Mystics & Statistics

Tank Loss Rates in Combat: Then and Now

wwii-tank-battlefieldAs the U.S. Army and the national security community seek a sense of what potential conflicts in the near future might be like, they see the distinct potential for large tank battles. Will technological advances change the character of armored warfare? Perhaps, but it seems more likely that the next big tank battles – if they occur – will likely resemble those from the past.

One aspect of future battle of great interest to military planners is probably going to tank loss rates in combat. In a previous post, I looked at the analysis done by Trevor Dupuy on the relationship between tank and personnel losses in the U.S. experience during World War II. Today, I will take a look at his analysis of historical tank loss rates.

In general, Dupuy identified that a proportional relationship exists between personnel casualty rates in combat and losses in tanks, guns, trucks, and other equipment. (His combat attrition verities are discussed here.) Looking at World War II division and corps-level combat engagement data in 1943-1944 between U.S., British and German forces in the west, and German and Soviet forces in the east, Dupuy found similar patterns in tank loss rates.

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In combat between two division/corps-sized, armor-heavy forces, Dupuy found that the tank loss rates were likely to be between five to seven times the personnel casualty rate for the winning side, and seven to 10 for the losing side. Additionally, defending units suffered lower loss rates than attackers; if an attacking force suffered a tank losses seven times the personnel rate, the defending forces tank losses would be around five times.

Dupuy also discovered the ratio of tank to personnel losses appeared to be a function of the proportion of tanks to infantry in a combat force. Units with fewer than six tanks per 1,000 troops could be considered armor supporting, while those with a density of more than six tanks per 1,000 troops were armor-heavy. Armor supporting units suffered lower tank casualty rates than armor heavy units.

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Dupuy looked at tank loss rates in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and found that they were consistent with World War II experience.

What does this tell us about possible tank losses in future combat? That is a very good question. One guess that is reasonably certain is that future tank battles will probably not involve forces of World War II division or corps size. The opposing forces will be brigade combat teams, or more likely, battalion-sized elements.

Dupuy did not have as much data on tank combat at this level, and what he did have indicated a great deal more variability in loss rates. Examples of this can be found in the tables below.

attrition-fig-53attrition-fig-54

These data points showed some consistency, with a mean of 6.96 and a standard deviation of 6.10, which is comparable to that for division/corps loss rates. Personnel casualty rates are higher and much more variable than those at the division level, however. Dupuy stated that more research was necessary to establish a higher degree of confidence and relevance of the apparent battalion tank loss ratio. So one potentially fruitful area of research with regard to near future combat could very well be a renewed focus on historical experience.

NOTES

Trevor N. Dupuy, Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War (Falls Church, VA: NOVA Publications, 1995), pp. 41-43; 81-90; 102-103

More than Halfway to Mosul

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Anyhow, this week it appears that the Iraqis have advanced more than halfway to Mosul. The town of Bartella was freed on Thursday: Raise flag in Bartella

They are now only 9 miles from Mosul. When the offensive started, it was more like 20 miles from the East. So progress is being made. Perhaps they will stick to the Peshmerga Brigadier General Barzani’s schedule of getting to Mosul in two weeks. The forces that took Bartella were Iraqi Army Special Forces vice Pesmerga.

By the way, Bartella has been a Christian center for almost 900 years. They had a population of around 30,000 before ISIL took over: Bartella

Russian Fleet Strength

The Carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and the Battle Cruiser Peter the Great are the only two ships of that size in the Russian fleet (keying off the previous post). One source places their active strength at:

1 Carrier (58,660 tons displacement) – commissioned 1990

1 Battle Cruiser (28,000 tons) – commissioned 1998

3 Cruisers (12,500 tons) – commissioned 1982-1989

14 destroyers (7,570 – 7,940 tons) – commissioned 1982-1999

1 Kashin class destroyer (4,390 tons) — commissioned 1969

6 Frigates (3,575 – 4,400 tons) – commissioned 1980-2016

5 Large corvettes (2,2000 tons) — commissioned 2008-2014

Lots of landing ships, smaller corvettes (less than 1,000 tons), auxiliary ships, intelligence ships, patrol boats, minesweepers, landing craft, and of course, submarines: 7 Cruise missile submarines (19,400 tons), 18 attack submarines (7,250 – 13,800 tons), 2 special-purpose submarines and 13 “boomers” (ballistic missile submarines).

