Wells and Schairer came up with the basic design for the B-52 over one weekend in 1948, drawing upon advanced concepts developed by Nazi Germany during World War II. The first prototype flew in 1952.
Six days after that first B-52 flight, the two pitched an idea to the Boeing board for a jet-powered passenger aircraft, which they would get the U.S. government pay to develop by marketing it as a military tanker for the B-52. This program would yield the KC-135 and the civilian Boeing 707 airliner. The first KC-135 flew in 1956.
Although seeking replacements, the Air Force is planning on keeping both the B-52 and KC-135 in service past 2050, when both airframes will be over 100 years old. Boeing won a contract to replace the KC-135 in 2011, but its new tanker is woefully late and over budget.
The 76 B-52s have a 70% readiness rate due to their relative simplicity to maintain and the Air Force is about to approve $4 billion in new engines to keep them flying.
Continuing with the fifteenth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/
This lecture addresses the impact of global warming on armed conflict over time. My previous post on the subject concerned a cross-country analysis of the impact of temperature on civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa that was not very convincing, even though it made the rather shocking claim that: “Burke et al. go on to predict 393,000 excess battle deaths caused by climate change…” (my bolding).
Probably the most interesting aspect of the presentation was when Dr. Spagat’s TA used the model to make predictions from the period 2003-2013 and also tested the model with the temperature variable removed from the model. Dr. Spagat’s conclusion was (slide 22) “…They mean that temperature is not very useful for predicting civil war….”
Then starting slide 23, the presentation looks at an effort by O’Loughlin et al. to look the impact of temperature and precipitation not by cross-country analysis, but by looking at local variations. They divided up East Africa into grid that are about 100 by 100 kilometers. They then measured it to a dependent variable that was the number of violent incidents. They then tested it using a “negative binomial regression model” (another methodology I have no experience using). They ran five different simple models, of which only one produced a statistically significant measure, and it was negative (meaning more rain = less violence). A sixth model he ran (“GAM splines”) did provide some fits by using different sized deviations and fitting a smoothed curve to these estimates (I really haven’t take the time to figure out what he did). The end result was that this last model provided some indication that:
Wet weather reduce violent incidents
Large warn deviations (unusually warm weather) increase violent incidents.
All the papers discussed are in the Dr. Spagat’s slides, so you can see the original. Just to grab a few quotes from the O’Loughlin paper:
“Recent studies concerning the possible relationship between climate trends and the risks of violent conflict have yielded contradictory results….”
“Sweeping generalizations have undermined a genuine understanding of any climate–conflict link, whereas cumulative results from the numerous studies of individual communities are difficult to summarize.”
This, of course, harkens back to my first observations over a decade ago when I saw the CNA study that was predicting increased wars, violence and problems (and perhaps increased U.S. intervention) as a result of climate change. Again….we really do not know if this is the case. Added to that, some of the areas that may be most affected by climate change are the areas that the United States are not likely to get heavily involved in (read: Sub-Sahara Africa). So, while climate change may be a very real problem, it may not have a huge impact on our defense policy and planning in the next couple of decades outside of the Arctic (and the Arctic is a whole separate discussion). We should be careful not to assume a significant cause-and-effect (climate change = many more wars) when there is not strong evidence to do so.
Moving onto the fifteenth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/
This lecture addresses the impact of global warming on armed conflict over time. If you happen to be one of those who believes that global warming is pseudo-science/a scientific hoax/an excuse to troll for research $$$/an invention of Al Gore/a liberal plot/a religion/a Chinese plot/obviously false because it was cold yesterday/and so forth…..then probably best to stop reading. On the other hand, we have done some proposals on measuring the impact of climate change on violence and consider this a legitimate area of study. Our attention was drawn to the subject over a decade ago when a CNA (Center for Naval Analysis) paper came out that postulated that global warming could result in more violence. This conclusion does not appear to have been based upon any analysis of data, just the assumption that as things get worse (in the environment) then things are going to get worse (with armed conflict). Of course, going back to Feierabend & Feierabend (and I do go back to them a lot)….poorer counties had less political violence than developing countries. Therefore, it does not necessarily follow that worse environmental and economics conditions results in more violence. The effect may be the reverse, which is that declining conditions may actually result in a reduction of violence. We really don’t know. Trying to examine these effects analytically was the gist of my proposals on the subject, but sequestration happened and budget for anything seemed to disappear.
