force ratios and combat casualty rates. Combat power ratios which take into account the circumstances of combat do affect casualty rates; forces with greater combat power inflict higher rates of casualties than less powerful forces do.
Winning forces suffer lower rates of combat losses than losing forces do, whether attacking or defending. (It should be noted that there is a difference between combat loss rates and numbers of losses. Depending on the circumstances, Dupuy found that the numerical losses of the winning and losing forces may often be similar, even if the winner’s casualty rate is lower.)
Dupuy’s research confirmed the fact that the combat loss rates of smaller forces is higher than that of larger forces. This is in part due to the fact that smaller forces have a larger proportion of their troops exposed to enemy weapons; combat casualties tend to concentrated in the forward-deployed combat and combat support elements. Dupuy also surmised that Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s concept of friction plays a role in this. The complexity of interactions between increasing numbers of troops and weapons simply diminishes the lethal effects of weapons systems on real world battlefields.
Somewhat unsurprisingly, higher quality forces (that better manage the ambient effects of friction in combat) inflict casualties at higher rates than those with less effectiveness. This can be seen clearly in the disparities in casualties between German and Soviet forces during World War II, Israeli and Arab combatants in 1973, and U.S. and coalition forces and the Iraqis in 1991 and 2003.
Combat Loss Rates on Future Battlefields
What do Dupuy’s combat attrition verities imply about casualties in future battles? As a baseline, he found that the average daily combat casualty rate in Western Europe during World War II for divisional-level engagements was 1-2% for winning forces and 2-3% for losing ones. For a divisional slice of 15,000 personnel, this meant daily combat losses of 150-450 troops, concentrated in the maneuver battalions (The ratio of wounded to killed in modern combat has been found to be consistently about 4:1. 20% are killed in action; the other 80% include mortally wounded/wounded in action, missing, and captured).
It seems reasonable to conclude that future battlefields will be less densely occupied. Brigades, battalions, and companies will be fighting in spaces formerly filled with armies, corps, and divisions. Fewer troops mean fewer overall casualties, but the daily casualty rates of individual smaller units may well exceed those of WWII divisions. Smaller forces experience significant variation in daily casualties, but Dupuy established average daily rates for them as shown below.
For example, based on Dupuy’s methodology, the average daily loss rate unmodified by combat variables for brigade combat teams would be 1.8% per day, battalions would be 8% per day, and companies 21% per day. For a brigade of 4,500, that would result in 81 battle casualties per day, a battalion of 800 would suffer 64 casualties, and a company of 120 would lose 27 troops. These rates would then be modified by the circumstances of each particular engagement.
Several factors could push daily casualty rates down. Milley envisions that U.S. units engaged in an anti-access/area denial environment will be constantly moving. A low density, highly mobile battlefield with fluid lines would be expected to reduce casualty rates for all sides. High mobility might also limit opportunities for infantry assaults and close quarters combat. The high operational tempo will be exhausting, according to Milley. This could also lower loss rates, as the casualty inflicting capabilities of combat units decline with each successive day in battle.
It is not immediately clear how cyberwarfare and information operations might influence casualty rates. One combat variable they might directly impact would be surprise. Dupuy identified surprise as one of the most potent combat power multipliers. A surprised force suffers a higher casualty rate and surprisers enjoy lower loss rates. Russian combat doctrine emphasizes using cyber and information operations to achieve it and forces with degraded situational awareness are highly susceptible to it. As Zelenopillya demonstrated, surprise attacks with modern weapons can be devastating.
Some factors could push combat loss rates up. Long-range precision weapons could expose greater numbers of troops to enemy fires, which would drive casualties up among combat support and combat service support elements. Casualty rates historically drop during night time hours, although modern night-vision technology and persistent drone reconnaissance might will likely enable continuous night and day battle, which could result in higher losses.
Drawing solid conclusions is difficult but the question of future battlefield attrition is far too important not to be studied with greater urgency. Current policy debates over whether or not the draft should be reinstated and the proper size and distribution of manpower in active and reserve components of the Army hinge on getting this right. The trend away from mass on the battlefield means that there may not be a large margin of error should future combat forces suffer higher combat casualties than expected.
Well, I do have the page proofs for War by Numbers, which I must absolutely get back to the publisher next week. It turns out the book is 374 pages. The Potomac Books/University of Nebraska Press site was saying 498 pages, which kind of mystified me as my Word final draft was only 342 pages. They also claim the book has 218 tables, 1 chart and 49 graphs, which sounds about right.
