Mystics & Statistics

War by Numbers Page Proofs

Well, I do have the page proofs for War by Numbers, which I must absolutely get back to the publisher next week. It turns out the book is 374 pages. The Potomac Books/University of Nebraska Press site was saying 498 pages, which kind of mystified me as my Word final draft was only 342 pages. They also claim the book has 218 tables, 1 chart and 49 graphs, which sounds about right.

So looks like we are on track (barely) for an August release date.

Anyhow, probably should be busy reviewing and editing instead of writing blog posts.

Finally going for Raqqa

Well, Mosul has taken a while….and it is not quite over yet. Now we are finally going after Raqqa. Some say it will be quicker (hard to imagine that it could be slower): https://uk.news.yahoo.com/battle-liberate-raqqa-isis-apos-152800876.html

A few highlights from the article:

  1. Awad of the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) says it will be quicker. Not sure what his expertise is.
  2. Raqqa has (or had) a population of 300,000 (compared to Mosul which had 1.3 million).
  3. SDF has 45,000 people of which 13,000 are Arab fighters (and most of the rest are Kurds?).
  4. They are 1 km away from Raqqa in the east, and 3 km away in the west and north.
  5. The U.S. estimates 3,000 to 4,000 ISIL fighters in Raqqa.
  6. Turkey is not particularly happy with the SDF.

 

 

Economics of Warfare 17-3

Finishing up the examination of the seventeenth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at:

https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

The first two posts on this lecture addressed the impact of climate change on political violence and civil conflict. This third part “completely shifts gears” and looks at the war in Syria (starting slide 31).  He provides data for percent of men, woman and children killed by weapon type (i.e. Air attack, mortar, small arms) for Iraq (slide 33) and Syria (slide 34). There are a higher percent of woman and children casualties in Iraq than Syria. Not sure what conclusion to draw from that little factoid without further study.

The link to his lecture is here (with the part on Syria covered in slides 31-35): http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%2017.pdf

Benedict Arnold’s Galleys

Spotted this article today: https://www.yahoo.com/news/museum-raise-revolutionary-war-gunboat-lake-bottom-160849735.html

Brigadier General Benedict Arnold, before he became infamous, almost became famous for building a fleet of gondolas on Lake Champlain in 1776 and actually fighting a British fleet with these row boats. Didn’t win the battle, but the process of dealing with the Arnold’s fleet delayed the British offensive until 1777….and that offensive didn’t go very well for the British (Battle of Saratoga). Anyhow, they are talking about raising another one of the gunboats (the Spitfire).

The USS Philadelphia was raised back in the 1930s and can be seen at National Museum of American History. It is my favorite exhibit there. I have also taken the time to visit the site of the Battle of Valcour Island (1776), Fort Ticonderoga, Battle of Saratoga (1777), the Battle of Lake Champlain (1814) and the Battle of Plattsburg (1814). It is a great drive, beautiful area, and good excuse to go to Montreal, which is a great city (and they have a grand prix there next weekend). Link to Philadelphia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Philadelphia_(1776)

On Domains And Doctrine

Sorry. I could not resist.

There is a lot of smart writing being published over at The Strategy Bridge. If you don’t follow it, you should. Among the recent offerings is a very good piece by Erik Heftye, a retired Air Force officer and senior military analyst in the U.S. Army’s Mission Command Battle Laboratory at Fort Leavenworth. His article “Multi-Domain Confusion: All Domains Are Not Created Equal,” takes a look at an au courant topic central to the new concept of Multi-Domain Battle (MDB).

Defense grognards have been grumbling that MDB is just a new term for an old concept. This is true, insofar as it goes. I am not sure this is in dispute. After all, the subtitle of the U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps MDB white paper is “Combined Arms For The 21st Century.” However, such comments do raise the issue of whether new terms for old concepts are serving to clarify or cloud current understanding.

This is Heftye’s concern regarding the use of the term domain: “An ambiguous categorization of separate operating domains in warfare could actually pose an intractable conceptual threat to an integrated joint force, which is ironically the stated purpose of multi-domain battle.” Noting the vagueness of the concept, Heftye traces how the term entered into U.S. military doctrine in the 1990s and evolved into the current four physical (land, sea, air, and space) and one virtual (cyberspace) warfighting realms. He then discusses the etymology of the word and how its meanings imply that all of the domains are equivalent in nature and importance. While this makes sense for air, sea, and land, the physical aspects of those domains do not translate to space or cyberspace. He argues that treating them all analogously will inevitably lead to conceptual confusion.