So….first two sentences of Dr. Spagat’s slides are
“There is a strong scientific consensus that the Earth is getting warmer over time.”
“It is reasonable to imagine that a side effect of global warming could be an increase in armed conflict over time.”
Slide 2 looks at possible channels that could lead to conflict
Dwindling food supply
Dwindling water supply
Sea Level changes causing migration.
On slide 3 he then addresses a study by Burke and others that attempt to address these concerns using a cross-country regression approach and linear probability model.
On slide 5 the results are summarized as “…an increase of 1 degree centigrade for a particularly country in a particular year is associated with a 0.0447 increase in the probability of there being an ongoing civil war….”
and on slide 11 as: “This means that Burke et al. predict that 15.8-17.1% of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2030 will suffer from big civil wars rather than the 11% that would occur without the warming climate.”
and on slide 16 as: “Burke et al. go on to predict 393,000 excess battle deaths caused by climate change…” (my bolding). Dr. Spagat then examines this number in the next two slides. It doesn’t sound like he fully accepts it.
Now, Burke based his study on the period from 1981-2002. One of Dr. Spagat’s TAs then used the model to make predictions from the period 2003-2013. There is nothing like trying to use a model to predict the past. It sort of shows whether it really works or not. This was the reasoning because the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base and the Kursk Data Base that we did (they were model validation data bases). It is related in concept to what I did in America’s Modern War, pages 65-68 when I tested my logistics probability model back to the 68 cases used to create the model and tried to figure out for each case why the model was predicting wrong. Once you have a model, there are lots of things to test it to in the past. If you can’t predict the past, you may not be able to predict the future.
Anyhow, the results are on slide 19 and summarized in slide 20 as
“There are 414 “no war” predictions…A war actually happens in 11 out of these 414 cases.”
“There are 37 predictions of “war”. War actually happens in 7 out of these 37 cases.”
Not sure I am any smarter at this point, but I am certainly amused.
His final point is “The Burke et al. model seems to be of some use in predicting wars although it seems have a general tendency to predict war too often.”
And then Dr. Spagat TA test how important the temperature variable is for making these predictions, so takes the temperature variable out of the model !!! This produces a table (slide 21) that is almost identical to his original table. The impact of removing the temperature from the model is that it produced five more false positives (predicted wars that did not happen). I am even more amused.
Spagat’s conclusion (slide 22) is “…They mean that temperature is not very useful for predicting civil war….”
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visits the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun in Pyongyang, July 27, 2014. [KCNA/REUTERS]
As tensions have ratcheted up on the Korean peninsula following a new round of provocative actions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK; North Korea), the prospect of war has once more become prominent. Renewed hostilities between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK; South Korea) is an old and oft studied scenario for the U.S. military. Although potential combat is likely to be intense, there is consensus that ROK forces and their U.S. allies would eventually prevail.
There is a great deal less clarity about what might happen after a military defeat of the DPRK. Military analyst and Columbia University professor Austin Long has taken a very interesting look at the prospect of an insurgency arising from the ashes of the regime of Kim Jong Un. Long does not confine the prospect of an insurgency in the north to a post-war scenario; it would be possible following any abrupt or forcible collapse of authority.
Long begins by looking at some of the historical factors for insurgency in a post-regime change environment and then examines each in the North Korean context. These include 1) unsecured weapons stockpiles; 2) elite regime forces;3) disbanded mass armies; 4) social network ties; 5) mobilizing ideology; and 6) sanctuary. He concludes that “the potential for an insurgency beginning after the collapse of the DPRK appears contingent but significant.”