So looks like we are on track (barely) for an August release date.
Anyhow, probably should be busy reviewing and editing instead of writing blog posts.
Finishing up the examination of the seventeenth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at:
The first two posts on this lecture addressed the impact of climate change on political violence and civil conflict. This third part “completely shifts gears” and looks at the war in Syria (starting slide 31). He provides data for percent of men, woman and children killed by weapon type (i.e. Air attack, mortar, small arms) for Iraq (slide 33) and Syria (slide 34). There are a higher percent of woman and children casualties in Iraq than Syria. Not sure what conclusion to draw from that little factoid without further study.
Brigadier General Benedict Arnold, before he became infamous, almost became famous for building a fleet of gondolas on Lake Champlain in 1776 and actually fighting a British fleet with these row boats. Didn’t win the battle, but the process of dealing with the Arnold’s fleet delayed the British offensive until 1777….and that offensive didn’t go very well for the British (Battle of Saratoga). Anyhow, they are talking about raising another one of the gunboats (the Spitfire).
The USS Philadelphia was raised back in the 1930s and can be seen at National Museum of American History. It is my favorite exhibit there. I have also taken the time to visit the site of the Battle of Valcour Island (1776), Fort Ticonderoga, Battle of Saratoga (1777), the Battle of Lake Champlain (1814) and the Battle of Plattsburg (1814). It is a great drive, beautiful area, and good excuse to go to Montreal, which is a great city (and they have a grand prix there next weekend). Link to Philadelphia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Philadelphia_(1776)
There is a lot of smart writing being published over at The Strategy Bridge. If you don’t follow it, you should. Among the recent offerings is a very good piece by Erik Heftye, a retired Air Force officer and senior military analyst in the U.S. Army’s Mission Command Battle Laboratory at Fort Leavenworth. His article “Multi-Domain Confusion: All Domains Are Not Created Equal,” takes a look at an au courant topic central to the new concept of Multi-Domain Battle (MDB).
Defense grognardshave been grumbling that MDB is just a new term for an old concept. This is true, insofar as it goes. I am not sure this is in dispute. After all, the subtitle of the U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps MDB white paper is “Combined Arms For The 21st Century.” However, such comments do raise the issue of whether new terms for old concepts are serving to clarify or cloud current understanding.
This is Heftye’s concern regarding the use of the term domain: “An ambiguous categorization of separate operating domains in warfare could actually pose an intractable conceptual threat to an integrated joint force, which is ironically the stated purpose of multi-domain battle.” Noting the vagueness of the concept, Heftye traces how the term entered into U.S. military doctrine in the 1990s and evolved into the current four physical (land, sea, air, and space) and one virtual (cyberspace) warfighting realms. He then discusses the etymology of the word and how its meanings imply that all of the domains are equivalent in nature and importance. While this makes sense for air, sea, and land, the physical aspects of those domains do not translate to space or cyberspace. He argues that treating them all analogously will inevitably lead to conceptual confusion.
Heftye recommends a solution: “In order to minimize the problem of domain equivalence, a revised construct should distinguish different types of domains in relation to relevant and advantageous warfighting effects. Focusing on effects rather than domains would allow for the elimination of unnecessary bureaucratic seams, gaps, and turf wars.” He offers up a simplified variation of the domain construct that had been published in the superseded 2005 edition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, which defined a domain as “any potential operating ‘space’ through which the target system can be influenced—not only the domains of land, sea, air, and space, but also the virtual (information and cyber) and human (cognitive, moral, and social) domains.”
This version not only simplifies by cutting the five existing categories to three, but it also groups like with like. “Land, sea, air, and space are physical domains involving material reality. Cyberspace and information, as well as the electromagnetic spectrum are virtual domains involving sensing and perception. The construct also included a human category involving value judgements.” Heftye acknowledges that looking at domains in terms of effects runs contrary to then-Joint Forces Commander General (and current Defense Secretary) James Mattis’s ban on the use of the Effects Based Operations (EBO) concept by the U.S. military 2008. He also points out that the concept of domains will not be going away anytime soon, either.
Of course, conceptual confusion is not a unique problem in U.S. military doctrine argues Steve Leonard in “Broken and Unreadable: Our Unbearable Aversion to Doctrine,” over at the Modern War Institute at West Point (which is also publishing great material these days). Leonard (aka Doctrine Man!!), a former U.S. Army senior strategist, ruminates about dissatisfaction and discontent with the American “rules of the game.” He offers up a personal anecdote about a popular military staff pastime: defining doctrinal terms.