Heftye recommends a solution: “In order to minimize the problem of domain equivalence, a revised construct should distinguish different types of domains in relation to relevant and advantageous warfighting effects. Focusing on effects rather than domains would allow for the elimination of unnecessary bureaucratic seams, gaps, and turf wars.” He offers up a simplified variation of the domain construct that had been published in the superseded 2005 edition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, which defined a domain as “any potential operating ‘space’ through which the target system can be influenced—not only the domains of land, sea, air, and space, but also the virtual (information and cyber) and human (cognitive, moral, and social) domains.”

This version not only simplifies by cutting the five existing categories to three, but it also groups like with like. “Land, sea, air, and space are physical domains involving material reality. Cyberspace and information, as well as the electromagnetic spectrum are virtual domains involving sensing and perception. The construct also included a human category involving value judgements.” Heftye acknowledges that looking at domains in terms of effects runs contrary to then-Joint Forces Commander General (and current Defense Secretary) James Mattis’s ban on the use of the Effects Based Operations (EBO) concept by the U.S. military 2008. He also points out that the concept of domains will not be going away anytime soon, either.

Of course, conceptual confusion is not a unique problem in U.S. military doctrine argues Steve Leonard in “Broken and Unreadable: Our Unbearable Aversion to Doctrine,” over at the Modern War Institute at West Point (which is also publishing great material these days). Leonard (aka Doctrine Man!!), a former U.S. Army senior strategist, ruminates about dissatisfaction and discontent with the American “rules of the game.” He offers up a personal anecdote about a popular military staff pastime: defining doctrinal terms.

We also tend to over-define our terminology. Words in common usage since the days of Noah Webster can find new life—and new meaning—in Army doctrine. Several years ago, I endured an hours-long argument among a group of doctrine writers trying to define the term “asymmetric.” The suggestion—after three full hours of debate—that the group consult a dictionary was not well-received.

I have no doubt Erik Heftye feels your pain, Doctrine Man.

Largest Armed Forces in the World

Just a listing by strength of active duty personnel (Army, Navy and Air Force). U.S. and some of its allies are in bold. Allies = countries we are obligated to defend by treaty or law (Taiwan), a total of 48 (in bold are the 27 NATO members, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines and Australia), including 16 Latin American nations in the Rio pact (but not placed in bold):

  1. China: 2,233,000
  2. United States: 1,492,200
  3. India: 1,325,000
  4. North Korea: 1,190,000
  5. Russia: 845,000
  6. Pakistan: 643,800
  7. South Korea: 630,000
  8. Iran: 523,000
  9. Algeria: 520,000
  10. Turkey: 510,600
  11. Vietnam: 482,000
  12. Colombia: 466,713
  13. Egypt: 438,500
  14. Burma: 406,000
  15. Indonesia: 395,500
  16. Thailand: 360,850
  17. Brazil: 318,480
  18. Taiwan: 290,000
  19. Sri Lanka: 276,700
  20. Iraq: 271,500
  21. Mexico: 270,250
  22. Ukraine: 250,000
  23. Japan: 247,150
  24. Sudan: 244,300
  25. Saudi Arabia: 233,500
  26. France: 222,200
  27. South Sudan: 210,000
  28. Eritrea: 201,750
  29. Morocco: 195,800
  30. Germany: 186,450
  31. Afghanistan: 185,800
  32. Israel: 176,500
  33. Italy: 176,000
  34. United Kingdom: 169,150
  35. Canada: 166,000
  36. Bangladesh: 157,050
  37. Greece: 143,350
  38. Ethiopia: 138,000
  39. Spain: 134,900
  40. Democratic Republic of the Congo: 134,250
  41. Philippines: 125,000
  42. Syria: 125,000
  43. Cambodia: 124,300
  44. Peru: 115,000
  45. Venezuela: 115,000
  46. Malaysia: 109,000
  47. Angola: 107,000
  48. Jordan: 100,500
  49. Poland: 99,300
  50. Nepal: 95,750
  51. Nigeria: 80,000
  52. Argentina: 73,100
  53. Singapore: 72,500
  54. Romania: 71,400

……

61. Australia: 56,200
71. Portugal: 42,600
75. Netherlands: 37,400 
78. Bulgaria: 31,300
79. Belgium: 30,700
83. Hungary: 26,500
84: Norway: 25,800
88. Czech Republic: 23,650
97. Denmark: 17,200
98. Lithuania: 17,131
100. Slovakia: 15,850
107. Croatia: 14,506
108: Albania: 14,250
129: New Zealand: 8,550 (U.S. suspended obligations in 1986)
133. Slovenia: 7,600
138. Estonia: 5,750
140: Latvia: 5,310
161: Luxembourg: 900
167+: Iceland: 0

Rio Pact includes Argentina, Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and of course, the United States.