With so much focus on the balance of conventional conflict, the potential for insurgency in North Korea might be of secondary concern. Hopefully, recent U.S. experience with the consequences of regime change will lead political and military planners to take it seriously.
When I was watching the first round of the Stanley Cup play-offs (Capitals versus Maple Leafs) and they posted a stat that when the seven-game play-off rounds are scored three won games to two, then the leading team wins the round 78% of the time. Mathematically, if the teams were equal, then it would be 75% of the time (same chance as with two coin tosses). See previous post: Hockey Play-off Games 6 & 7
Right now, all four match-ups in the second round of the Stanley Cup play-offs are split 3 to 2 (Nashville over St. Louis, Anaheim over Edmonton, Ottawa over New York and Pittsburgh over Washington). Now, if the teams are roughly equal to each other and with average luck, then three of the leading teams will win and there will be one upset. Hoping it will be the Washington Capitals.
On 16 April 1941, four British destroyers operating out of Malta, moved to intercept an Axis convoy moving along the coast of Tunisia. The British were able to intercept the convoy due to intercepted radio messages (but it was not Ultra). The Axis convoy consisted of three Italian destroyers protecting four German troopships and an Italian ammunition ship. The British attacked at night, having radar on several of their destroyers, which the Italians did not have. This night action that started at only 2,000 yards and at times closed to within 50 yards, with the Italians having all three destroyers and all five cargo ships sunk or beached. This one sided affair also ended up costing the British one destroyer, torpedoed by a sinking Italian destroyer, now commanded by an Italian junior officer. Around 1,800 men were killed in this convoy.
The British Destroyer Mohawk
While I was researching this, I came across a poorly translated article called the “Sinking of the Tarigo Convoy” by Cristiano D’Adamo. This article got my attention because he tracks the accounts of this battle as presented in nine books and accounts from 1948 to 1998. Of those nine accounts, only four mention that the British had radar and only two mention the interception of Italian signals. Seven of the nine accounts were missing critical material as to why the battle shaped up the way it did and why it was so one-sided. His article is here:
This is an exercise similar to what I did in Appendix VII “A History of the Histories” in my book Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka. In that appendix, I tracked a number the accounts of the battles of Kursk and Prokhorovka that had been written over the years. It continues to surprise me how many major errors and significant omissions are made in widely published military historical works.
West Point class of 1986. Platoon and Company commander, then went to medical school becoming a doctor. Was a flight surgeon in special operations. Served in Iraq and Afghanistan. Was the doctor who first sat with and interviewed Saddam Hussein when he was captured. Wrote a book about it: night-saddam-Mark-Green-md
Left service in 2006 after 20 years. Founded a medical company. Elected to the Tennessee Senate in 2012.
I guess we will have to see how the third nominee for Secretary of the Army fares.
Well, I managed to turn Dr. Spagat’s last lecture into three blog posts. Probably could do that for most of them. There is a lot in them. Moving onto the fourteenth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/
This lecture focuses on the impact of foreign aid on a conflict and starts with a study by Nunn and Qian (link to it is on slide 1). It is another cross-national study (by the way, I love cross-national studies). As always, Dr. Spagat’s asides are loaded with meaning. In this case, on slide 2 he again mentions the problem of reverse causation, where the subject you are trying to measure (the dependent variable) is in fact, probably influencing the so-called independent variable. In effect, you are trying to establish cause-and-effect when there is also a flow the other way (the effect is affecting the cause).
Moving through to slide 14 is the rather counterintuitive conclusion of the study done by Nunn and Qian which is that “US food aid seems to contribute to prolonging conflicts but not to starting new ones.” Not sure what to make of that.