The Admiral Kuznetsov Adventure

The super-stealthy Admiral Kuznetzov passes stealthily through the English Channel near Kent Credit: Jim Bennett for The Telegraph
The super-stealthy Admiral Kuznetsov passes stealthily through the English Channel near Kent (Jim Bennett for The Telegraph)

A Russian naval flotilla of seven ships, including the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and battle cruiser Peter the Great, steamed through the English Channel today under the watchful eyes of the British Royal Navy. The squadron is on a voyage from Severomorsk, the home of the Russian Northern Fleet, to the coast of Syria to help provide air support for the regime of Bashar Assad against the forces of Syrian rebels and Daesh fighters.

The deployment is viewed as more of a politically symbolic show of force than a meaningful military contribution. The Kuznetsov carries just 15 Su-33 and MiG-29 fighter/bombers and is capable of only limited flight operations. This will provide meager augmentation for Russian aircraft already operating from Syrian airbases.

The Kuznetsov's projected course from Russia to Syria. {BBC)

This will mark the carrier’s first combat mission, although it has been deployed to the Mediterranean Sea four times previously, in 1995, 2007, 2012, and 2014. The U.S. Sixth Fleet monitored the Kuznetsov‘s 2012 voyage closely, out of concerns that the aged and problematic vessel might suffer mechanical troubles sufficient to cause it to sink, requiring a complex rescue operation. Such concerns were validated when the Kuznetsov‘s boilers “blew out” off the coast of France on it’s return voyage, and the ship had to be taken under tow by an accompanying Russian ocean-going tug.

The present squadron also includes a tug, a practice that appears to have become standard Russian Navy procedure in recent years.

Back To The Future: The Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) Program

The MPF's historical antecedent: the German Army's 7.5 cm leichtes Infanteriegeschütz.
The MPF’s historical antecedent: the German Army’s 7.5 cm leichtes Infanteriegeschütz.

Historically, one of the challenges of modern combat has been in providing responsive, on-call, direct fire support for infantry. The U.S. armed forces have traditionally excelled in providing fire support for their ground combat maneuver elements, but recent changes have apparently caused concern that this will continue to be the case in the future.

Case in point is the U.S. Army’s Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) program. The MPF seems to reflect concern by the U.S. Army that future combat environments will inhibit the capabilities of heavy artillery and air support systems tasked with providing fire support for infantry units. As Breaking Defense describes it,

“Our near-peers have sought to catch up with us,” said Fort Benning commander Maj. Gen. Eric Wesley, using Pentagon code for China and Russia. These sophisticated nation-states — and countries buying their hardware, like Iran — are developing so-called Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD): layered defenses of long-range sensors and missiles to keep US airpower and ships at a distance (anti-access), plus anti-tank weapons, mines, and roadside bombs to decimate ground troops who get close (area denial).

The Army’s Maneuver Center of Excellence at Ft. Benning, Georgia is the proponent for development of a new lightly-armored, tracked vehicle mounting a 105mm or 120mm gun. According to the National Interest, the goal of the MPF program is

… to provide a company of vehicles—which the Army adamantly does not want to refer to as light tanks—to brigades from the 82nd Airborne Division or 10th Mountain Division that can provide heavy fire support to those infantry units. The new vehicle, which is scheduled to enter into full-scale engineering and manufacturing development in 2019—with fielding tentatively scheduled for around 2022—would be similar in concept to the M551 Sheridan light tank. The Sheridan used to be operated the Army’s airborne units unit until 1996, but was retired without replacement. (Emphasis added)

As Chris recently pointed out, General Dynamics Land Systems has developed a prototype it calls the Griffin. BAE Systems has also pitched its XM8 Armored Gun System, developed in the 1990s.

The development of a dedicated, direct fire support weapon for line infantry can be seen as something of an anachronism. During World War I, German infantrymen sought alternatives to relying on heavy artillery support that was under the control of higher headquarters and often slow or unresponsive to tactical situations on the battlefield. They developed an expedient called the “infantry gun” (Infanteriegeschütz) by stripping down captured Russian 76.2mm field guns for direct use against enemy infantry, fortifications, and machine guns. Other armies imitated the Germans, but between the wars, the German Army was only one to develop 75mm and 150mm wheeled guns of its own dedicated specifically to infantry combat support.

The Germans were also the first to develop versions mounted on tracked, armored chassis, called “assault guns” (Sturmgeschütz). During World War II, the Germans often pressed their lightly armored assault guns into duty as ersatz tanks to compensate for insufficient numbers of actual tanks. (The apparently irresistible lure to use anything that looks like a tank as a tank also afflicted the World War II U.S. tank destroyer as well, yielding results that dissatisfied all concerned.)