This listing is drawn from Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_number_of_military_and_paramilitary_personnel

It is based upon the 2014 edition of “The Military Balance” by IISS.

They also have a number of other lists…if that is your thing:

The Challenge of Getting to a 350-Ship Fleet

This article, while a little more political than I prefer, does nicely address the reasons why building up to a 350-355 ship navy is going to be a challenge: Trumps-navy-is-already-sunk

The main points are:

  1. Current fleet is 275 warships
  2. The proposed DOD budget for FY2018 is $603, which is only $18 million over the previous administration’s projected budget.
  3. Proposed budget only asks for 8 new ships, which is been the build rate for a while.
  4. The fleet is on track to expand to 308-310 ships.
  5. Previous ship-building account was $15 billion annually. This is on track for a 308-310 ship fleet.
  6. To grow the fleet to 350-355 ships would require a budget of $27 billion annually (and I assume increased costs for operation and maintenance also).
  7. I assume this would take around eight years or more of increased building at these increased costs (so at least $90 billion more total).
  8. The U.S. industrial base is sized to build 6-9 warships a year, the rate would have to increase to 12-15 warships a year for a 350-355 ship fleet.
  9. Article concludes that a 350-355 ship fleet is not going to happen (it will be at 308-310 ships) and notes that no naval production increase was in the proposed 2018 budget.

 

Sketching Out Multi-Domain Battle Operational Doctrine

Small Wars Journal has published an insightful essay by U.S. Army Major Amos Fox, “Multi-Domain Battle: A Perspective on the Salient Features of an Emerging Operational Doctrine.” Fox is a recent graduate of Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) and author of several excellent pieces assessing Russian military doctrine and its application in the Ukraine.

Drawing upon an array of sources, including recent Russian military operations, preliminary conceptualizations of MDB, Carl von Clausewitz, J.F.C Fuller, and maneuver warfare theory, Fox takes a crack at shaping the parameters of a doctrine for Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) operations on land. He begins by summarizing how MDB will connect operations to strategy.

Current proponents suggest that [MDB] will occur against peer competitors in contested environments, providing the US Army and its joint partners with a much thinner margin of victory than in the recent past. As such, US forces should look to create zones of proximal dominance to enable the active pursuit of objectives and end states, and that dislocation is the key to defeating an adversary capable of multi-domain operations.

The essence of MDB will be a constant struggle for battlespace dominance, which will be “fleeting, fragile, and prone to shock or surprise.” Achieving temporary dominance only establishes the pre-conditions necessary for closing with and destroying enemy forces, however.

Fox suggests envisioning the cross-domain, combined arms, and individual arms of ground forces (i.e. direct fire weapons, indirect fire weapons, cyber, electronic, information, reconnaissance, et cetera) as “zones of proximal dominance” or “as an orb of power which radiates from a central position.” Long-range weapons perform a protective function and form the outer layers of the zone, while shorter-range weapons constitute the fighting functions.

[O]ne must understand that in multi-domain battle they must first strip away, or dislocate, the protective layers of an enemy’s force in order to destroy its strength, or its inner core. In the cross-domain environment, an enemy’s outer core is its cross-domain and joint capabilities. Therefore, the more of the enemy’s outer can be cleaved away or neutralized, the more success friendly forces will have in defeating the enemy’s main fighting force. Dislocating the outer layers and destroying the inner core will, in essence, defeats the cross-domain enemy.

Dislocation is a concept Fox adopts from maneuver warfare theory as “a critical component of defeating an enemy with cross-domain capabilities because it denies the enemy access to its tools, renders those tools irrelevant, or forces the enemy into environments in which those tools are ill-disposed.”

Fox’s perspective is well informed and logical, but exploration of the implications of MDB are in the earliest stages. The essay is a fascinating and highly-recommended read.