He then shifts to a study that focuses just on the Philippines using an approach called the “regression discontinuity approach” (which is something I have never played with). What gets my attention is that the paper’s author’s (Crost, Felter and Johnston) set up a way to do a side-by-side experiment looking at different municipalities that received aid vice ones that did not. As Dr. Spagat notes on slide 16: “Once again, the idea is to create a situation that resembles a controlled experiment.”
This “controlled experiment” or “side-by-side approach” was the basis of our three urban warfare studies done for the Center for Army Analysis and our situational awareness study that we did for OSD Net Assessment. In the first we looked at engagement results in urban areas vice non-urban areas; and in the situational awareness study we compared engagement results for situations where they knew a lot about their enemy compared to those where they did not. Both of these studies are discussed in some depth in my upcoming book War by Numbers, which I still think will be released this August.
The discussion after that gets a little dense, but the conclusion presented on slide 26 is that also that “…aid leads to conflict.” and “…that insurgents work specifically to prevent aid flowing so that they can prevent local governments from winning over its citizens by providing them with good services.” Interesting. We really have not done any comparable work on this.
Starting on slide 27, he looks are an analytical paper examining the issue rape during Civil War. Again, this is not something we have examined, but the paper is available through a link on slide 27 and discussed by Dr. Spagat in slides 27-34.
Anyhow, I could have easily broken this discussion into three or even four blog posts….but did not this time. Probably more useful than reading my blog post is to actually read Dr. Spagat’s lecture. The link to the lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%2014.pdf
The question of how insurgencies end is crucially important. There is no consensus on how to effectively wage counterinsurgency much less end one on favorable terms. Even successful counterinsurgencies may not end decisively. In the Dupuy Insurgency Spread Sheets (DISS) database of 83 post-World War II insurgencies, interventions, and stabilization operations, 42 are counterinsurgent successes and 11 had indeterminate conclusions. Of the counterinsurgent successes, about 1/3 failed to bring about stability or achieve long-term success.
George Frederick Willcoxon, an economist with the United Nations, recently looked into the question of why up to half of countries that suffer civil conflict relapse into violence between the same belligerents within a decade. He identified risk factors for reversion to war by examining the end of civil conflict and post-war recovery in 109 cases since 1970, drawing upon data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the Peace Research Institute Oslo, the Polity IV project and the World Bank.
Long-standing international conventional wisdom prioritizes economic reforms, transitional justice mechanisms or institutional continuity in post-war settings. However, my statistical analyses found that political institutions and military factors were actually the primary drivers of post-war risk. In particular, post-war states with more representative and competitive political systems as well as larger armed forces were better able to avoid war relapse.
These findings challenge a growing reluctance to consider early elections and political liberalization as critical steps for reestablishing authoritative, legitimate and sustainable political order after major armed conflict.
The non-results are perhaps as interesting as the results. With one exception discussed below, there is no evidence that the economic characteristics of post-war countries strongly influence the likelihood they will return to war. Income per capita, development assistance per capita, oil rents as a percent of GDP, overall unemployment rates and youth unemployment rates are not associated with civil war relapse.
Equally significant is there is no evidence that the culture, religion or geopolitics of the Middle East and North Africa will impede post-war recovery. I introduced into the statistical models measures for Islam, Arab culture and location in the region. None of these variables showed statistically significant correlations with the risk of war relapse since 1970, holding everything else constant, suggesting that such factors should not distinctively handicap post-war stabilization, recovery and transition in Iraq, Libya, Syria or Yemen.
Willcoxon’s research suggested a correlation between numbers of security forces and successfully preventing new violence.
Perhaps not surprisingly, larger security sectors reduce the risk of war relapse. For every additional soldier in the national armed forces per 1,000 people, the risk of relapse is about seven percent lower. Larger militaries are better able to deter renewed rebel activity, as well as prevent or reduce other forms of conflict such as terrorism, organized crime and communal violence.