Other armies again copied the Germans during the war, but the assault gun concept was largely abandoned afterward. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union developed vehicles intended to provide gunfire support for airborne infantry, but these were more aptly described as light tanks. The U.S. Army’s last light tank, the M551 Sheridan, was retired in 1996 and not replaced.

It appears that the development of new technology is leading the U.S. Army back to old ideas. Just don’t call them light tanks.

Duration Estimate II

Retired Major General “Spider” Marks was on CNN this morning. He did not buy into the estimate of Mosul being taken in two-three months.

I suspect the duration will be driven by three or four factors:

  1. How serious of a fight ISIL puts up in the areas in front of and around Mosul. I don’t think they will, as this is where they are going to get unfavorable exchanges and take considerable losses. So far it does not seem like they are putting up that serious of resistance.
  2. How many people they decide to leave behind in Mosul. In the Second Battle of Fallujah (2004) the insurgents may have left behind less than a thousand fighters. Don’t have the stats at hand for the other battles. I would be surprised if they leave more.
  3. How aggressive the Iraqi Army is. How hard do they work to finish this off. There is probably a trade-off between time and casualties, so there is a reason to take their time. On the other hand, political leaders usually prefer quick victories.
  4. What is their level of competence.

Duration Estimate for Mosul

OK…..someone published a duration estimate for Mosul: Mosul Estimate

Not sure a Peshmerga Brigadier General is supposed to be providing this information to the press, but I assume it comes from some of their planning.

The main points:

  1. “The Battle to recapture Mosul from ISIS could take two months….”
  2. “…said it would likely take two weeks for advancing forces to enter the city….”

So, a two-week advance and a six-week mop up. This actually sounds pretty reasonable, so I will avoid any “home before the leaves fall” references.

Lots of other articles on that page on Mosul, so certainly worth perusing.

By the way, this is the Peshmerga Brigadier General, Sidwan Barzani, who also happens to be a nephew of the Kurdish president and a telecommunications millionaire: Millionaire commander protects Kurdish capital

 

 

Battle for Mosul II (continued)

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Washington Post article: kurds-pause-in-mosul-offensive-say-iraqi-army-will-advance

I gather there is some agreement negotiated in advance as to who is going to move into Mosul and who is not.

The Iraq Army’s 9th Division is reported on the outskirts of the town of al-Hamdaniyah (also known at Bakhdida), south of Mosul. This town is some 51 kilometers (32 miles) southeast of Mosul. Interesting place: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bakhdida

The Federal Police reached the village of al–Houd, east of Mosul.

The Kurdish Peshmerga (operating to the east of Mosul) say they pushed the front line back 8 kilometers (5 miles). Their front line is now 30 kilometers (20 miles) from Mosul.

The most interesting paragraph in the article: “Turkey says the troops are training Iraqi fighters to help retake Mosul, and that they are there with the permission of the Iraqi government. Baghdad denies it granted permission and has ordered the Turks to withdraw — a call Ankara has ignored”

 

Battle for Mosul II

Day 2: One news channel last night claimed that the clearing of the city could take up to six months. That seemed excessive.

Basically, with ISIL being outnumbered and not having any real armored forces or artillery, they really have no way to contest the ground outside of Mosul. Like most of these other operations, I suspect that getting to and isolating the city won’t take that long (maybe a week or two). I also suspect that the majority of the ISIL fighters will withdraw and they will leave a holding force in Mosul. This is how these fights have happened several times before. Then there is a city-clearing operation, which is basically a mop-up operation. This could drag on for a while, depending on how aggressively it is pushed. The Second Battle of Fallujah in late 2004, primarily done by U.S. Army and Marines, took about six weeks. The Second Battle of Tikrit in 2015 also took around six weeks. The Battle of Ramadi in 2015-2016 took over ten weeks. The latest Battle of Fallujah in 2016 lasted about five weeks. Granted Mosul is bigger, but I can’t envision it will be that different. How many fighters is ISIL going to sacrifice to a lost cause?

Anyhow, article de jure on the war: Mosul offensive

Battle for Mosul I

I gather it is day 1 of the Battle for Mosul. A CNN article on the subject: Mosul operation begins

A couple of things that caught my eye:

  1. CNN reporter witnessed an advance of “…about 6 kilometers towards the city, with sporadic fighting erupting as they encountered pockets of ISIS fighters”
  2. “But on the whole, he said, Peshmerga commanders felt they were encountering less resistance than they had expected.”

The rest is material that has sort of already been reported.

Also, on MSNBC their reporter in Irbil was stating that the Kurdish Peshmerga were “within striking distance” of Mosul, but I believe they already started pretty close to Mosul to begin with.