Economics of Warfare 17-2

Continuing the examination of the seventeenth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

This lecture started with a paper by Hsiang, Burke and Miguel that was a survey of 60 different papers from 1994-2013 on interpersonal conflict and climate, intergroup conflict and climate, and “institutional breakdown and population collapse” and climate (see slides 3-8). This is discussed in more depth on my previous post. Starting on slide 26, he then reviews a group of authors who are critical of the findings of Hsiang, Burke and Miguel. The review makes three arguments

  1. Many of 60 studies are quite similar to each other. For example, many contain African countries and some only contain African countries.
  2. There is a lot of variation of what is modeled and how it is modeled.
  3. They omit other studies that reach other conclusions.

They then provided their own meta-analysis for the effect of climate variability on civil conflict on slide 29. The argument here is not “….that climate has no effect on conflict, but, rather, that the effects of climate on conflict are less clear than claimed…” by the previous studies authors “…and that more research is needed to pin down what the real effects are.”

OK…..noted.

Now going back to America’s Modern War, which I seem to do a lot lately, I do have a chapter called “Other Similar Work” (Chapter 7, pages 70-77) that looks at other work similar to the work I present in that book. I provided in Chapter 6 a logistic regression model that keys off of force ratio and insurgent cause compared to outcome. At the time I wrote the book, there were only two similar studies I was aware of that addressed this. Done independently and at the same time as my study was Andrew Hossack’s study over at Ministry of Defence in the United Kingdom. Done after my study and using the database we developed was a study done by Center for Army Analysis (CAA). Certainly the first two criticisms provided above could be partially applied to this comparison, in that these three studies (The Dupuy Institute, Hossack and CAA) are 1) quite similar to each other, including two studies using the same database and, 2) there is some variation (but not much actually) in what is modeled (although all three studies effectively used the same dependent variable). On the other hand, as far as I know, there are no other quantitative studies out there that reach a contradictory conclusion. There are few studies done comparing force ratios to outcome. Shawn listed seven studies one of his posts, but several were related to troops per 1,000 population as opposed to force ratios:

https://dupuyinstitute.org/2016/01/08/force-ratios-and-counterinsurgency-ii/

and

https://dupuyinstitute.org/2016/01/13/force-ratios-and-counterinsurgency-iii/

Only five studies addressed force ratios and they found a positive correlation in all cases (although there was some debate over the significance).

Now, when I was out marketing my book to publishers, one British editor sent the manuscript to two expert reviewers to look at. One came back with the comment that contemporary studies clearly show that a force ratio model is not correct, and therefore they should not publish. I almost felt like trying to argue with this anonymous reviewer, but there were many other things on my plate (including finding another publisher for the book). I get the sense that because force ratio models of insurgency were discussed in the 1950s and 1960s, and were dismissed by some at the time, that people believe that they are passé. But, it does not appear that the original 10-to-1 or similar force ratio model that was quoted in the 50s and 60s was based upon any systematic quantitative analysis. It also does not appear that the dismissal of it in the 1960s was based upon any systematic quantitative analysis.

Anyhow, that was somewhat of a long and not clearly related aside. But sometimes, the Dr. Spagat lectures get me thinking back to my work and how it compares and contrasts these other attempts to quantify and model conflict phenomena. The link to his lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%2017.pdf

Economics of Warfare 17 – 1

Examining the seventeenth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

As is the case with the last two lectures, this one also focuses on climate and conflict. It starts with a paper by Hsiang, Burke and Miguel (a different paper than the one in the last lecture by the same authors). This paper is not a single test, but a survey of 60 different papers from 1994-2013. There are 15 that look at interpersonal conflict and climate (usually temperature compared to crime), 30 that look at intergroup conflict and climate (often rain or temperature compared to civil conflict), and 15 that look at “institutional breakdown and population collapse” and climate. All these are listed in slides 3-8.

The discussion after that goes into considerable depth (and is certainly worth perusing), but the conclusion on slide 25 is “HBM seem to present a pretty impressive accumulation of evidence associating higher temperatures with more conflict….” (my bolding)

And he notes: “The authors admit that there is not a lot of research spelling out plausible mechanism that might explain why higher temperatures are associated with more violence.”

I will stop here and pick this up tomorrow. Starting on slide 26, he then reviews a group of authors who are critical of the findings of Hsiang, Burke and Miguel.

The link to the lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%2017.pdf