He also found that the types of security forces had an influence as well.
The presence of outside troops also has significant influence on risk. The analysis lends support to a well-established finding in the political science literature that the presence of United Nations peacekeepers lowers the risk of conflict relapse. However, the presence of non-U.N. foreign troops almost triples the risk of relapsing back into civil war. There are at least two potential interpretations on this latter finding: Foreign troops may intervene in especially difficult circumstances, and therefore their presence indicates the post-war episodes most likely to fail; or foreign troops, particularly occupying armies, generate their own conflict risk.
These findings are strikingly similar to TDI’s research that suggests that higher force ratios of counterinsurgent troops to insurgents correlate with counterinsurgent success. You can check Willcoxon’s paper out here.
This is the third and last posting on the thirteenth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/
My first post on his lecture did not get past his second page as I ended up pontificating about his two rather significant statements on data. They were:
To get anywhere with empirical research you need to have a reasonably large number of data points. (This is a basic fact about empirical analysis that many students beginning research projects overlook)
So we need to ask ourselves — where are all of these data points going to come from?
My second post covered the part when he looked at Colombia. The rather interesting conclusion from that was (slide 18): “Dube and Vargas [the study authors] calculate that the fall in coffee prices between 1997 and 2003 translates into an additional 1013 deaths in coffee growing areas….”
On slide 26 of his lecture he starts an examination of a study done by Blazzi and Blattman that does a cross-country approach examining changes in commodity prices to analyze the impact of income on armed conflict (and although Dr. Spagat is American…he has disciplined himself to spell it “analyse” in the British fashion).
The next slide (slide 26) talks about three facets of their work, looking at 1) opportunity cost (making a decent living vice rebelling), 2) state capacity, and 3) state prize. This last idea caught my attention because it harkens back to the work of Feierabend & Feierabend and Ted Gurr. In their seminal work done in the 1960s on causes of revolution they found that political violence was less in really poor countries than in developing countries. Here they are looking whether a state is so poor that there is no incentive to rebel because of the small “prize” you will win if you succeed. Certainly a viewpoint more in line with an economists’ training. I believe Feierabend & Feierabend (a political scientist and psychologist if I remember correctly) concluded that if you are struggling to survive in a poor country, this may take priority. Political revolt is luxury afforded by a developing economy (for example, the Russian economy before World War I). I am not sure I buy into the “state prize” explanation. I don’t really think people revolt for profit.
The next slide (slide 27) is also interesting, as it talked about 1) conflict onset, 2) conflict ending and 3) conflict intensity. As Dr. Spagat states: “Many people mix these things together so this attention to detail is welcome.” These first two points go back to areas I wanted to examine with our insurgency studies which was (to quote myself):
First, future analysis should be clearly focused, so that it addresses one of the three distinct time frames:
a. Before an insurgency starts (pre-insurgency)
b. In the early stages of an insurgency (proto-insurgency)
c. As an insurgency has clearly developed (developed insurgency)
(see Chapter 24: “Where Do We Go From Here” in American’s Modern Wars, pages 294-298)
And of course, withdrawal and war termination (see Chapter 19: “Withdrawal and War Termination” in AMW, pages 237-242).
Needless to say, we could never locate budget to examine the early stages of an insurgency (pre-insurgency and proto-insurgency) or examine how they end (which in 2008…I thought was kind of an important subject)..
Anyhow, the results from the Blazzi and Blattman study are summarized in the next slides. In short they are:
“…suggests that there is no connection between price shocks to exports on the onset of armed conflict (or coups)”
“…weak evidence…that positive export price shocks help to end wars…”
“…rather weak evidence…that positive export price shocks help to decrease (a lot) the number of battle deaths in ongoing wars.”
“The opportunity cost and state capacity ides do get some support.”
“The state prize idea gets no support at all” (and this is really not surprising, as I thought that construct was kind of “batty” to start with…Lenin was not in it for the money)