We also tend to over-define our terminology. Words in common usage since the days of Noah Webster can find new life—and new meaning—in Army doctrine. Several years ago, I endured an hours-long argument among a group of doctrine writers trying to define the term “asymmetric.” The suggestion—after three full hours of debate—that the group consult a dictionary was not well-received.
I have no doubt Erik Heftye feels your pain, Doctrine Man.
Just a listing by strength of active duty personnel (Army, Navy and Air Force). U.S. and some of its allies are in bold. Allies = countries we are obligated to defend by treaty or law (Taiwan), a total of 48 (in bold are the 27 NATO members, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines and Australia), including 16 Latin American nations in the Rio pact (but not placed in bold):
China: 2,233,000
United States: 1,492,200
India: 1,325,000
North Korea: 1,190,000
Russia: 845,000
Pakistan: 643,800
South Korea: 630,000
Iran: 523,000
Algeria: 520,000
Turkey: 510,600
Vietnam: 482,000
Colombia: 466,713
Egypt: 438,500
Burma: 406,000
Indonesia: 395,500
Thailand: 360,850
Brazil: 318,480
Taiwan: 290,000
Sri Lanka: 276,700
Iraq: 271,500
Mexico: 270,250
Ukraine: 250,000
Japan: 247,150
Sudan: 244,300
Saudi Arabia: 233,500
France: 222,200
South Sudan: 210,000
Eritrea: 201,750
Morocco: 195,800
Germany: 186,450
Afghanistan: 185,800
Israel: 176,500
Italy: 176,000
United Kingdom: 169,150
Canada: 166,000
Bangladesh: 157,050
Greece: 143,350
Ethiopia: 138,000
Spain: 134,900
Democratic Republic of the Congo: 134,250
Philippines: 125,000
Syria: 125,000
Cambodia: 124,300
Peru: 115,000
Venezuela: 115,000
Malaysia: 109,000
Angola: 107,000
Jordan: 100,500
Poland: 99,300
Nepal: 95,750
Nigeria: 80,000
Argentina: 73,100
Singapore: 72,500
Romania: 71,400
……
61. Australia: 56,200
71. Portugal: 42,600
75. Netherlands: 37,400
78. Bulgaria: 31,300
79. Belgium: 30,700
83. Hungary: 26,500
84: Norway: 25,800
88. Czech Republic: 23,650
97. Denmark: 17,200
98. Lithuania: 17,131
100. Slovakia: 15,850
107. Croatia: 14,506
108: Albania: 14,250
129: New Zealand: 8,550 (U.S. suspended obligations in 1986)
133. Slovenia: 7,600
138. Estonia: 5,750
140: Latvia: 5,310
161: Luxembourg: 900
167+: Iceland: 0
Rio Pact includes Argentina, Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and of course, the United States.
This article, while a little more political than I prefer, does nicely address the reasons why building up to a 350-355 ship navy is going to be a challenge: Trumps-navy-is-already-sunk
The main points are:
Current fleet is 275 warships
The proposed DOD budget for FY2018 is $603, which is only $18 million over the previous administration’s projected budget.
Proposed budget only asks for 8 new ships, which is been the build rate for a while.
The fleet is on track to expand to 308-310 ships.
Previous ship-building account was $15 billion annually. This is on track for a 308-310 ship fleet.
To grow the fleet to 350-355 ships would require a budget of $27 billion annually (and I assume increased costs for operation and maintenance also).
I assume this would take around eight years or more of increased building at these increased costs (so at least $90 billion more total).
The U.S. industrial base is sized to build 6-9 warships a year, the rate would have to increase to 12-15 warships a year for a 350-355 ship fleet.
Article concludes that a 350-355 ship fleet is not going to happen (it will be at 308-310 ships) and notes that no naval production increase was in the proposed 2018 budget.
Dupuy devoted an entire chapter of Understanding War to the Soviet scientific approach to the study and application of warfare. There was a time when the mention of Soviet/Russian military theory would have produced patronizing smirks from American commentators. In truth, Russian military theorizing has a long and robust tradition; much deeper than its American counterpart. Given the recent success Russia has had in leveraging its national security capabilities to influence favorable geopolitical outcomes, it might be that those theories are useful after all. One need not subscribe to the Soviet scientific approach to warfare to acknowledge the value of a scientific approach to studying warfare.
